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ABSTRACT

The Gulf of Guinea is a region of strategic importance and a major
source of essential commodities for both domestic and industrial use,
while its sea lanes connect trade from multiple continents. The maritime
profile of the region also presents enormous opportunities for enhancing
socio-economic development of member States and for delivering
positive human development index across the region. However, there are
increasing maritime security threats in the Gulf of Guinea that affect the
peaceful uses of sea, impair the exploitation of coastal resources and also
undermine regional and global security. Effective responses to these
threats require a comprehensive approach, one which is based on
regional and international cooperation.
This thesis examines the prospects and challenges of maritime security
cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea. It analyses the concept of maritime
security cooperation and develops a framework for explaining maritime
security threats in the Gulf of Guinea. The thesis examines the responses
to maritime security threats in the Gulf of Guinea by assessing the
effectiveness of regional and international cooperative initiatives. The
conclusion of the thesis is that current processes of maritime security
cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea are inadequate and suffers multiple
limitations. Appropriate responses must therefore be put in place to
address the gaps. The thesis provides several suggestions for enhancing
maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1

BACKGROUND

The Gulf of Guinea region stretches from Cape Verde to Angola on the
West coast of Africa, forming part of the Atlantic Ocean and its maritime
system. 1 The sea lanes of the Gulf of Guinea connect maritime traffic
from multiple continents, while the region’s central location (particularly
its proximity to Europe and America) makes it an important part of
global trade. The Gulf of Guinea also possesses valuable goods,
commodities and minerals, making it the subject of European
expansionism and imperialism.2 However, the region’s geostrategic
importance has endured into the post-colonial period, and particularly in
the last decade due to increasing global dependency on the region’s
energy resources.3

1

The Gulf of Guinea is defined in this thesis as comprising 25 States: 20 coastal States from Cape
Verde to Angola, and 5 neighbouring landlocked States. The coastal States are Angola, Benin,
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, Cote D’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea,
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Sao Tome & Principe,
Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. The landlocked States are Burkina Faso, Central Africa Republic,
Chad, Mali and Niger.
2

Generally on colonialism, the scramble for Africa and the Gulf of Guinea in particular, see Thomas
Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa: White Man's Conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876 to 1912,
New York, Hearst Corporation, 1991. Michael Crowder, West Africa Under Colonial Rule, London,
Hutchinson, 1968. Adu A. Boahen, Britain, the Sahara, and Western Sudan, Oxford, Clarendon Press,
1964.
3

George F. Jedrzej and Manuel Paulo, "A New Scramble for African Oil? Historical, Political and
Business Perspectives” African Affairs 106, 423, 2007, pp. 229-51. Douglas Yates, "The Scramble for
Africa Oil," South African Journal of International Affairs 13, 2, 2006, pp. 11-31. Pierre Abramovici,
"United States: the new scramble for Africa," Review of African Political Economy 31, 2004, pp. 68590. Neil Ford, "Oil from Deep Waters (2): Africa - World’s Greatest Deepwater Potential " Platts
Energy Economist Briefing, 248, June 2002, 2-11. "A new scramble," The Economist, 27 November
2004.
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The maritime profile of the Gulf of Guinea is also making an enormous
contribution to the social-economic development of the region. In 2010,
the Gulf of Guinea was the only developing region that registered an
average growth rate of six per cent, with high-income gains of about ten
per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of some States.4 This
growth is grounded in favourable international trade, with the shipping
industry being the primary vehicle. Indeed, the 2011 World Bank Report
shows that offshore oil and gas resources have substantially contributed
to favourable economic indicators in the Gulf of Guinea, including
increased capital inflows.5 Fisheries resources are also a major source of
employment, especially in coastal communities, and equally contribute
to poverty alleviation and food security across the region.6

However, since 2005 piracy has been on the rise in the Gulf of Guinea,
with the region’s maritime space being described as “Africa’s other
dangerous waters” and “pirates…new territory”. 7 In 2011, the Gulf of
Guinea ranked second after the Indian Ocean in terms of frequency of
piracy attacks.8 These violent attacks constitute a serious threat to global
4

World Bank, Global Economic Prospects: Maintaining Progress and Turmoil, vol. 3, Washington
DC, June 2011, pp. 127-128. Angola, Congo Brazzaville and Gabon have experienced higher growth
levels as a result of their offshore oil and gas industries.
5
World Bank, Global Economic Prospects: Maintaining Progress and Turmoil, vol. 3, Washington
DC, June 2011, pp. 127-141.
6
FAO Report, Increasing the Contribution of Small Scale Fisheries to Poverty Alleviation and Food
Security, 2007. FAO, Achieving Poverty Reduction through Responsible Fisheries: Lessons from
West and Central Africa, FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Technical Paper, 513, 2008.
7
Peter Pham, “Africa’s Other Dangerous Waters: Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea,” World Defence
Review, 3 December 2009. Scot Baldauf, “Pirates Take New Territory: West African Gulf of Guinea,”
The Christian Science Monitor, 15 January 2010.
8

See “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Annual Report – 2011,”
International Maritime Bureau, MSC.4/Circ.180, 1 March 2012. See also International Maritime
Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Reports from 2005-2010. Page 26 of the
2008 Report (which analysed global piracy trends), indicated that Nigeria has the second highest
number of serious piratical attacks in the world.
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trade and the security of the region.9 The Gulf of Guinea is also
confronted with a myriad of other sea-based threats. Transnational
organised crimes undermine the security and stability of member States.
Decades of illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs fuels crime and imperils
governance institutions, illegal migration by sea frequently leads to
maritime accidents and disasters, while illegal trafficking in weapons has
also contributed to multiple internal conflicts and widespread
instability.10 Moreover, food security in the region is being threatened by
illegal fishing activities and unsustainable fishing practices. 11 This has
the effect of placing the livelihood of coastal communities in jeopardy.

There are clearly multiple maritime security threats and challenges in the
Gulf of Guinea. These threats are undermining the region’s development
agenda, threatening the security of international shipping, and above all,
endangering regional and international security. Effective responses to
these threats require a comprehensive response, one which is based on
regional and international cooperation.

9

See United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2018 - Piracy and Security in Africa (Security
Council 6645th Meeting, 31 October 2011). See also United Nations Security Council, Resolution
2039 - Peace Consolidation in West Africa (Security Council 6727th Meeting, 29 February 2012).
10

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “The Globalization of Crime: a
Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment,” 2010. See also UNOD, “World Drug Report
2011. UNODC, “Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa,” December 2007. UNODC, “Drug Trafficking
as a Security Threat in West Africa,” 2008.
11
Mark Rowe, "Fishy Business" Geographical, August 2013. Eyiwunmi Falaye, Illegal Unreported
and Unregulated Fishing in West Africa (Ghana and Nigeria), Marine Resources Assessment Group,
2008. MRAG and DEFID, "Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing” Policy Brief 8, 2009. See
also David J. Agnew and Colin T. Barnes, Economic Aspects and Drivers of IUU Fishing: Building a
Framework, 2004, Available: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/7/29468002.PDF (accessed 24 March
2011).

3

1.2 PREVAILING INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL
RESPONSES TO MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION IN
THE GULF OF GUINEA
The United Nations (UN) Security Council has adopted two Resolutions
which express deep concern over the spate of piratical attacks in the Gulf
of Guinea region. The first Resolution was adopted in October 2011, the
second in February 2012.12 In November 2011, the UN Secretary
General sent a special mission to the Gulf of Guinea to assess the piracy
situation, and in February 2012, the UN Security Council convened a
debate on the growing insecurity in the region.13

These developments demonstrate the enormity of the problem in the
Gulf of Guinea, and also the concern of the international community
with finding an effective solution to the region’s security dilemma. In
geostrategic terms, the developments also illustrate that the attention of
the global community is steadfastly fixed on the Gulf of Guinea region.
Indeed, 2011 saw a sharp decline in successful piratical incidents off the
Horn of Africa, offering both a glimmer of hope and an opportunity to
celebrate the success of international anti-piracy efforts (particularly in
regard to the Somali piracy enterprise).14 However, 2011 also manifested
an endemic piracy problem in the Gulf of Guinea.

12

United Nations, Resolution 2018 - Piracy and Security in Africa(Security Council 6645th Meeting.
31 October 2011). United Nations, Resolution 2039 - Peace Consolidation in West Africa(Security
Council 6727th Meeting. 29 February 2012).
13

UN Security Council, “Report of the United Nations Assessment Mission on Piracy in the Gulf of
Guinea,” S/2012/45, 19 January 2012. United Nations, Security Council 6723rd Meeting, S/pv.6723,
27 February 2012.
14

A distinction is being made between total number of attempted hijacks and the number of successful
hijacks. While total hijacks in the Indian Ocean remained high in 2011, according to the International

4

In a sense therefore, the Gulf of Guinea presents a paradox of
opportunity and complexity to the international community. The
opportunity, at least in principle, is that the international efforts that were
successful in substantially suppressing the threat of piracy off the Somali
coast can be applied elsewhere, such as in the Gulf of Guinea. Indeed, it
should be easier for the international community to deal with the piracy
situation in this region, as there are past experiences to draw on. In this
way, the lessons learnt from combating the ‘horn pirates’ at both the
strategic and enforcement levels could be migrated across the equator
and applied to ‘gulf pirates’. The conundrum, however, is that many
factors set the two situations apart.15 In the case of the Gulf of Guinea
you will be dealing with multiple States with stable and legitimate
governments – even if they are largely ineffective. Moreover the nature
and drivers of piratical incidents in the Gulf of Guinea are different from
those in the Horn of Africa.16 Above all, the Guinea of Gulf represents a
different geostrategic environment.17

These contrasting dynamics demonstrate that even in the context of
piracy, the Gulf of Guinea requires a unique and individual approach.
Nonetheless, the multilateral processes commenced by UN suggest that
an effective path is being charted to address the insecurity in the region.
It is therefore necessary to assess whether the maritime situation in the

Maritime Organisation (IMO) only 15% were successful. See IMO, Acts of Piracy and Armed
Robbery Against Ships - Annual Report 2011 (MSC.4/Circ.180. 1 March 2012).
15

Chapter 4 of this thesis offers a comparative analysis of piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of
Guinea and Somalia.
16

See chapter 4.

17

See chapter 6 and 7.
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region is, in fact, being adequately dealt with. To this end, it is necessary
to examine the context within which the current multilateral efforts will
take place. This will be done by analysing the two Resolutions and the
accompanying regional and international initiatives in some detail.

First, the Resolutions declare that the ongoing regional and international
initiatives are on track to adequately address the maritime security
situation in the Gulf of Guinea. For example, Resolution 2018
commends initiatives being pursued by member States of three regional
organisations in the Gulf of Guinea: the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central
African States (ECCAS), and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC),
and also encourages the convening of a region-wide summit to bring
together the political leaders of Gulf of Guinea States so that the issue
can be further explored.18 The Resolution also recognises the support
being offered to Gulf of Guinea States by member States of the
international community and relevant international organisations, while
calling for further assistance to bolster regional efforts. The content and
wording of the second resolution, Resolution 2039, is even more
emphatic.19 It describes initiatives being adopted by ECCAS member
States as “comprehensive”20, noting that steps are also being taken by

18

United Nations, Security Council Resolution 2018, 29 October 2011.

19

United Nations, Security Council Resolution 2039, 27 February 2012.

20

The relevant paragraph is as follows: “Noting the ECCAS comprehensive joint maritime security
architecture to counter piracy in the Central African subregion, including the strategy adopted by the
ECCAS Peace and Security Council in February 2008, the establishment of the Regional Centre for
Maritime Security in Central Africa (CRESMAC) in Pointe- Noire, Congo, as well as the
multinational coordination centres in the region …”. See United Nations, Security Council Resolution
2039, 27 February 2012.
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ECOWAS to adopt an “integrated maritime strategy”.21 The Resolution
further designates the Maritime Organisation for West and Central
Africa (MOWCA) as another key regional platform for addressing the
maritime security situation. Indeed, preceding the adoption of Resolution
2039, the UN Secretary General had unequivocally urged Gulf of Guinea
States to take steps to implement the regional coast guard project
pioneered by MOWCA.22 It was in between the adoption of these two
resolutions, and entreaties by the UN Secretary General, that the
assessment mission was sent to the Gulf of Guinea and the UN-convened
debate was held on the floor of the Security Council.23

A further reason for interrogating the comprehensiveness of the maritime
security cooperative framework in the Gulf of Guinea is founded on the
headings of the two resolutions, as well as the institutional mandate and
raison d’être of the UN. Resolutions 2018 and 2039 are respectively
titled “Piracy and Security in Africa” and “Peace Consolidation in West
Africa”. These titles convey both a premise and a promise that a
comprehensive maritime security solution is being sought for the Gulf of
Guinea - one that will scope maritime security within the larger security
and stability requirements of the region. As a matter of fact, the
21

The relevant paragraph is as follows: “Further noting the preparatory steps taken by ECOWAS
towards developing a maritime security approach through an Integrated Maritime Security Strategy
and an Integrated Maritime Plan…”. See United Nations, Security Council Resolution 2039, 27
February 2012.
22

UN News Centre, Ban calls for integrated strategy against maritime piracy in Gulf of Guinea 19
October
2011,
Available:
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40103&Cr=gulf+of+guinea&Cr1
9 December
2012.
23

UN Security Council, “Report of the United Nations Assessment Mission on Piracy in the Gulf of
Guinea,” S/2012/45, 19 January 2012. United Nations, Security Council 6723 rd Meeting, S/pv.6723,
27 February 2012.
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fundamental role of the UN, and particularly the UN Security Council, is
to maintain international peace and security.24 When discharging this
responsibility, therefore, the UN cannot be seen to be acting in a
fragmented manner. Every action mandated by the UN should be
founded on the broader security and strategic requirements of the
situation. It is precisely for this reason that in the area of conflict
resolution, the UN has endeavoured to move beyond merely deploying
peacekeeping forces to implementing broader peacebuilding and
governance measures as part of its objective to restore peace, security
and stability to struggling States.25

By way of summary, Resolutions 2018 and 2039 (and their
accompanying multilateral measures) have defined a context within
which maritime security cooperation is to be executed, and that context
has been deemed appropriate and responsive to the maritime security
needs of the region. The Resolutions have thus charted a course for
cooperative international engagement in the Gulf of Guinea, and have
explicitly sanctioned ongoing regional and global efforts as being
fundamental for the operationalisation of regional maritime security
cooperation. It is therefore to be expected that regional States and the
international community will implement both the broad and specific
24

United Nations, Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
San Francisco, 1945. See particularly Chapters 1, 6 and 7.
25

For a comprehensive approach to UN peacekeeping, see Cedric De Coning and Karsten Friis,
"Coherence and Coordination The Limits of the Comprehensive Approach " International
Peacekeeping 15, 1, 2013, pp. 243-72. Richard Gowan, "The Strategic Context: Peacekeeping in
Crisis, 2006–08," International Peacekeeping 15, 4, 2008, pp. 453-69. See also Espen B. Eide, "From
Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding," FIIA Report 14/2006, 2006, pp. 43-52. Cedric de Coning, "United
Nations and the Comprehensive Approach," Danish Institute for International Studies 14, 2008. Tom
Woodhouse, "Conflict resolution and peacekeeping: Critiques and responses," International
Peacekeeping 7, 1, 2000, pp. 8-26.
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prescriptions that have emerged. Indeed, in June 2013, the Summit of
Heads of State and Government of Gulf of Guinea States was convened
in Yaoundé, Cameroon, as recommended by the two Resolutions.26 As
anticipated, the meeting was heralded a success, with the remarks of the
UN Secretary General making news headlines.27

However, what emerges from a thorough examination of the prevailing
situation is that the processes being implemented inadequately address
the state of insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea. Firstly, the Resolutions
endorse multiple channels for addressing maritime security in the region,
thereby creating confusion and disharmony with regional processes.
Secondly, the prevailing maritime security cooperative agenda for the
Gulf of Guinea centres on piratical attacks, thus failing to prioritise other
dimensions of insecurity, such as depleting fisheries resources, which
have substantial effects on the security and stability of the region.
Thirdly, critical requirements that will contribute to durable maritime
security outcomes, such as the nexus between land and sea in maritime
security threats, as well as the governance-based dimensions of the
region’s insecurity, do not feature prominently in the cooperative
dialogue.

26

Summit of Heads of State and Governments of ECOWAS and ECCAS, Yaoundé, Cameroon on
24- 25 June 2013.
27

At UN-backed meeting, African States seek to combat piracy in Gulf of Guinea, UN News Centre,
Available: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44440&Cr=piracy&Cr1=, 29 December
2013. Ban welcomes anti-piracy strategy adopted by leaders from West, Central Africa, UN News
Centre Available: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45281, 29 December 2013.

9

1.3

HYPOTHESIS

The hypothesis underlining this thesis is that the current approach to
maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea is inadequate and
suffers multiple limitations.

The thesis argues that the current maritime security cooperative
processes in the region do not comprehensively address the relevant
maritime security threats, thereby failing to provide an inclusive concept
of security. It also demonstrates that current regional and international
processes have not yielded a well-defined regional platform for maritime
security cooperation, while critical factors that will contribute to
enduring maritime security outcomes (such as enhanced legal
frameworks for States and addressing the governance-based dimensions
to maritime security), are being insufficiently prioritised in the
cooperative process.

1.4

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THESIS

To establish the hypothesis and defend the thesis statement, the central
aim of this research is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the
maritime security situation in the Gulf of Guinea, and to demonstrate the
inadequacy of the current cooperative mechanisms which seek to address
the maritime security needs of the Gulf of Guinea region. As a corollary
to this central aim, the thesis examines critical factors that will contribute
to effective maritime security cooperation and the delivery of robust
maritime security outcomes in the Gulf of Guinea.
10

In furtherance of the above aims, the first objective of the thesis is to
establish the strategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea and the vast
array of maritime interests in the region. The second objective is to
develop a conceptual framework for understanding the maritime security
situation in the Gulf of Guinea, and to analyse the multiple maritime
security threats in the region. The third objective is to establish the gaps
in the prevailing regional and international approaches to maritime
security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea.

To achieve the above objectives, the thesis will answer the following
mutually reinforcing questions: what is the strategic importance of the
Gulf of Guinea maritime domain? What are the underlying interests of
external actors and stakeholders in the region? How does the region’s
maritime domain contribute to the socio-economic development and
long term security and stability of Gulf of Guinea States? What threats
undermine these opportunities and what are the imperatives for
addressing them? How effective are the national and regional response
frameworks for maritime security, and what are the underlying
challenges to regional cooperation? And finally, how adequate and
viable is the contribution and support of the international community to
maritime security coperation in the Gulf of Guinea?

11

1.5

APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

The main research approach employed in the thesis is the identification,
collection, review and analysis of primary and secondary literature. The
primary data which has been relied upon includes official reports and
documents of relevant international and regional organisations, including
conventions and agreements. Additional primary sources include
national legislative instruments and policy documents. Secondary data
sources which have been used in the thesis include books, published
journal articles in print and electronic form, newspaper articles and
critical commentaries, newsletters, press releases and information from
internet sources. The thesis also relies on the author’s experience as a
naval officer in the Ghana Navy, along with the administrative and
operational insights this role has afforded the author regarding maritime
security dynamics in the Gulf of Guinea.

1.6

THESIS STRUCTURE

The thesis is presented in eight chapters. This introductory chapter
highlights the inadequacies in the current approach to maritime security
cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as the need for a
comprehensive approach to the maritime security needs of the region. It
also outlines the thesis methodology, structure and the significance and
contribution of the thesis to the existing knowledge base.

Chapter two sets the overarching background for the thesis. More
specifically, the chapter reviews various conceptions of the Gulf of
12

Guinea region, and adopts a working definition of the geographical
scope of the region for the purpose of the thesis. The chapter analyses
the socio-economic profile of the Gulf of Guinea, and also examines the
geostrategic importance of the region from both a historical and
contemporary perspective. Most importantly, however, the chapter
examines the major contributions of the Gulf of Guinea’s maritime
domain to the region’s socio-economic development and long term and
security and stability, In doing so, the chapter highlights the interests of
external actors and stakeholders, especially offshore oil and gas
companies, as well as the opportunities and challenges that these
interests present to the security and stability of the region.

Chapter three provides both a conceptual and empirical context for the
thesis. Indeed, the chapter develops an analytical framework for
understanding the concept of maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea,
and provides an overview of maritime security challenges in the region.
First, the chapter reviews the evolution of the concept of security in
security studies, highlighting various dimensions of security. The chapter
then analyses the link between general concepts of security (as they have
evolved in security studies) and the concept of maritime security.
Building on the analysis in the first two parts, the chapter goes on to
provide unique insights into the evolution of the concept of maritime
security, and also develops an analytical framework for applying the
concept of maritime security to the Gulf of Guinea. The analytical
framework is then used to outline the substantive maritime security
threats which will be investigated in the thesis. These threats include: (i)
piracy and armed robbery; (ii) threats to sustainable fisheries, including
13

illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU fishing); (iii) illicit
trafficking in narcotic drugs by sea; (iv) illegal trafficking in arms by
sea; and (v) illegal migration by sea.

The analysis of maritime security challenges is continued in chapter four,
with a case study focusing on piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of
Guinea. The chapter highlights the complex nature of piratical attacks in
the Gulf of Guinea, and distinguishes Gulf piracy from the Somali
situation. The analysis examines the actors and drivers of piracy in the
region, and traces the evolution of piracy from a fairly narrow base into
an insidious regional threat. The chapter also examines the implications
of piratical attacks for both regional and global security and concludes
by developing a profile of Gulf of Guinea piracy, and illuminating the
future trends and complexities of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.

Chapter five examines the responses of Gulf of Guinea States to
maritime security challenges by assessing the implementation of various
international legal frameworks at the national level. Indeed, these
international

frameworks

provide

cooperative

mechanisms

and

jurisdiction for addressing maritime security threats. Therefore, the
chapter investigates the extent to which Gulf of Guinea States have
responded to and implemented the requisite legal regimes.

Chapter six examines the four platforms being used for maritime security
cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea, evaluating the responsiveness of these
14

platforms to the maritime security concerns in the region. In particularly,
the chapter examines the structural, geopolitical and governance-based
challenges and limitations of the current frameworks. It also assesses
which regional platforms are suitable for forging maritime security
cooperation in the region, and presents policy recommendations for how
the initiatives can be moulded to meet the maritime security
requirements of the region.

Chapter seven examines the role and contribution of the international
community to maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea. In
doing so, the chapter examines the involvement of five key global
players in the cooperative process: the United States, France, the United
Kingdom, the European Union and China. The chapter analyses the
strategic interests underpinning the maritime security partnerships of
these actors, as well as the convergence and divergence of these interests
vis-à-vis the relevant actors. The chapter then evaluates the positive and
negative implications of these interests, concluding with a discussion of
the limitations and challenges presented by the strategic partnerships.

The final chapter synthesises the results of the research to ascertain
whether the findings support the thesis hypothesis – that is, that the
current approach to maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea
is inadequate and suffers multiple limitations. The conclusion reveals
that the hypothesis has been established, and then proceeds to offer
suggestions as to how maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of
Guinea could be improved.
15

1.7

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH

The thesis is significant for three reasons. First, the thesis provides the
needed intellectual input for understanding maritime security issues in
the Gulf of Guinea, and for enhancing maritime security cooperation in
the region. The thesis is the first piece of research to comprehensively
analyse maritime security threats in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as the
challenges to regional and international cooperation. Therefore, the
thesis sets the scene for further research on Gulf of Guinea maritime
security. Also, the limitations and gaps that the thesis identifies in the
current cooperative initiatives will serve to guide regional States and the
global community in adopting an effective maritime security cooperative
framework for the Gulf of Guinea region.

Second, the thesis makes a unique contribution to the growing literature
on maritime security. Contemporary literature on maritime security is
generally focused on examining isolated maritime security threats, while
the concept of security is largely applied in maritime security studies
without being scrutinised. The thesis is one of the first studies to provide
a detailed conceptual and empirical analysis of the diverse maritime
security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea. The thesis thus lays the
foundation for future research in this area.

Third, the thesis emphasises a novel approach to understanding maritime
security challenges. While there is a tendency to view maritime security
threats as being exclusively sea-based, the thesis emphasises the land-sea
nexus and governance-based dimensions to maritime security threats.
16

The study will therefore fuel further research into how poor governance
results in security threats at sea, while policy makers will be better
placed to address the broader dynamics of maritime security challenges.

17

CHAPTER TWO
THE SEA AS THE GEOSTRATEGIC ESSENCE OF THE GULF
OF GUINEA: A HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY
OVERVIEW
If we flow with life's lessons, we learn that the sea is what it is
Swahili Proverb

2.1

INTRODUCTION

The Gulf of Guinea has attracted profound global attention and interest
in the last decade, due largely to its growing status as a source of global
energy security.1 The oil and gas factor has led to the region being
characterised as a province of vast untold wealth,2 the spotlight of
Africa’s greatness,3 the El Dorado of the globalised-corporate world,4
and, at the strategic level, as taking centre stage in the contest of the
superpowers, especially between the United States of America (US) and
China.5

1

Sam Raphael and Doug Stokes, "Globalizing West African oil: US ‘energy security’ and the global
economy," International Affairs 87, 4, 2011, pp. 903-21. Paul M Lubeck, Michael J Watts and
Ronnie Lipschutz, Convergent Interests: United States Energy Security and the ‘Securing’ of
Democracy in Nigeria (Massachusetts: February 2007 ).
2

Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, Oil and Politics in Gulf of Guinea, London, Hurst, 2007, p. 1. See also
“Oil Empires,” Africa Confidential, 21 March 2002. “Africa drowns in a pool of oil”, Los Angeles
Times, 1 July 2003.
3

James Dao, ‘Oil Puts Africa in Spotlight’ New York Times, 20 September 2002.

4

Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, Oil and Politics in the Gulf of Guinea, Hurst, 2007, p. 9. Somini
Sengupta, "The Making of an African Petrostate," New York Times, 18 February 2004.
5

George F. Jedrzej and Manuel Paulo, "A New Scramble for African Oil? Historical, Political and
Business Perspectives " African Affairs, 106/423, pp. 229-51, Gal Luft, "Fueling the Dragon: China's
race into the oil market " Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, 2004. Okbazghi Yohannes,
"America's new frontier: Oil in the Gulf of Guinea," The Black Scholar 33, 2, 2003. James Hentz,
"The Contending Currents in United States Involvement in Sub-saharan Africa", in Ian Taylor and
Paul Williams, eds. Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the Continent, London
and New York, Routledge, 2004, pp. 23-40.
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While this energy-security-geostrategic renaissance is important, and
indeed strengthens the requirement for effective maritime security
cooperation in the region, the analysis in this chapter will demonstrate
that the maritime domain of the Gulf of Guinea has much wider
significance, that it is a key enabler of socio-economic development, and
that in both historical and contemporary context the maritime realm is
indeed the geostrategic essence of the Gulf of Guinea.

The chapter is organised in four parts. First, the chapter will define the
Gulf of Guinea region, and by so doing, adopt a working definition for
the thesis. Second, the chapter summarises the demographic and socioeconomic profile of the Gulf of Guinea region. Third, the chapter
reviews the historical significance of the Gulf of Guinea, and finally, the
chapter examines the contemporary importance of the Gulf of Guinea
and the accompanying geostrategic interests.

2.2

DEFINING THE GULF OF GUINEA REGION

Prevalent references to the “Gulf of Guinea” in contemporary global
dialogue, including in the official documentation of the United Nations
(UN), 6 may convey an impression of certainty about the geographical
scope of the Gulf of Guinea. However, this is far from the case. The Gulf
of Guinea is by no means a uniformly defined region, as depending upon
the particular issue or interest at stake, the physical or geographical
6

See for example references to the “Gulf of Guinea” in a report of the UN. United Nations, Report of
the United Nations Assessment Mission on Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, UNSC S/2012/45 (19
January 2012).
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scope of the Gulf of Guinea changes. These varied connotations of the
region translate into conflicting policy perspectives, thus compounding
the challenges of fostering effective maritime security cooperation. The
discussion below examines the different perspectives on the Gulf of
Guinea under three broad headings, resulting in a definition for the
thesis.

2.2.1 The Gulf of Guinea in Academic Literature
One of the most cited works on the Gulf of Guinea is Ricardo de
Oliveira’s book, “Oil and Politics in Gulf of Guinea.”7 Although the
book has no specific definition of the Gulf of Guinea, it contains a map
depicting eight coastal States,8 from Nigeria to Angola, and the
landlocked States of Chad and the Central African Republic, as Gulf of
Guinea States.

9

In the absence of a clear definition, it can be inferred

that the writer views the ten States as constituting the Gulf of Guinea
region. James Forest and Mathew Sousa also provide an identical map in
their book, “Oil and Terrorism in the New Gulf,” but leave out the
Central African Republic.10 Thus, although the authors differ on the total
number of States that constitute the Gulf of Guinea, their shared focus on
oil and gas resources leads to a common understanding of the Gulf of
Guinea as a region of coastal and landlocked States banded together.

7

Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, Oil and Politics in Gulf of Guinea, London, Hurst, 2007.

8

The term “coastal State is used here as a contrast to “landlocked State”, and therefore includes the
archipelagic States of Cape Verde and São Tomé and Principe.
9

Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, Oil and Politics in Gulf of Guinea, London, Hurst, 2007, p.9.

10

James J. F. Forest and Mathew V. Sousa, Oil and Terrorism in the New Gulf: Framing U.S Energy
and Security Policies in the Gulf of Guinea, New York and Oxford Lexington Books, 2006, p. x-xii.
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A contrary approach to the Gulf of Guinea can be found in the most
recent security review of the International Crises Group.11 The report
centres on the same geographic space as the two books but defines and
limits the Gulf of Guinea region to only eight coastal States.12 Raymond
Gilpin has a similar coastal inclination of the Gulf of Guinea and
therefore defines the region as consisting only of littoral States.13
However, for Gilpin, the region comprises eleven States, from Ghana to
Angola.14 According to Freedom Onouha, the Gulf of Guinea comprises
nineteen States (from Gambia to Angola), all of which are coastal except
one,15 while Kamal-Deen Ali and Martin Tsamenyi have broadened the
coastal definition to include Cape Verde.16

2.2.3 Institutional Conceptions of the Gulf of Guinea
Institutional definitions and understandings of the Gulf of Guinea also
differ remarkably.17 The Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) conveys

11

See International Crises Group, "The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone " Africa Report No.
196, 12 December 2012 p. 2.
12

Ibid. The Report, however, extrapolated the research analysis to cover Benin, Togo and Ghana.

13

Raymond Gilpin, "Enhancing Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea," Strategic Insights VI, 1,
January 2007.
14

Ibid. p.2.

15

Freedom C. Onuoha, "The Geo-strategy of Oil in the Gulf of Guinea: Implications for Regional
Stability," Journal of Asian and African Studies 45, 2010, pp. 370-71.
16

Kamal-Deen Ali and Martin Tsamenyi, "Fault Lines in Maritime Security: Analysis of maritime
boundary uncertainties in the Gulf of Guinea," African Security Review, August 2013, pp. 1-16.
17

It is noted that the word “institution” has a deeper application and a different conceptual meaning in
the field of international relations. The use of the word here is not intended to evoke the conceptual
debate, if it does however, then it is used in the context of John Mearsheimer’s view of institutions as
formal organisations through which States interact. See John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of
International Institutions," International Security 19, 3, 1994/95, pp. 5-49. For a discussion of
institutions in the African context, see Samuel M. Makinda, "Terrorism, counter-terrorism and norms
in Africa," African Security Review 15, 3, 2006, pp. 19-31. On institutions generally see Robert O.
Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: essays in international relations theory,

21

the narrowest concept of the Gulf of Guinea region.18 Although the name
of the Commission has in a way monopolised the phrase “Gulf of
Guinea,” only eight States make up the Commission.19 The definition of
the region by the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) is also
quite narrow, but broader than that of the GGC. The IHO defines the
Gulf of Guinea in its 1953 publication titled “Limits of Oceans and
Seas” as the area from Cape Palmas in Liberia to Cape Lopez in Gabon
(0'38' S, 8"42' E).20 The area encompasses the coastal domain of ten
States and that has been maintained in

the 2002 edition.

21

Thus,

Angola, Congo-Brazzaville and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR
Congo), all of which are very prominent in other conceptions of the
region, fall outside the IHO definition.

Compared to the narrow views canvassed above, the Gulf of Guinea
Current Large Marine Ecosystem (GCLME) Project defines the Gulf of
Guinea as constituting sixteen coastal States, from Guinea to
Angola.22The Maritime Organization for West and Central Africa
(MOWCA) provides an even broader outlook for the Gulf of Guinea.23
Boulder, Colo Westview, 1989, Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World
Politics, New York, Columbia University Press, 1977.
18

See chapter 6.

19

These members States are Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, and São
Tomé and Príncipe.
20

See International Hydrography Organization, Limits of Oceans and Seas, 3rd ed., 1953, p. 19.
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The ten States whose coastal domain are covered in the IHO definition are Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire,
Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe and Gabon.
International Hydrographic Organization, “Limits of Oceans and Seas,” Draft 4 rd Edition 2002,
Chapter 1.
22

"Gulf of Guinea Current Large Marine Ecosystem (GCLME) Project: Trans-boundary Diagnostic
Analysis," 2006, pp. 6-8.
23

On MOWCA, see chapter 6.
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Although MOWCA has no precise definition for the Gulf of Guinea, in
practice the Organisation has deemed its twenty five member States to
comprise the Gulf of Guinea region. 24 This can be discerned from the
feasibility study on its integrated regional coast guard network, as well
as the accompanying Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the
coast guard network.25 Although this broad definition is unique, it has
commonalities with those conceptions of the Gulf of Guinea that
includes landlocked States within the geographic scope of the region.26
2.2.3 Evolving Global Concept of the Gulf of Guinea
There is an evolving global outlook for the Gulf of Guinea that differs in
some respects from the definitions reviewed thus far. What this evolving
concept shares with other notions of the Gulf of Guinea is the geographic
element that the Gulf of Guinea is contiguous to the Atlantic Ocean.
However, this evolving concept is marked by a shift in emphasis from
defining the Gulf of Guinea region on the basis of physical limits
towards a more functional perspective. Thus the emphasis is on securing
the benefits that inure from the region, especially energy security and
international trade.27 The second element of the evolving concept of the
Gulf of Guinea is the stress on regional frameworks as the means for
24

The coastal States of MOWCA are Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, Cote D’Ivoire,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau,
Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe , Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. The
landlocked States are Burkina Faso, Central Africa Republic, Chad, Mali and Niger.
25
MOWCA, Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of a Sub-Regional Integrated
Coast Guard Network In West and Central Africa (MOWCA/XIII GA.08/8. 2008). IMO, Report on
the Mission on Evaluation and Assessment of the Feasibility to Establish An Integrated Coast Guard
Network in the West And Central African Region (TC/0046-01-2000. 15 February 2006).
26

The landlocked States are Burkina Faso, Central Africa Republic, Chad, Mali and Niger.
Fidelis Allen, "Oil and Security in the Gulf of Guinea: Reflections on the External and Domestic
Linkages," Journal of Sustainable Development 5, 4, 2012, pp. 132-40. Cristina Barrios, "Fighting
piracy in the Gulf of Guinea Offshore and onshore," European Union Institute for Security Studies,
May 2013.
27
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enhancing maritime security in the region. This underpins United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 2018 and 2039.28 The
Resolutions view the Gulf of Guinea as synonymous with the member
States of four key organisations, and treat the structures and institutional
capacity of these organisations as the platform for delivering security to
the region.29 The four institutions are the Maritime Organization for
West and Central Africa (MOWCA), the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central
African States (ECCAS), and the Gulf of Guinea Commission.30

2.2.4 Thesis Definition and Scope of the Gulf of Guinea
Since the focus of this thesis is on challenges and prospects of maritime
security cooperation, the thesis adopts a working definition of the Gulf
of Guinea in the context of UNSC Resolutions 2018 and 2039,
comprising twenty five States and four regional organisations. Indeed,
the four regional organisations mentioned in the Resolutions are
regarded as the drivers of maritime security cooperation, so this
definition facilitates an evaluation of their suitability for delivering
effective maritime security cooperation in the region.31

There are also conceptual justifications for the approach the thesis takes
to the Gulf of Guinea. Both international relations and security studies
28

United Nations, Resolution 2018 - Piracy and Security in Africa(Security Council 6645th Meeting.
31 October 2011). United Nations, Resolution 2039 - Peace Consolidation in West Africa(Security
Council 6727th Meeting. 29 February 2012).
29

This point is examined in chapter 6.

30

These institutions are examined in chapter 6.

31

See chapter 6.
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literature regard “regions” and “inter-state cooperative frameworks” as
both means and agents of global and regional order.32 The emphasis in
these theoretical perspectives is on establishing a common approach and
solving shared problems, rather than physical boundaries.33 Similarly,
concepts of ocean governance view regional institutions and inter-state
frameworks as converging points for adopting appropriate responses to
ocean management concerns generally,34 and increasingly with regard to
maritime security.35 Therefore, the scope and definition of the Gulf of
Guinea adopted in the thesis has both practical and conceptual
32

Acharya Amitav, ed., Crafting Cooperation : Regional International Institutions in Comparative
Perspective Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007. Maren Ihlau, How can we best account
for the role of regional institutions in providing security? In reference to Sub-Saharan Africa,
M nchen GRIN Verlag GmbH 2010, Nkechi Mgbeoji, Collective Security – The Liberian Crisis,
Unilateralism and Global Order, Vancouver University of British Columbia Press, 2003 , Abbas
Bundu, "Sub-regional Organizations and the Promotion of African Economic Integration: The Case of
ECOWAS", in Ojomo M.A. and Adewale O, eds. African Economic Community Treaty: Issues,
Problems and Prospects, Nigeria Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 1993.
33

Andrew Hurrell argues that there are no natural regions, and that the definition of “region” or
“regioness” depends on the issue or problem area under investigation. Andrew Hurrell, "Explaining
the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics," Review of International Studies 21, 1995, pp. 33158. Generally on regionalism, cooperation and regional organisations, see Louise L. Fawcett and
Andrew Hurrell, eds., Regionalism in Word Politics: Regional Organization and International Order,
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995. Nye S. Joseph, International Regionalism: Readings, Boston,
Little Brown & Co, 1968. Crickard Fred, Fred Deveaux and Katherine Orr, eds., Multinational Naval
Cooperation and Foreign Policy in the 21st Century, Adershot, Ashagate, 1998.
34

Aldaberto Vallega, "The regional approach to the ocean, the ocean regions, and ocean
regionalisation – a post-modern dilemma," Ocean and Coastal Management 45, 2000, pp. 712-60.
Elizabeth A. Kirk, "Maritime Zones and the Ecosystem Approach: A Mismatch," Review of European
Community and International Environmental Law 8, 1, 1999, pp. 67-72. Tanaka Yoshifumi, "Zonal
and Integrated Management Approaches to Ocean Governance: Reflections on a Dual Approach in
International Law of the Sea," International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 19, 4, 2004, pp. 483515. Lewis L. Alexander, "Regional Arrangements in the Oceans," The American Journal of
International Law 71, 1, 1977, pp. 84-109.
35

Chris Rahman, Concepts of Maritime Security: A strategic perspective on alternative visions for
good order and security at sea, with policy implications for New Zealand, The Centre for Strategic
Studies, New Zealand Victoria University of Wellington, 2009. Manoj Gupta, Indian Ocean Region:
Maritime Regimes for Regional Cooperation, New York Springer, 2010. Catherine Zara Raymond
and Arthur Morriën, "Security in the Maritime Domain and Its Evolution Since 9/11", in Rupert
Herber-Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr, eds. Vol. 3 Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime
Security, CRC Press, 2008, pp. 3-12. Sam Bateman, "Capacity Building for Maritime Security
Cooperation: What are We Talking About? ", in Peter Cozens and Joanna Mossop, eds. Capacity
Building for Maritime Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, New Zealand, Center for Strategic
Studies, 2005, pp. 3-23. Mark J. Valencia, "Prospects for Multilateral Maritime Regime Building in
Asia", in Sam Bateman, ed. Maritime Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region: Current Situation and
Prospects, Canberra Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1999, pp. 27-68.

25

foundations. Figure 2.1 depicts the twenty five States of the Gulf of
Guinea.
Figure 2.1: Map of the Gulf of Guinea

A look at figure 2.1 shows that five landlocked States- Burkina Faso,
Chad, the Central African Republic, Mali and Niger, are included in the
Gulf of Guinea region. These landlocked States depend on ports of
neighbouring coastal States and the sea routes of the Gulf of Guinea for
international trade. The case of Chad is even more peculiar. In addition
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to general trade, Chad exports its oil through a pipeline laid to the coast
of Cameroon.36

2.2.5 Regional Organisations of the Gulf of Guinea
Chapter six of this thesis will analyse the maritime security frameworks
of the four organisations mentioned in the last section, that is,
ECOWAS, ECCAS, MOWCA and the Gulf of Guinea Commission
(GGC). A detailed analysis of the evolution and structures of these
organisations, as well as the dynamics of cooperation and conflict with
the organisations is, however, outside the scope of this thesis.
Nonetheless, to the extent that some of these undercurrents are relevant
to understanding maritime security cooperative challenges in the Gulf of
Guinea, they will be examined in chapter six.

However, it is important to clarify the membership of the four
institutions at this stage. It should be noted that the twenty five member
States of the Gulf of Guinea are also member States of MOWCA.
ECOWAS has fifteen member States,37 while States ECCAS has ten.38
As indicated earlier, the Gulf of Guinea Commission has eight member
States.39 Since the twenty five member States of MOWCA also

36

The Doba-Kribi pipeline, estimated to cost US$ 4.2 billion, is the single most costly investment on
the African continent. It is owned by a consortium of ExxonMobile, ChevronTexaco and Petronas.
37

The States of ECOWAS are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.
38

The States of ECCAS are Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, The Central African Republic, Chad,
Congo-Brazzaville, DR Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tomé and Principe. See
“Economic Community of Central African States,” http://www.au.int/en/recs/eccas, 28 September
2013.
39

See chapter 6. The members of the Gulf of Guinea Commission are Angola, Cameroon, Congo,
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, and São Tomé and Príncipe.
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constitute the twenty five States of the Gulf of Guinea, MOWCA
occupies a special position as the biggest platform for discussing
maritime security cooperation. However, unlike the other three
organisations, MOWCA is not an inter-state political organisation, as its
mandate is limited to the promotion of commercial shipping.40

Although some reports suggest that the Republic of Rwanda has renewed
its membership of ECCAS, the country is not listed in the official
membership of ECCAS and is therefore excluded from the analysis in
this thesis.41 The second point to note is that the Republic of Mauritania
falls within the definition of the Gulf of Guinea by virtue of its
membership of MOWCA, but Mauritania now belongs to the Arab
Maghreb Union,42 having withdrawn its membership of ECOWAS in
2000.43 As analysed in chapter six, this creates challenges for maritime
security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea, because while maritime
security imperatives should be part of any evolving cooperative
framework, the institutional framework to support the inclusion of
Mauritania is lacking at the moment.

40

See chapter 6.

41

Rwanda was originally a member State of ECCAS, but withdrew from the Community as a result of
major disagreements with other member States, especially Angola. Indeed, the two States fought in
opposite sides in the war in DR Congo. There have been reports that Rwanda has renewed its
membership to the Community. However, Rwanda is not listed as a member State on the official
website of ECCAS. See “Economic Community of Central African States,”
http://www.au.int/en/recs/eccas, 28 September 2013.
42

Other member States of the Arab Maghreb Union include Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Libya.

43

On the withdrawal of Mauritania, see ECOWAS, “Executive Secretary's Report 2000: chapter II,”
http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=es-rep2000-3-5&lang=en, 14 October 2013.
Generally on issues of ECOWAS integration including Mauritania, see Fumi Olonisakin, "ECOWAS:
from Economic Integration to Peace Building", in Thomas Jaye, Dauda Garuba and Stella Amadi,
eds. ECOWAS and the Dynamics of Conflict and Peace-building Senegal, CODERSA, 2011, pp. 1126. Kofi O. Kufuor, The Institutional Transformation of the Economic Community of West African,
Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, 2006, pp. 19-68.
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2.3

SUMMARY OF THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND

MARITIME PROFILE OF THE GULF OF GUINEA
The land area of the Gulf of Guinea is approximately 12,754,790 million
square kilometres - three times the size of the European Union.44 The
estimated population of the region is 435.5 million people, with over
one-third of the population living in Nigeria.45 Fifteen States in the Gulf
of Guinea are Francophone, having French as their national language.46
Five are Anglophone, having English as their national language.47 Four
States are Lusophone, having Portuguese as their language,48 while
Equatorial Guinea is the only Spanish speaking State in the region. Table
2.1 summarises the socio-economic and maritime profile of the Gulf of
Guinea.

44

The European Union website (Europa) States the land size of the EU to be about 4 million km² with
503 million inhabitants. See Europa, “Size and Population,” http://europa.eu/about-eu/factsfigures/living/, 2 July 2013.
45

The official webpage of Nigeria simply States that its population is over 150 million people, but the
CIA World Factbook gives a figure of 150.8 million people. See Federal Republic of Nigeria,
http://www.nigeria.gov.ng/2012-10-29-11-05-46, 14 October 2013.
46

The Francophone States were colonised by France. They are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, The
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Cote d’Ivoire, The Democratic Republic of
Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Togo.
47

The Anglophone States are English speaking. Four are former colonies of Britain: Ghana, Gambia,
Nigeria and Sierra Leone. The fifth, the State of Liberia, was formed in 1847 when the United States
returned ex-slaves and settled them in West Africa.
48

Lusophone States are Portuguese speaking and former colonies of Portugal. They are Angola, Cape
Verde, Guinea Bissau and São Tomé and Príncipe.
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112,622
273,800
475,440
4,033
623,000
1,284,000
342,000
322,463
2,344,858
28,051
267,667
11,295
238,533
245,857
36,125
111,367
1,240,000
1,030,000
1,267,000
923,768
964
196,722
71,740
56,785
12,754,790

501,050
30,024
14,693
796,840
40,499
174,545
1,072
308,337
193,627
22,630
224,908
109,456
106,117
246,152
155,422
216,789
165,364
157,550
159,744
15,375
3,640,194

84,391
6,633
8,820
22,394
1,648
7,588
11,898
22,780
13,145
14,007
13,011
807
31,306
4,511
879
986
9,251
3,636
5,549
193,609
197
12,954
1,905
3,153
475,058

7.6
5.9
6.9
5.5
7.8
8.5
6.3
7.8
8.2
5.1
6.7
5.9
7.5
7.5
7.4
7.0
6.9
7.5
7.0
4.3
7.5
7.2
5.3

1.9
2.8
3.1
2.2
2.1
1.7
2.1
2.2
2.0
1.9
2.8
2.8
4.1
2.0
2.1
3.3
2.7
2.3
2.6
2.4
2.9
2.4
2.4

Remarks

Technology

Infrastructure

Institutions

Economic
environment

GDP, Millions
of US Dollars

EEZ, Km2

Coastline, Km
1,600
121
402
965
169
515
37
296
885
80
539
320
350
579
754
853
209
531
402
56
9,663

Transparency

20
8.8
15.8
19.4
0.5
5.0
11.3
4.5
20.6
66
0.7
1.5
1.7
24
10
1.6
4
14.5
3.4
11.5
158.3
.2
13.7
6.4
6.6
435.5

Global Competitive Index
2010/2011
122 119 136
130
82
87 133
122
98
90 134
124
53 107 126
118
102
56 109
79
137 135 137
138
94 133
99
102
117
37
69
97
136
67 106
117
65 109 121
128
118 116 122
132
97 121 135
104
89
76 122
93
-

Stability

Angola
Benin
Burkina Faso
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central Af. Rep
Chad
Congo
Cote d’Ivoire
DR Congo
Equ. Guinea
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea Bissau
Liberia
Mali
Mauritania
Niger
Nigeria
São Tomé
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Togo
TOTAL

Land Size ,
Km2

State

Socio-economic and Maritime Profile of Gulf of Guinea

Population
millions

Table 2.1

landlocked

landlocked
landlocked

landlocked
landlocked

Data Interpretation: Global Competitive Index: Ranking out of 139 States. Stability: 10= highly
unstable; 0 = Very stable. Transparency: 10= Clean; 1= Very Corrupt. EEZ: Limits are truncated at
200m water depth.
Data Sources: Data sources are indicated in the footnotes as follows: Population, Land Size, and
Coastline,49 EEZ Areas,50 GDP,51 Global Competitive Index,52 Instability Index53 and Transparency
Index.54
49

Population, Land Size and Coastline data has been taken from official country websites. In cases
where the information was not available on official websites, the data has been taken from the CIA
World Factbook and the Nations Online Project, http://www.nationsonline.org/.
50

Estimates of EEZ Areas are taken from the Sea Around Us Project. The estimates are truncated at
the 200m water depth.
51

“World Bank Development Indicators 2010,” World Bank, July 2011.

52

World Bank, Africa Competiveness Report 2011, World Bank 2011.

53

“Country Stability Index, 2009/2010” The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2010.

54

“Corruption Perception Index 2010,” Transparency International.
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The information in Table 2.1 conveys the socio-economic multiple
challenges that confront the Gulf of Guinea. The Gulf of Guinea also
ranks very low in terms of development indicators. The average position
of the region in three areas of global competiveness: economic
environment, infrastructure and technology, is 110 out of 139 States
globally.55 Overlaid on the economic and developmental setbacks are a
myriad of governance weaknesses. National institutions in the region are
dysfunctional, with most States ranking in the upper limit of the global
instability index, and no State in the region has attained even a mid-level
rating for good governance or transparency.

56

All these factors impact

on maritime security and the capacity for regional cooperation.57

Despite the ailing socio-economic profile of the Gulf of Guinea, the
region still has key strengths. This can be gleaned from the physical data
in Table 2.1, which will be further explored in the next two parts of this
chapter. The region has a vast land area and its tropical environment
supports the growth of unique plantations and cash crops for export. The
region is also a major import market for global goods and services, partly
because of its growing population, and also due to the absence of
domestic production. Many of the States in the region have vast areas of
maritime jurisdiction (with 40 to 80 per cent of the total area of some
States comprising maritime domains). Indeed, for some States, their total
maritime area far exceeds their land area. These maritime spaces
constitute a viable maritime estate which has in the last couple of years
55
56
57

World Bank, The Africa Competiveness Report 2011, World Bank 2011.
The Economist, "Country Stability Index 2009/2010 " The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2010.
See chapters 3, 4 and 6.

31

contributed to appreciable economic growth across the Gulf of Guinea
region. 58

Therefore, the challenges and vulnerabilities of the Gulf of Guinea
region co-exist with its potential.59 Indeed, the combination of
economically valuable mineral resources, essential commodities that are
vital for international trade, important coastal living and non-living
resources, and international sea lines for shipping, underpins the strategic
significance of the Gulf of Guinea in historical and contemporary times.
Indeed, the maritime border, more than anything else, have influenced
the history and socio-economic dynamics of the region.

2.4

A GEOPOLTICAL HISTORY FROM THE OCEAN

This part examines the strategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea from a
historical perspective. The argument underlying the analysis is that the
Gulf of Guinea has been part of, and in some cases at the centre of,
major transformations in the history of the world, and that the maritime
domain of the Gulf of Guinea has been pivotal to the historical role and
prominence of the region. The discussion is divided into four sections:
early exploration and trade in the Gulf of Guinea, the Dutch-Portuguese
commercial rivalry in the Gulf of Guinea and its influence on the
evolution of the doctrine of Mare Liberum, slave trade and the industrial
58

World Bank, "Global Economic Prospects: Maintaining Progress and Turmoil," 3, June 2011, pp.
127-41. African Development Bank, "Regional Integration Strategy Paper For West Africa 2011 –
2015," March 2011, pp. 3-7.
59

World Bank, "Global Economic Prospects: Maintaining Progress and Turmoil," 3 June 2011, pp.
127-41.
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revolution, and finally, the inseparable link between the quest for sea
power by European States and the imposition of the system of
colonialism.

2.4.1 Early Exploration and Trade
History shows that the activities of early humans were restricted to their
immediate surroundings, and as a result, communities had little
knowledge or awareness of each other. 60 In this primordial world, the
influence possessed by any particular society ended at the outskirts of
their territory, and feudal lords enjoyed limited wealth because they lived
principally on land resources.

61

This was largely the case until the

Roman Empire rose to greatness, owing its growth to the opportunities
afforded by the Mediterranean Sea.62 Since the Mediterranean Sea
offered vast commercial and strategic military advantages, the city of
Carthage also assumed prominence on the shores of present day North
Africa.63 Though it had little arable land, Carthage prospered because its
ports had become regional centres for trade and commerce by 300 BC.64
The centuries that followed saw the rise and fall of many kingdoms in
different geographical locations; however, those kingdoms with access to
60

On the early history of the human race, see T.V.N. Persaud, Early History of Human Anatomy:
From Antiquity to the beginning of the Modern Era, Springfield, Charles C. Thomas, 1984
61

T.V.N. Persaud, Early History of Human Anatomy: From Antiquity to the beginning of the Modern
Era, Springfield, Charles C. Thomas, 1984 p. 35.
62

Historians differ over the precise date of the Roman Empire or Republic. The general view is that
Rome was founded in 753 BC and that the Republic began in 509 BC. See, Encyclopaedia Britannica,
Roman
Republic,
Britannica
Academic
Edition
Available:
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/857952/Roman-Republic, 26 February 2013.
63

Encyclopaedia
Britannica,
Carthage,
Britannica
Academic
Edition
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/97373/Carthage, 26 February 2013.
64

Ibid.
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Available:

the sea were able to greatly expand their social, economic and political
base, as well as display enduring growth and power. This was the case
with many Pre-Westphalian Europeans settlements and kingdoms that
subsequently became States.65

In the case of the Gulf of Guinea, the great ancient empire of Ghana was
located on the banks of the Atlantic coast, around present day
Mauritania, and the sea anchored its socio-economic power. 66 Even the
thirteenth century Mali Empire, though not in the precincts of the coast,
relied on trade by rivers and also benefited from trade by sea. Thus, the
Gulf of Guinea established patterns of interaction with the sea much
earlier than the recorded discovery of the region by the great sailor
Vasco Da Gama.67 However, it was Vasco Da Gama’s sea trip that
increased awareness about the region, firmly linking it with other parts
of the world, and from that point, the Gulf of Guinea became a place for
achieving strategic objectives, with the sea as the primary vehicle.68 In
fact, the economic and commercial potential of the Gulf of Guinea
expanded, leading to an increased focus on the region, and culminating
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in competition and contest between the early European powers, the
Dutch and Portuguese.69

2.4.2 Gulf of Guinea and the birth of Mare Liberum Doctrine
The treatise or doctrine of Mare Liberum, articulated in 1609 by Hugo
Grotius, remains the most celebrated development in maritime strategic,
legal and commercial thinking, and has its antecedents in events in the
Gulf of Guinea.70
As in the case of earlier empires, Portugal built its wealth and power by
dominating trade. In order to retain its supremacy, Portugal tried to limit
the trading opportunities of other nations.71 The assertiveness of Portugal
was partly grounded in a 1493 declaration by Pope Alexander VI, which
divided the world’s oceans between Portugal and Spain.72 However, the
Dutch, as commercial competitors of the Portuguese, went on to
establish trade relations with the Gold Coast in 1598, and started
spreading trade posts to the rest of the Gulf of Guinea.73 The effective
69
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assertion of Dutch trade in the Gulf of Guinea heightened tensions
between Portuguese and Dutch trading companies in other parts of the
world. Portugal persisted with the enforcement of monopolistic methods
in the East and West Indies. As part of their scheme of retaliatory
measures, the Dutch seized a Portuguese ship, the Santa Catarina, in the
Strait of Malacca in 1603.74 This resulted in the famous treatise Mare
Librium (Freedom of the Sea) by Hugo Grotius, with the jurist arguing in
support of the right of the Dutch East Indian Company to trade in the Far
East, and also justifying the capture and sale of the Santa Catarina as a
prize.75

Thus, the Gulf of Guinea was at the centre of the sequence of events that
gave birth to Mare Liberum, the monograph that underpins the
conceptual and strategic character of the sea. It was the commercial
triumph of the Dutch in the Gold Coast that emboldened them to contest
the Portuguese monopoly in other parts of the world. Indeed, evidence of
the ensuing wars between these competing powers to control trade routes
and ports in the Gulf of Guinea can be seen in the remnants of canons
and guns on the shores of Elmina in Ghana, and other places in the
region.76
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2.4.3 Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade
No matter how the (in)famous transatlantic slave trade is regarded
today,77 it was the political economy of the world for about three
centuries, and a large part of the human chattel came from the Gulf of
Guinea, christened “the slave coast.”78Notable slave centres in the Gulf
of Guinea included Badagry in Nigeria, Cabinda in the DR Congo, the
Cape Coast in Ghana, and Launda in Angola.79 From these forts,
millions of coastal and hinterland dwellers of the Gulf of Guinea were
shipped across the Atlantic Ocean and traded by mercantile and
corporate interests.80Although the United States of America (US) stands
out as the dominant endpoint, there were also key slave destinations in
Europe and other parts of the world.
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Gulf of Guinea was the source of the human labour that ensured
increased production and economic prosperity in the destination States,
turning otherwise poor and obsolescent Western economies into vibrant
and powerful States.83 The sea provided the means and platform for the
whole enterprise.

2.4.4 The Industrial Revolution
The abolition of the slave trade facilitated the revival of transactions in
natural goods, providing the impetus for the industrial revolution in
Europe. 84 The survival of this new political economy depended on two
additional pillars: secure markets for goods, and a reliable source of
industrial raw materials. The Gulf of Guinea provided both.85 Indeed, the
annual value of trade from the region was over 3 million pounds
sterling.86 Among the valuable commodities bought from the region
were ivory, gum, beeswax, wild coffee, peanuts, cotton, rubber, clothes,
iron and steel. The Gulf of Guinea accounted for a sixth of the ivory
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traded in London in 1860, and by 1891, modern day Ghana had become
the leading producer of rubber in the whole of the British trading zone. 87

The industrial revolution inspired great transformations in Western
empires, nonetheless, other parts of the world also profited from it.
Within the Gulf of Guinea, new patterns of socio-economic expansion
evolved, including a growing indigenous wealthy society and a regional
system which has been positively described as a pluralistic regional
environment.88 Thus, the trade routes of the Gulf of Guinea and the
larger Atlantic Ocean were important sea lines of communication, not
just for the benefit of Europe, but also for West African inhabitants and
rulers. 89

2.4.5 Seapower, the Berlin Conference and Colonialism
The above accounts of the historical significance of the Gulf of Guinea
should not be understood as mere socio-economic engagements. On the
contrary, they were the result of strategic thinking and emerging
concepts of the time. Foremost among these concepts was the notion of
“seapower” in the classical work of Alfred Thayer Mahan.90 This was
87
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followed by the restated concept of “maritime power” by Sir Julian
Corbett. 91 Inspired by these strategic edits, the mutual trade upon which
the industrial revolution was anchored was soon to be obliterated by the
quest for expansionism. 92

Mahan’s doctrinal ethos bounded naval power, conquest and trade as the
inseparable instrument of national power and prosperity, and seapower
was just an instrument for trade but also to establish dominion over
territories across the world.93 Indeed, Mahan’s ideas stimulated the rise
of the British Navy to support British expansion and influence.
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Mahan’s writings were also translated into all major languages of the
time, and thus Pax Britannica was not just a hegemonic tool, it also
spurred the ambition of other European powers to seek overseas
territories. As German Emperor and strategist, Kaiser Wilhelm II,
affirmed: “I am not just reading it but devouring it; and it is on board all
my ships.”95 Sir William Corbett’s “Some Principles of Maritime
Strategy”, which emphasised maritime power in the context of maritime
trade, further revolutionised strategic thinking and the desire of nations
to gain control of territories abroad.96
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The Gulf of Guinea became representative of both the process and the
product of the doctrines of “seapower” and “maritime strategy”, with all
the major European powers of the time setting their eyes on the African
continent. The Berlin Conference, which formalised colonial rule across
Africa, was convened because of events in the region. Germany, widely
considered a minor power at the time, had established political authority
in Togo and Cameroon by hoisting flags.97 This brought Germany to the
brink of war with other European powers, especially Great Britain. The
conference was therefore convened to formalise colonial possessions and
to divide the rest of the continent.98 Thus by 1890, the whole of the Gulf
of Guinea was under colonial rule,99 and as all the imperial powers were
coastal States, they made use of the sea for the execution of their rule
and administration. 100

Although the Berlin Conference is recorded in historical narratives as the
meeting that partitioned the African continent, thereby placing emphasis
on the land component, a careful reading of the Berlin Agreement shows
that the maritime domain was as strategically important to the colonialist
as the land. Article 4 of the Agreement stipulated that each power was to
extend its coastal possessions inland, while Article 5 granted all
signatory States the freedom of navigation through the sea to the Congo
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and Niger rivers.101 It is clear from these two Articles that access to the
sea coast was the foremost concern for the colonialist, and thus it was the
sea, rather than the land, that held the key to the development of a
colonial empire. 102 It is for this reason that Britain, the most dominant
power of the time, gathered for herself only coastal colonies in the Gulf
of Guinea.103 The French taxonomy of its colonies as territoire d'outre
mer (or “oversees territory”) equally underscores the centrality of the sea
to colonial rule.104

The above analysis shows that the Gulf of Guinea has historically been a
region of strategic importance. Indeed, economic and commercial gains
were made from the region, the implementation of seapower concepts
yielded great dividends, and imperialist ambitions were realised. It
should also be mentioned in passing that the Gulf of Guinea was also
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central to two other crucial events in world history - the First and Second
World Wars, by providing troops for the war effort.

The above analysis shows that the geopolitical history of the Gulf of
Guinea - whether viewed as beneficial or detrimental - has much to do
with the sea. The ‘positive' exploitation and use of global maritime
commons, including the waters of the Gulf of Guinea, has historically
allowed many States to rise to greatness. However, the same cannot be
said for Gulf of Guinea States. In light of this fact, what lessons can Gulf
of Guinea States draw from the prosperous nations that have come
before them? As the Swahili proverb quoted at the beginning of this
chapter states: "the sea is what it is". Thus, the benefits of the sea still
abound, and it is not too late for Gulf of Guinea States to chart a
geostrategic future based on the sea. This leads us into an investigation
of the contemporary value and strategic derivatives of the Gulf of Guinea
and its maritime space.

2.5

A GEOSTRATEGIC FUTURE IN THE OCEAN
There is a tide in the affairs of men, which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune.
Omitted, all the voyage of their life is bound in shallows and in miseries. On such a
full sea are we now afloat. And we must take the current when it serves, or lose our
ventures. Shakespeare105

The Gulf of Guinea remains a region of great importance. In fact, global
interest in the region is on the rise, and the maritime domain is once
again central to this strategic outlook. The analysis of the contemporary
105
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status of the Gulf of Guinea will be discussed with reference to four
specific areas: international trade and shipping, oil and gas resources,
marine living resources, and finally, submarine cables and pipelines.

2.5.1 International Trade and Shipping
The world’s oceans remain the most important means for global trade,
with over 90 per cent of trade in goods and services being carried out by
sea.106 The emergence of containerised shipping has also made shipping
quicker and safer, thereby placing it at the heart of global trade and
transportation.107 The total volume of goods loaded on ships in 2010 was
8.4 billion tons, a 7 per cent increase from the previous year.108 Although
Africa’s share in overall maritime trade remains low (an estimated 7.5
per cent between 2006-2010, compared to, for example, 43 per cent for
Asia),109 maritime trade is still the most critical determinant of socioeconomic development and long term stability in the Gulf of Guinea.
This is demonstrated by an analysis of export and import trade in the
region.

2.5.1.1

Export Trade

As in the case of many other developing economies, Gulf of Guinea
States derive a substantial part of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
106
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from the export of cash crops and mineral resources, but are also steadily
increasing their share of trade in non-traditional products like pineapples,
pawpaw and mangoes to both traditional and emerging markets.110 The
tropical weather of the region, combined with its lush rainforests,
ensures high yields of cocoa, cotton, groundnuts, shea-nuts and timber.
Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana produce more than half of the world’s cocoa.111
Other States in the region also contribute substantially to global trade in
cocoa. Between 2010 and 2011, global production of cocoa was
estimated to have increased to a record figure of 4.3 million tonnes, with
3.2 million tonnes or 80 per cent being produced by Cote d’Ivoire,
Ghana, Nigeria and Cameroon.

112

The Gulf of Guinea also abounds in

precious stones and minerals.113 The world’s largest deposit of cobalt is
in DR Congo. 114Other mineral endowments in the region include gold,
diamonds and titanium, as well as dense minerals like iron, bauxite and
manganese. These resources attract significant interest and investment,
even in the midst of conflict and instability. 115 Table 2.2 represents the
maritime trade of Gulf of Guinea States from 2006 to 2010. 116
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Table 2.2:

Seaborne Trade in the Gulf of Guinea 2006-2010

Year
Crude

2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

224.6
232.8
246.0
233.7
220.8

Goods Loaded
Products Dry Cargo

15.2
12.9
14.9
12.5
11.1

46.1
54.3
63.2
49.9
63.0

Total

285.7
300.0
324.5
295.6
295.6

Crude

Millions of tons
7.5
10.4
8.5
8.9
8.4

Goods Unloaded
Products Dry Cargo

15.9
19.0
16.3
13.5
13.7

69.7
75.5
70.4
77.1
87.6

Total

93.2
104.9
94.3
99.3
115.8

Source: UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport 2011.

A comparison of the import and export figures above makes the Gulf of
Guinea region a net volume exporter of goods. The total goods exported
for the five year period is about three times the quantity of imports. 117 It
is significant that dry cargo exports increased from 46.1 million tons in
2006 to 63 million tons in 2010, whilst exports of other products has
been at appreciably high levels. The point to draw from these statistics is
that maritime trade and shipping is contributing substantially to export
drive, and a number of important interpretations can be made from this
broad fact.

The first is that the sustainability of export trade is fundamental to the
economies of Gulf of Guinea States. Export trade drives domestic
production, generates employment, builds private capital, and it is also
an essential source of revenue and foreign exchange for governments.118
Second, at the social level, export trade is vital to the wellbeing of
citizens in the region. For example, poverty in Ghana’s cocoa producing
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areas remains very low compared to the rest of the country. 119 This
positive development has a direct relationship with shipping, as the
cocoa produced by these communities is integrated into global maritime
trade, translating into a better standard of living for these communities
and increasing the profile of the standard of living at the national
level.120 This will certainly aggregate into positive regional development
in the future. Therefore, while the Gulf of Guinea is satisfying global
needs with its exports, international trade and shipping is providing
revenue and foreign exchange earnings for the region, which is crucial
for regional security and stability. The stability and development of the
Gulf of Guinea region is thus tied to the safety and security of
international shipping.

2.5.1.2

Import Trade

The other side of the global trade equation in the Gulf of Guinea is
import trade. The region’s share of consumption of global goods and
services is on the rise, from 93.2 million tons in 2006 to 115 million tons
in 2010. Imports of dry cargo, including food and other industrial
products, rose from 69.7 million tons in 2006 to 87.6 million tons in
2010, while the import of refined crude for domestic and industrial use
went up by about 10 per cent within the same period. These rising
imports may be interpreted in two ways: as a positive reflection of a
119
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burgeoning middle class which has increased purchasing power, or a
stern warning of the region’s increasing dependence on external sources
for its livelihood. However, both conclusions reiterate the importance of
maritime trade as the primary mode for obtaining food and other basic
necessities. Significantly, the import figures cement the Gulf of Guinea
as an important market for the consumption of global goods.

2.5.1.3

Transit Trade of Landlocked States

The landlocked States of the Gulf of Guinea are equally dependent on
international trade and shipping for economic growth and development.
The main ports which are used to transfer goods to and from landlocked
States are the Port of Abidjan in Cote d’Ivoire, the Port of Duala in
Cameroon, the Port of Lome in Togo, and the Port of Tema in Ghana.
Available figures show that roughly 4 per cent of the total cargo handled
by these five ports in 2006 was transit cargo,121 and in 2008 the Port of
Tema handled an estimated 865,000 tons of transit cargo from
neighbouring landlocked States.122 It is important to note that the
landlocked States of the Gulf of Guinea region also export a substantial
quantity of goods for the international market. For example, exports of
cotton from landlocked States in the ECOWAS sub-region accounted for
5 per cent of the global total in 2006.123 These statistics indicate that
maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea is as important to landlocked
States as it is for their coastal counterparts.
121
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2.5.2 The Gulf of Guinea and Global Energy Security
Oil and gas resources form the bedrock of global energy security.
Indeed, the network of global transportation (cars, aeroplanes, trains and
ships), depend on oil and gas, as does the military. 124 Although there are
attempts to reduce dependence on fossil fuels (petroleum, coal and
natural gas), petroleum remains the world’s leading fuel, representing
33.6 per cent of global energy consumption.125 In recent times, demand
for liquid natural gas (LNG) has also outpaced fossil fuels like coal,
owing to its environmentally friendly profile.126 There are two critical
determinants of global oil and gas energy security: first, the volume of
reserves and supplies, and second, the ability to protect and ensure
regular supplies. In the current global setting, the Gulf of Guinea
commands both, with the region possessing additional advantages over
other regions.127 It is estimated that global dependence on the Gulf of
Guinea for oil and gas supplies will rise by 30 per cent by 2040.128

The rest of this section examines the significance of the Gulf of Guinea
to global energy security. It will analyse the oil and gas reserves in the
region and the comparative advantage of the Gulf of Guinea as a source
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of global energy security. The section will also examine the oil and gas
interests of key global players in the Gulf of Guinea, and conclude with a
discussion of oil power politics, as well as associated governance and
security challenges.

2.5.2.1

Gulf of Guinea Oil and Gas Reserves

Global interest in the Gulf of Guinea has increased tremendously, largely
due to vast discoveries of offshore oil and gas resources.

129

For many

years, sizeable oil and gas reserves have been limited to a few regions,
such as the Middle East, the Caspian Basin, the North Sea and the
Americas.130 Studies, however, indicate that the African continent has
major oil reserves, particularly in the offshore and deep-water areas of
the Gulf of Guinea.131 The discovery of oil offshore Congo-Brazzaville
in 1969 gave some indication of the region’s oil and gas potential, but
the extent of such potential remained uncertain until the first deep-water
oil discovery in offshore Angola in 1996.132 Since then, oil and gas
discoveries in the ultra-deep water areas across the region have
continued to occur, while onshore discoveries have also sharply risen.133
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Nigeria has the ninth highest oil reserves in the world,134 with its daily
production of over 2 million barrels in 2010 placing it in the top three oil
producing nations according to the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC).135 Angola’s estimated output of 1.8 million
barrels is also one of the highest in the world, and projections are for
Angola to reach a daily output of 2 million barrels in 2014.136 Nigeria
and Angola, together with Congo-Brazzaville and Gabon, are mature oil
producers, with a large part of their reserves and production being
generated from offshore operations. In 2004, major oil reserves
discovered in offshore Equatorial Guinea signalled that the region had
become a key oil producing region. 137

The landlocked State of Chad is also a significant oil player on the world
stage. It is estimated that Chad has oil reserves exceeding 900 million
barrels, and its oil is carried by a pipeline from Doba in Chad to the
Cameroonian coastal town, Kribi.138 The 663 mile pipeline, which cost
approximately $US4.2 billion, is owned by a consortium consisting of
ExxonMobile, ChevronTexaco and Petronas, and is regarded as the
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single most expensive private investment in Africa.139 Cameroon’s oil
industry, which declined in the 1990s because of waning land-based
reserves, has recently recovered due to an injection of funds following
the discovery of new oil reserves in its offshore areas.140

Benin, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana
have also become oil producing States, further raising the oil profile of
the Gulf of Guinea. Ghana announced its first oil discovery in 2005, and
since then more discoveries have been made.141 According to the
International Energy Outlook of 2011, Ghana’s budding offshore oil
industry made a positive contribution to global energy resource levels,
and the trend is expected to continue.142There have also been reports of
offshore oil discoveries in Sierra Leone as well,143 while both Senegal
and Guinea have onshore oil fields, which strongly indicate that the two
States may reap the benefits of the deep-water potential of the Gulf of
Guinea.144 The proven oil reserves for selected Gulf of Guinea States as
139
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at 2011 is contained in Table 2.3 below. The significant thing to note e is
that the oil reserves in the Gulf of Guinea have tripled from 20.4 million
barrels in 1990 to 59.22 million barrels in 2011. Almost all the States
that have proven oil reserves also have huge deposits of gas, and in the
case of Cote d’Ivoire, its proven gas reserves exceed its oil reserves.145
Table 2.3:

Proven Oil Reserves of Gulf of Guinea Sates
1990

2000

2009

2010

2011146

Billion Barrels
Angola

1.6

6.0

13.5

13.5

13.5

Congo Brazzaville

0.8

1.7

1.9

1.9

1.9

0.8

1.7

1.7

1.7

Equatorial Guinea
Gabon

0.9

2.4

3.7

3.7

3.7

Nigeria

17.1

29.0

37.2

37.2

37.2

Benin

0.08

0.08

Cameroon

0.20

0.20

DR Congo

0.18

0.18

Ghana

0.01

0.66

Cote d’Ivoire

0.10

0.10

58.7

59.22

Total of Estimates

20.4

39.9

58.0

Sources: Angola to Nigeria, BP Statistical Review of Energy Outlook June 2011
Benin to Cote d’Ivoire, Oil & Gas Journal, vol. 108, No. 46, Dec 2010

2.5.2.2

Comparative Advantages and Security of Gulf of

Guinea Oil and Gas Reserves
Apart from having substantial oil reserves and the ability to meet the
increasing demands of the global energy market, the Gulf of Guinea oil
industry has several advantages over oil industries in other regions. In
terms of quality, the oil from the region is classified as “sweet oil” due to
145
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its low sulphur content, the low cost of refining the oil, and its limited
environmental harm.147 Moreover, the region’s deep water exploration is
regarded as the new frontier of energy security. There are two reasons
for this. First, the absence of human habitation in the deep waters of the
Gulf of Guinea renders the entire offshore area an exploitable zone.
Second, problems with older technology which were previously seen as
an impediment for extracting deep water reserves have been
overcome.148 The advent of new technology in the oil and gas industry
has allowed the production, storage and processing of oil to take place
offshore. Congo-Brazzaville is the first State in the world to boast a
state-of-the-art system known as a Floating, Drilling, Production,
Storage and Offloading (FDPSO) System.149

The Gulf of Guinea also enjoys great advantages over other oil
producing regions with respect to transportation. As noted by one energy
expert: “There is a lot of excitement about West Africa oil industry, its
politics may be complex but transportation and logistics are easier than
the Persian Gulf.”150 This remark points to three distinct advantages of
the Gulf of Guinea oil industry. First, the ease with which the oil can be
exploited, processed, and loaded directly onto ships, compared to other
regions where the resources are on land or in shallow waters. Second, the
close proximity of the region to both Europe and the US, which are the
147
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two major centres for oil consumption and trade worldwide. And third,
unlike other regions, where vessels carrying oil have to pass through
narrow straits or chokepoints (with attendant safety and security
concerns),151 the open nature of the Gulf of Guinea makes it suitable and
safe for use by all ships, including very large oil carriers.152

There are three additional advantages of the Gulf of Guinea oil and gas
industry. First, since production is offshore, the operation as a whole
suffers less risk of being disrupted by civil unrest or violent attacks.153
Second, the Gulf of Guinea oil and gas industry has led to a
diversification of supply and dependency, a crucial determinant of
energy security. With the exception of Nigeria and Angola, none of the
Gulf of Guinea oil States are members of the Organization for Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC). Non-OPEC States have flexibility with
regard to both output levels and the direction of trade.154 It is also
unlikely that there will be a general embargo of oil supplies by these
States.155 Third, market and investment analysts have noted that financial
151
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arrangements offered to transnational oil companies in the Gulf of
Guinea, including higher shareholding and tax exemptions, are more
favourable compared to other regions.156

The above analysis underscores the strategic value of the Gulf of Guinea
region in the context of global energy security. Indeed, energy security
has become fundamental in the conceptualisation of security and
maritime security partnerships in the Gulf of Guinea.157 It is thus
necessary to review the oil and gas interests of key global States in the
region, as well as the transnational energy corporations that are reaping
substantial benefits. Indeed, such a review will serve as the background
to Chapter 6, which assesses the strategic underpinnings of international
support to maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea.

2.5.2.3

United States Oil and Gas Interest in the Gulf of Guinea

The United States (US) is highly dependent on fossil fuels as a source of
energy, with the US Department of Defence being the largest single
consumer of oil and gas stocks.158 Access to oil is therefore a matter of
national security, but despite many years of oil diplomacy in the Middle
East, US energy security in the region is still threatened by political
instability, religious conflict and terrorist activities.159 These factors,
156
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combined with other problems, have compelled Washington to seek
innovative solutions to energy security.160
United States oil diplomacy in the Gulf of Guinea was ushered in by the
visit of US Secretary of State Colin Powell to Angola and Gabon in
September 2002.161 Not long after Powell’s visit, President Bush met
with leaders of oil producing countries in the region.162 These moves
coincided with expert projections of an increase in global energy
reserves, especially from deep water explorations in the Gulf of
Guinea.163 Current indications are that the Gulf of Guinea region will
provide 25 per cent of US oil imports by 2015 and 40 per cent by
2025.164

To fortify its energy security, the US will have to first secure access to
reserves. Given its free market orientation, this task has been indirectly
consigned to Corporate America. It should thus come as no surprise that
US oil companies are mapped across the Gulf of Guinea.
ChevronTexaco pumps about 60 per cent of Angolan oil, and also has a

160
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major presence in Congo-Brazzaville.165 ExxonMobil, the world’s
largest oil company, and Amerada Hess and Marathon, both US
companies, are prime movers in Equatorial Guinea’s oil industry.
ExxonMobil and Chevron also have a presence in São Tomé and
Príncipe, and are equally seeking a considerable stake in Nigeria’s oil
and gas industry.166 There are also reports of ExxonMobile trying to
acquire a stake in Ghana’s offshore Jubilee Fields.167 These energy
interests partly underline the maritime security interest and activities of
the US in the Gulf of Guinea that will be examined in chapter seven.

2.5.2.4.

Oil and Gas Interest of the European Union in the Gulf

of Guinea
Member States of the European Union (EU) are highly dependent on oil
and gas imports for domestic consumption.168 In 2011 for example, the
EU imported an estimated 80 and 60 per cent of its oil and gas
consumption respectively.169 Unlike the US that has substantial domestic
oil and gas reserves, the EU has limited reserves, and local gas
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production in particular has declined over the years.170 Meanwhile, there
is a shift away from the use of coal towards oil and gas in a bid to
address climate change, with gas being the preferred energy resource.171
This has made the EU increasingly dependent on Russian gas supplies,
with the concomitant concern that Moscow may use its privileged
position as a provider of renewable energy resources as a strategic
weapon.172
To fortify its energy security, individual EU States as well the Union’s
executive arm – the EU Commission – is looking at both renewal energy
and emerging sources such as the Gulf of Guinea.173 Nigeria and
Equatorial Guinea are among the top eleven members of the Gas
Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), also known as Gas-OPEC, which
controls an enormous share of the global gas market.174 As indicated
earlier, Cote d’Ivoire is also making substantial gas discoveries, and
many of the oil producing States in the region are moving from flaring
gas to harnessing it for export.175 In strategic terms, therefore, the Gulf of
Guinea is not just seen as a region that can help meet the quantity and
quality of EU’s energy requirements , but also as a region that can help
diffuse the EU’s gas dependency on Russia.
170
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Twenty two per cent of the total oil and gas production in the Gulf of
Guinea is traded and consumed in the EU.176 In terms of specific EU
States, the French company TotalFinaElf controls large offshore oil
activities in Congo, and also has sizeable investments in the offshore
fields of Angola, Gabon, Cote d’Ivoire and DR Congo.177 Perenco (an
Anglo-French oil and gas Company), has extensive investments in
Cameroon’s offshore fields.178 Other examples of EU corporate interests
in the region include Shell (Dutch), which controls almost half of
Nigeria’s production; Eni (Italy) and Maersk (Denmark), which have
substantial offshore oil productions in Angola; and Tullow (Ireland), the
operator of Ghana’s offshore Jubilee fields.179 Moreover, in 2011 and
2013, Eni announced that it had made multiple energy resource
discoveries in offshore Ghana.180

2.5.2.5

China’s Energy Activities in the Gulf of Guinea

In the past two decades, China has been on the path of rapid
development and industrialisation. This growth, coupled with high
household demands, has resulted in an insatiable need for all types of
energy – coal, gas and oil. Chinese energy consumption increased by
176
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11.2 per cent in 2010, and with a net consumption of 20.3 per cent of the
global total, in 2011 China surpassed the US as the world’s largest
energy consumer.181 Based on current trends, China’s share of global
energy is projected to grow to 150 per cent by 2020.182 Although China
produces oil and gas domestically, the nation’s production is woefully
insufficient compared to its consumption.183 Thus, just as the Sino-Soviet
split in 1960 created energy supply challenges for China, and major
efforts had to be made to change the tide, China has reverted to a similar
position of vulnerability.184 This has led to an intense search for energy
supplies beyond the Middle East. 185
As in the case of the US, China’s focus is now on Africa to secure longterm energy supplies.186 Indeed, in 2005 China’s oil import dependence
on Africa exceeded 30 per cent, and this figure is expected to increase to
50 per cent by 2020.187 China has a two-prong approach to securing
current and future energy security in the Gulf of Guinea. The first is to
invest in oil exploration, the second is to secure oil supplies as part of
181
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loan arrangements with governments. China’s State-owned companies China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), China National
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and China Petroleum and Chemical
Corporation (Sinopec), are competitively acquiring oil reserves across
the region.188 The entry of Chinese oil companies into the Gulf of Guinea
commenced in 1997, when CNPC acquired exploration licences in the
Chad Basin, followed by two oil blocs in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region in
1998.189 This opened the way for more acquisition of offshore acreage
and an expansion of Chinese corporate oil trading across the Gulf of
Guinea.190 A substantial part of the national share of the annual oil
production of Congo-Brazzaville is now being bought by CNPC, whilst
Sinopec has purchased a major stake in the SIR refinery in Cote
d’Ivoire.191

China’s “loans for oil” diplomacy started in the Gulf of Guinea, with a
package of US$2 billion to Angola in 2004. This allowed Sinopec to bid
for two deep water blocs off the Angolan coast.
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case of this Chinese scheme is the Government of Ghana entering into an
arrangement for a US$3 billion Chinese loan, the re-payment terms of
which include the supply of oil to China.194

2.5.2.6

Oil Power, Governance and Maritime Security

The analysis in this section demonstrates that the Gulf of Guinea is a key
player in securing global energy needs, and it is likely that this will be
the case into the foreseeable future. Indeed, this situation has increased
the visibility of the region on the world stage, placing it on the edge of a
geopolitical renaissance.195 This geopolitical regeneration presents
economic and political advantages to the region. Whereas growth in
other parts of the world has waned in recent years (and particularly from
2009 to 2011), the average rate of economic growth in the Gulf of
Guinea has remained high, mostly due to favourable oil and gas trade.196
Angola, Congo Brazzaville and Gabon - all of which are highly
dependent on offshore oil production, experienced a rate of economic
growth exceeding ten per cent.197 According to development analysts,
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these economic indicators are translating into job creation and a fast
growing middle class.198
On the flipside, the Gulf of Guinea’s newfound oil wealth and economic
potential also calls for a degree of caution. If the lessons of history are
anything to go by, the exploitation of the region’s oil and gas resources
can lead to gaping governance challenges, potentially outweighing any
socio-economic gains.199 In fact, years of exploitation of mineral
resources has hardly benefitted Gulf of Guinea States. On the contrary, it
has instigated conflicts in Angola, DR Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone,
just to name a few, and there is no reason to believe an oil resource
boom would produce a different result. 200 Indeed, Nigeria is in its fourth
decade of oil exploration and wealth, yet the country is still at the bottom
of the global development index. While the country has enjoyed
considerable oil wealth, a large proportion of Nigeria’s population lives
in poverty, while corruption is rife within political spheres and the
governing class.201 Oil has also brooded conflict and crime in the Niger
Delta region, with consequences beyond Nigeria.202 Equatorial Guinea
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and Gabon also face similar governance challenges, with long term
implications for stability.203

The second major concern is the realpolitik of oil power. The muchtalked about geopolitical renaissance of the Gulf of Guinea may have
other, more significant implications. Many commentators view the Gulf
of Guinea as the new political battleground of the US and other rising
powers, especially China.204 As these States are frantically trying to
secure their energy security in the region, oil diplomacy is ongoing for
both States, partnerships are being forged, and in some cases arms sales
and defence support is added to the equation.205 While the US and China
have been given visibility in commentaries and discussions, the
historical analysis of the Gulf of Guinea presented in this chapter, and
the political reality of the region, still make European States (especially
France) a major force in the Gulf of Guinea.206 These competing external
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interests can strain regional cohesion, create conflict among States, and
turn the region once again into a sphere of major power rivalries. 207

Although the aforementioned geopolitical and governance challenges
deserve attention, and must be factored into the wider dialogue of
development and stability in the Gulf of Guinea, this thesis proceeds on
the optimistic note that, Gulf of Guinea States can harness both petrodollars and petro-power to project and develop the region. A key
imperative for achieving this is effective regional maritime security
cooperation. Indeed, such cooperation must be fostered between States in
the region to deal with increasing threats to critical offshore energy
infrastructure.208

2.5.3 Gulf of Guinea Marine Living Resources
Marine living resources are a vital component of the maritime estate of
the Gulf of Guinea.
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In the 1970s, when there was little scientific

information about the offshore oil and gas potential of the Gulf of
Guinea, fisheries resources were the major motivation for Gulf of Guinea
States, and indeed other African States, seeking to extend their
jurisdiction and control further into sea. This issue was canvassed at the
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Third United Nations Conference on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS III), 210
and resulted in the recognition of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
The EEZ regime offers Gulf of Guinea States sovereign rights over
living resources up to 200 nautical miles from their baselines.211

2.5.3.1

Socio-economic Importance of Fisheries

Location, climatic situations and sea conditions are also important
determinants of fish productivity.212 Luckily, the Gulf of Guinea is
situated close to the equator, where the natural upwelling of the sea
supports very high fish productivity, especially from Sierra Leone to
Mauritania. 213 In addition to shrimp and other demersal species, the Gulf
of Guinea is very rich in pelagic stocks such as sardine and tuna, which
are important for both industrial and artisanal fishing sectors.214 In terms
of revenue, Senegal, Gambia and Sierra are net exporters of fish, and
their fisheries revenue contribution to overall export merchandise in
2008 was 9.7 per cent, 6.9 per cent and 4.7 per cent respectively.215
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Although fisheries may have a less direct contribution to foreign
exchange revenue compared to offshore oil and gas resources, fisheries
nonetheless support broader socio-economic development in the Gulf of
Guinea. The first element of the wider impact of fishing is on food
security.216 Inadequate food, including sources of protein, is a key threat
to the survival and food security of many people in developing
countries.217 The contribution of fish to dietary protein requirements
ranges from 34.4 per cent in DR Congo to 63.9 per cent in Ghana, and is
as high as about 80 per cent in São Tomé and Príncipe.218 Fishing is also
a source of employment for coastal communities, and recent data shows
a positive reduction in poverty across most fishing communities in the
Gulf of Guinea. 219 In this regard, it is significant that women who would
otherwise have no source of income, and thus suffer serious challenges
relating to food, health care, child care and mortality, are empowered by
the fish trade.220 The New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD)
and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – two strategic
instruments aimed at improving the livelihood of people in Africa - have
216
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noted the centrality of sustainable fisheries to the human security needs
of the continent.221 When judiciously managed, the fishing sector can
also engineer the growth of other sectors of the economy, including food
processing and fertilizer industries.222

2.5.3.2

External Interest in Gulf of Guinea Fisheries

Although fisheries resources within the EEZ are generally subject to the
control of Gulf of Guinea States, there are nonetheless major foreign
interests in fisheries as well. The reasons for this are found in the legal
framework of UNCLOS, as well as the specific arrangements entered
into by Gulf of Guinea States.

First, Articles 63 and 64 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS) stipulate special management and access regimes for
the category of fisheries known as shared species and highly migratory
species. Tuna, which is of very high economic value, falls within the
category of highly migratory species. The result of this categorisation is
that these species do not fall under the exclusive control of Gulf of
Guinea States. Therefore, States outside the Gulf of Guinea have access
rights to tuna in the region, with the access quotas being managed within
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the framework of the International Commission for the Conservation of
Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT).223
The second reason for foreign interest in Gulf of Guinea marine living
resources is partly economic and partly historical. The historical
connection between EU States and the Gulf of Guinea is not just limited
to politics, but entails a unique fisheries relationship. Indeed, most EU
States have fishing licensing and access arrangements in the Gulf of
Guinea.

224

In recent times, however, other distant fishing nations,

especially China, Korea and Taiwan, have managed to secure fishing
access arrangements with Gulf of Guinea States. This has contorted the
interest in fisheries and created competition in the region, with serious
implications for maritime security and maritime security cooperation in
the Gulf of Guinea.225

2.5.4

Submarine Cables and Pipelines

Though less discussed in comparison to other issues, the sea is the most
important medium for bridging the technology gap in the Gulf of
Guinea. The exponential growth of technology and telecommunications
infrastructure in the region in the last decade demonstrates that the
223
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regime governing submarine cables (as set out in UNCLOS) is being
utilised.226 Submarine cables have long been recognised as the most
reliable, effective and cheapest form of transmitting voice and data
information, and hence UNCLOS recognises the right of all States to lay
submarine cables.227 But for many years neither the governments of Gulf
of Guinea States nor private sector actors took full opportunity of the
right, resulting in a digital gap in the region and thus high cost for
telecommunication services.228

However, the seascape is now changing, with more subsea cables
landing in the region.229 This breakthrough started with the arrival of the
South Atlantic 3/West Africa (SAT 3) Cable in 2001, connecting eight
States in the Gulf of Guinea. These States include Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon,
Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal.230 The Main One Cable and the Glo Cable
landed in 2010, with mega bandwidths connecting the region with other
head cables in Portugal and the United Kingdom.
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cables landed in 2012 - the West Africa Cable System (WACS)232 and
the Africa Coast to Europe (ACE) System.233 These cables have allowed
the Gulf of Guinea to engage in faster, more efficient communication. At
the same time, they represent costly investments involving global
companies and strategic partnerships.

Given the centrality of communication and technology to the modern
world, the protection and security of these cables is as important as the
protection afforded to traditional maritime interests such as shipping. A
related piece of critical offshore infrastructure in the Gulf of Guinea is
the West Africa gas pipeline.234 This 678 kilometre pipeline, which cost
an estimated US$1 billion to construct and install, carries gas from
Nigeria to Benin, Togo and Ghana. This gas is heavily relied on for
electricity production in both the domestic and industrial sector.235

2.6

CONCLUSION

The analysis in this chapter has demonstrated that the Gulf of Guinea is a
region of great strategic importance – both historically and in
contemporary times. Indeed, the region remains an integral part of the
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global system of maritime trade, and its sea routes connect and sustain
international shipping. Exports and imports are important sources of
revenue and foreign exchange for Gulf of Guinea States, and are also
pivotal to realising the socio-economic requirements of the region,
including food security.

The analysis also demonstrates that while fisheries resources continue to
make a substantial contribution to the socio-economic development of
Gulf of Guinea States, offshore oil and gas reserves have more of a
strategic importance for the region. Indeed, current and future global
energy security depends on the secure exploitation of the enormous
reserves that the region holds. Governments in the Gulf of Guinea also
have an opportunity to address the developmental deficits in the region
through the judicious application of oil and gas revenue. The realisation
of these shared objectives depends on effective maritime security.
However, the analysis has also revealed that there are competing
regional and external interests at stake in the Gulf of Guinea, and these
constitute important variables for understanding the dynamics of
maritime security cooperation in the region.

The analysis has therefore provided the background for analysing
maritime security dynamics in the rest of the thesis. The next chapter
will demonstrate that there are mounting insecurities in the Gulf of
Guinea which threaten the strategic imperatives and socio-economic
opportunities analysed in this chapter. The analysis will be scoped within
an analytical framework that focuses on the concept of security, and
following on from that, the concept of maritime security. Proceeding in
this way will allow a link to be forged between, on the one hand, the
73

historical and strategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea region, and on
the other, the emerging tensions and shortfalls in the construction of a
durable maritime security agenda that will equitably bind the interests of
actors.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE CONCEPT OF MARITIME SECURITY AND AN
OVERVIEW OF MARITIME SECURITY CHALLENGES
IN THE GULF OF GUINEA
3.1

INTRODUCTION

This chapter has two primary objectives. It will examine the concept of
maritime security and its application in the Gulf of Guinea region. The
chapter will also analyse maritime security challenges in the Gulf of
Guinea and their implications for national, regional and global security.
The chapter is organised in four parts. First, the chapter will examine the
concept of security in the field of security studies and its relevance to
maritime security cooperation. Second, the chapter will analyse various
approaches to the concept of maritime security, and in doing so, adopt an
independent approach to the evolution of the concept of maritime
security. Third, the chapter will develop an analytical framework for
maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea. Finally, the chapter
will provide an overview of maritime security challenges in the Gulf of
Guinea and their implications for national, regional and global security.

3.2

RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN

THE

CONCEPT

OF

SECURITY AND MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION
Maritime security cooperation entails the collective pursuit of “security”
by States in a maritime context. Indeed, the presumption is that
cooperating States have common security interests to protect. This raises
two fundamental questions. First, what is the meaning of security in the
context of interstate relations? Second, can States share a concept of
75

security, or have common security interests? Several other issues can
then be raised from these two questions: by what process or means is the
cooperation being pursued? What are the prevailing threats to the
security? What are the objectives of security cooperation? And, for
whom and what purpose is security being sought?

To answer the above questions, it is necessary to examine the concept of
security in the field of international security studies, as well as its
relationship with the notion of maritime security cooperation.

3.2.1 A State-Centric Approach to the Concept of Security
The traditional view of security has been espoused by realist schools of
international security studies. According to this view, ‘security’ is a
state-centric concept and an objective outcome of an anarchical society. 1
This view of security has two strands - classical and revisionist.

Classical realism views interstate relations as intrinsically anarchical due
to the absence of a commanding sovereign.2 Thus, self-interest and
power are the most relevant considerations, with States being in
competition with each other to maximise their autonomously defined
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interest.3 In this environment, the chief security interest of a State
becomes its national security, which is threatened by the interests,
policies, ambitions and values of other States.4 Therefore, the ability of a
State to defend itself against another State, or at the very least dissuade
the other State from attacking it, becomes a measure of its security. 5 It is
in this sense that security is referred to as the “irreducible minimum, the
necessary element of…interests vis-à-vis other units.”6 To guarantee this
irreducible minimum, States must maintain enough military might to
withstand adversaries, or enter into alliances with other States.7 But since
power is dynamic in nature, and alliances can be fragile, it is clear that
there can be no permanent guarantee of security.8 Also, the very
measures designed to achieve security yield insecurity, resulting in a
“security dilemma” where real security becomes an illusion, or at best is
merely transient.9
3
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The second strand of the traditional approach to security is equally statecentric, but its main focus is on sovereignty and territorial integrity.10
Security in this setting is judged by the ability of a State to extend or
maintain control over its territorial boundaries. This view of security still
puts emphasis on the military and related institutions.

11

In short, in a

state-centric approach to security, issues such as the balance of power,
deterrence and sovereignty, become sub-elements in the dialogue on
security construction. It is this traditional view of security that has
dominated the field of international security studies for most of the
twenty-first century.

3.2.2 Broader Concept of Security
Some international relations schools, however, have not shared the statecentric view of security. These dissenting interpretations have affirmed
that society is not as violent as the realist approach proclaims.12
Proponents of this contrary view argue that, in practice, States can
accommodate each other and are very much concerned with threats and
security outcomes outside of war.13 This broader approach to security
Joshua H. Ho and Sam Bateman, eds., The Evolving Maritime Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific :
maritime doctrines and nuclear weapons at sea Singapore, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies,
2006.
10

Jessica T. Matthews, "Redefining Security," Foreign Affairs 68, 1989, pp. 162-77. Richard H.
Ullman, "Redefining Security," International Security 8 1983, pp. 129-53. Martin Shaw, "There Is No
Such Thing as Society: Beyond Individualism and Statism in International Security Studies," Review
of International Studies 19, 1993, pp. 159-75.
11

Michael Sheehan, "Military Security", in Alan Collins, ed. Contemporary Security Studies Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 147-59, p.50. See also Alan Collins, The security dilemmas of
Southeast Asia, New York, Macmillan, 2000. Kenneth N. Waltz, Realism and International Politics,
New York, Routledge, 2008.
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This group is led by Robert Keohan and Charles Doyle, see Robert O. Keohane, International
Institutions and State Power, Boulder, Westview Press, 1989. Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and
Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism, New York, Norton 1997.
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has gained prominence since the end of the Cold War,14 and emphasises
the stress caused by security threats, as well as the preference for
multilateralism as a source of security and stability. 15 This approach to
security has been espoused in the 1994 Human Development Report, as
well as the 1995 Report of the Commission on Global Governance,
where security is viewed as a “public good.”

16

According to this

conception, security should yield societal benefits, such as enhancing
people’s livelihoods and affirming human dignity, and should also be
understood both as an ingredient of socio-economic development and a
measure of progress. Over time, this notion has moulded into the concept
of human security.17

This fundamental shift in the notion of security has facilitated other
important interpretations of the concept. Research has shown that the
main threats to human health and safety are not military attacks or
interstate conflicts, but basic issues such as food shortages,
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University Press, 1994). “The Report of the Commission on Global Governance,” United Nations,
1995. See also "The UN’s Role in Global Governance," Ralph Bunche Institute for International
Studies Briefing Note No. 15, August 2009.
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World, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2003, pp. 15-39, Barbara von Tigerstrom, Human
Security and International Law: Prospects and Problems Oxford Hart Publishing, 2007. David
Roberts, "Human Security or Human Insecurity? Moving the Debate Forward," Security Dialogue 37,
2006, pp. 249-61. Astri Suhke, "Human Security and the Interest of States," Security Dialogue 30, 3,
1999, pp. 265-76. Neil S. MacFarlane and Yuen F. Khong, Human Security and the UN: A Critical
History, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2006.
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environmental disasters, epidemics and violent crimes.18 This wider
interpretation of security threats has been emphasised by the 2004 UN
High-level Panel Report on Threats and Challenges, as well as the 2005
UN Secretary General Report on Development and Security. 19 The
concept of security has since expanded to cover food security,
environmental security and threats from non-State actors.20 Despite
criticism being levelled against the concept of human security and its
subfields, it continues to form part of international security discourse.21

3.2.3 Embedded Elements in the Concept of Security
Before examining some embedded elements in the concept of security, it
is important to clarify two issues. The first concerns the relationship
between the traditional approach to the concept of security and its
restatements. It must be made clear that the shift in emphasis in the
concept of security should not be interpreted as a rejection of, or a
decline in, the role of States in providing security. Indeed, States remain
at the centre of seeking and promoting security, but this is not an end in
itself, but rather a means of protecting the interests of citizens and
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Daniel Deudney and Richard Matthew, Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New
Environmental Politics, New York, State University Press, 1999, pp. 61-187.
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environmental security, see Marc A. Levy, "Is the Environment a National Security Issue?,"
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society in general.22 Thus, in the evolution of the concept of security, it
is only recently that other important elements of security have been
recognised – elements that were originally ignored or not prioritised.23 It
is this broader understanding of security, where the policies and
decisions of States are subject to questioning, that ensures that the
security needs of citizens and the international system as a whole are
satisfied.24

The second point to clarify is the meaning of specific terms, such as
‘threat’ and ‘challenges.’ Generally, the word ‘threat’ is used to signify a
fear or anxiety over possible harm.25 However, in the context of security
studies, a ‘threat’ refers to the probability of damage to the values or
vital interests of a State, a community of States, or society. 26 Drawing on
the earlier discussion on the concept of security, it is evident that the
terms “security threats” and “security challenges” are largely
22

Barry Buzan, "Peace, Power and Security: Contending Concepts in the Study of International
Relations," Journal of Peace Research 21, 1984, pp. 109-25, David A. Baldwin, "The concept of
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synonymous, and represent strands of a common security concern. With
these clarifications, we can proceed to analyse the embedded elements in
the concept of security.

To give practical effect to the concept of security, its various subelements or constituents must be examined. Indeed, Barry Buzan has
noted that the concept of security is less relevant unless it has a frame of
reference.27 For this reason, Buzan has advocated the idea of “levels of
security” and “dimensions of security” as tools for understanding and
applying the concept of security.28 “Levels of security” comprise
individual security (i.e. the security of groups and communities),
national security and international security.29 Since the end of the Cold
War, however, regional institutions have become veritable sources of
security, and the international system as a whole is viewed as consisting
of regions.30 Therefore, the typology of levels of security should include
regional security.31 Buzan also conceives of security as having three
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Wheatsheaf, 1983.
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security at sea, Centre for Strategic Studies, New Zealand, Discussion Paper No. 07/09, 2009, p. 6.
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dimensions: societal security, economic security and environmental
security.32 It is prudent to add food security to this list, especially if we
view this dimension from the perspective of Gulf of Guinea States and
Third World countries in general.33 Indeed, food security has become
central to the global dialogue on survival and development, particularly
in light of declining food supplies, the increasing global population, and
the aggravating effect of environmental factors on agriculture and food
production.34

There are other applications of the concept of security which lie outside
traditional security studies, some of which are relevant for this thesis. A
typical example is the notion of transnational security threats or simply
transnational security.35 The focus of transnational security is on
organised crime, where the actors are not States but carry out their
activities across State boundaries.36 These organised groups or sub-state
actors, as they are known in the literature, are in fact contra-state because
their activities threaten the security of States and other dimensions or
31

David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World,
Pennsylvania, Penn State Press, 1997 p. 3. Barry Buzan has similarly recognised the importance of
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The Structure of International Security Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 219-253.
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levels of security.37 The ‘transnational security’ terminology has also
been used in environmental studies, where it is used interchangeably
with trans-boundary threats to refer to environmental impacts which are
felt beyond the place of origin of the incident.38

A question that logically flows from the above analysis is: what is the
interaction between the various levels or dimensions of security? In
answering this question, one must contemplate both vertical and
horizontal interactions. In practice, these levels of security may overlap
significantly, and should at times be expected to be in conflict with one
another.39 This is chiefly the case when individual security is posited
against national security, national security against regional or
international security, and also in balancing environmental security
concerns with national security.40 In all these instances, elements of
security are in competition with each other.

The above explanation of competing security interests introduces two
other important elements of the concept of security: the securitisation of
security and the notion of regime security. As is the case with other
security concepts, the debate on the securitisation of security is vast.
37

See Frank G. Madsen, Transnational Organized Crime, Abingdon Routledge, 2009. Sayaka
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According to the Copenhagen School of Security (which pioneered the
concept), the securitisation of security refers to the labelling of
something as a security threat in order to justify extraordinary
countermeasures or validate rule-breaking behaviour.41 While this
description of the concept is intelligible, further elucidation of the
concept by the School has been viewed with scepticism. 42 Nonetheless,
the concept provides an analytical framework for understanding the
struggle between different security concerns, particularly where the
pursuit of one security concern is used as a justification for curtailing
others, or where other equally important security concerns are deemed
less relevant by an actor because of specific preferences or interests.43

Unlike other forms of security, regime security has not received much
attention in the field of security studies. In terms of categorisation,
regime security sits within the wider discourse on regime survival
theory, and centres on the construction of security by political leaders for
the purpose of perpetuating their political power or gaining political
legitimacy.44 However, to avoid making this objective apparent, national
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security becomes the public facade or “mask”45 that is employed. A
prime example of regime security is the political preoccupation with
military expenditure, as well as the creation of institutions and structures
that protect the political elite.46 Another example is where leaders give
less credence to those aspects of security that have a wider societal
benefit, instead prioritising those aspects that directly benefit them. For
this reason, regime security is ubiquitous in States where there is
dictatorship, lack of accountability or where corruption is rife. Academic
discourse on regime security also extends to concerns on how to subject
security institutions in developing Countries, especially the military, to
democratic culture and governance.47

3.2.4 Concept of Security Cooperation
The concept of security cooperation could well be embodied in the
discussion on the elements that comprise the security concept. However,
it deserves a separate examination here since the thesis is focused on
regional security cooperation.

The theories of security analysed in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 are also
applicable to the idea of security cooperation. Indeed, opinions as to
whether interstate cooperation is possible or not, and the strength of the
Routledge, 2009. Amitav Acharya, "Human Security and Global Order", in John Baylis, Steve Smith
and Patricia Owens, eds. The Globalisation of World Politics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007.
45
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outcomes that can be achieved, largely depend on what views are held
about the concept of security in the first place.48 From a realist
perspective, self-reliance is the most prudent form of security, not
cooperation.49 Therefore, security cooperation should only be used as a
transient measure to ward-off a common threat, and should cease once
the threat is no longer imminent.50 Indeed, the realist approach views
cooperation as unsustainable, because even States that are compelled to
form an alliance may covertly be enemies, and will prefer to seek their
exclusive security as soon as practicable.51 According to this conception,
security cooperation itself is a threat, since one party may detect
weaknesses in the other, and later seek to exploit them.52

Modifications of the realist position on security cooperation have
produced the idea of security communities.

53

According to this

restatement, States have the option to choose between an amalgamated
security community, on the one hand, and a pluralistic security
community on the other.54 An amalgamated security community is
where the pursuit of shared security concerns demands the formal
48
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merger of States into a composite unit.55 In the case of a pluralistic
security community, States retain their independence, but still converge
around very structured arrangements whose raison d’être is military
action and defence.56 Further shifts in the realist view occurred following
the Cold War. Indeed, interstate security cooperation was now seen as a
feasible, but not ideal or rational choice.57 Thus, according to the realist
approach, intergovernmental institutions such as the UN are not
favoured; indeed they are seen as structures for interaction rather than
organisations with any durable value for peace and stability.58

However, the evolution of the concept of security has resulted in liberal
theories on security cooperation dominating the discourse.59 This has
resulted in interstate cooperation being viewed as a feasible choice,
paving the way for intergovernmental institutions to promote shared
interests and values outside the scope of war.60 All forms of cooperation,
from bilateral to multilateral, are now accepted as useful means of
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solving common security concerns.61 This has provided the impetus for
global institutions to be used as platforms for promoting security
dialogue, 62 with regional organisations and structures being regarded as
a source of durable security cooperation.63 In essence, States that are not
pre-occupied with achieving dominance can attain stability and
development through responsive security cooperation.64

In the context of the Gulf of Guinea, regional security cooperation is
structured within the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of Central African States
(ECCAS). Chapter six will examine the role of these two bodies, and
other regional organisations, in the context of maritime security. Suffice
to say, despite the usefulness of interstate cooperation generally, and
security cooperation in particular, cooperative structures are still
subservient to the realities of State sovereignty and the conflicting
interests of States.65 Also, where security cooperation in a defined region
61
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requires

the

participation

of

extra-regional

partners,

questions

concerning the degree of interest the external participants have in the
long-term security of the region ought to be investigated.

3.2.5 Relating the Concept of Security to Maritime Security
It can be deduced from the analysis above that the concept of security
has conceptual and practical relevance to maritime security and maritime
security cooperation. Thus, rather than embarking on an extensive
theoretical comparison, the author intends to raise practical questions,
using the Gulf of Guinea as the context, to highlight how the concept of
security is relevant to the study of maritime security.

Since the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has addressed the
question of Gulf of Guinea maritime security through its resolutions, it is
appropriate to start at the global level. One may ask: what concept of
security is projected in Resolution 2018 of October 2011, and how
broadly has the concept been framed?66 Does the title of the Resolution “Piracy and Security in Africa”, convey the security concerns of Africa,
or is the Resolution chiefly concerned with the security of the world in
Africa? When the Resolution commends the international community for
offering support to improve maritime security in the region, does that
amount to an endorsement that the support has solved the maritime
security threats in the region? Are there other, equally important security
the Asia Pacific: A Clash of Economic Interests?", in Bunn Nagara and Cheeah S. Ean, eds.
Managing Security and Peace in the Asia-Pacific, Kuala Lumpur, ISIS, 1996, pp. 29-38. Stivachtis
Ioannis, Human and State (In)Security in a Globalized World: An Introduction to International
Relations and Security Studies, Kendall Hunt Publishing, 2012.
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threats that are being ignored? If piracy constitutes a threat to
international and regional security, is it the case that the support being
offered by external actors is geared towards meeting other strategic
objectives independent of the piracy threat itself?

Similar issues can be raised when the spotlight is turned on Gulf of
Guinea States. Do Gulf of Guinea States share a common concept of
security? What about a common concept of maritime security? What
dimension or level of security is piracy a threat to? And is it likely that
this will be the same for all Gulf of Guinea States? Is it possible that
non-maritime security concerns may nonetheless impact on maritime
security cooperation? Are there elements in the concept of security - for
example, disputed maritime boundaries, which have the capacity to
undermine a common concept of maritime security? Is good governance
understood as an element of security? And will governance concerns be
part of the dialogue on enhancing maritime security?

These questions will be addressed in the thesis, and the answers they
elicit will undoubtedly demonstrate the conceptual and empirical links
between the concept of security and maritime security cooperation.

3.3

CONCEPT OF MARITIME SECURITY

This part examines the concept of maritime security. It will assess the
application of the concept of security in maritime security literature. This
will be followed by an examination of various definitions and
approaches to the concept of maritime security. Finally, this section will
analyse the evolution of the concept of maritime security.
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3.3.1 The Concept of Security in Maritime Security Literature
The questions raised in the previous section reveal the links between the
concept of security and maritime security cooperation. It should
therefore be expected that maritime security literature will demonstrate
these links in an effort to provide a better understanding of the dynamics
of maritime security cooperation. However, this is generally lacking in
the literature. One explanation for these missing links is that writers and
researchers see them as axiomatic. However, the absence of any such
discussion can potentially impede the success of maritime security
cooperation, particularly in a regional and multilateral context. Based on
a review of the relevant literature, three authors have addressed the
relationship between the two concepts: one very remotely, another
indirectly, and the third directly.

Geoffrey Till’s book, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century,
67

is primarily about naval strategy, covering naval concepts of war and

the projection of naval power, which are traditional issues of security.
Even so, Till dedicates chapter eleven of his book to an analysis of
“maintaining good order at sea.” The chapter stipulates four attributes of
the sea: the sea as a resource, the sea as means of transportation, the sea
as a means of gaining and exchanging information, and the sea as an area
of dominion.68 The book analyses key threats to these attributes,
including piracy and illicit drug trafficking by sea. The book also notes
67
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that “the concept of ‘security’ has widened…from traditional, ‘hard’
national defence concerns to issues of marine safety”.69 Although this
statement is made in passing, and no further discussion of a conceptual
link is provided, Till has shown by this statement that the bounds of the
concept of security has expanded to include maritime security concerns.
A number of phrases in the opening chapter of Nathalie Klein’s book
suggest the importance of interrogating the concept of security in the
study of maritime security.70 In highlighting the scope of the book, Klein
indicates her ultimate objective: to establish how security interests have
influenced the development of the law of the sea.71 Klein goes on to state
that maritime security should not be understood simply as a legal term of
art, but must be considered in the broader perspective of international
relations.72 The book discusses some concepts in security studies,
including human security,

73

and also expands on various definitions of

maritime security (which we shall return to later). However, Klein
provides no deeper analysis of the interface between concepts of security
and maritime security. Nonetheless, it is clear from Klein’s approach in
the book that the concept of security, as espoused in security studies, is
relevant to the maritime domain, but the extent to which it is relevant
remains in doubt.
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In contrast to the above approaches, Chris Rahman has provided a
comprehensive analysis of the concept of security and its interface with
maritime security.74 Rahman’s work commences with a detailed
examination of the general concept of security, and then proceeds to
review the evolution of the concept of security, the various applications
of the concept, as well as its constituent elements.75 The paper also
analyses the relationship between the concept of security and the concept
of maritime security. In doing so, Rahman postulates that maritime
security may be seen as a dimension of security in its own right, and
furthermore, that each of the dimensions of security may be applicable to
the maritime environment.76

This thesis adopts a position similar to that of Rahman. In particular, the
author takes the view that the levels and dimensions of security in
security studies have comparable application to the concept of maritime
security. It is argued that since the ocean environment serves the
political, economic and strategic objectives of States, the dynamics that
surround the pursuit of all interstate interests will similarly be reflected
in the maritime realm. According to this conception, it is possible to
investigate how maritime security threats affect national security,
regional security, economic security or even food security, and how
these security concerns may compete with one another. We can equally
74
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examine the competing interests of various actors that occupy these
levels and dimensions of security. Indeed, the analysis of the historical
and contemporary significance of the Gulf of Guinea in chapter two has
already provided empirical evidence of the strategic importance of the
sea to Gulf of Guinea States (and the international community as a
whole), but it has also alluded to the conflicts that may exist between
States in pursuit of these interests.

The above conceptual position will be further developed in the next
section of this chapter, and also employed in later chapters to interrogate
these shared but competing interests.

3.3.2 Definitions and Approaches to the Concept of Maritime
Security
Since the concept of security has been conceived in different ways, it
follows that a diverse range of approaches to the concept of maritime
security will emerge. Indeed, differing interests, political perspectives,
organisational viewpoints and cultural sensibilities will produce varied
perspectives and applications of the concept of maritime security.77
Kenneth Hawkes’ definition of maritime security – that is, as measures
employed to prevent crime and sabotage, can be regarded as the shipping
industry’s perspective of maritime security.78 This can be contrasted to
the approach outlined in the United States National Strategy for
Maritime Security (US NSMS), which looks at a broad spectrum of
77
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maritime security threats including terrorism and the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD).79 After reviewing various
approaches to maritime security, Natalie Klein has defined maritime
security as “the protection of a State’s land and maritime territory,
infrastructure, economy, environment and society from certain harmful
acts occurring at sea.”80

The author’s review of the various definitions of, and approaches to,
maritime security reveals that three factors account for the differences:
time, interests and actors. Definitions of the concept will differ because
maritime security is an evolving notion, and thus earlier definitions may
not take into account newer dimensions. Maritime security may also be
defined based on a particular interest or subject. Such a definition may
ignore other dimensions completely, because those dimensions are not
material to the subject. Thirdly, the orientation of an actor or participant
will affect the definition or approach to maritime security, and to that
extent, an actor’s definition may be constructed in competition with, or
in opposition to, other dimensions of security.

3.3.3 Evolution of the Concept of Security
The above analysis of the main factors which account for different
approaches to the concept of maritime security marks the first point of
departure of this thesis with contemporary literature on maritime
security. The second point of departure is that this thesis traces the
79

United States, National Strategy for Maritime Security, 2005.

80

Natalie Klein, Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011,
p.11

96

evolutionary process of the concept of maritime security. It is the
author’s view that this provides a holistic approach and enables a better
understanding of the concept of maritime security.

3.3.2.1

Maritime Transportation Security

The traditional concern of maritime security has been maritime
transportation, although the scope of this concern has changed over
time. From the perspective of the shipping industry (and in particular
ship operators) perspective, maritime security involves adopting and
implementing measures designed to protect a ship and its cargo from
threats.81 These threats have historically included piracy, sabotage and
the theft of cargo, and with the exception of piracy, have customarily
been regarded as ‘safety’ issues rather than ‘security’ threats.82 Hence, at
the global institutional level, the Maritime Safety Committee of the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) has served as the forum for
discussing concerns and responses to maritime transportation security.

3.3.2.2

Mare Clausum and National Security

The second phase in the evolution of the concept began when coastal
States perceived activities in waters close to their shores as threats to
their national security.83 The core security threats for coastal States
include possible attacks from enemy vessels, espionage and gunboat
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diplomacy.84 Thus, Britain’s attempt to safeguard itself against these
threats was justified by the doctrine of Mare clausum, with the nation
arguing for a right to exercise controls over the water belt close to its
shores.85 Responses to these threats resulted in the territorial sea regime,
where sovereignty-security measures can be exercised.86 Subsequently,
the breadth of the territorial sea was considered insufficient for security
controls, because ships outside the territorial sea could still partake in
activities that are inimical to the interests of coastal States, such as drug
trafficking and trading in prohibited items and uncustomed goods.87 The
concept of the contiguous zone thus evolved to create a policing and
enforcement jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea.88

3.3.2.3

Offshore Energy Security

Although a number of developments were responsible for the broadening
of the concept of security, all are grounded in changes to the
international law of the sea. First, by the 1940s scientific evidence had
pointed to large deposits of hydrocarbon material in the sea bed, and thus
84
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the maritime domain became a growing source of energy supplies.89 This
inspired the 1945 proclamation by US President Harry Truman - that the
seabed contiguous to the US and its resources were subject to US
sovereignty.90 Other States followed the US, making similar declarations
and setting into motion a chain of events which would eventually lead to
a customary international law rule.91 The Continental Shelf Convention
of 1958, and subsequently the United Nations Convention on the Law of
Sea (1982) made the continental shelf and its oil and gas deposits the
exclusive national interest of States.92 Indeed, this provided the impetus
for their inclusion in the national security interest of coastal States. Thus,
both the control and access to offshore oil and gas resources became a
matter of national security.

Second, the exploitation of offshore oil and gas resources has been
enabled by a complex system of offshore structures and facilities,
collectively referred to as offshore installations or platforms. 93 Unlike
ships that are mobile, these platforms are fixed to the seabed, thus
increasing their vulnerability to accidents and intentional attacks. A
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combination of these factors gave rise to legal and practical concerns
relating to offshore energy security.94
The third development is very much related to the second. Earlier, in
1961, a mutinying crew took control of the Santa Maria cruise ship,95
and then in 1985 the Achille Lauro was hijacked by supporters of the
Palestinian Liberation Front (PLO) as part of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict.96 The hijacking of the Achille Lauro pointed to a more serious
threat to the security of shipping - terrorist hijackings.97 The international
response to this threat, and threats to offshore energy installations,
resulted in two international instruments in 1988 which expanded the
scope of the concept of maritime security.98
3.3.2.4

The Exclusive Economic Zone Concept and Further

Dimensions of Maritime Security
It is not clear when marine environmental security became a dimension
of the maritime security concept, but the regime of the Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) can be regarded as the catalyst.99 The adoption
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and coming into force of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
Sea (UNCLOS) 1982, strengthened the scope of existing maritime
security jurisdiction, for example in the territorial sea and the contiguous
zone.100 It also extended jurisdiction and enforcement measures over
living resources and the conservation and management of the marine
environment.101 Since the concept of security is a product of the
construction of particular interests, the extended interest of States into
the sea has necessarily yielded a concept of security to protect that
interest.102 Marine environmental security can equally be seen as a
product of an environmentalist agenda – one that aims to protect the
earth and its resources, particularly following the UN Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED).103 From a national viewpoint,
however, the EEZ regime serves as the anchor for marine environment
security.104

3.3.2.5

Naval Constabulary Roles and the Construction of

Maritime Security
The analysis thus far has shown that ‘soft security’ interests at sea have
expanded from maritime transportation security to include broader
dimensions of security. In a national setting, these different dimensions
Oxford University Press, 2001. See also GESAMP, Impact of Oil and Related Chemicals and Wastes
on the Marine Environment, GESAMP Report and Studies No. 50 (London: IMO Publication 1993).
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would be treated as separate segments of maritime or ocean governance
concerns and administered by different national agencies. In contrast,
navies and coastguards (being the response and enforcement arms of
these dimensions of security), adopt a composite approach in their
constabulary roles.105 This is often reflected in operational concepts that
provide an expansive definition of maritime security operation.106

The conceptual framework that underpins naval constabulary roles
influences the concept of maritime security in three ways. First, rather
than seeing maritime security in segments, naval concepts provide a
composite approach to the definition of maritime security – one which
embodies all aspects of the duties to be performed. Second, this approach
is situated in the context of national security, which accords with the
institutional role of navies. Third, the concept of maritime security is
assimilated into naval strategy or ‘hard security.’ Thus, while sea lines of
communication security (SLOC-security) may be viewed simply as the
protection of shipping, as far as navies are concerned, it is embedded in
the concept of Naval Control of Shipping (NCS) that co-locates SLOCsecurity with concepts of sea denial and power projection. 107 For
example, the 2010 US Naval Operations Concept (NOC) referred to the
role of the Navy in war as “conduct[ing] sea control operations...to
105
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enforce freedom of navigation, sustain unhindered global maritime
commerce, prevent or limit the spread of conflict, and [to] prevail in
war.”108 Furthermore, the NOC considers sea control to be essential to
“all naval missions.” These operational concepts directly link sea
control, a war fighting concept, with the constabulary role of the US
Navy.109
This, in essence, represents a securitisation of ‘soft security,’ but that is
the reality of how navies view and deliver maritime security. Indeed,
because naval tasks – whether they be militaristic, diplomatic or related
to law enforcement - are delivered as part of a spectrum of activities,
even when textual differences are made apparent, the objectives and
outcomes are fused.110 Ivan Luke has described the overlaps in the US
NOC 2010 as the inappropriate inclusion of roles in one domain, into
another.111 But in my view it is more of a structural and conceptual issue
founded on the indivisibility of naval capabilities and operational
posture, and also on the constant interaction of military and non-military
aspects of the sea as combined elements of sea power.112

There is also a tendency to label this defence construction of maritime
security as a post-9/11 phenomenon, but this is not the case, as events
after the 9/11 attacks have added new dimensions to the concept.
108
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Western naval power has historically revolved around mercantile trade,
and similarly mercantile trade has thrived on naval support.113 Navies
have equally exploited ‘soft security’ concerns in distant waters for
strategic ends.114 As Martin Murphy has noted: “once pirates begin to
prey on international trade, they attract the interest of States, and States
throughout history have used piracy suppression as a device to further
foreign policy objectives.”115 These extra-strategic objectives have the
tendency to make external engagement with, and support for, maritime
security problematic.116

3.3.2.6

Post-9/11 Maritime Security

The final phase of the evolution of the concept of maritime security
occurred as part of the broader security dynamics following the terrorist
attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York on 11 September 2001.
Indeed, the concept of maritime security changed dramatically as a new
approach to maritime security was adopted by the US and this influenced
the overall global outlook. This new approach is characterised by an
expansion in threat perception and the scope of maritime security, a
diminishing land-sea interface, and an extension of the response space
for maritime security. It is within this new environment that Natalie
113
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Klein’s definition of maritime security as “the protection of a State’s
land and maritime territory, infrastructure, economy, environment and
society from certain harmful acts occurring at sea” seems apt.117

The successful hijacking of aircrafts by terrorists also heightened fears
that ships could be hijacked, particularly since security arrangements at
seaports are generally lax compared to those of the aviation industry.118
The US also became concerned that ships could be used as a means for
attacking States, by loading them with destructive biological, chemical
or nuclear (BCN) weapons.119 Hence, the threat to maritime security was
no longer limited to attacks at sea, but also extended to attacks on land
from the sea.120 The US responded to these threats by enhancing security
in overseas seaports, and also by screening ship cargo and containers. To
this end, the US launched the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the
Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT).121 Many States
subsequently joined these programmes, creating a broad countersecurity
regime.122
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At the multilateral level, the US pushed for global instruments to be
adopted to counter these new types of threats.123 The US also
promulgated a number of strategic documents which underpin its
approach to maritime security and maritime security cooperation.124
Suffice to say, the post-9/11 dimension of maritime security is partly
global and partly US-centric. 125 This deduction is not to suggest that the
spectrum of responses adopted by the US at the multilateral level is
meant to satisfy the exclusive maritime security needs of the US. Rather,
the conclusion is to highlight just how far the US has conditioned and
influenced not just the notion of maritime security, but security generally
in a post-9/11 environment. Indeed, this raises serious concerns about the
quality and durability of the new approaches to security.126

3.3.4 The 2008 Oceans and the Law of Sea Report and the
Harmonisation of Maritime Security
Three important points emerged from the analysis of the evolution of the
concept of maritime security in the preceding section. First the
discussion shows that the concept of maritime security has broadened
over time. Second, that the maritime interest (or location) of a State may
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determine what threats are of priority to the State. Third, that there is no
consensus on all the elements of maritime security.

Therefore, one of the objectives of the UN Secretary General’s report on
oceans and the law of the sea, 2008, was to provide a global overview of
maritime security.127 The report noted that the concept of maritime
security varies significantly, and as such, there is no single definition of
the concept that is universally applicable.128 Nonetheless, the report
identified seven threats that are generally accepted as maritime security
threats: (i) piracy and armed robbery against ships; (ii) terrorists acts
involving shipping, offshore installations and other maritime interests;
(iii) illicit trafficking in arms and weapons of mass destructions; (iv)
illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; (v)
smuggling and trafficking of persons by sea; (vi) illegal, unreported and
unregulated fishing; and (vii) intentional and unlawful damage to the
marine environment.129

Although this shift from defining the concept of maritime security to
listing maritime security threats was intended to garner international
consensus, the approach has some shortcomings. These will be analysed
in the next section as part of the background to the framework that has
been developed and applied in the thesis.
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3.4

THESIS

APPLICATION

OF

THE

CONCEPT

OF

MARITIME SECURITY TO THE GULF OF GUINEA
At the regional level, maritime security cooperation requires clarity of
policy objectives and outcomes. 130 Regional States must define the core
interests to be protected, the processes for doing so, and also identify the
critical responses that will contribute to enhanced cooperative efforts. As
demonstrated in the analysis of the concept of security, maritime security
threats have effects beyond national and regional boundaries. Therefore,
regional maritime security cooperation should accommodate external
participation and third party roles. Thus, what we have are three levels of
action: national, regional and global. Harmonisation of these levels
reinforces the need for a common understanding of the concept of
maritime security and a well-defined cooperative process.

This thesis has developed a framework for the purpose of enhancing
maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea. The framework is
analysed in the three sections that follow. The first section argues for a
broader concept of maritime security and also develops a concept of
maritime security cooperation for the Gulf of Guinea. The second section
develops a maritime security threat path which explains the nature and
impact of maritime security threats, while the third section develops a
framework for particular maritime security concerns in the Gulf of
Guinea region.
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3.4.1 Analytical Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation in
the Gulf of Guinea
As indicated earlier, the UN approach to maritime security has some
limitations. Indeed, the approach has the potential to hamstring the
broader conceptualisation of some aspects of maritime security,
particularly the security interest in fisheries. It is a fact that the profound
interest of States in shipping, and also in offshore energy resources, is
what has yielded the concepts of maritime transportation security and
offshore energy security. Indeed, the classification of these concerns as
‘security interests’ has promoted broader governance and protective
measures.

In the case of fisheries, there has been a reluctance to classify the broad
concerns of the sector as maritime security issues. Instead, illegal,
unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU) has been singled out as the
threat to be addressed through cooperative responses. This narrow
approach excludes key concerns such as decreased access to food and the
impact of foreign fishing license agreements on the livelihood of coastal
communities in developing countries. In regard to the human security
dimensions of fisheries, it has been noted that seafood constitutes the
primary source of protein for over 100 million people in Southeast Asia.
Moreover, the fishing industry represents the main source of
employment for countless individuals and communities.131 Evidently, the
connection between depleting fisheries resources, declining food
131
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supplies and the economic dimensions of maritime security are all very
much apparent in the Gulf of Guinea.132

As will be demonstrated in the last part of this chapter, there are multiple
causes of depleting fisheries resources in the Gulf of Guinea, one of
which is the impact of foreign fishing licences.133 This point is perhaps
best illustrated by Geoffrey Till:

Already, most world fishing grounds are under severe pressure, and many
local fishing communities around the world are further threatened by the
advent of highly mechanised distant-water fishing fleets from elsewhere, which
have moved into new fishing grounds, because they have exhausted their own.
European Union fishing boats operating off the coast of Senegal, Mauritania
and other parts of West Africa are a typical example. Here, as elsewhere,
licences are granted by struggling Third World governments desperate for
immediate capital with inadequate means of supervising the activities they
have allowed off-shore. In effect, they feel they have to mortgage their future
for the sake of the present. 134

The above quote vividly portrays the threat posed by depleting fisheries
resources to human security, societal security, food security, and even
national and regional security. Indeed, the alarm bells of this threat have
been sounding for over a decade, yet little has been done to rectify the
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situation.135 Such concerns should be the subject of global maritime
security dialogue at the UN, but the restrictive approach to maritime
security being adopted in the Gulf of Guinea, as reflected in the UN
Security Council resolutions, clearly impedes this.136 In fact, the
approach is even more restrictive when the scope of the IUU concept is
fully analysed. This will be done in the next part of this chapter.

It could be argued that concerns over foreign fishing arrangements have
been overstated. After all, the granting of foreign fishing licences is a
deliberate choice made by governments, and should therefore not be
classified as a security threat. Such an argument, however, is based on a
limited application of the concept of security. The fact that choices are
deliberate, or even consensual, does not prevent the choices from being
security threats. Indeed, the Cold War was a product of deliberate
choices and policies of governments, yet it constituted a global security
concern. A number of Gulf of Guinea States have made deliberate
choices regarding the governance and management of natural resources,
but such choices have resulted in conflicts and threats to national,
regional and even global security. Furthermore, if any or all of the States
in the Gulf of Guinea were to transfer or sell their offshore oil reserves to
one nation (e.g. China), such action would surely be treated as a threat to
global energy security, despite the consensual nature of the transaction.
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Our decision to quote Till at length is not to suggest that the depletion of
fish stocks in the Gulf of Guinea is solely attributable to foreign fleets.
Rather, the point being established is that the singling out of IUU fishing
inadequately addresses one of the major concerns of maritime security in
the region. In other words, an important dimension of maritime security one with similar consequences to piracy, has not been properly situated
within the maritime security agenda of the Gulf of Guinea.137

Figure 3.1 represents the conceptual framework that has been developed
in the thesis for enhancing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. It
recognises three key components of the maritime security process:
adequate national capacity, effective regional frameworks and viable
global support. It also has three critical success indicators: improved
governance, adequate legal frameworks and a durable maritime security
concept. We may refer to it as the 3layer 3indicator framework. The
three overlapping triangles show that maritime security is a shared
responsibility, but they equally denote the three levels of security
analysed in the concept of security: national, regional and global.
Ideally, maritime security cooperation would involve a leveraging and
coordination of efforts at the national, regional and global level.138
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Figure 3.1

Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation139

The analysis of the evolution of the concept of maritime security has
already emphasised the role of legal frameworks in defining and
contributing to maritime security. Chapter five will put this in context by
reviewing the implementation of maritime security legal frameworks in
the Gulf of Guinea. However, the adequacy of legal frameworks is not a
sufficient condition for enhancing maritime security. If maritime security
cooperation is to yield positive outcomes and have long term benefits,
governments in the Gulf of Guinea must accept that improving
governance is an integral element of the concept of maritime security.140
External actors should equally embrace a broader concept of security one that enhances the long term security of the region.
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The core elements of the framework are summarised below:
National Effort: Strength and capability of maritime forces, Legal
frameworks and enforcement, Institutional Coordination, Quality of
Governance.
Regional Effort: Quality of Regional Frameworks, Funding, Shared Concept
of Security, Coordination of efforts.
Global Effort: Inclusive Concept of Security, Coordination of effort, Support
to Governance, Funding.
Governance: Institutional Strengths, Quality of leadership, Resource
management, Accountable and transparent processes, Security sector reform.
Legal Framework: Ratification of international frameworks, Effective
national legislation, Implementation and enforcement of international
frameworks, Availability of judicial processes.
Concept of Security: Broad concept of security, Governance as inclusive
element of security, Priority given to regional security concerns.

The analysis in the rest of the thesis, more so chapters five, six and
seven, will cover these core elements.

3.4.2 Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Threat Path
The purpose of the maritime security threat path is to explain the nature
and impact of maritime security threats. A maritime security threat can
be conceived as embodying two components: an activity and its effect.
The activity is ordinarily generated or caused by human action, and the
effect or impact is also felt on humans, although there may be
intermediary consequences. Thus, the consequence of a maritime
security threat is equally as visible as the activity or incident that
generates it, and because of this dual visibility, both may in fact be
referred to as ‘the threat’. This relationship is represented in Figure 3.2,
from which four threat paths can be analysed.
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Figure 3.2

Maritime Security Threat Paths

First, a threat activity and the consequence of the threat can both occur at
sea. Piracy and illegal fishing activities properly fit into this scenario. In
the case of piracy, a piratical attack (activity) may result in a disruption
to navigation, damage to a ship, as well as injury to crew members - all
sea-based consequences. But the real effect is the undermining of various
dimensions of security, for example, transportation security and
economic security. Indeed, piracy has the potential to undermine or
threaten multiple dimensions of security.

The second conceptualisation of the threat path is where the activity or
incident occurs at sea (or from the sea), but the consequence or effect
takes place on land. Illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and weapons fits
into this description. Illicit trafficking (the activity) is carried out at sea,
while the consequences (which include danger to human life and
national security) are felt on land.

The third interpretation is where activities on land contribute to disorder
at sea, in which case the consequences will be felt on land and at sea. In
fact, all disorder at sea has some connection with the land. For example,
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poor governance can result in civil protests and then escalate into
insurgency, which in turn can threaten offshore energy installations.

Finally, and more importantly, the threat relationship in Figure 3.2 is
mutually reinforcing, thus leading to continuous insecurity unless all
components of the land-sea nexus are addressed.

3.4.3 Thematic Concerns of Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security
The third model, Figure 3.3 below, is derived from a practical
application of the first and second models examined above to the
analysis of the geopolitical importance of the Gulf of Guinea in chapter
two, overlaid with the concept of security espoused in the early parts of
this chapter. The model identifies five components of the concept of
security, and depicts their relationship with five threat sources. It also
shows primary and secondary effects which combine to create a web of
interaction.
Figure 3.3:

Thematic Concerns of Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security
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Although the threats and dimensions of security are vertically denoted, in
practice they are indivisible. The dimensions relate and overlap, while
the threats may intersect or morph into one another. For example, the
economic security of Gulf of Guinea States is tied to resources, and is
therefore linked with energy security. Moreover, food security in the
Gulf of Guinea centres not just on sustainable fisheries, but the food
security requirements of the region as a whole, which in turn is
dependent on international trade and shipping (as discussed in chapter
two). Hence, there are inextricable links between food security,
economic security and transportation security.

The rest of the thesis proceeds on the basis of these three, mutually
reinforcing models.

3.5

OVERVIEW OF MARITIME SECURITY CHALLENGES

IN THE GULF OF GUINEA

This part of the chapter examines the maritime security threats and
challenges in the Gulf of Guinea. It provides a practical discussion of the
implications of the threats and thematic areas identified in Figure 3.3.
Although the analysis goes into considerable detail, it is nonetheless an
overview of the case study presented in the next chapter. It needs to be
emphasised that although reference will be made to some of the root
causes of the maritime security threats, the thrust of the analysis is on the
implications of the threats to security and stability.

117

3.5.1 Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea
In the last decade, piracy and armed robbery at sea have become the
chief maritime security threats, mainly due to their impact on
international trade and SLOC security.141 Indeed, global attention has
centred on Southeast Asia, especially the Malacca and Singapore Straits,
where piratical attacks have become commonplace.142 Piratical attacks in
the Indian Ocean have also become a global concern, especially from
2005 and peaking in 2008.143 This prompted a series of UN resolutions
targeting Somalia, the source of many piratical activities.144 However, as
the global response to the problems in the Indian Ocean was unfolding,
piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea was gaining momentum.
This prompted the two UN Security Council Resolutions expressing
concerns about piratical attacks in the Gulf of Guinea, and calling for
regional States to take remedial action.145

Chapter four will examine the threat of piracy and armed robbery in the
Gulf of Guinea. This detailed case study is justified by the historical
significance of piracy and armed robbery as a maritime security threat,
141
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as well as the complex dynamics and implications of the crime on
critical dimensions of maritime security (as illustrated in Figure 3.3).

3.5.2

Illicit Drug Trafficking in the Gulf of Guinea

The 2008 UN Secretary General’s Report on Oceans and the Law of the
Sea identified the illicit trafficking in narcotics and psychotropic
substances as a maritime security threat.146 Indeed, a year earlier the
International Drug Control Board assessed illicit drug trafficking in the
Gulf of Guinea, concluding that it had become a region-wide
phenomenon.147 This section examines the nature, trends and dynamics
of drug trafficking in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as its implications.

3.5.2.1

Drug Vessels and Transhipment at Sea

For over two decades the Gulf of Guinea has been a major hub of drug
trafficking.148 The multiple sea approaches to the region, coupled with
governance and structural weaknesses, has made the Gulf of Guinea an
attraction for organised crime.149 The region is a key link in what has
become known as the “cocaine triangle” – consisting of South America,
Africa and Europe.150 Cocaine originating from South America is usually
transported by mother-ships and brought directly into ports, or
146
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transhipped at sea into smaller vessels and canoes, covertly landing the
drugs along beaches and remote parts of the coast.151 These drugs are
then distributed within Africa, and subsequently trafficked using
multiple channels into European and other markets.152 In 2009, the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated that 35
metric tonnes of cocaine landed in Africa, with some 21 metric tonnes
being transferred to Europe. The remainder was most likely left as
payment for network members or consumed locally. 153

Drug entry points were originally restricted to a few States in the Gulf of
Guinea, but are now well established across the entire region.154 As early
as 1993 a Nigerian drug baron was convicted for importing 250
kilograms of heroin from Thailand by sea.155 In 2000, Cape Verdean
authorities intercepted a ship heading from the Caribbean with 2.3 tonnes
of cocaine, and three years later, a consignment of 7.2 tonnes heading to
Spain from Cape Verde and Senegal was intercepted.156 Approximately
588 kilograms of cocaine was seized in the Port of Tema, Ghana, in
2004,157 and in 2006, a large quantity of cocaine was brought into Ghana
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by a fishing vessel.158 According to the UNOCD, the amount of cocaine
intercepted in the ECOWAS segment of the Gulf of Guinea by Spanish
and British navies in 2006 and 2007 amounted to 9.9 tonnes and 5.7
tonnes respectively.159 While West Africa is the main entry point for
drugs into the Gulf of Guinea, the sea coast of Angola, which is further
south, is also a notorious route for Brazilian drug networks.160

3.5.2.2

The Switch from Cocaine Ships to Shipping Containers

The interception of multiple vessels transporting cocaine at sea has led to
drug traffickers changing their tactics. To escape detection (and thus
reduce the risk of losing large shipments), drug cartels are increasingly
using shipping containers to transport drugs.161 Through this method,
drugs are trafficked by being deceptively labelled as legitimate goods or
concealed in legitimate goods within shipping containers. Eleven
seizures of cocaine trafficked in this way were made in 2011, amounting
to a staggering 6 tonnes.162 Since only a limited number of containers are
actually inspected globally, more cocaine could be coming into the Gulf
of Guinea through this method than through traditional channels. Indeed,
the quantity seized in 2011 indicates that drug trafficking is more likely
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increasing than declining. This raises questions about the response
measures and capacity of Gulf of Guinea States to tackle this problem. 163

3.5.2.3

Implications of Drug Trafficking For National and

Regional Security
The security and stability challenges posed by drug trafficking in the
Gulf of Guinea have been succinctly stated by the Executive Director of
UNODC as follows:
West Africa…has become a hub for cocaine trafficking. Ships and planes
loaded with cocaine are coming from Latin America into poorly guarded
ports and airfields in West Africa. This is more than a drugs problem. It is a
serious security threat.164

Two broad implications of drug trafficking can be drawn from the above
statement. The first is the impact of drug trafficking on national and
regional security. The second is the transnational security dimensions of
drug trafficking, and its symbiotic relationship with other types of
organised crime. Both have disastrous outcomes for maritime security
generally and in particular for long term national and regional stability.

Drug trafficking constitutes a serious threat to the security and stability
of the Gulf of Guinea region.
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communities, corrupt State institutions and affect the stability of the
State system as a whole.166 Guinea-Bissau is a microcosm of this fact.167
Although a small State in terms of landmass, Guinea-Bissau has many
islands. Indeed, the regime of islands under UNCLOS recognises the
right of a coastal State to claim maritime spaces for these islands,
including an EEZ.168 This vast maritime estate should have been of great
benefit to Guinea-Bissau, but a lack of maritime enforcement of
maritime spaces, coupled with corruption, has turned Guinea-Bissau into
a “narco-State” or “narco-coast.”169 This description epitomises the fact
that the national budget of Guinea-Bissau is estimated to be the value of
just 2.5 tonnes of cocaine, a small fraction of the annual quantity of
cocaine believed to be trafficked through the country.170

The UN has indicated that Guinea-Bissau has moved from being a mere
drug transit State into a consumption market.171 Indeed, the instability
and intense political conflicts that characterise the State are generally
regarded as a product of the struggle to access the cocaine trade and drug
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money.172 The assassinations of the President of Guinea and the head of
army in 2009 have both been linked to cocaine politics.173 However,
Guinea-Bissau is not the only country associated with cocaine politics.
The proceeds of the State’s cocaine trade are widely believed to finance
unsavoury political activities in other Gulf of Guinea States, including
Ghana.174 In this way, cocaine money provides the perfect means for
drug networks to infiltrate the corridors of power, compromising
governance structures in the region, including law enforcement
agencies.175

However, the greater threat posed by illicit drug trafficking is its
connection with transnational organised crime (TOC) in the Gulf of
Guinea.176 Organised criminals, including terrorists, sustain their
activities through money raised from their participation in drug
trafficking, or from money supplied directly by drug traffickers.177 In
2009 Ghanaian authorities arrested three Malians on drug charges,
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subsequently extraditing the men to the US on the basis of alleged links
with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).178 This raises the
possible forging of alliances between drug traffickers and terrorists in the
Gulf of Guinea.179 The African Marine Commando, a militant group in
Cameroon which is deeply involved in the maritime drug trade, has also
been noted to have conducted piratical attacks.180 There are also reports
of militias in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria having accepted cocaine
as in-kind payment for services rendered to drug traffickers.181 These
examples parallel the connection between pirates and the al-shabab in
Somalia.182

The above trends suggest the presence of dangerous, transnational
organised crime partnerships in the Gulf of Guinea - a situation that
needs to be addressed urgently. The analysis also demonstrates that any
attempt at addressing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea must be
holistic, as there is interaction between the different facets of threats.
However, UN Resolutions 2018 and 2039 treated piracy as an isolated
maritime security threat.183 Indeed, although Resolution 2039 mentioned
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drug trafficking as a possible threat to peace and security in the Sahel
region, the entirety of recommendations and action plans in the
Resolution are directed at combating the threat of piracy and armed
robbery at sea. Any cooperative processes built on the Resolutions
would therefore set a narrow maritime security framework for the Gulf
of Guinea. Chapter five will also assess the extent to which Gulf of
Guinea States have implemented international instruments that address
the subject of illegal drug trafficking.

3.5.3 Illegal Migration by Sea
There are two related issues involved in illegal migration by sea: migrant
smuggling and people trafficking.184 Migrant smuggling involves
facilitating the illegal entry of persons into a State for financial or other
material benefit.185 Migrant smuggling is undertaken with the consent of
the migrant who anticipates better living conditions at the point of
destination.186 This can be contrasted with trafficking of people, where
the objective is to put the trafficked persons in some form of servitude,
for example, forced prostitution.187 In a legal context, however, both
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involve entry into a State in breach of its migration laws. Migrant
smuggling accounts for the bulk of illegal migration by sea, but the two
crimes are very much related and are often perpetrated by the same or
related criminal networks.188 Thus, persons who willingly embark on
illegal migration can quite easily end up in bondage or servitude.189

In the context of the Gulf of Guinea, migrants intending to enter Europe
often walk long distances, while others are transported by fishing vessels
to congregate at Cape Verde and Senegal (the main transit countries in
the Gulf of Guinea), or to other transit States including Algeria, Libya
and Morocco.190 They are then put on boats or fishing vessels which
travel through the Canary Islands or the Strait of Gibraltar on route to
Spain or Malta, the chief ports of entry into Europe.191 Almost 32,000
irregular migrants were detected through the Spanish route in 2006, with
35,000 being detected in 2008.192 It has been noted in a 2012 report that
approximately 11 per cent of illegal immigrants into Europe originate
from countries in the Gulf of Guinea.193 While these people undertake
the journey voluntarily, it nonetheless exposes them to exploitation and
187
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the perils of the sea, while providing a great profit to organised criminal
groups who arrange for their passage.

Although the Gulf of Guinea is the source, rather than the destination, of
illegal migration, this activity can still be classified as a maritime
security threat to the region. The criminal syndicates involved in these
operations often use unseaworthy vessels, thus running the risk of the
vessels sinking or becoming distressed at sea, thereby creating further
maritime security challenges. The crime also puts the lives of people
from the region in peril, while creating a lucrative trade for the people
smugglers.

3.5.4

Declining Fisheries as a Maritime Security Threat

The significance of fisheries as a source of food security in the Gulf of
Guinea has been addressed in chapter two. In reality, however, the
majority of States in the Gulf of Guinea are net importers of fish, despite
having large areas of maritime space.194 For example, Cote d’Ivoire and
Nigeria are among the principal importers of fish globally.195

As the above heading indicates, this section intends to broadly analyse
the maritime security dimension of fisheries in the Gulf of Guinea. Yet it
must be conceded that a discussion of the causes of declining fish stocks
is outside the scope of this section. Therefore, the analysis will focus on
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, while seeking to
194
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128

outline some threat dimensions beyond IUU fishing. To put the analysis
in context, we will first review the statistics that reveal the economic cost
of IUU to developing countries and the Gulf of Guinea. This will be
followed by an examination of the meaning and scope of IUU fishing.
Then we will analyse the threats to fisheries beyond the IUU factor.
Finally, the larger security threats posed by depleting fish stock in the
Gulf of Guinea will be examined.

3.5.4.1

Scale and Cost of IUU Fishing in the Gulf of Guinea

It is estimated that between US$9 billion and US$24 billion is lost to
IUU fishing globally, with the level of illegal fishing in the Gulf of
Guinea being 40 per cent higher than the global average in 2009.196
Some reports put the financial losses from IUU fishing in the Gulf of
Guinea at US$1 billion.197 In Sierra Leone, Guinea and Guinea Bissau,
illegal fishing accounts for 50 to 60 per cent of total stock catch. 198 It is
estimated that Guinea loses US$105 million annually to illegal fishing,
while Sierra Leone loses US$29 million and Liberia US$12 million.199
The EU was initially thought to be the destination for illegal catches, but
there are now indications that Asia has become a major market, and there
is an increasing involvement of Chinese and South Korean vessels in
IUU fishing activities off the Gulf of Guinea.200
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In May 2013 two South Korean vessels - Premier and Solevant,
reportedly negotiated an out of court settlement for illegal fishing in
Sierra Leone, with South Korea reportedly paying a fine of US$2
million.201 This fine reflects the illegal gains from IUU fishing and the
corresponding losses to Gulf of Guinea States. Given the socio-economic
fragility of the region, as reflected in the lack of basic human needs such
as access to health care, adequate food supplies, education and shelter,
the economic losses attributed to IUU fishing could substantially
enhance the livelihood of many people.202 Chapter five will evaluate the
extent to which Gulf of Guinea States have implemented international
frameworks designed to combat IUU fishing. However, there is a
tendency to view the international framework for addressing IUU fishing
as comprehensively dealing with fisheries governance concerns.
Therefore, the term ‘IUU fishing’ must be analysed so that its scope can
be appreciated.

3.5.4.2

The Concept of IUU Fishing and Its Limitations

The term ‘IUU fishing’ has been attributed to the work of Commission
for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)
in 1997.203 However, the term remained undefined until it was adopted

201

“The Government of Liberia and Dongwon Industries Agree on an Out of Court Settlement of 2
Million USD for IUU Tuna Fishing,” Fishery Committee of West and Central Gulf of Guinea, 2 May
2013.
202

UNDP, “Human Development Report 2010” (New York, 2010). WHO, “Micronutrient
deficiencies 2011” (Geneva. 2011). “The State of the World’s Children 2012” (UNICEF, 2012).
Richard Valdmanis and Simon Akam, Illegal fishing plunders and strains West Africa, 15 March
2012,
Reuters,
Available:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/15/us-westafrica-fishingidUSBRE82E0HD20120315, 2014 5 January.
203

CCAMLR, Report of the Sixteenth Meeting, 27 October – 7 November 1997, p.8. William Edeson,
"The International Plan of Action on Illegal Unreported and Unregulated Fishing: The Legal Context
of a Non-Legally Binding Instrument", International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 16 4, 2001,
pp. 603-623, p.605.

130

and used in the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and
Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU) in
2001.204 Though the IPOA-IUU definition is widely used, it is still
regarded as lacking clarity in many areas.205 Thus, unless the meaning of
IUU fishing is properly understood, it can be easily be misapplied.206
To properly understand the meaning and scope of the term ‘IUU
fishing’, it is important to note that the term has three separate
components: ‘illegal fishing,’ ‘unreported fishing,’ and ‘unregulated
fishing.’ Each of these components is described in the IPOA-IUU in
relation to fishing in areas that are subject to a State’s national
jurisdiction and on the high seas.207 The analysis in this section is
concerned with the definitions that deal with fishing in waters that are
under the national jurisdiction of a State. From a coastal State point of
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view, ‘illegal fishing’ refers to activities conducted by foreign or national
vessels in waters under the jurisdiction of a State without the permission
of the State or in contravention of its laws.

208

“Unreported fishing”

refers to fishing activities which have not been reported, or have been
misreported to the relevant national authority.209 While illegal and
unreported fishing is concerned with illegal conduct in waters under
national jurisdiction, “unregulated fishing” refers only to high seas
fishing or fisheries managed within the Regional Fisheries Management
Organization (RFMO) framework.210 Thus, “unregulated fishing”
describes fishing in a manner that is not consistent with or contravenes
the conservation and management measures of a RFMO.211

208
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Put simply, IUU fishing in a national context is fishing in violation of
national fisheries laws.212 Even from this description it is clear that the
concept is very limited and its application very narrow. Technically
therefore, if there are weaknesses in the legislation of a State, it is
perfectly legitimate for other States to exploit these legislative loopholes
- for example, by using a fishing method that is prima facie destructive,
while maintaining that the activity is not IUU fishing. Therefore, while
conservation groups or Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) may
describe a situation as IUU fishing, flag States of fishing vessels can
stand their ground, arguing that the conduct does not fall within the
description of IUU fishing.

3.5.4.3

The Need for a Broader Approach and the Governance

Dimension to IUU Fishing
The analysis above demonstrates that addressing fisheries concerns
through the international framework for IUU fishing is highly
inadequate. Depleting fisheries should be examined from the perspective
of food security instead. This approach will allow threats and issues on
all levels – national, regional and global, to be addressed. An
examination of maritime security cooperative frameworks in the Gulf of
Guinea will show that, thus far, States in the region have adopted a
narrow approach to IUU fishing governance.213 External partners have
also tended to avoid addressing concerns of depleting fisheries, and
when they do, they focus exclusively on the issue of IUU fishing,

212
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ignoring broader threats to the sustainable access to fisheries resources
(particularly by coastal communities in Gulf of Guinea States).214

The above argument does not suggest that external factors are solely
responsible for depleting fisheries and illegal fishing activities in the
Gulf of Guinea. Indeed, analysis in chapter five will show that even the
requisite framework for addressing IUU fishing is poorly implemented
by Gulf of Guinea States.215 Reports have also cited corruption and the
complicity of government officials as a factor undermining fisheries
management measures.216 Moreover, there are indications that vessels
flagged by some Gulf of Guinea States are engaging in IUU fishing
activities within the region. In a report to Congress in 2013, the US
government listed Ghana as an IUU fishing State because vessels
flagged by Ghana are in flagrant violation of measures for combating
IUU fishing.217 For the same reason, the EU is reported to have placed a
ban on tuna exports from Ghana, and possibly also Cape Verde, Cote
d’Ivoire and Senegal.218
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3.5.4.4

Implications of Declining Fisheries in the Gulf of Guinea

The socio-economic consequences of depleting fisheries in the Gulf of
Guinea have already been alluded to. However, the nexus between
declining fisheries and regional security and stability need to be
examined. Fundamental to this nexus is the fact that fishing is a social
activity.219 Therefore, the consequences of depleting fisheries are far
reaching. The first flow-on effects from a decline in fisheries stock
include unemployment, social unrest and poverty, particularly in coastal
communities.220 These factors, coupled with the deplorable socioeconomic indicators analysed in chapter one, lead to increased social
dislocations. Indeed, research has shown that the threat of HIV/AIDS is
more acute in fishing communities where fisheries are in decline.221 This
vulnerability may also lead to malevolent behaviour at sea, with those
people previously engaged in the fishing sector searching for an
alternative source of income - a situation criminals can easily exploit. 222
Research conducted in Southeast Asia suggests that unemployed
fishermen increasingly become involved in the theft of vessels and
canoes.223 A decline in fisheries has equally been shown to contribute
significantly to piracy off the coast of Somalia.224
219
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The UNODC has confirmed that fishing vessels and fisherfolk in West
Africa are involved in drug trafficking and people smuggling.225 There
are also reports of unemployed fishermen in Senegal threatening to
resort to piracy if issues surrounding IUU fishing and foreign fishing
licences are not resolved by the government.226 Indeed, even if these
fishermen choose not to engage in piracy due to the increased risks, they
may nonetheless turn to drug trafficking or other types of organised
crime. Applying this situation to Figure 3.4 below, fishing communities
and States fall into the first quadrant, with declining fish stocks leading
to vulnerability in fishing communities and an increased crime rate in
susceptible States.
Figure 3.4: Fisheries as a Threat to Regional Security and Stability
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Further depletion of fish stocks may also create tension among fisherfolk
within and across State boundaries.227 This trend may be exacerbated by
the growing oil and gas interests that lie in close proximity to fishing
grounds in the Gulf of Guinea – interests that are ripe for exploratory
activities.228 Finally, as fishing communities struggle to catch their last
fish at sea, interstate conflicts will likely result. Indeed, research already
points to food scarcity and competition for resources as the main drivers
of small and large scale conflicts.229

3.5.5

Offshore Energy Security Concerns and Challenges

The contribution of the Gulf of Guinea to global energy security has
been extensively analysed in chapter two. Thus, the safety and security
of offshore energy platforms is a major concern. The objective of this
section is to examine the general challenges to the security of offshore
platforms in the Gulf of Guinea. The next chapter will analyse specific
attacks on offshore platforms as part of the case study on piracy and
armed robbery in the region.
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3.5.5.1

The Nature of Offshore Oil and Gas Infrastructure

In 2011, the Gulf of Guinea’s deep-water petroleum industry was
described as the most active in the world, with the level of offshore
activities projected to increase in the coming years.230 Offshore oil and
gas extraction comprises two key phases: exploration and production.
Each phase involves the use of platforms that are vulnerable to deliberate
attacks and accidents.231 To put the analysis of safety and security
concerns in context, it is important to briefly explain the nature of
offshore oil and gas development, as well as the types of offshore
platforms that are used in the Gulf of Guinea.

The exploration phase of offshore oil and gas development normally
commences with a seismic survey. This is carried out with the use of
ships that have been specifically designed for this purpose.232 This is
followed by drilling the seabed using mobile drilling platforms. These
platforms may be semi-submersible or submersible, and are generally
referred to as mobile drilling units (MODUs).233 A key feature of
MODUs is their mobility, and as a result they are regulated like ships
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under international conventions and frameworks.234 This also explains
why MODUs are susceptible to the same security risks and
vulnerabilities as ships.

The second phase of activity in offshore energy exploration is
production. Successful detection of oil and or gas in commercial
quantities will typically be followed by the establishment of one or more
oil wells. Production will then be carried out using fixed platforms.235 In
fact production from these wells and floating platforms will usually be
continuous, and may last for over fifty years. This results in significant
human activity taking place on board production platforms, with larger
platforms boasting accommodation and living facilities for hundreds of
personnel.236

Extracted oil and gas is mostly processed in the Gulf of Guinea by the
use of Floating, Production, Storage and Offloading units (FPSOs).
These are either converted double hull oil tankers or structures
specifically designed for this purpose.237 Indeed, this technology is
widely regarded as one of the greatest technological breakthroughs in the
industry, as it has made deep sea oil and gas production viable. 238 Built
in 2007, Nigeria’s FPSO Agbami is the largest in the world, with a
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Available:

storage capacity of over 2.1 million barrels.239 Meanwhile, Angola’s
Dalia FPSO, located 80 nautical miles offshore, has a capacity of 2
million barrels.240 FPSO Nkrumah serves the Jubilee oil fields offshore
Ghana,241 while FPSO Serpentina is being used in the Zafiro oil fields of
Equatorial Guinea.242 As an alternative to FPSOs, extracted crude may
be kept in a Floating Storage Offloading unit (FSO) and then transferred
ashore for processing.

3.5.5.2

Safety and Security Concerns of Offshore Infrastructure

Two significant security concerns stem from the nature and processes of
offshore oil and gas development: investment security and the physical
vulnerability of offshore infrastructure.243 Summarising the possible
impact of an accident or attack on Ghana’s offshore oil and gas
platforms, Martin Tsamenyi and Kwame Mfodwo have noted:
Incidents in the...offshore oil and gas industry would…put pressure on
regional security arrangements; increase operating costs through increased
security requirements…and higher insurance premiums; provide adverse
239
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http://www.offshore-technology.com/projects/agbami/ (accessed 16 August 2011).
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Located in ultra-deep waters of Angola (about 80nm), Dalia is one of the world's largest deep water
oil developments. The Dalia FPSO floating production, storage and offloading (FPSO) vessel used in
the field is 300 meters long, 60 meters wide and 32 meters high. It weighs in at an equally impressive
416,000 metric tons, nearly 30,000 metric tons for the topsides alone. Its living quarters can
accommodate up to 190 people. See, http://www.total.com/en/our-energies/oil/exploration-andproduction/projects-and-achievements/dalia-940847.html (accessed 12 August 2011).
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The FPSO Kwame Nkrumah MV21 is installed in approximately 1,100 meters water depth on the
Jubilee Field. It has been named after the first president of the country and arrived for operations in
June 2010.
242

FPSO Serpentina was built in 1974. It was delivered to the Zifiro fields on 1 November 2005 under
the order of Equatorial Guinea Inc., an ExxonMobil subsidiary ExxonMobil subsidiary.
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American Petroleum Institute, Security Assessment Vulnerability Methodology for the Petroleum
and Petrochemical Industries, 2nd ed., 2004.
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publicity, impacting negatively on public and business confidence…More
importantly it could negatively affect investment in the country as a whole.
244

Although the summary above is from the perspective of a single country,
it nonetheless characterises regional and global security dimensions.245
Every activity in the oil and gas production process requires substantial
financial investment. For example, the cost of a single FPSO can be
upwards of US$800 million.246 Moreover, offshore oil platforms are
exposed to different levels of physical risks across the activity chain,
such that a single incident of violence or interference directed at offshore
oil and gas infrastructure can have serious consequences.
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At the

general level, accidents from commercial and fishing vessels are a
concern,248 with higher level risks encompassing deliberate attacks by
pirates, insurgents or terrorists.249 FPSO’s are particularly vulnerable to
violent actions because of their large size, predictable location and high
244

Martin Tsamenyi and Kwame Mfodwo, “Developing Capacity for Addressing Safety, Security and
Marine Pollution Concerns arising from oil and Gas Industry”, National Conference on Positioning
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3.
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For concerns regarding the adequacy of safety zones, see Australian Government, Offshore Oil and
Gas Resources Security Sector Inquiry (Office of the Inspectorate of Transport Security. June 2012).
Anthony Bergin and Sam Bateman, "Things Could Turn Ugly in Troubled Waters to Our North:
Doubts Surface about the Safeguarding of Australia's Offshore Oil and Gas Installations," The
Australian 28 July 2012.
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Trends in Product Transportation for Future Offshore Oil and Gas Developments, The Australian
Pipeliner, January 2012.
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Australian Government, Offshore Oil and Gas Resources Security Sector Inquiry (Office of the
Inspectorate of Transport Security, June 2012). Peter Maass, Crude World: The Violent Twilight of
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Lloyd's of london Press, 1991.
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Stuart Kaye, "International Measures to Protect Oil Platforms, Pipelines and Submarine Cable from
Attack," Tulane Maritime Law Journal 31, 2, 2007, pp. 377-423.
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See chapter 4.
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value.250 As demonstrated in the analysis in chapter two, oil and gas are
strategic global commodities.251 Therefore, any interference with the
supply chain in any part of the world will have global consequences.

3.5.6 Illicit Trafficking in Weapons
The final maritime security concern to be discussed in this chapter is
illicit trafficking in weapons. The contribution of small arms and light
weapons (SALW) to instability in the Gulf of Guinea is palpable.

252

Liberia and Sierra Leone are still lurking in the shadows of years of
conflict in which thousands of lives were lost and State institutions
completely dismantled.253 The fragility of Angola’s future is also rooted
in decades of conflict.254 Fighting is still ongoing in DR Congo, the
Central African Republic and Mali. Many other States, Nigeria being the
most recent one, are in the throes of violence perpetuated by the
prevalence of SALW.
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Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004, pp. 223-43. Adedeji Ebo, Small Arms Control in West
Africa (Monitoring the Implementation of Small Arms Controls, 2003).
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Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau, International Peace Academy Occasional Papers, Covenant
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While weapons proliferation is a major factor in communal violence,
impoverishment and underdevelopment,255 it is difficult to establish the
percentage of weapons being circulated due to illicit trafficking, and the
percentage of weapons coming in by sea.256 However, research has
indicated that the maritime corridor is a source of illicit arms
trafficking.257 Indeed, an insurgent group leader in Nigeria has been
reported as saying that arms can easily be purchased from ships anchored
off the coast of Nigeria.258 Also, speedboats are reported to be involved
in transferring arms from ships into Guinea-Bissau, Gabon and
Cameroon.259

Countering illegal trafficking of weapons in the Gulf of Guinea requires
regional and global cooperation. Such a cooperative process will also
entail the implementation of relevant international instruments that
addresses the issue of illegal trafficking in weapons, particularly the
United Nations Transnational Organized Crime Convention (UNTOC)260
and the Protocol against Illicit Manufacture and Trafficking in
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Francis L. Keili, "Small arms and light weapons transfer in West Africa: a stock-taking,"
Disarmament Forum, 2008, pp. 1-8, p.1.
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Disarmament Forum, 2008, p. 4.
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See pp. 23-24, Nicolas Florquin and Eric G. Berman, eds., Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups,
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Firearms.261 Chapter five will assess the extent to which Gulf of Guinea
States have responded to these frameworks. It also worthy of note that
the UN Security Council Resolution 2039,262 has at least, indicated the
threat posed by illegal trafficking in weapons to the security of West
Africa and the Sahel regions.263 However, this is only in the preamble as
the subject was not addressed in the substantive paragraphs of the
Resolution which concentrated on piracy.

3.6

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has shown that maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of
Guinea primarily requires a well-developed conceptual framework. As
the analysis has revealed, however, there are key shortcomings in the
current application of the concept of maritime security in the Gulf of
Guinea. The chapter has developed a cooperative framework that takes
into account the fundamental maritime security requirements of the
region. This framework recognises three key components of the
maritime security process: adequate national capacity, effective regional
frameworks and viable global support. The framework also has three
critical progress indicators: improved governance, adequate legal
frameworks and a durable maritime security concept. The proper
implementation of this framework to maritime security cooperation in

261

Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and
Components and Ammunition, 2001, adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/255, 31 May 2001,
entered into force 3 July 2005.
262

The relevant paragraphs reads as follows: Expressing its concern about the serious threats to
international peace and stability in different regions of the world, in particular in West Africa and the
Sahel Region, posed by transnational organized crime, including illicit weapons and drug trafficking,
piracy and armed robbery at sea.
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the Gulf of Guinea will yield effective outcomes and also ensure long
term security and stability.

The analysis in this chapter has also demonstrated that multiple maritime
security threats and challenges exist in the Gulf of Guinea. Illicit drug
trafficking, the proliferation of weapons and illegal migration by sea all
affect the good order of the oceans, and also pose serious challenges to
the security of Gulf of Guinea States. Furthermore, although the issue of
depleting fishery resources has been given less priority within the
cooperative framework of the region, it constitutes a serious threat to
long term security and stability of the region. Finally, concerns over the
safety and security of offshore platforms have the potential to endanger
the socio-economic interests of Gulf of Guinea States, while at the same
time undermining global energy security.

Despite the persistent nature of these maritime security threats in the
Gulf of Guinea, they cannot be viewed in a vacuum. Indeed, the
pervasiveness of these security challenges suggest that governance and
institutional frameworks are either weak or have been compromised. It
is, in fact, a reflection of the inability of States in the region to provide
and maintain security as a public good. The next chapter provides a case
study of piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea. The rest of the
thesis examines how well the cooperative framework developed in this
chapter is being implemented in the Gulf of Guinea region.
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CHAPTER FOUR
A CASE STUDY OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY
IN THE GULF OF GUINEA

4.1

INTRODUCTION

The objective of this chapter is to analyse the nature and dynamics of the
threat of piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as its
implication for regional and global security. The chapter begins by
examining the legal and conceptual framework of piracy and armed
robbery. This is followed by an overview of piratical attacks that have
occurred in the Gulf of Guinea. The chapter then analyses the anatomy
of Gulf of Guinea piracy, its evolutionary tracks and contrast the
paradigm of Gulf of Guinea piracy with contemporary piracy concepts.
The chapter also examines the implications of Gulf of Guinea piracy for
regional and international security, summarises the profile of Gulf of
Guinea piracy, and concludes with analysis of future projections.

4.2

LEGAL, CONCEPTUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS

OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS
Although piracy and armed robbery against ships have similar maritime
security implications, the two activities have different conceptual and
jurisdictional ramifications. This section examines the legal, conceptual
and institutional bases of piracy and armed robbery at sea. The first two
sections will define and clarify the jurisdictional and conceptual
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foundations of piracy and armed robbery at sea, while the third section
will examine institutional approaches to the two crimes.

4.2.1 Nature, Definition and Jurisdiction over Piracy
The concept of piracy has deep historical roots and has evolved over
time. Indeed, some ancient kingdoms and their rulers were beneficiaries
and perpetrators of piratical activities, with pirates generally being
regarded as noble people.1 However, piracy was subsequently considered
a heinous crime and a threat to the good order of the oceans, and was
thus outlawed in many kingdoms.2 This crystallised into a rule of
customary international law that made piracy a universal crime, thus
allowing every State to exercise jurisdiction over pirates.3 This principle
of customary international law finds its most lucid expression in the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).4
Articles 100-107 of the Convention require State parties to cooperate in
the repression of piracy. Article 101 defines “piracy” as:

1

For an historical account of piracy, see Anne Perontin-Dumon, "The Pirate and the Emperor: Power
and Law", in C.R. Pennel, ed. Bandits at Sea: A Pirate Reader, New York, New York University
Press, 2011, pp. 25-55, Daniel Heller-Roazen, The Enemy of All: Piracy and the Law of Nations New
York Zone Books, 2009. Jack A. Gottschalk and Brian P. Flanagan, Jolly Roger with an Uzi: The Rise
and Threat of Modern Piracy, Annapolis US Naval Institute Press, 2000.
2

Harry D. Gould, "Cicero's Ghost: Rethinking the Social Construction of Piracy", in Michael J.
Struett, Jon D. Carlson and Mark T. Nance, eds. Maritime Piracy and the Construction of Global
Governance, New York, Routledge, 2013, pp. 23-46.
3

Gerhard O.W. Mueller and Freda Adler, Outlaws of the Ocean: The Complete Book of
Contemporary Crime on the High Seas New York Hearst Marine Books, 1985, p. 288. Thomas A.
Walker, A History of Law of Nations, vol. I, Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1899. Terence
Fokas, "The Barbary Coast Revisited: The Resurgence of International Maritime Piracy," University
of San Francisco Maritime Law Journal 9 1997, pp. 427-60.
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United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. The full text of
the Convention is reprinted in 21 International Legal Materials 1261 (1982). The Convention opened
for signature at Montego Bay, Jamaica, on 10 December 1982, and came into force on 16 November
1994. It has 164 ratifications as at 24 September 2012.
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(a) Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or
against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place
outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or
of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or
aircraft; (c) any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act
described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b).

The above definition may appear simple at first glance, upon close
examination, however, it becomes clear that the wording contains
complex issues and nuances. The key elements of the offence of piracy
are therefore analysed below.

4.2.1.1

A Crime of Universal Jurisdiction

Piracy is unique in its conceptual and legal underpinnings in that it is an
offence over which States have universal jurisdiction.5 Under
international law, the jurisdiction of States may be classified into four

5

Eugene Kontorovich, "Universal Jurisdiction and the Piracy Analogy," Harvard International Law
Journal 45, 1, 2004, pp. 183-237, Jose L. Jesus, "Protection of Foreign Ships against Piracy and
Terrorism at Sea: Legal Aspects," International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 18, 2003, pp.
363-400.
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different types - territorial, nationality, extra-territorial and universal.6
The concept of territorial jurisdiction is founded on the sovereignty of
States over their territory. According to this idea, States have control
over all matters in their territory, thus making territorial jurisdiction the
primary mode of jurisdiction.7 In exercising territorial jurisdiction, States
have the right to enact and enforce laws and regulations, as well as
punish those who violate such laws in their territory. 8 In relation to
maritime domains, coastal States enjoy similar territorial jurisdiction in
their ports and internal waters, and pre-eminent jurisdiction in their
territorial sea.9

Nationality jurisdiction is based on the binding relationship between a
State and its citizens, such that citizens remain subject to the jurisdiction
of their State even when they are outside its territory. 10 Similarly, States
have jurisdiction and responsibility over vessels flying their flag,
regardless of the location of the vessel. However, a coastal State may
have concurrent or overriding jurisdiction where the vessel is in its ports
or territorial sea, or otherwise engages in activities over which UNCLOS
6

It is noted that there are varying views on the classification of jurisdiction under international law.
Some commentators refer to only two types of jurisdiction - prescriptive and enforcement, preferring
to treat territorial, nationality, extra-territorial and universal jurisdiction as examples of the exercise of
the other two types of jurisdiction. Other writers discuss only territorial and nationality jurisdiction,
treat the other two as exceptions. It is important to note, however, that the classification of jurisdiction
adopted in this chapter does have the support of several commentators.
7

Donald R. Rothwell, Stuart Kaye, Afshin Akhtarkhavari and Ruth Davis, International Law: Case
and materials with Australian Perspective, New York Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 335-346.
8

The right to legislate is often referred to as an example of prescriptive jurisdiction, whilst
enforcement jurisdiction refers to the right to investigate, arrest, prosecute and punish perpetrators for
violations.
9

UNCLOS, Articles 2, 21, 27 and 28. See also Robin R. Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, Law of the
Sea, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1999 p. 71-101.
10

This principle was elaborated in the Nottebohn Case (Liechtenstein v Guatemala) ICJ Reports 4
[1955].
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vests primary jurisdiction in coastal States.11 However, where a vessel is
on the high seas, only the flag State will have jurisdiction over the
vessel, except in exceptional circumstances provided by UNCLOS.12

Extra-territorial jurisdiction is largely a derivative of territorial and
nationality jurisdiction, and can only be exercised in special
circumstances. For example, an offence outside the territory of a State
may nonetheless affect or impact on the State, thus allowing it to assume
jurisdiction in respect of the activity.13 This head of jurisdiction is
sometimes referred to as the protective principle.14

In contrast to the other three forms of jurisdiction, universal jurisdiction
is a unique creation of international law, vesting States with the right to
legislate and take enforcement measures over crimes that neither relate
to their territory nor their citizens.15 These crimes are considered
heinous, and thus the objective of universal jurisdiction is to suppress or
prevent their commission. International law has long treated piracy as a
crime of universal jurisdiction, along with slave trading, war crimes,

11

For example, the rights of coastal States in the Contiguous Zone, Article 33; in the EEZ, Articles 55
and 73; and over the Continental Shelf, Article 77.
12

UNCLOS, Article 92.
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See Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v Eichmann 36 International Legal Materials 5
(1961).
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An example is the Barcelona Traction Case, where the ICJ upheld the right of Belgium to claim
jurisdiction to protect the investment interest of its nationals who were principal shareholders in a
company. Barcelona Traction Case (Belgium v Spain) ICJ Reports 3 [1970].
15

Rothwell, Kaye, Akhtarkhavari and Davis, International Law: Case and materials with Australian
Perspective.
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genocide and crimes against humanity. 16 Pirates may therefore be
arrested and prosecuted by the legal system of any State, irrespective of
the flag of the vessel attacked, the flag of the vessel used to commit the
piracy, or the nationality of the pirates.17 In practice, however, States
may show reluctance in taking counter-piracy measures. This posture
may be informed by practical constraints (including logistics), or
dictated by a national policy that justifies prosecution of non-nationals
only when a well-defined national interest (political, security or
economic) is affected.18 Prosecution may also be stalled because of the
inadequacy of the domestic legal framework of the State concerned.19

4.2.1.2

Acts

of

Violence,

Detention,

Depredation

and

Facilitation
For the crime of piracy to be made out, it must involve acts of violence,
detention or depredation directed against a ship, goods on board the ship
or persons on board the ship.20 This requirement is generally less
16

Cherif M Bassiouni, "The History of Universal Jurisdiction and Its Place in International Law", in
Stephen Macedo, ed. Universal Jurisdiction: National Courts and the Prosecution of Serious Crimes
Under International Law, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. Recent
acknowledgement of the applicability of universal jurisdiction in regard to heinous crimes can be
found in the ICJ’s ruling in Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v
Belgium) ICJ Reports 3 [2002].
17

Robin Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, Law of the Sea, Manchester, Manchester University Press,
1999, pp.209-211. See also United States v. Brig Malek Adhel (2 How), 1844, and United States v.
Smith, 18 (5 Wheat.), 1820.
18

Amber Ramsey, Barriers to Prosecution: The Problem of Piracy, September 2011, Civil-Military
Fusion Centre, Available: https://www.cimicweb.org/Documents/CFC%20AntiPiracy%20Thematic%20Papers/CFC_Anti-Piracy_Report_Prosecution_Aug_2011_FINAL.pdf, 20
September 2013, Christiane Ahlborn, Adjudicating Somali Piracy Cases – German Courts in a
Double Bind, , 13 January 2013, Blog of Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law,
Available: http://www.cjicl.org.uk/index.php/cjicl-blog/adjudicating-somali-piracy-cases--germancourts-in-a-double-bind, 20 August 2013.
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Diana Chang, "Piracy Laws and the Effective Prosecution of Pirates," Boston College International
and Comparative Law Review, 2010, pp. 273-188.
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UNCLOS, Art 101(a).
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contentious than the other elements of the offence. However, it must be
emphasised that the crime of piracy does not require that goods, property
or money be stolen. A close reading of UNCLOS reveals that Article 101
treats the very act of violence or depredation against a ship, its crew, or
goods on board the ship as piratical acts, provided the other elements of
the crime are present. Hence, domestic legislation seeking to incorporate
the piracy provisions of UNCLOS should be broad enough to encompass
assault, injury or damage committed in a piratical context.21 Article 101
also classifies the act of inciting or intentionally facilitating piracy, as
well as voluntary participation in the operation of a pirate ship, as
piratical acts.22

4.2.1.3

Committed on the High Seas

Fundamental to the definition and exercise of jurisdiction over piracy is
the place of the offence (locus delicti).23 For an act of violence or
depredation to be classified as piracy, the activity must take place on the
“high seas” or a “place outside the jurisdiction of any State.” 24 In this
context, “high seas” includes the contiguous zone and the Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ),25 while the expression “in a place outside the
jurisdiction of any State” contemplates regions such as Antarctica, which
is not subject to the jurisdiction of any State.
21

Eugene Kontorovich, "A Guantanamo on the Sea: The Difficulty of Prosecuting Pirates and
Terrorists," California Law Review 98, 2010, pp. 243-76. Chang, "Piracy Laws and the Effective
Prosecution of Pirates."
22

UNCLOS Art 101(b)(c).
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Robin Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, Law of the Sea, Manchester University of Manchester Press,
1999.
24

See generally, Thomas A. Walker, A History of Law of Nations, vol. I, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1899.
25

UNCLOS, Articles 55, 58 and 88-115.
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A recent decision by the United States Appellate Court, United States v
Ali, involving the trial of a Somali ransom negotiator for pirates,
provided a perceptive interpretation of the scope of the “high seas”
requirement for an offence of facilitating piracy.26 In the Court’s view,
since the phrase “on the high seas” has been used in Article 101(a)
(which covers acts of violence or depredation), but is missing in Article
101(c) (which focuses on inciting or facilitating the crime of piracy), the
two sections must be interpreted differently. 27 The Court took the view
that while the offence of facilitating piracy must be in aid of acts
committed on the high seas, the charge of facilitating (or aiding and
abetting) is not contingent on the person having physically participated
in the crime on the high seas. Rather, it is sufficient that the person has
played a role in facilitating the offence.28 This reasoning may be
criticised as overstretching the bounds of Article 101,29 but the
interpretation is logical, well-grounded and a potent tool for combating
piracy networks in a regional and global context.30

4.2.1.4

Private Ship or Aircraft against Private Ship or Aircraft

Another element required for the crime of piracy is what is often referred
to as the “ship to ship” rule. This element demands that acts constituting
26

United States v Ali. District of Columbia Court 11 June 2013.

27

United States v Ali. District of Columbia Court 11 June 2013, p.20.
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Ibid.
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Jonathan Bellish, The Possible Unintended Consequences of United States v. Ali, 10 July 2013,
Blog of European Journal of International Law, Available: http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-possibleunintended-consequences-of-united-states-v-ali/, 19 September 2013.
30

Jonathan Bellish, A High Seas Requirement for Inciters and Intentional Facilitators of Piracy: Jure
Gentium and Its (Lack of) Implications for Impunity, Available: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2226030, 19
September 2013. Douglas Guilfoyle, Piracy on dry land: now with added case law, 5 July 2013, Blog
of the European Journal of International Law, Available: http://www.ejiltalk.org/piracy-on-dry-landnow-with-added-case-law/, 19 September 2013.
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piracy be committed by the crew or passengers of a private ship (or
aircraft) against another ship or aircraft. At first glance, this “ship to
ship” requirement does not appear to create any difficulties. After all,
piracy is a maritime crime and is thus expected to be committed at sea.
However, this requirement excludes situations where crew members or
passengers hijack a ship on which they are on board. It also excludes
attacks committed on offshore installations that do not qualify as a
ship.31 Examples of these types of hijacking include the Santa Maria and
Achille Lauro. In the case of the Santa Maria, her crew mutinied and
took control of the ship,

32

while the Achille Lauro was hijacked by

persons who illegally hid within the ship.33 Both incidents fell outside
the definition of piracy, although they posed serious threats to the
security and safety of the shipping industry and the crews on board. It
also follows that, with the exception of coastal States, the ability of
States to invoke jurisdiction over attacks on fixed offshore energy
platforms is circumvented, despite the strategic nature of these
installations.34 Attempts to cure these jurisdictional gaps led to the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of

31

Douglas Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea, New York Cambridge University
Press, 2009, pp 254-259.
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In 1961 the Santa Maria, a Portuguese liner carrying over 600 passengers, was seized by several
crew members as part of a political agitation. For developments on the mutiny, see “Crew of Santa
Maria Threatens Mutiny as Food and water Run Low,” News Sentinel, California, 2 February 1961.
33
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Fixed platforms are, however, treated and regulated as ships in certain instances. For example, the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) 1973 treats fixed
platforms as ships for the purpose of pollution control. See Chester Brown, "International
Environmental Law in the Regulation of Offshore Installations and Sea Bed Activities: The Case for a
South pacific Regional Protocol," Australian Resources and Energy Law Journal 17, 2, 1998, pp.
109-37. Hossein Esmaeili, The Lagal Regime of Offshore Rigs in International Law, vol. Dartmouth,
Ashagate, 2001.
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Maritime Navigation, 1988 (SUA 1988) and its Protocols, which will be
analysed in the next chapter.

4.2.1.5

Committed for Private Ends

The most problematic element of the crime of piracy is the requirement
that the act be committed for “private ends” (lucri causa).35 This
requirement is problematic for two reasons. First, it is difficult to prove
the private motive of a crime. Second, it restricts the scope of piratical
acts, such that a person may escape conviction on grounds that the
piratical acts were committed for public ends. The Achille Lauro incident
is a classic example of the difficulty associated with the “private ends”
requirement. Assuming the ship to ship requirement had been met, there
was still the issue of whether the crime qualified as piracy, since the
hijackers were purportedly acting on behalf of the Palestinian Liberation
Organization.36

The difficulties associated with the lucri causa element are exacerbated
by the fact that UNCLOS provides no clarification as to what amounts to
“private ends”. And although the expression has been equated with some
kind of economic or financial motivation, there is nothing in the wording
of Article 101 to suggest that the benefit obtained must be pecuniary in
nature.37 Indeed, as Douglas Guilfoyle has argued, the expression
35

Maximo Q. Mejia Jr, "Modern Piracy at Sea: Selected Legal Aspects," International Proceedings of
Economics Development an Research 48, 21, 2012, pp. 96-100.
36
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Convention on Maritime Safety," American Journal of International Law 88, 1988, pp. 269-92, p.91.
37
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International Journal of Criminal Justice Sciences 4, 1, 2009, pp. 13-22. Malvina Halberstam,
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Safety," American Journal of International Law 88, 1988, pp. 269-92.
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“private ends” may have been used to echo the expression “private ship”
(which is also used in Article 101), and to clarify the fact that piratical
acts sponsored by a State do not amount to piracy. 38

4.2.2 Armed Robbery at Sea-Nature, Definition and Jurisdiction
In contrast to piracy, the phrase “armed robbery against ships” or “armed
robbery at sea” (or simply “sea robbery”), denotes robberies or acts
similar to piracy that are undertaken within the territorial sea, internal
waters, ports or anchorages.39 Since the sovereignty of coastal States
extends to these maritime spaces, jurisdiction over armed robbery
against ships comes under the exclusive authority of these States.40

Since the crime of armed robbery against ships comes under the
exclusive jurisdiction of coastal States, UNCLOS has no provisions
dealing with the offence. Therefore, the particular acts that constitute the
crime must be expressed in the domestic legal system of coastal States.41
This has both positive and negative implications. On the negative side,
States will have varying and sometimes conflicting approaches to the
exercise

of

jurisdiction

which

can

hamper

maritime

security

38

Douglas Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea, New York, Cambridge University
Press, 2009, pp. 254-259. See also Alfred P. Rubin, The Law of Piracy, Honolulu University Press of
the Pacific, 2006.
39

Lawrence Azubuike, "International Law Regime Against Piracy," Annual Survey of International &
Comparative Law 15, 2010, pp. 43-60.
40

UNCLOS, Article 2. See also Article 49 in the case of archipelagic States.

41

See generally Robin Geiss and Anna Petrig, Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea: The Legal
Framework for Counter-Piracy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011.
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enforcement.42 Conversely, it could be argued that the exclusive
jurisdiction of coastal States over armed robbery at sea gives such States
the opportunity to enact their own legislation, thus circumventing the
difficulties inherent in the definition of piracy under international law. In
practice, however, the concept of exclusive jurisdiction has fettered
attempts to combat armed robberies against ships. This is because the
legislative and enforcement capacity of many coastal States is weak, yet
sovereignty considerations proscribe unilateral intervention by other
states.43

4.2.3 Implications of the Somali Experience for the Future
Development of the Law on Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea
As alluded to in the last paragraph, international efforts aimed at
combating the activities of Somali pirates have been hampered by legal
and conceptual challenges.44 These challenges have been compounded
by the fact that the State of Somalia claims a territorial sea of 200
nautical miles.45 Indeed, such action is inconsistent with the 12 nautical
miles stipulated by international law, thus adding to the difficulty in
42

Martin Murphy, "Piracy and UNCLOS: Does International Law Help Regional States to Combat
Piracy", in Peter Lehr, ed. Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism, New York,,
Routledge, 2007, pp. 155-82.
43

For a discussion on how exclusive jurisdiction over piratical acts in the territorial sea compromises
law enforcement and the interests of other states, see James Kraska, Contemporary Maritime Piracy:
International Law, Strategy, and Diplomacy California Praeger, 2011. Ruwantissa Abeyratne, "The
responsibility of Somalia for the acts of the Somali pirates," Journal of Transportation Security 2, 3,
2009, pp. 63-76.
44

Generally on Somali piracy see, Martin Murphy, Somalia, the New Barbary?: Piracy and Islam in
the Horn of Africa, New York Columbia University Press, 2012.
45

Law No. 37 on the Territorial Sea and Ports, of 10 September 1972, available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/SOM_1972_Law.pdf, 15
July 2013. See also Tullio Treves, "Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off the
Coast of Somalia," European Journal of International Law 20, 2, 2009, pp. 399 – 414.
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implementing counter-piracy measures. Additionally, the Somali State
has been subject to widespread violence and instability for many years,
and has often been without a functioning government. As a result, it has
not been practically possible for the State to combat acts of piracy and
armed robbery.

To obviate the above legal and practical difficulties, the UN Security
Council adopted Resolution 1846, granting authority to naval forces to
enter Somali territorial waters and use “all necessary means” to repress
piracy.46 Additional resolutions were also adopted, including Resolution
1851, which permits the pursuit of pirates into Somali land territory.47
Though the resolutions do not stipulate specific measures, their scope
has been interpreted as including the right to seize and dispose of boats,
vessels, arms and related equipment being used by the pirates or robbers,
as well as the right to arrest and prosecute such offenders.48

In maritime security literature, these resolutions have been described as
creating the regime of “reverse hot pursuit”.49 Arguably, the resolutions
reflect a progressive development in the law on piracy and armed

46

See Paragraph 10(a), United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1846(6026th Meeting
December 2008).

2

47

Resolution 1851 contained a more robust mandate, authoring interested states to undertake
operations within Somali land territory to interdict those using Somali land to plan and facilitate
piracy. See United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1851(6046th Meeting. 16 December 2008).
48

See Paragraph 10(b) of UNSC Resolution 1846, 26 December 2008.

49

Sam Bateman, "UNCLOS and its Limitations as the Foundation for a Regional Maritime Security
Regime," Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Singapore, Working Paper 111, April 2006.

158

robbery against ships. 50 This view, however, can be rebutted on grounds
that the resolutions were meant to address a specific situation, and are
not intended to have a wider application.

51

Also, since the resolutions

required the permission of the Transitional Federal Government of
Somalia, it is possible to argue that the resolutions merely reflect
existing principles of international law – namely, the exclusivity of
territorial jurisdiction, with the caveat that States have the right to waive
their sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction.52 The resolutions may also
be construed as an exercise of the authority of the Security Council on
matters of peace, rather than a new direction in international law. 53 No
matter which one of these positions is taken, the fact remains that the
Somali resolutions have brought a new dimension to countering piracy
and armed robbery against ships, and may be able to be replicated in
other situations.54

50

For views on resolutions as new developments in international law, see Douglas Guilfoyle, "Somali
Pirates as Agents of Change in International Law–making and Organization," Cambridge Journal of
International and Comparative Law 1, 3, 2012, pp. 81-106. Douglas Guilfoyle, Piracy off Somalia: A
sketch of the legal framework, April 2009, Blog of European Journal of International Law, Available:
http://www.ejiltalk.org/piracy-off-somalia-a-sketch-of-the-legal-framework/, 16 July 2013.
51

See for example paragraph 11 of UNSC Resolution 1851, 16 December 2008.

52

The counter-argument is that the requirement of prior permission is often inserted in such
resolutions merely for political expediency, as the actions of the Security Council under Chapter VII
of the UN Charter are enforceable without the consent of the particular State.
53

Articles 25 and 39, Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco 1945. Generally on the effects of
Security Council decisions, see Bruce Russet and James Sutterlin, "The UN in a New World Order,"
Foreign Affairs, Spring 1999, pp. 69-83. Jules Lobel and Michael Ratner, "Bypassing the Security
Council: Ambiguous Authorizations to Use Force, Cease-Fires and the Iraqi Inspection Regime,"
American Journal of International Law 93, 1, 1999, pp. 124-54. John Quigley, "The “Privatization”
of UN Enforcement Action: A Threat to Multilateralism," Michigan International Law Journal 17,
1996, pp. 249-84. Ted Galen, ed., Delusions of Grandeur: The United Nations and Global
Intervention, Washington Cato Institute, 1997. Dan Sarooshi, The United Nations and the
Development of Collective Security, Oxford Oxford University Press, 1996.
54

Elizabeth Andersen, Benjamin Brockham-Hawe and Patricia Goff, Suppressing Maritime Piracy:
Exploring the Options in International Law, Washington, D.C. American Society of International Law
& Academic Council on the United Nations System, 2010.
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4.2.4 Institutional Approaches to Piratical Incidents
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International
Maritime Bureau (IMB) are the key global institutions whose activities
are centred on ensuring the safety and security of ships. Both
organisations collate, analyse and publish reports on piracy and armed
robbery that are relied on globally for research and policy decisions.

4.2.4.1

International Maritime Organization

The International Maritime Bureau (IMO), previously known as the
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation (IMCO), was
established in 1948 to regulate shipping and navigation safety. 55 All
coastal States in the Gulf of Guinea are members of the IMO.56 The IMO
adopts the definition of “piracy” provided by UNCLOS, but has also
formulated a definition of “armed robbery against ships” which is cast in
similar terms to the UNCLOS definition of piracy, except that it only
applies to piratical acts landward of the outer limit of the territorial sea.57
Notwithstanding the similarity of the two definitions, the IMO maintains
separate data on the two crimes and distinguishes between successful
attacks and attempted attacks.
55

"Convention of the Intergovernmental Consultative Organization," 6 March 1948, 89 UNTS 48.
Ademuni-Odeke, Protection and the Future of international Shipping, Dordretch Martinus Nihojj,
1984.
56

IMO, Member States, http://www.imo.org/About/Membership/Pages/MemberStates.aspx, 17 July
2013.
57

The IMO Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery
Against Ships, adopted pursuant to Resolution A.1025(26), defines "Armed robbery against ships" as
any of the following acts: (a) any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or
threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or
against persons or property on board such a ship, within a State's internal waters, archipelagic waters
and territorial sea; (b) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above". See
IMO, IMO, Resolution A.1025(26) - Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and
Armed Robbery Against Ships( . 18 January 2010).
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Since a definition of “armed robbery against ships” is missing under
international law, the IMO’s definition provides an opportunity for
member States to adopt a uniform approach to combating the crime. The
IMO’s practice of keeping separate information on piracy and armed
robbery is equally important for a number of reasons. Since this
information is publicly available, a close examination of piracy trends
can guide States and the shipping industry to take protective and
remedial measures. Logically, the closer the incidents are to the coast of
a State, the greater the likelihood that the perpetrators are from that State
or have networks in that State.58 This will allow coastal States to take
steps to arrest the growing piracy rates. Ships traversing the coast or
calling into port will also be alerted to take protective measures, while
neighbouring States may be better placed to increase their own security
capabilities, thus preventing the spread of piracy and armed robbery in
the area. Moreover, in a cooperative context, continuous robberies in the
territorial sea or port area of a particular State reflect a decline in the
enforcement capacity of that State. Therefore, neighbouring States and
the global community may assist the State to strengthen its capacity to
prevent further threats to global trade.

However, by mirroring the UNCLOS definition of piracy for armed
robbery at sea, the IMO has transposed the challenges associated with
the legal concept of piracy onto the concept of armed robbery at sea.
Thus, member States of the organisation who fail to separate the two

58

Section 4.4 of this chapter, however, demonstrates that piratical incidents in the Gulf of Guinea
region defy this logic.
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concepts may limit their legislative and enforcement jurisdiction for
armed robbery.

4.2.4.2

International Maritime Bureau

The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) is a branch of the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) that provides a wide range of services to
the shipping industry, including marine insurance cover and risk
analysis.59 Despite its private industry character, the IMB plays an
important role in facilitating maritime traffic and preventing shipping
related fraud. The IMO has recognised the vital role played by the IMB,
and in 1981 urged member States of the IMO to cooperate with the IMB
in the performance of its functions.60

Since 1992, the IMB has monitored piracy and armed robbery offences
through a network of reporting points, with the main centre being located
in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.61 Compared to the IMO, however, the IMB
has a different approach to the definition and reporting of piracy and
armed robbery offences. Though the IMB has taken note of the
definition of “piracy” in UNCLOS, as well as the definition of “armed
robbery against ships” formulated by the IMO, the IMB does not
generally distinguish between the two crimes. Indeed, it simply defines
piracy as an “act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the
intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the attempt to or

59

For details on the IMB, see http://www.icc-ccs.org/icc/imb.

60

IMO, Resolution A504 (XII) of 20 November 1981.

61

See IMB Piracy Reporting Centre, http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre, 22 July 2013.

162

capability to use force in the furtherance of that act.”

62

Therefore,

although the reports published by the IMB categorise maritime attacks as
either “actual” or “attempted” attacks, they treat all incidents as piracy
attacks, irrespective of the location of the incident.63

The IMB’s approach of not distinguishing between reported incidents of
piracy and armed robbery is problematic, as it confuses the jurisdictional
powers of States. Nonetheless, the reports of the IMB, much like those of
the IMO, provide a useful analysis of incidents that are relevant for
understanding the trends and evolution of piracy. For this reason, the
discussion in this thesis relies on the IMO reports as the primary basis
for analysis, supported by the IMB reports. It should be noted, however,
that because of the varied approaches of the two institutions, there are
occasional discrepancies in the reports, especially in the figures showing
the total number of attacks.

4.3

OVERVIEW OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY IN

THE GULF OF GUINEA
Although piratical attacks form part of the history of the Gulf of
Guinea,64 piracy in the region has not been a matter of global concern
62

This definition is contained in successive IMB piracy reports. See, for example, IMB, Piracy and
Armed Robbery Against Ships - Annual Report 2009, p. 3.
63

Dana Dillon, "Maritime Piracy: Defining the Problem," SAIS Review 25, 1, 2005, pp. 115-64.

64

For example, the Ijaw and Itsekiri groups of present day Nigeria conducted raids against each
other’s trading canoes and vessels until the Itsekiri were able to turn the tide between 1890-1900,
mobilising over 100 canoes and 20,000 sea fighters. These raids or “piracy” attacks were, however,
offshoots of contests between coastal kingdoms to control and influence trade and commerce. See P.
C. Lloyd. ‘The Itsekiri in the Nineteenth Century: An Outline Social History’. The Journal of African
History, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1963, pp. 225-6. See also Ukoha Ukiwo. ‘From ‘Pirates’ to ‘Militants’: A
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until recently. Within a short space of time, starting from 2005, the Gulf
of Guinea has seen a rising trend in piratical incidents. In terms of total
figures, the number of attacks rose from 23 in 2005 to 43 in 2006,
peaking at 60 attacks in 2007. For reasons that will be discussed in depth
in the next section, the number of incidents decreased to 50 in 2008 and
36 in 2009, but have since swelled to 47 in 2010, 61 in 2011 and 56 in
2012. Table 4.1 shows the frequency of piracy and armed robbery
incidents in the region.
Table 4.1: Piracy Statistics in the Gulf of Guinea
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Legend: Committed (Y) and Attempted (X)
Source: Collated by Author from IMO Piracy Reports: 2005-2012
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Historical Perspective on Anti-State and Anti-Oil Company Mobilization among the Ijaw of Warri,
Western Niger Delta’. African Affairs, Vol. 106, No. 425, p. 592. John Darnton, ‘Pirates plying
Nigerian Seas’, New York Times, 9th January 1977.
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It can be seen from the above statistics that piratical incidents are not just
limited to port areas and the territorial sea, but also extend to the high
seas. Furthermore, the trends reveal that piratical attacks in all three
maritime areas are on the increase. Robberies in the territorial sea rose
from 5 in 2005 to 31 in 2007. The region recorded only one attack on the
high seas in 2005, but this number jumped ten-fold the following year,
with the rate of successful attacks on the high seas also increasing.
Indeed, as early as 2006 pirates hijacked a Russian oil tanker, Shkotov,
about 60 nautical miles off Guinea, brandishing automatic rifles and
Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs).65 In March 2011, pirates fired on
and damaged the Star Gamma 85 nautical miles off Nigeria.66 It is
important to note that 15 out of 21 high seas attacks in 2012 were
successful, and more than half of the total attacks in 2012 were on
moving vessels. The situation is even worse than the statistics depict,
because unlike other regions, it is thought that only half of the incidents
of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea are actually reported by ships’ captains
and operators, mainly due to fears of reprisal attacks on their next visit.67
Notwithstanding the limited reports, since 2009 the Gulf of Guinea

65

The IMO report on the attack on the Shkotov (Oil Tanker, Russian Federation) gave the following
details: the incident took place on 22/05/2006 about 60 nautical miles from Conakry. Two speedboats
approached the ship underway and six pirates armed with automatic rifles and RPGs boarded. They
held the cook hostage and forced him to take them to the Master's cabin. The pirates disembarked
after forcing the Master to surrender about USD$3,000. IMO, "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed
Robbery against Ships: Acts reported during May 2006," MSC.4/Circ.87, 20 June 2006.
66

Star Gamma Bulk carrier Marshall Islands, 20/04/2011, Around 85 NM South of Lagos, Nigeria:
Pirates in a skiff chased and fired on the ship underway. Master raised alarm, activated SSAS, sent
distress message and increased speed. Ship sustained some bullet marks. Eventually the pirates
abandoned the attempted boarding. See IMO, "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against
Ships: Acts reported during April 2011," MSC.4/Circ.171, 23 May 2011.
67

See, page 41 of International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Annual
Report 2009. See also Neptune Maritime Security, “Analysis - Pirates Eye Share of Gulf of Guinea
Riches,” July 29, 2011, http://neptunemaritimesecurity.posterous.com/analysis-pirates-eye-share-ofgulf-of-guinea, 22 August 2011.
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region has been considered the new piracy ‘hotspot’ after Somalia.68
Indeed, experts have now stipulated that the area 200 nautical miles from
the coastlines of some Gulf of Guinea States constitutes a piracy risk
zone.69

The above overview shows that Gulf of Guinea piracy is not a localised
issue. Indeed, the incidents of attacks are increasing while trends are
getting complex. There is therefore a need to have a much deeper
understanding of the dynamics. This is examined in the next part of the
chapter.

4.4

UNDERSTANDING THE ANATOMY OF GULF OF

GUINEA PIRACY
This part analyses the nature and drivers of piratical attacks in the Gulf
of Guinea. The first section categorises the Gulf of Guinea region into
piracy hotspots and enclaves, the second section examines the immediate
factors accounting for the rising threat of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea,
while the third section analyses the evolution and spread of piratical
attacks in the Gulf of Guinea.

68

Peter J. Pham, "Africa’s Other Dangerous Waters: Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea " World defence
Review, 3 December 2009. IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships - Annual Report 2009, p.
41. Scott Baldauf, "Pirates take new territory: West African Gulf of Guinea," The Christian Science
Monitor, 15 January 2010.
69

The Joint War Committee, which specialises in maritime risk analysis, has put the coasts of Benin
and Nigeria at the highest level of risk (known as a “war-risk zone”). The risk zone extends 200
nautical miles from the entire coastline of Nigeria and also from parts of the coastline of Benin.
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4.4.1 Piracy Hotspots and Enclaves
Although the information in Table 4.1 covers the entire Gulf of Guinea
region, two points must be emphasised when explaining the phenomenon
of piracy in the region. First, incidents of piracy and armed robbery have
not taken place across the whole Gulf of Guinea region between 2005
and 2012. Second, even in areas where high incidents have been
recorded, the nature of the attacks, as well as the trends associated with
the attacks, have changed with time. It is therefore necessary to
categorise the Gulf of Guinea maritime domain into piracy hotspots and
enclaves.

The categorisation of certain areas in the Gulf of Guinea as “piracy
hotspots” is based on the frequency of incidents and the degree of
violence employed in the attacks, while the categorisation of other areas
in the region as “piracy enclaves” is based on where pirates are residing
or launching their operations. This classification is depicted in Figure 4.1
below, with “1” indicating the most dangerous coast or hotspot, and “6”
being the least dangerous area. Primary piracy enclaves are represented
by “PPE”, while secondary piracy enclaves are denoted by “SPE”.
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Figure 4.1: Gulf of Guinea Piracy Hotspots and Enclaves

Angola and Cape Verde receive category 6 classifications as there are
very few reported piratical incidents off the coasts of these States.
Moreover, there is a trend towards fewer piracy attacks off the coasts of
neighbouring States. Incidents in category 5 States (Democratic Republic
of Congo, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau,
Liberia, São Tomé and Príncipe and Senegal) include theft from ships in
ports and anchorages, as well as occasional robberies in the territorial
sea. Attacks off the coasts of Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea have
declined substantially since 2009, thus downgrading the piracy risk of
these two States from category 3 to category 4. Recent multiple attacks
in Cote d’Ivoire have increased the piracy risk of this State to category 3,
168

with Sierra Leone falling into the same category, but for a different
reason. Although Sierra Leone has had fewer piracy attacks off its coast
compared to Cote d’Ivoire, the nature of these attacks have been more
violent.

Guinea receives a category 2 classification due to the number and
severity of attacks taking place. Since 2006 attacks off the coast of
Guinea have been characterised by the heavy use of weapons and
violence. In May 2006 two ships, Shkotovo and Maersk Belfast, were
attacked at 60 and 25 nautical miles off the coast of Guinea by pirates
using automatic rifles and RPGs.70 Though the Shkotovo was underway,
the pirates successfully boarded the ship, showing a high level of
sophistication. The Isola Verde (an Italian tanker) was boarded by armed
robbers whilst underway in November 2009,71 and Songa Emerald (a
Marshall Islands tanker) was attacked in February 2010.72 More recently,
armed pirates attacked the Maltese vessel Constanza, anchored 20
nautical miles off Guinea, causing damage to the ship.73 The frequency
and similarity of these attacks suggests the existence of a piracy base in
70

IMO, "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Acts reported during May
2006." The incident involving Maersk Belfast, Chemical tanker - United Kingdom, 02/05/2006, was
described as follows: “The chemical tanker drifting 25NM off the port received a VHF call by
someone claiming to be from Conakry port. The caller asked the ship to rig the pilot ladder as the pilot
was on the way. Soon after, the D/O noticed a grey boat containing five pirates being launched by a
mother fishing vessel nearby. The pirates in the boat, armed with automatic weapons and wearing life
jackets, pretended to be officials and demanded that the pilot ladder be lowered. As the ship was not
expecting to berth until the following day, the Master raised the alarm and the crew activated fire
hoses. The boat followed the ship for a while and returned to the mother ship. The Master reported the
incident but no action was taken.”
71

IMB, "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships - Annual Report 2009," pp. 70-71.
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For details of the attack on Songa Emeral and other vessels in 2010, see IMB, "Piracy and Armed
Robbery agains Ships - Annual Report 2010," pp. 65-70.
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IMO, "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Acts reported during August
2012 " MSC.4/Circ.188, 29 October 2012.
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Guinea and its surrounds, hence the State’s classification as a secondary
piracy enclave.

Nigeria, together with Benin and Togo, receive a category 1
classification, and are thus the most dangerous coasts in the Gulf of
Guinea. However, Nigeria stands out as the epicentre of Gulf of Guinea
piracy, and is therefore considered a primary piracy enclave. Indeed,
Nigeria alone accounts for 80 per cent of reported piracy incidents in the
Gulf of Guinea.74 The analysis in section 4.4.3 will demonstrate the
transformation of piracy from a specific threat in the Nigerian enclave
into a regional threat. To appreciate this evolutionary process, it is
important to first provide the context of Gulf of Guinea piracy showing
the immediate dynamics that has led to the spate of piratical attacks.

4.4.2 The Paradigm of Gulf of Guinea Piracy
This section provides the answers two important questions: (i) what
fundamentally drives piracy, especially in the primary enclave that
accounts for over 80 per cent of reported piracy incidents in the Gulf of
Guinea?; (ii) who are the primary actors responsible for these activities?
Answers to these questions lie in the transmutation of an insurgency into
a ravaging piracy network. This is analysed in the following sections.

74

For details of the frequency and severity of attacks off the Nigerian coast, see IMB, Piracy and
Armed Robbery against Ships -Annual Reports 2005-2010. Page 26 of the IMB 2008 Report, which
analysed global piracy trends, cited the coast of Nigeria as the area with the second highest number of
serious attacks in the world. See also UNODC, "Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: A
Threat Assessment," February 2013, pp. 26-30.
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4.4.2.1

The Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta

The Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) is a loose
coalition of militant groups that emerged in 2005 in the Niger Delta
Region of Nigeria, ostensibly seeking a greater share of oil revenue for
the region.75 The Joint Revolutionary Council surfaced in 2006 as an
umbrella organisation for MEND and other splinter groups;76
nonetheless MEND continued to be the most dominant and cohesive of
these insurgent groups.77 While MEND claims to fight for ‘community’
interests, intense criminality dominates its practical existence and
activities.78 Indeed, expatriate workers are regularly kidnapped for
ransom at each okrika, a MEND term representing the area or axis of
control of a subunit or splinter group.79

At the strategic level, the MEND insurgency gained increasing notoriety
for attacks on critical installations in the Niger Delta region, starting with

75

Nigeria is a Federal State and the Niger Delta region is made up of a number of Nigerian States
including Delta State, Bayelsa State, Endo State, Ondo State and Rivers State. The swampy coastal
areas and deep seas bordering the Niger Delta are one of the world’s richest oil and gas regions. John
H. Enemugwem, "The Niger Delta of Nigeria: A World Class Oil Region in Africa, 2000-2006,"
Africana June 2012, pp. 166-81.
76

The Joint Revolutionary Council (JRC) emerged as an umbrella organisation for MEND, the Niger
Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), and the Martyrs Brigade. The JRC was used as a platform
to claim responsibility for attacks and release public statements. See, “Country briefing - Nigeria:
April 2009 to March 2010,” Janes Terrorism Monitor, 7 May 2010.
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Nigeria's MEND: A Different Militant Movement 19 March 2009, Stratfor Global Intelligence,
Available: http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090316_nigerias_mend_different_militant_movement
16 August 2011. Stephanie Hanson, MEND: The Niger Delta’s Umbrella Militant Group, 22 March
2007, US Council on Foreign Relations, Available: http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/mend-niger-deltasumbrella-militant-group/p12920, 2 March 2010.
78

Ilufoye S. Ogundiya, "Domestic Terrorism and Security Threats in the Niger Delta Region of
Nigeria," Journal of Social Science 20, 1, 2009, pp. 31-42.
79

Okrika is a MEND term used to describe areas of control. Each okrika is regarded as semiautonomous and controlled by a leader or commander. Stratfor Global Intelligence provides insightful
analysis on the genesis and nature of MEND, see, Nigeria's MEND: A Different Militant Movement

171

onshore oil pipelines and later offshore oil platforms. 80 The Federal
Government of Nigeria responded with the establishment of a Joint Task
Force (JTF) of security agencies to counter the activities of the
insurgency. Despite the robustness of the JTF, MEND continued to be
lethal, successfully engaging and killing government forces in multiple
gun battles.81 For example, three Navy personnel were missing and
feared dead in 2007, nine were killed in June 2008, and three were killed
in April 2009.82

4.4.2.2

Rising Threat and Amnesty Pact

After almost four years of insurgent attacks, the Federal Government of
Nigeria entered into negotiations with MEND in late 2008, resulting in a
formal amnesty proclamation in June 2009.83 This rapprochement was
influenced by the increasing threat posed by insurgents to oil security, as
epitomised by the successful attack on the Bonga Floating Production
and Storage and Offloading unit (Bonga FPSO) in 2008.84 The attack
had serious implications for Nigeria, the wider Gulf of Guinea region,
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and beyond. The Bonga attack marked a highpoint in a series of threats
to energy security in the Gulf of Guinea, and represents a new chapter in
global asymmetric threats.

Indeed, excluding the attack on the Aban VII off the cost of India in
2006,85 the Gulf of Guinea has recorded the highest number of attacks
against offshore platforms in the world, with all such attacks taking place
off the coast of Nigeria.86 The Bulford Dolphin, a mobile drilling rig,
was attacked in April 2007 by insurgents.87 In May 2007 the Mystras
was also attacked, and three days later Trident VIII was targeted.88 In
addition to the physical damage and personal injury inflicted by the
insurgents, these incidents impact on the operation of the platforms
themselves.89 The attack on the Mystras was indeed very significant, as it
marked the second FPSO attack in two years.
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These incidents boosted the confidence of the insurgents, culminating in
the attack on the Bonga FPSO in June 2008 – a major hub of the oil giant
Royal Dutch Shell – about 120 kilometres offshore.90 After the incident,
Nigeria’s oil production dropped to the lowest in 25 years, whilst global
oil prices soared.91 The Bonga incident also heightened global fears that
even deep-sea energy installations were not safe from insurgent and
terrorist activities.92 In a statement released after the attack, MEND
affirmed that their grand objective was to disable oil export operations,
describing the attack as a humiliating security breach for the Nigerian
Military and warning that their “next visit [would] be different.”93 Soon
after, the Nigerian Government and MEND group leaders came to the
negotiation table and an amnesty pact was entered into. The arrangement
involved insurgents laying down their weapons in return for monthly
allowances and skills training.94 However, some commentators have
opined that members of the insurgent leadership were accommodated in
90
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luxurious hotels alongside high-ranking politicians and influential
people, all while arrangements were being made for them to receive
juicy financial ‘pay-offs’.95

The amnesty led to the demobilisation of insurgent forces and the
organisational structure of MEND, as well as a decline in its activities,
starting from the latter part of 2008.96 Interestingly, in the same period
piracy attacks in the Gulf of Guinea decreased from a high of 60
incidents in 2007 to 50 incidents in 2008, reaching a low of 36 cases in
2009 (as shown in Table 4.1).97 A review of piracy reports of the
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) for 2009 and 2010 showed that
there were few or no occurrences of piratical incidents in the last and
first quarter of 2009 and 2010 respectively.98 However, the amnesty
arrangement became tenuous thereafter, partly because the amnesty
95
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‘cake’ had not been divided between all actors (and certainly not in sizes
that were satisfactory to all members of the insurgency). 99 Splinter
groups thus announced an intention to resume normal campaigns,100 and
once again piracy attacks became prevalent for the remainder of 2010.
By the close of 2011, the Gulf of Guinea had recorded 61 piracy
incidents, a sharp contrast to the low figures of 2009.

4.4.2.3

Insurgency, Criminality, Piracy and Security Complex

The above analysis, as well as the discussion in the next section, gives
credence to the fact that the creeks of the Niger Delta region harbour
dangerous pirates that threaten the security of sea lines of
communication in the Gulf of Guinea. Components of MEND that are no
longer pursuing their normal activities – such as attacking offshore oil
platforms, kidnapping offshore workers for ransom and extorting money
from oil companies, have turned to piracy as their principal criminal
activity. This insurgent-piracy is symptomatic of the nexus that often
exists between different kinds of organised crimes.101 In the case of the
Gulf of Guinea, however, piracy is committed with impunity, and rather
than remaining in a symbiotic relationship, insurgents have fully
transformed into pirates.
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While noting that piracy is crime and must be treated as such, it is still
essential to investigate the broad scope of actions and complexities
surrounding the piracy threat. It may for instance be argued that the
Niger Delta piracy represents a trade-off of one element of security for
another. The lessons of history are replete with examples of States
adopting a range of policy options (including partnerships), that they
would not have made but for their need to safeguard against a particular
threat.102 It has been posited, for example, that in the fight against piracy
in Somalia, Western States (including the United States), initially
refrained from adopting robust measures against the leadership of some
Somali clans103 who were known to be key sponsors of piracy. 104 Indeed,
this was to prevent the disintegration of the authority and organisational
structure of these clans, which would otherwise have created an
exploitable power vacuum for the al-Shaabab islamist militants. Indeed,
this example reflects the balancing of maritime security interests with
broader security and strategic concerns.

At any point in time, much so prior to the amnesty process, the Niger
Delta insurgency posed threat to five critical security interests: the
national security of Nigeria, the investment security of oil companies,
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global energy security, regional security, and finally, the security of
shipping. These five segments of security are in many ways interlinked.
Insurgent activities impact negatively on Nigeria’s economic interests
and stability, which are key components of national security. Insurgent
attacks equally threaten the investment interests of oil companies, as well
as global energy security, the safety and security of shipping, and
regional stability. In the case of Nigeria, safeguarding national security
becomes paramount following incidents such as the Bonga attack, with
the security of shipping a lesser concern. Oil companies initially secured
their investment interests by succumbing to the extortion attempts of
insurgent groups.105 The amnesty arrangement then became an
assurance, albeit a temporary one, of Nigeria’s national security, oil
investment security, and by extension, Nigeria’s oil contribution to
global energy security. In an effort to protect these security interests,
regional security and the security of shipping are left in peril. This
situation may be regarded as unintended, or viewed as Nigeria
sacrificing one element of security interest for the other. Indeed, as far as
the shipping industry was concerned Nigeria had “no political will to
combat the problem of piracy.”106 Although this statement is open to
varying interpretations, the shipping community was most likely
expressing the view that there was a political nexus to the increasing
piratical attacks. The analysis in the next section demonstrates how the
Niger Delta piracy has evolved into a regional threat.
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4.4.3 Evolution of Insurgent-Piracy from the Primary Piracy
Enclave into a Regional Threat
This section will examine the evolution of the Niger Delta insurgency
from its origins as a primary piracy enclave (PPE) into a regional piracy
threat. This evolution encompasses not only changes in time and space,
but also in tactics, trends and transnational dimensions. As in many
instances of criminal morphing, the exact dates of the transitions are
difficult to pinpoint, but the patterns are nonetheless discernible. The
sections that follow summarise the evolution of piracy in eight stages –
beginning in 2005 and concluding with the hijacking of the Orfeas in
October 2012.107

4.4.3.1

Opportunistic Piracy

The first phase of Gulf of Guinea piratical attacks may be described as
“opportunistic piracy.” This taxonomy applies to piracy incidents up
until 2005, but also extends to attacks as recent as 2007. Two-thirds of
attacks during this period took place in ports and anchorages,
interspersed with robberies in the territorial sea.108 It needs to be
emphasised that the description of this phase as “opportunistic” is not
based on the capability of the actors, but rather relates to sea robbery as a
subsidiary activity. The attention of insurgents during this period was on
attacking offshore platforms, extorting money from oil companies and
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kidnapping expatriate workers for ransom. However, ships were also
hijacked and crews kidnapped for ransom.

Piracy reports during this period indicated that attacks in the region
would be dominated by gangs of hijackers using speedboats and armed
with heavy weapons. The use of speedboats can be contrasted with
Somali piracy, where fishing vessels and skiffs are the principal
platforms.109 In 2006 four crew members of the Northern Comrade (a
Norwegian Tug) were kidnapped for ransom.110 In May 2007 over forty
people armed with guns in six speedboats attacked the Dlb Cheyen. The
Nigerian military engaged the pirates in a shootout, but the pirates
nevertheless kidnapped the crew of the ship.111 In the same month
another ship, the Oloibiri, was attacked using explosives and its crew
were again kidnapped for ransom.112 It is clear from these incidents that
in hijacking ships, the modus operandi of insurgent groups was to kidnap
expatriate oil workers on land and offshore for ransom. Moreover, the
level of professionalism exhibited by the pirates clearly precludes the
possibility that such attacks were perpetrated by members of
impoverished coastal communities.
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4.4.3.2

Widening the Enclave

In the same the period, and up to until 2009, there were signs of another
trait emerging in Gulf of Guinea piracy. Unlike Somalia, where pirates
set out hunting for victim ships,113 pirates in the Gulf of Guinea
undertake calculated attacks by converging on locations of interest.
Attacks by insurgents during this period expanded beyond the South and
West coasts of Nigeria, with westerly swarms targeting vessels off the
coast of Benin, while those to the south targeted ships beyond the
neighbouring coast of Cameroon.

In 2008 ten armed men in military clothing boarded the Elbia, a cement
carrier off the Island of Bioko in Equatorial Guinea. The men identified
themselves as Nigerian rebels, demanded food from the ship’s crew, and
after six hours on board disembarked into speedboats.114 In the same
year, heavily armed pirates with RPGs kidnapped the crew of a French
tug off the coast of Cameroon.115 The 2008 IMB Piracy Report referred
to these pirates as “Nigerian rebels,” “Nigerian militants” and
“Protectors of the Bonny River.”116 It is equally instructive that the
President of Equatorial Guinea, in alerting the international community
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to this new piracy threat in the region, made specific reference to the
“growing number of attacks by rebels and smugglers.”117

The point to note is that these surges signalled the ability of insurgents to
extend the intensity and scope of their activities. This was demonstrated
by the alleged involvement of Niger Delta insurgents in a sea-borne
attack targeting the Presidential Palace of Equatorial Guinea in February
2009.118 The incident was the catalyst for the establishment of a subregional maritime security framework by member States of the
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).119 Despite
the challenges confronting the ECCAS maritime framework,120 it
nonetheless weakened the southern surges of rebel forces, resulting in
fewer piracy attacks in the southern segment of the Gulf of Guinea.

4.4.3.3

The Pursuits and Violence

In 2009 insurgent piracy tactics evolved once again. Pirates started
hunting and attacking vessels, albeit selectively, and often with a high
incidence of violence. Once a high value target was identified, gangs of
pirates in speedboats would shadow the vessel further out to sea, and at
the most vulnerable location the vessel would be violently attacked.
117
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These types of attacks ensured quick outcomes, while at the same time
compensating pirates for the absence of sanctuaries where vessels could
be kept during ransom negotiations.121 A review of the IMB Piracy
Report for 2009 gives startling accounts of violence. In February 2009
grenades were thrown at an oil tanker (the Front Chief) killing a crew
member, while the crews of other vessels including the Emirates Swam,
the Sevastopolskaya and the Buhta suffered serious injuries during
similar attacks.122 These incidents parallel Gulf of Guinea historical
records which show that pirates employ violence and killing to sustain
their operations.123

4.4.3.4

Full Scale Insurgent-Piracy

The transition from insurgency into full-scale piracy is a post-amnesty
phenomenon. Indeed, following insurgent disengagement from the
amnesty deal in 2010,124 attacks have become more prevalent, resulting
in a higher number of reported incidents between 2010 and 2013.125
Indications of these brazen attacks include the chasing of, and firing

121

Puchala sees sanctuaries as very important for sustained piracy activity. Donald J. Puchala, “Of
Pirates and Terrorists: What Experience and History Teach,” Contemporary Security Policy, 26, 1,
2005, 1-24 at p. 7.
122

IMB, "Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships - Annual Report 2009," pp. 66-72.

123

Alexander O. Exquemelin, The Buccaneers of America Annapolis, MD Naval Institute Press,
1993, p. 263-274. See also, Neil Renwick and Jason Abbot, "Piratical Violence and Maritime Security
in Southeast Asia " Security Dialogue 30, 2, 1999, pp. 183-96.
124

"MEND Threatens 'onslaught' on Nigerian Oil Trade," Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor,
February 2010. See also "MEND Threatens more Violence" Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor,
October 2010.
125

For example, on 2/7/2010 the MV BBC Polonia (Antigua) was attacked whilst underway off Port
Bonny, Nigeria. The pirates kidnapped 11 crew members who were released two days later. It is
believed that a ransom was paid. See also attacks on Argo (Lithuanian) and North Spirit (St Vincent &
Grenadines) where a ransom is believed to have been paid. See pages 27 and 66 of International
Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Annual Report 2010.

183

upon, the Elbtank Germany for over an hour, as well as the shadowing of
Cape Bon for two days in both February and March 2011.126

4.4.3.5

Mother ships and Oil Cargo

As piracy itself has become a primary activity, as opposed to a corollary
of another exploit, Gulf of Guinea pirates have devised new measures to
boost their exploits. Indeed, a variant of the “mother ship” concept has
emerged, with pirates hijacking fishing vessels to store fuel for extended
operations, similar to Somali piracy methods. But in the case of the Gulf
of Guinea, this technique has largely been a deception measure, allowing
pirates to get close to target vessels without arousing suspicion. In April
2011, pirates using skiffs chased and fired at the Star Gamma about 85
nautical miles off Nigeria.127 And a month earlier an oil tanker was
approached three times by suspected pirates in a fishing vessel.128

Furthermore, as pirates are seeking higher and quicker returns, oil
tankers (and particularly those that carry refined oil), have become prime
126
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targets.129 The cargo is invariably siphoned into smaller tankers - a novel
method of assisting piracy vessels, and then sold illegally within and
outside the Gulf of Guinea.130

4.4.3.6

Regional Threat and Piracy Networks - Invasion of

Benin’s Coast
The regional threat of piracy first became apparent following multiple
attacks off the coast of Benin in June and July 2011. Off course, piratical
incidents off the coast of Benin are by no means new,131 but unlike
earlier cases, the June-July attacks represent an invasion of Benin’s
coastal space. When these incidents (which are reproduced in Table 2
below), are compared to the piracy profile analysed in the last part of this
chapter, it is clear that Nigerian pirates have expanded the scope of their
activities to the coast of Benin.
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Table 4.2 Piratical Attacks off the Coast of Benin – June and July 2011
Date

Ship

08/06/11

Aristofanis
Chemical tanker
Liberia

Description of Incident

Location

Armed robbers hijacked the ship at anchor and
forced the crew to sail to an unknown location.
Port
Crew members were forced to discharge part of
the cargo of the ship into another vessel. The
robbers stole the ship’s property and escaped.
14/06/11
New Ranger
Robbers hijacked the ship at anchor and forced
Territorial Sea
Chemical tanker
the Master to sail to an unknown location. The
Malta
robbers stole the ship’s property and escaped
24/06/11
Paterna
Twelve armed pirates hijacked the ship, taking all
Chemical tanker
crew members hostage. The pirates sailed the
High Seas
Malta
ship to an unknown location, harassed the crew,
then stole the ship’s cash and property before
escaping
24/06/11
Sp Atlanta
Ten 10 robbers armed with guns and knives in a
Tanker
speed boat approached the ship at anchor. Four Territorial Sea
Marshall Islands
robbers boarded and stole the ship's cash and the
crew's personal belongings. Some crew members
were threatened while others were beaten
24/06/11
Silvaplana
Four robbers in a speed boat boarded the ship
Tanker
during ship-to-ship operations. They captured the Territorial Sea
Greece
2nd engineer and the Master and beat them. They
also stole the ship’s property and the crew's
personal
belongings before escaping
30/06/11
Freja Hafnia
Armed robbers in a speed boat boarded the ship
Product tanker
during ship-to-ship operations. The robbers stole
Territorial Sea
Singapore
the ship’s property and the crew's personal
belongings
06/07/11
Varg Star
Ten robbers armed with guns attempted to board
Tanker
the ship at anchor using a hook attached to a rope.
Bahamas
Alert crew raised the alarm. Master sent Mayday Territorial Sea
message via VHF and informed Cotonou signal
station and the Navy. The next day the same
robbers attempted to board the ship. The crew
were alerted and parachute flares were fired. The
pirates escaped
16/07/11
Aegean Star
Armed robbers in a boat boarded the ship at
Product tanker
anchor. The robbers remained on the ship for 63
Port
Liberia
hours. Some crew members were injured. The
robbers stole the ship's cargo and damaged
navigation and radio equipment
24/07/11
Rbd Anema E Core
Armed pirates hijacked the ship during ship-toHigh Seas
Product tanker
ship
Italy
operations, taking 23 crew members hostage
31/07/11
Gotland Sofia
Ten robbers armed with guns boarded the
Chemical tanker
ship at anchor during ship-to-ship operations. The Territorial Sea
Bahamas
robbers fired towards the bridge. The crew
retreated to the engine room until the robbers left
the vessel.
Source: IMO Piracy Reports June and July 2011 (MSC.4/Circ.173, 11 July 2011 and MSC.4/Circ.174, 8 August
2011)
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Two significant trends have emerged from the incidents above, the first
of which defies normal risk analysis regarding the safety and security of
ships. It is customary for ships in port areas to be shielded from violent
piratical activities, and crews in these areas will normally lower their
security threshold, risking only minor robberies and minimal violence
usually perpetrated by intrastate criminals. However, the description of
incidents in Table 4.2 challenges that assumption, with pirates actively
entering port areas to hijack vessels. In the case of the Aristofanis, the
tanker was subsequently sailed to open seas where its cargo was
discharged onto another vessel.

The second piracy trend that has emerged from Benin is the growing
network of transnational criminals in the Gulf of Guinea. This is evident
from the report on the hijacking of the Duzgit Venture in April 2011, as
reported in the IMB Annual Piracy Report. Fourteen pirates in two boats
boarded the tanker underway, took control of the vessel and ordered the
Master to sail to Gabon. The captain was forced to sail the vessel all the
way to the coast of Gabon, where the pirates planned to transfer the oil
onto a barge. Having failed to meet with the barge, the captain was
forced to sail off Warri, Nigeria, to lighter the cargo. After a series of
unsuccessful attempts to get a vessel to transfer the cargo, the pirates
disembarked into fast boats, kidnapping the captain and another crew
member.132
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IMB, "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships - Annual Report 2011," pp. 53-54.
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This incident reflects the growth in piracy networks in the Gulf of
Guinea, networks that facilitate the sale of stolen cargo. The pirates were
clearly working in conjunction with other actors located 4,000km from
the point of the hijacking, with the pirates successfully commandeering
the hijacked ship across the coastal spaces of five States.

4.4.3.7

Togo in the Claws-Consequences of Operation Prosperity

The piratical invasion of the coast of Benin had a staggering impact on
the State’s economy. Indeed, insurance companies declared the coast of
Benin a high-risk zone.133 As a result, shipping activities plummeted,
with the port sustaining a revenue loss of US$81 million in 2011.134 The
State’s fishing industry also received a heavy blow, losing US$1 million
a month.135 The President of Benin took two diplomatic steps in response
to the crisis. At the multilateral level, he sent a request to the UN
Secretary General requesting the support of the international community
to fight piracy off the coast of Benin.136 Second, he sought the support of
his counterpart in Nigeria to combat transnational crime, especially

133

In August 2011 the London Insurance Group, as well as the Joint War Committee, added Benin to
the list of high-risk countries, leading to higher insurance premiums for ships using the coast and ports
of Benin. See also BBC News, “Piracy soars' off coast of Benin,” 11 August 2011,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14499784, accessed 10 December 2012.
134

The report of the UN stated that ships entering the Port of Cotonou declined by 70 per cent. See
UN Security Council, “Report of the United Nations Assessment Mission on Piracy in the Gulf of
Guinea,” S/2012/45, 19 January 2012, p. 5.
135
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See UN Security Council, “Report of the United Nations Assessment Mission on Piracy in the Gulf
of Guinea,” S/2012/45, 19 January 2012, p. 2. See also Yusuf Mohammad Bala, "Economic, Political
and Social implications of Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea: Nigeria as a Case Study," International
Conference on Piracy at Sea, (Malmö, Sweden 17-19 October 2011).
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piracy.137 In August 2011, the two States launched joint patrols, codenamed Operation Prosperity.138

Within months of Operation Prosperity being launched, a UN Secretary
General Assessment Team that had been dispatched to the Gulf of
Guinea observed that the joint patrols had led to a reduction in piracy
attacks off the coast of Benin.139 This was corroborated by the Military
Chief of Benin in a separate interview.140 However, these assessments
failed to view the progress made in a regional context. The fundamental
question that should have been asked is: what has been the effect of
Operation Prosperity on the region’s immediate neighbours – namely,
Nigeria and Benin? Table 4.3 is a compilation of selected piracy cases
from the coasts of Nigeria to Cote d’Ivoire from June 2011 to August
2012.
Table: 4.3 Piracy Incidents in Togo Involving Gangs with Guns and Speed
Boats within 1 year of Operation Prosperity
2011

2012

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Nigeria

-

1

1

-

3

-

1

3

3

2

-

2

3

1

1

Benin

6

4

3

2

-

-

-

-

1

-

-

-

-

1

-

Togo

-

-

-

5

1

-

-

-

-

-

4

-

-

3

3

Source: Compiled by Author from IMO Reports
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See "Benin seeks Nigeria's help to fight sea pirates," Next Newspapers, 12 August 2011.

138

See Chapter 6 of this thesis.

139

UN Security Council, “Report of the United Nations Assessment Mission on Piracy in the Gulf of
Guinea,” S/2012/45, 19 January 2012, p. 6.
140

"Nigeria-Benin anti-piracy patrols ‘successful’ " DefenceWeb, 18 October 2011.
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Although the data in the Table is limited and does not unequivocally
point to one conclusion, it nevertheless shows a rise in piracy incidents
off the coast of Togo – thus signalling another phase in Gulf of Guinea
piracy. Indeed, since the launch of Operation Prosperity there has been a
steady decrease in piracy incidents off the coast of Benin, but also a
corresponding rise in piratical cases off the coast of Togo.141
Interestingly, attacks off the Togolese coast coincide with few or no
reported incidents off the coasts of Nigeria and Benin. Some of these
attacks have occurred deep in the port areas of Togo, similar to the
earlier attacks in the port of Benin.142 On 4 April 2012, ten robbers in a
boat attempted to board a ship in port, but having been detected, the
pirates moved towards a different ship; meanwhile another speedboat
with robbers moved towards a third ship.143 On 12 April 2012, robbers
armed with machine guns attacked a ship in the territorial sea of Togo,
and less than three weeks later, a product tanker hijacked off the coast of
Togo was sailed to an unknown location, only to be released five days
later.144 These incidents suggest that Operation Prosperity has actually
pushed piratical attacks further to the west.

This phenomenon has been made easier by the short coastlines of Benin
and Togo, tactically allowing pirates to treat the two coasts as a single

141

For details of incidents in the months under review, see IMO, MSC.4/Circ.178(20 December
2011). IMO, MSC.4/Circ.179(10 January 2012). IMO, MSC.4/Circ.181(10 February 2012). IMO,
MSC.4/Circ.182(30 April 2012).
142

IMO, Reports of Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships - September 2011
(MSC.4/Circ.176. 1 November 2011).
143

IMO, Reports of Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships – April 2012 (MSC.4/Cir.184,
22 June 2012).
144

Ibid.
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operational space. This is demonstrated by two reported incidents in
September 2011. On 14 September at 4.15am, armed robbers attacked
the Abu Dhabi Star, a Singapore flagged chemical tanker, a few nautical
miles off Lome, Togo, but aborted the attack after being noticed. Four
hours earlier, at 23.52pm, two gangs of pirates had hijacked tankers
undertaking ship-to-ship operations, the Mattheos I and the Northern
Bell, 62 nautical miles off Benin. The pirates succeeded in sailing the
Mattheos I to an unknown location, but the crew of the Northern Bell
regained control of the ship. Taking into account the time, location and
distance between the two incidents, it is likely that that the same gang
that aborted their attack on the Northern Bell off Benin sailed towards
Togo, setting their sights on the Abu Dhabi Star.

4.4.3.8

Cote d’Ivoire under Siege – Nowhere is Safe

The hijacking of the Orfeas in October 2012 marks the seven-phase
evolution of piracy from a primary enclave in the Niger Delta into well
entrenched regional piracy. Figure 4.2 illustrates the hijacking of the
vessel and its movements thereafter.145
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IMO, Reports of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships - Acts Reported During October 2012
(MSC.4/Circ.190. 21 January 2013).
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Figure 4.2: The Hijacking of the Orfeas

Source:
Maritime
Bulletin,
9
October
2012,
posted
http://www.odin.tc/news/read.asp?articleID=1419, accessed 9 December 2012.

at

The Orfeas was hijacked on 6 October 2012 off Cote d’Ivoire. After
gaining control of the vessel, the pirates sailed over 2,000km to the coast
of the Niger Delta, stole the ship’s oil cargo, and released the vessel two
days later.146 This incident shows that attacks in the western area of the
Gulf of Guinea are becoming more brazen. The incident encapsulates
most of the tactics already discussed, but also brings to the fore the
additional sophistication of Gulf of Guinea piracy. Soon after the
hijacking, the pirates drew the vessel into deeper seas. This allowed them
sufficient time to make contact with their criminal networks, while at the
same time ensuring the ship was out of reach of a possible rescue. In

146

IMO, Reports of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Acts Reported During October 2012,
MSC.4/Circ.190, 21 January 2013.
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December 2012, armed pirates with machine guns attacked another oil
tanker in the port area of Cote d’Ivoire.147

It is clear from the above analysis that piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is
well established. Therefore, though the numbers of attacks in the region
are still less, when compared to the figures recorded in the highpoints of
the piracy situations in Somalia and Indonesia, it is essential for the
paradigm of Gulf of Guinea piracy to be examined in the context of
contemporary piracy concepts. This will illuminate relationship between
piratical dynamics in the Gulf of Guinea with the broader global
understanding.

4.5

SITUATING GUINEA PIRACY WITHIN

CONTEMPORARY PIRACY THEORIES AND PROVIDING FOR
THE GOVERNANCE DIMENSION

A number of theories aimed at explaining the causes and drivers of
piracy have been proposed.

Four concepts have particularly gained

prominence: (i) piracy as a social problem; (ii) piracy as a symptom of
failed states; (iii) the business model of piracy; and (iv) the piracy cycle.
The analysis below demonstrates

the relevance and limitations of

applying these theories to Gulf of Guinea, and then provides the

147

The chemical tanker Madonna 1, Panama, was attacked on 23/12/2012. The pirates injured the
crew, damaged the ship’s communication equipment and stole ship’s property and the crew’s personal
belongings. See IMO, Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships - December 2012
(MSC.4/Cir.192. 24 January 2012).
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governance dimensions to Gulf of Guinea piracy which though relates to
some of the theories still has distinctions on its own.

4.5.1 Piracy as a Social Problem
The social theory of piracy, which is divided into classical and
revisionist camps, argues that poverty is the primary driver of piracy. 148
The classical argument is that piracy represents an uprising of
disadvantaged and impoverished coastal communities against those that
enjoy major benefits from the sea, especially maritime trade.149 The
revisionist camp supports the classical hypothesis, while asserting that
poverty creates a malignant environment that is exploited by pirates and
criminal networks.150

The social theory of piracy has been used to account for piracy both in
Indonesia and Somalia.151 In the case of Somalia, it has been argued that
following the overthrow of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, poverty
became endemic, mainly due to the collapse of fishing cooperatives that
previously employed local fishermen and supported the livelihood of

148

Abdi Ismail Samatar, Mark Lindberg and Basil Mayani, "The Dialectics of Piracy in Somalia: the
Rich Versus the Poor," Third World Quarterly 31, 8, 2011, pp. 1377-94. See also Guo Xinning,
"Anti-Terrorism, Maritime Security, and ASEAN-China Cooperation: A Chinese Perspective "
Trends in Southeast Asia Series 15, 2005.
149

Abdi Ismail Samatar, Mark Lindberg and Basil Mayani, "The Dialectics of Piracy in Somalia: the
Rich Versus the Poor," Third World Quarterly 31, 8, 2011, pp. 1377-94.
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Sarah N. Katherine, "Piracy in Somalia: Targeting the Source," Global Security Studies 2, 3, 2011,
pp. 22-29.
151

See Eric Frecon, "Piracy in the Malacca Straits: notes from the field," International Institute for
Asian Studies Newsletter 36, 2005.
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coastal communities.152 Moreover, foreign fishing trawlers began to
illegally plunder the rich fishing grounds off Somalia, and toxic waste
from European industrial plants started being dumped off the Somali
coast.153 In light of these events, local fishermen formed vigilante groups
to protect the Somali coast. This public motive gave way to private
interest and eventually criminality, especially when it became clear that
accepting bribes from those involved in the illegal fishing and dumping,
as well as theft and extortion, provided lucrative sources of income.154
Proponents of the social theory also refer to correspondence from the
Transitional Federal Government to the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC), with Somali authorities asserting that the illegal exploitation of
Somali resources by foreign fishing interests served to legitimise piracy
activities among the local population.155

Applying the social theory to the piracy situation in the Gulf of Guinea
has both strengths and limitations. Poverty, unemployment and illegal
fishing are major issues confronting the region, and indeed have
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See Mohammed A. Waldo, The Two Piracies in Somalia: Why the World Ignores the Other?,
2009,
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implications for ocean resource management and stability.156 But, there
is neither evidence of a direct link between poverty in coastal
communities and piracy, nor the direct engagement of unemployed
fishermen in piracy. The closest example of this assertion, are threats
made by Senegalese fishermen in March 2012 to resort to piracy if the
government failed to address issues of illegal fishing and foreign fishing
licenses.157 Therefore, the classical formulation of the social theory
which places emphasises on poverty, inadequately explains the
increasing threat of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. However, the
restatement of the social theory by revisionist camp is of relevance to the
piracy syndrome in the Gulf of Guinea. The analysis in sections 4.3 and
4.4 demonstrates that the Niger Delta insurgency is a product of sociopolitical dynamics in the Niger Delta region. There are two possible
classification of the insurgency: it may be regarded as a legitimate
process that became criminal; or a criminal group that exploited a
legitimate process.158 Both of these descriptions accords with the
revisionist school of the social theory.
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4.5.2 Piracy as a Symptom of Failed States
The social theory of piracy is often discussed alongside a second
construct – one that seeks to account for piracy by viewing it is a
symptom of “failed states.”159 According to this theory, pirates are nonstate actors (along with mafia groups, militias and drug cartels) that
spring up and thrive due to state failure.160 Somalia has again served as
the perfect testing ground for this theory. 161 During the period that
Somali pirates caused havoc with international shipping, the Somali
State had been divided into territories and controlled by combatants and
other groups that generally lacked domestic, regional and international
legitimacy to combat crime, including piracy.162 The international
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community also had difficulty responding to the situation, as no
engagement could be made with legitimate authority.163

While noting that the concept of “failed state” is a contested subject,164
there are linkages to draw from the “failed state” rankings of some Gulf
of Guinea States with piracy dynamics in the region. Nigeria has
systematically slipped from a relatively strong position of number 54 in
2005 to number 14 in 2011, thus joining the top twenty fragile countries
in the global “failed state” ranking.165 During the same period piratical
attacks, as shown by the statistics and analysis in this chapter, has
steadily increased to a high point in 2011. It is equally important that
Guinea, which is the secondary piracy enclave in the Gulf of Guinea, has
equally ranked in the top twenty of fragile countries of the world since
2005.166 Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea can therefore be situated within the
“failed state” concept.

The above deduction may equally be queried on the basis of the same
statistics and trends that has been analysed earlier. As illustrated in
163
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Figure 4.1, piratical incidents off the coasts of the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DR Congo), Guinea-Bissau and Liberia are generally limited
to robberies in ports, yet these States are among the most fragile in the
Gulf of Guinea.167 Indeed, DR Congo has consistently been placed in the
top five “failed states” of the world from 2005 to 2011, 168 but has low
incidents of piracy. Nonetheless, this contrast should not dismiss the
application of the “failed state” concept to the Gulf of Guinea; first
because the correlations in the case of Nigeria and Guinea are too strong
to disregard; and second, the concept is better explained when viewed in
the context of governance. This is examined below after analysing the
“business model” and “piracy cycle” concepts.

4.5.3 Business Model of Piracy
Research into the world of Somali piracy has revealed that piratical
activities are supported by transnational networks of individuals, groups
and even professionals.169 Some of these networks provide funds to
sustain piracy, while others supply logistical equipment including
weapons, Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and fuel directly to
pirates.170 In return, financiers profit from the ransoms extorted by
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pirates, which is estimated to be in the millions of dollars.171 However,
does the business model of piracy fit into the case of the Gulf of Guinea?

The classical case of the Somali piracy business which operated along
the lines of ransom payments does not fit well into the Gulf of Guinea.
Although there are multiple cases of crews being kidnapped, with pirates
demanding ransom payments for their release,172 it is very doubtful
whether the quantum and frequency of money extorted could sustain a
piracy business model of the Somali type. The analysis of the evolution
of piracy in section 4.4.3, however, points to a different piracy business
model in the Gulf of Guinea, which is based on the hijacking of oil
tankers and selling the cargo. 173 Indeed, oil tankers are prime targets of
pirates and there is a growing organised criminal market within and
outside the Gulf of Guinea that facilitates the crime.174

4.5.4 The Piracy Cycle
The last of the four theories, the piracy cycle, has been used by both
historical and contemporary researchers to explain the phenomenon of
171
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piracy.175 The hypothesis underlying this theory is that piratical activities
often go through a criminal cycle, starting with attacks by “coastal
peasants” who, over time, aggregate into “organized groups” and
threaten the security of shipping, until they are ultimately defeated by
powerful navies.176

As with the other theories, the piracy cycle theory has limitations when
applied to the Gulf of Guinea, nonetheless, it is still of relevance in
understanding the piracy dynamics in the region. The classical
hypothesis of concept will not fit into the Gulf of Guinea because the
analysis of trends and evolution does not show attacks by “coastal
peasants” graduating into “organized groups.” In fact, even if we liken
attacks by “coastal peasants” to robberies in ports (which researchers
often refer to as “subsistence piracy”),177 the inadequacy of the piracy
cycle theory becomes clear. This is because the statistics in Table 4.1 do
not exhibit a gradual transformation of robberies in ports or coastal
surrounds into full scale offshore piracy. More so, the MEND insurgency
cannot also be described as “coastal peasants.” The relevance of the
piracy cycle, however, lies in analysis of the evolution of piracy
discussed in section 4.4.3. In the context of the wider region and the
global community, the Niger Delta piracy is a localised crime or threat
that has become a threat to regional and international security.
175

See Philip Gosse, The History of Piracy, New York, Burt Franklin, 1968, p. 1-2.
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Donald J. Puchala, "Of Pirates and Terrorists: What Experience and History Teach "
Contemporary Security Policy 26, 1, 2005, pp. 1-24. See also Philip Gosse, The History of Piracy,
New York, Burt Franklin, 1968, p. 1-2
177

This is referred to as “subsistence piracy” by Hansen, see Stig J. Hansen, "Modern Piracy as a
Subject of Academic Enquiry," International Relations, 19 December 2008, pp. 2. http://www.eir.info/?p=593, 3 August 2011.
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4.5.5 The Governance Factor in Gulf of Guinea Piracy
While the four piracy theories discussed above have relevance in
explaining current and future trends of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, it is
better to account for the rising threat of piracy from the broader political
and governance-based dynamics of the region. Indeed, chapter six will
examine the governance nexus to maritime security in general terms.
However, in order to fully explain the piracy paradigm in the Gulf of
Guinea, the governance nexus should also be discussed here.

The 2006 United Nations Niger Delta Human Development Report
provides an incisive description of the socio-economic conditions of the
people of the Niger Delta.
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The Report noted that the region has

“dismal health and health service delivery”, that the people are living in
“predominantly poor quality [housing]”, and that nearly all school
facilities are in “a state of extreme disrepair”. The Report summed up the
situation by stating that there was increasing “disillusionment and
frustration” among inhabitants in the region, as well as “deepening
deprivation and environmental devastation” across the Niger Delta.179
Considering the tremendous amount of oil wealth generated by the Niger
Delta region, the dismal social picture painted by the UN Report is
difficult to comprehend. However, for the people of the Niger Delta
resentment would be at its height in such an environment, leading to
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United Nations Development Programme, Niger Delta Human Development Report, 2006, pp. 1934.
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United Nations Development Programme, Niger Delta Human Development Report, 2006, pp. 1934.
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restiveness, conflict and crime.180 This brings the piracy anatomy in the
Niger Delta close to the sociological school that seeks to explain piracy
from the point of view of social issues.

However, it is the author’s view that while each of four piracy concepts
offers insights into the piracy situation in the Gulf of Guinea, a
governance approach provides an all-embracing explanation and
analytical framework to the piracy paradigm in the Gulf of Guinea.
Indeed, the governance-maritime security nexus is important for
understanding the causality of threats and also for devising appropriate
responses to the plethora of maritime security threats in the region. As
analysed in chapter two, Nigeria is among the top oil producing
countries in the world, receiving millions of dollars in oil revenue each
year. Thus, it is the failure of successive governments to sufficiently
carter for the governance and developmental needs of the people that has
resulted in the poor socio-economic conditions in the Niger Delta.181 In
fact, some research suggests that the quantity of oil that has been spilled
in the Niger Delta region from oil exploitation in the last fifty years 182 is
more than fifty times the volume of the oil that spilled from the Exxon
180

Sheriff Folarin, "Niger-delta: Environment, Ogani Crises and the state," The Constitution 7, 1,
2007, pp. 37-61. John Vidal, Niger delta oil spills clean-up will take 30 years, says UN, 4 August
2011, The Guardian, Available: http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/aug/04/niger-deltaoil-spill-clean-up-un, 4 January 2014.
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Ibaba S. Ibada, "Violent Conflict and Sustainable Development in Bayelsa State," Review of
African Political Economy 36, 122, 2009, pp. 555-73. Oscar E. Ubhenin, "The Federal Government’s
Amnesty Programme in the Niger-Delta: An Appraisal," Yönetim Bilimleri Dergisi 21, 1, 2013, pp.
179-203
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Gold", in Dorceta E. Taylor, ed. Environment and Social Justice: An International Perspective,
Emerald Group Publishing, 2010, pp. 324-49. See also “Nigeria: Petroleum Pollution and Poverty in
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Valdez accident of 1989 - one of the greatest environmental disasters the
world has ever witnessed.183 This poor environmental management has
led to serious pollution and environmental degradation, limiting the
opportunity of people to earn a living from both farming and fishing
grounds.184As shown by the analysis in the earlier sections, it was only
after insurgent attacks starting posing a threat to the economic security of
Nigeria (and also global energy security), that an amnesty process was
initiated. Therefore, bad governance lies at the centre of the piracy
problem; not just of social issues but also of environmental stewardship.
Chapter six will analyse the facets of this governance deficit in the Gulf
of Guinea.

4.6

IMPLICATIONS OF GULF OF GUINEA PIRACY FOR

REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
Although the Niger Delta insurgency, which accounts for a substantial
number of piratical attacks in the Gulf of Guinea, has its roots in
insurgency, there is no doubt that ‘insurgency’ now qualifies as ‘piracy’
in both legal and practical contexts. The analysis has demonstrated that
vessels are attacked for the economic and personal benefit of the
perpetrators. Ransom payments are exacted, equipment, money and
183

Exxon Valdez was an oil tanker that struck a reef off the coast of Alaska, United States, on 24
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personnel effects are rampantly stolen, and increasingly part or all of a
vessel’s cargo (especially refined oil), is siphoned and sold within and
outside the Gulf of Guinea.

This penultimate section of the chapter examines the impact and
implication of piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea. Although
the analysis will compile the trends and developments that have emerged
from the rest of the chapter, the discussion will be conducted within the
context of the dimensions and levels of security examined in chapter
three.

4.6.1 Transportation Security
Guaranteeing the safety of shipping has been a traditional concern for
maritime security, but advancements in technology and the advent of
globalisation has added new dimensions and challenges to this task.185
The security of international shipping now depends on multiple factors,
including effective performance of flag State responsibilities, efficient
managers and operators, as well as reliable and affordable insurance.
However, the safety and security of ships and their crew remain the
fundamental requirement for maritime transportation security. Table 4.4
contains information on 43 vessels belonging to sixteen different flag
States that were attacked and boarded in the Gulf of Guinea in 2012
alone.
185

See Chapter Three Section 3.2. See also, Thean Potgieter and Reiner Pommerin, eds., Maritime
Security in Southern African Waters, Stellenbosch Sun Press, 2009, p. 70, D.S. Grewal,
"Identification and Formulation of Maritime Security Management System from the Shore Side: An
Interim Report", in Detlef Nielsen, ed. Maritime security and MET Southampton, WIT, 2005.
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Of particular interest is the column that specifies high risk activities
associated with the attacks. Indeed, in almost all the attacks the safety
and security of the ship and its crew were put at serious risk. The
piratical attacks outlined in the table resulted in multiple injuries,
kidnappings, as well as the death of three crew members. Moreover, the
prevalent use of weapons (including explosives) in the commission of
the crimes represents an aggravating risk factor. Many of ships suffered
damaged to their hull, and in most cases, the navigation and
communication equipment of the vessels was damaged, disabled or
stolen.

Table 4.4:

Nationality of Vessels Attacked in 2012

Flag State/ No. of
Vessels
Bahamas - 2

Names of Vessel

Risk Activities

Withheld, Orfeas

Curacao - 2

Breiz Klipper, UAL Transporter

Firing, Comms equipment
damage
Injuries, kidnapping, firing,
damage

Withheld, Withheld
Olivia
Energy Centurion
Asso Ventuno
Hansa Cloppenburg, Gallia, Zouzou,
Hellespont Drive, SCF Provider,
Liberia - 8
Ermer,
Withheld, Wappen von Hamburg
Bourbon Liberty
Luxemburg - 1
Grand, Costanza, Marciana
Malta - 3
Argos, SP Brussels
Marshall Islands - 2
WAO Brass
Nigeria
Spar Rigel
Norway-1
Saphina, BW Rhine,Fourseas,
Emmanuel
Panama - 8
Geo Endeavour, Madonna , Nord
Sincere,
Anuket Emerald
Season Trader
Philippines -1
Stormbas II Jascon 33
St Kitts & Nevis - 2
Pacific Amethyst, Ursula, Ark Charly
,
Singapore -7
Pacific Retriever, Maersk Harmony,
Pacific Raider, Abu Dhabi Star
Source: IBM Annual Piracy Report 2012.
Denmark-2
Germany
Isle of Man/UK -1
Italy - 1
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Injuries
Firing
Kidnapping
Ship equipment stolen
Navigation equipment damaged

Vessel damage

Firing
Death, injuries, firing
Vessel damage
Comms equipment damage

Vessel damage
2 deaths, injuries,
Comms equipment disabled

4.6.2 Global Trade and Economy
In addition to impairing the safety and security of shipping, piracy and
armed robbery negatively impacts on global trade and economic
development. While international law requires a ship to sail under the
flag of one State,186 in practice a single ship can represent layers of
different interests cast around multiple States. For example, the
nationality of the beneficial owner of a ship is often different from the
ship’s flag State. Moreover, the ship may be financed, managed and
insured by individuals or companies in another state, and manned by a
crew of multiple nationalities. A further layer of complexity is added if
one considers that ships on international voyages often carry cargo to
multiple destinations, particularly in the case of containerised shipping
and bulk cargo ships transporting crude oil.

Each of the above interests represents a layer of corporate and national
investment that aggregates into a global economic trade interest. As a
result, a threat to any of these interests translates into a global economic
cost. This explains why piracy and armed robbery constitute a major
threat to the global economy. Piratical incidents affect the timely
delivery of goods and also lead to higher insurance premiums. Money is
also lost through ransom payments, and ships incur extra security costs
when purchasing additional equipment and/or employing maritime
security guards. Furthermore, in an attempt to avoid pirates, ships burn
extra fuel, increasing operational costs even further. Although there is no
consensus on the exact cost of piracy to the global economy, one report
186

UNCLOS, Article 92.
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conducted in 2012 put the annual cost of Somali piracy at between
US$0.9 to 3.3 billion per annum.187 A similar report commissioned by
the One Earth Future Foundation in 2011 put the combined cost of
piracy at between US$6.6 to $6.9 billion per annum.188

4.6.3 Energy Security
The analysis in chapter two demonstrated the global reliance on the Gulf
of Guinea region as a current and future source of energy security. To
ensure the continuous delivery of oil and gas supplies to the international
market, good order at sea is paramount. This includes safe drilling and
exploration for reserves, as well as securing production infrastructure
and transportation networks. An important point demonstrated by the
analysis of the evolution of piracy and armed robbery in this chapter is
the interrelated risk posed by insurgency and piracy to the security of
shipping and critical offshore energy infrastructure.

Piracy and armed robbery disrupt the production activities of oil
platforms, and also impact greatly on the safety of oil tankers. In turn,
this affects the availability of oil supplies to the international market. For
example, as a result of the attack on the Bonga facility in June 2008,
Nigeria’s oil production dropped substantially, pushing up already
volatile oil prices from US$110 per barrel in May that year to US$130 in

187

Timothy Besley and Thiemo Fetzer, “The Welfare Cost of Lawlessness: Evidence from Somali
Piracy,” London School of Economics, London and Institut d’Analisi Economica, Barcelona, October
2012, p.11.
188

“The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2011,” Working Paper, One Earth Future Foundation, 2011.
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July.189 Top energy experts have therefore described insecurity in the
Gulf of Guinea as a key threat to global energy security.190

4.6.4 Economic Losses and Food Security in the Gulf of Guinea
Threats to maritime transportation and energy resource investments will
undoubtedly have ramifications for economic and food security in the
Gulf of Guinea. As indicated earlier, port revenue in Benin declined by
US$81 million in 2011 due to piratical attacks, with the country’s fishing
industry suffering a US$1 million a month loss in the wake of the
attacks.
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Indeed, Nigeria’s Maritime Administration estimates the

State’s financial loss due to pirate activities to be US$3.5 billion
annually.192

The rise in piratical attacks is also pushing up the cost of shipping in the
Gulf of Guinea. In August 2011, Lloyds and other insurers placed part of
the Gulf of Guinea in the same high-risk category as Somalia.193 The
189

Fuad Al-Zayer (OPEC Data Services), “The 2008 OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin,” 8 July 2009,
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n.pdf (10 October 2013). Jeff Veil, "Nigeria - The Significance of the Bonga Offshore Oil Platform
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International Transport Workers Federation (ITF) similarly declared the
Gulf of Guinea to be a high risk area when reviewing the wages and
working conditions of crews.194 Available figures show that in the case
of Somalia, insurance costs alone increased from US$500 per voyage in
2008 to US$20,000 in 2009 because of piracy.195 It is important to note
that these are the direct (and thus easily verifiable) costs associated with
piracy. The real economic and social costs of piracy are much higher.
Furthermore, as analysed in chapter two, Gulf of Guinea States depend
heavily on imports. Therefore, high shipping costs will translate into
more expensive prices for imported goods, including food, which may
result in a worsening of social and economic conditions.

A second overlap between piracy and food security in the Gulf of Guinea
can be seen in the attacks on fishing vessels. In 2007 the Agricultural
and Allied Workers Union of Nigeria reported that over forty-four
fishing personnel had been killed by pirates, and that fishing vessels had
routinely been robbed of their goods and property.196 Subsequently, in
2008, the Association withdraw over 170 fishing vessels from service
due to the increasing threat to the security of its members, and as a form
of protest against the lack of protection being afforded by Nigeria’s
Federal Government.197
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4.6.5

Regional and National Security

All the threats analysed above ultimately impact on the national security
of individual Gulf of Guinea States, as well as the security of the region
as a whole. However, such threats also have the capacity to directly
affect national and regional security.

A general way of stating this fact is to say that piracy, like all criminal
activities, undermines national security. But there are more nuanced
ways of analysing the nexus, and MEND provides a good example. Even
when piratical attacks were in their infancy, and regarded as
opportunistic, they still posed significant national security threats. As
these attacks increased in sophistication, involving not only theft but
extortion attempts, kidnapping and ransom demands, they provided a
source of funding for insurgents, allowing them to sustain their
livelihoods. As a result, insurgent groups were able to focus on their
primary objective – creating political instability, thereby creating more
serious security threats.

The second point to note is that piratical attacks should be seen as both a
transitional and growing threat. Indeed, this can be seen in the case of
insurgents practicing the rudiments of piracy as part of their political
campaigns, and later turning to it on a full-time basis. National security
assessors may have disregarded piracy’s incubation period as of little
consequence, but that in itself has become a national and regional
security threat. It is important to note that there is always a tendency for
transnational crimes to blend together or overlap with each other. Indeed,
211

there are already reports of insurgents in the Niger Delta accepting
cocaine as payment for undisclosed services.198 Drug traffickers could
thus start using the services of pirates to ferry drugs in their speedboats,
in a similar way that fishermen are currently used to transport drugs in
the region.199 These are threats and trends that have serious implications
for national and regional security. But the situation has the capacity to
become even more complex.

In 2009, maritime security concerns in the Gulf of Guinea came to a
head following an alleged sea-borne attack targeting the Palace of the
President of Equatorial Guinea. The attackers were thought to be
insurgents from Niger Delta who regularly engaged in piracy activities in
neighbouring coasts.
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The incident also generated tensions between

Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon, leading to a temporary suspension of
trading activities between the two States. This was because the attackers
were said to have sailed from, and retreated to, a port in Cameroon.201 A
second incident occurred in Cameroon in 2011, when Niger Delta pirates
and insurgents attacked and robbed a bank, killing several people in the
process.202 Although the perpetrators of these incidents may not always
be identified and brought to justice, one thing is known: the incidents
highlight the interface of attacks between ships and offshore assets,
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creating a new, seaborne asymmetric threat to national and regional
security.203

4.7

PIRACY PROFILE AND FUTURE PROJECTIONS

Given the far reaching implications of piratical attacks in the Gulf of
Guinea, effective counter-piracy measures must be adopted by regional
States and international community to address the situation. Indeed,
counter-piracy initiatives in the Gulf of Guinea must take into account
the emerging piracy profile of the region. The modus operandi of pirates
must also be understood, and emerging trends closely monitored.
Therefore, this concluding section summarises the piracy profile in the
Gulf of Guinea as well as the future projections.

4.7.1 Profile of Niger Delta Pirates
By the close of 2012, the evolving piracy profile had crystallised, with
the details summarised in Table 4.5 below.

203
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Table 4.5
Subject
Platforms

Grouping
Weapons
Violence
Reach/Range
Time
Target ships
Mother ship
Assisting Ships
Ransom
Networks

Profile of Gulf of Guinea Piracy
Description/Outcome
Speedboats – These were already being used by insurgents. They are ideal for
piracy because of their speed and manoeuvrability. Generally faster than victim
ships and naval ships.
There can be up to 40 pirates in multiple speedboats.
Large numbers are ideal for overpowering crew.
AK 47s, machine guns, RPGs, grenades and knifes.
Able to stop ships underway with strong fire power.
High level of violence and injury to crew.
Instils fear and ensures quick outcome of attacks.
South – Nigeria to Equatorial Guinea (over 1,550km).
West – Nigeria to Cote d’Ivoire (over 2,000km).
Pirates operate both day and night, but are shifting towards night operations.
An element of surprise is achieved through night attacks.
Oil and product tankers, with the objective of stealing refined oil cargo.
Other vessels attacked for money and valuables.
Hijacked fishing vessels are occasionally used on a resupply basis or as a decoy
when approaching targeted ships.
Tankers used to transfer stolen oil cargo.
Not a prime motivation, but still employed as a supplementary activity.
Stolen oil sold within and outside the region. Timing of attacks suggest prior
information about location of oil tankers

The above profile has emerged from the discussion of the seven phases
of piracy, with the main focus being on the primary piracy enclave.
However, Gulf of Guinea piratical activity is marked by fluidity and
increasing complexity. Effective responses should therefore be scoped
within the broader maritime security context of the region, with
particular attention being paid to developments in the way piratical
activities are being carried out (and their links to criminal networks). The
following trends should be closely watched in both the primary and
secondary piracy enclaves.
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4.7.2 Increasing Trends in Piracy and Criminal Oil Networks
Unlike Somalia, where multilateral counter-piracy efforts have led to a
steady decline in successful attacks since 2009,204 the Gulf of Guinea has
seen an escalation in attacks. Pirates in the region have mastered the
geography and shipping profile of the Gulf of Guinea, making attacks
easier to perpetrate. The IMO reported 13 attacks in the Gulf of Guinea
between January and February 2013 alone, with 8 of the attacks taking
place on the high seas.205 If this trend continues, the region will record
over 100 incidents in 2013, twice the yearly average of the last 8 years,
and more than half of these will be committed on the high seas.

The maritime security profile of the Gulf of Guinea shows that distance
is not a limiting factor for piratical activities. Conversely, long-range
attacks give pirates more time to plunder ships and transfer stolen cargo.
Clearly, there is no area in the Gulf of Guinea too remote or too secure to
dissuade pirates from their marauding activities. Indications of a
widening primary piracy enclave became apparent in July 2013, when an
oil tanker was hijacked near the Port of Gabon, and subsequently sighted
under the control of the hijackers off the coast of Nigeria.206 This
204
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(MSC.4/Circ.194. 19 March 2013). IMO, Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against
Ships-February 2013, (MSC.4/Cir.195. 21 March 2013).
206

"Pirates hijack tanker off Gabon as shipping risks spread," defenseWed, 19 July 2013. “Pirates
leave hijacked ship, all 24 Indians on board safe,” The Times of India, 23 July 2013.

215

incident shows once more that oil tankers will continue to be targeted by
pirates because the financial rewards for the pirates, their accomplices,
as well as the buyers of the stolen oil, are extremely high.207 However,
while pirates hunt for these high value targets, all other vessels become
susceptible to piratical attacks. Therefore, the oil factor is indeed a
critical determinant of the future of maritime security in the region.

4.7.3 Other Piratical Groups within the Primary Piracy Enclave
It is important to note that the situation in the primary piracy enclave is
even more complicated than this analysis has highlighted. Indeed, there
is a history of attacks by two other organised groups in neighbouring
Cameroon – groups that are completely removed from the Niger Delta
insurgency. The first is the Bakassi Freedom Fighters (BFF), a group that
is opposed to Nigeria returning the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon.208
The BFF attacked an oil tanker in 2008, kidnapping the crew and
detaining them for ten days, before successfully negotiating a ransom
payment. 209 The second group, the Africa Marine Commando (AMC),
kidnapped a Chinese fishing crew in 2010, accepting a ransom for their
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release.210 There have not been any other discernible cases of piratical
attacks by the BFF or the AMC, partly because of robust responses from
the Cameroon government – responses which have included lethal force
being used against group members.211However, the groups are far from
being dismantled, with reports indicating that the AMC was involved in
the kidnapping of local officials in 2011.212

4.7.4 Deepening Piratical Attacks in the Secondary Piracy Enclave
Another concern is the future safety of the coasts of Guinea and Sierra
Leone. Indeed, the trajectory of incidents in this enclave is worrying,
with a high level of violence often being employed. There is also a very
close correlation between reported piratical incidents off the coast of
Guinea and incidents in neighbouring Sierra Leone - a portent sign of
organised criminal activity in the area. In March 2007, pirates armed
with machine guns boarded the Atropos, which was underway 40
nautical miles off Sierra Leone.213 In August the same year, thirty pirates
armed with guns boarded a United Kingdom registered product tanker
off Guinea.214 Later, in December, pirates armed with AK47s and
wearing military-like uniforms fired upon and boarded a tanker off
210
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Sierra Leone.215 In August 2010, ten pirates armed with AK47s again
attacked a ship off the coast of Guinea,216 and more recently in 2012, a
Maltese cargo ship, the Costanza, was attacked 20 nautical miles off
Guinea by armed pirates with AK47s, with the ship sustaining
damage.217 Indeed, these are indications of entrenched piratical activities.
As attacks from the secondary enclave spread southwards, a piracy arch
with the primary enclave will be formed, leading to a very grave
situation at sea – one which has far reaching consequences for regional
security.

4.7.5 Threats Beyond Piracy

While the Gulf of Guinea grapples with a spate of piratical activity, new
transnational actors are gaining notoriety in the region. Indeed, the
extremist Islamist group, Boko Haram,218 whose activities were
previously confined to the northern part of Nigeria, has broadened its
operations. In August 2011, the group claimed responsibility for a
suicide attack on the United Nations Office in Nigeria, killing 18 United

215

The tanker Jamal Massry is Gambian registered. See IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against
Ships Annual Report 2007, p. 74.
216

IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Annual Report 2010, p. 55.
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IMO, Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships – August 2012, IMO,
MSC.4/Cir.188, 29 October 2012). See also the hijacking of the Marciana, a general cargo ship,
Malta, in October 2012 (IMO, MSC.4/Cir.190, 21 January 2013).
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“Boko Haram” translates to “western education is bad”. The group is an extremist Islamic sect in
Northern Nigeria that is waging a war against the Government of Nigeria, demanding the
institutionalisation of Islamic rule in Nigeria. According to the United States Peace Institute, the group
is not in the same category as other terrorist groups as it is not targeting western interests. See,
Andrew Walker, What Is Boko Haram? United States Peace Institute, May 2012,
http://www.usip.org/publications/what-boko-haram, 14 March 2013.
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Nations staff and injuring over one hundred others.219 This attack
dramatically changed earlier assessments of the group that viewed their
threat as limited.220 In June 2013, following repeated attacks on major
cities and towns in Nigeria, the Government of Nigeria officially
declared Boko Haram a terrorist group,221 with the Nigerian Minister of
Defence emphatically describing the group as a franchise of Al-Qaeda.222

To date, there have been no reports of Boko Haram having launched
maritime attacks. And although a strike on an onshore pipeline in
February 2012 by a group “want[ing] to register their presence” raised
fears that Boko Haram may have been targeting strategic oil assets, no
connection with the group has been established.223 Nevertheless, the
possibility of Boko Haram or another terrorist group - such as Al-Qaeda
in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM), targeting offshore oil and gas
installations in the Gulf of Guinea cannot be discounted.224 Indeed, the
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Vangauard Newspaper, UN House Bombing: Boko Haram Claims Responsibility, 27 August 2011,
Nigerian Bulletin Available: http://nigerianbulletin.com/2011/08/27/un-house-bombing-boko-haramclaims-responsibility-vanguard/, 30 August 2011. See also, Bashir Adigun, UN Headquarters Car
Bombing in Nigeria kills 18,
27 August 2011, The Associate Press, Available:
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gOTyKRMIh695bDlsnpuxCVTWxYWA?doc
Id=25af455aab4440aeb6acaeccf757547b, 30 August 2011.
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See Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor, 7 May 2010. Gwynne Dyer, Nigeria and Boko Haram:
Islamist extremists threaten democracy and Muslim-Christian unity in Africa’s largest country
29August 2011, Available: http://www.thespec.com/opinion/columns/article/586023--nigeria-andboko-haram, 30 August 2011.
221

“Jonathan officially declares Boko Haram a terrorist organization,” Premium Times, 4 June 2013.
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Hon. Erelu Olusola Obada, "Nigeria’s Defence Priorities: Domestic Stability for Regional
Security," Chatham House, 18 July 2013, pp. 4. See also Ola Awoniyi, “Nigeria Defence Chief says
Boko Haram has ties to Al-Qaeda,” AFP, 23 February 2012.
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Militants claim attack on Eni oil pipeline 5 February 2012, BusinessDay, Available:
http://www.businessdayonline.com/NG/index.php/news/76-hot-topic/32640-mend-claim-attack-onnigeria-eni-oil-pipeline, 14 March 2013 2013.
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The AQIM operates in the Sahel or Maghreb region of Western Africa, falling largely within Chad,
Mali, Niger and Senegal. See Anneli Botha, “Terrorism in the Maghreb the Transnationalisation of
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high value of these assets, coupled with their vulnerability, make them
attractive targets.225

4.8

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has demonstrated that piracy presents a major risk to the
geostrategic advantages of the Gulf of Guinea. The analysis has shown
that piratical attacks are on the increase, that the trends and dynamics of
such attacks are becoming more complex. The analysis of the future
projections for the region also reveals deepening piracy trends and
widespread insecurity. These trends have enormous implications for
maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. Without doubt, piracy and
armed robbery is a significant threat to the safety and security of
international shipping, undermining global energy security, and also
impacting on national and regional security.

It is evident from the examination of the evolution of piracy that
although pirates operate with impunity, the counter-piracy measures
adopted by States have largely been ineffective. The analysis has also
demonstrated that unless national and bilateral initiatives are coordinated
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/201305/peace_and_security_in_africa.php?print=true, 5 September 2013.
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Hans Tino Hansen, "Distinctions in the Finer Shades of Gray: The "Four Circles Model" for
Maritime Security Threat Assessment", in Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr, eds.
Lloyd's MIU Handbook of Maritime Security, CRC Press, 2008. Torbjorn Thedeen, "Setting the Stage:
The Vulnerability of Critical Infrastructures", in Konstantin Frolov and Gregory Baecher, eds.
Protection of Civilian Infrastructure from Acts of terrorism, Springer, 2006. Amanda East and Bill
Bailey, "Australia's Oil Refining Industry - Importance, Threats and Emergency Response," Security
Management, 2008.
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within a regional framework, pirates will merely transfer their activities
to neighbouring coasts or modify their tactics, which will ultimately
compound regional and global insecurity. More worrying, however, is
the fact that apart from piracy, other serious maritime security threats
exist in the Gulf of Guinea.

It is indeed clear from the analysis in this chapter, as well as that in the
previous chapter, that the enhancement of maritime security in the Gulf
of Guinea requires: (i) the effective exercise of jurisdiction and
enforcement by Gulf of Guinea States; (ii) effective regional
cooperation; and (iii) viable global engagement and support; and more
importantly (vi) appreciating the land-sea nexus to maritime security and
addressing the governance dimensions to insecurity. The next chapter
will assess the extent to which Gulf of Guinea States have implemented
pertinent international instruments and frameworks which form the basis
for the exercise of maritime security jurisdiction. Chapters six and seven
will then proceed to assess regional and global cooperation in the Gulf of
Guinea region.
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CHAPTER FIVE
IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL
FRAMEWORKS FOR ENHANCING MARITIME
SECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA

5.1 INTRODUCTION
The analysis in chapter three demonstrated the role of international
frameworks in defining the scope and content of the concept of maritime
security. Additionally, international legal and policy frameworks serve
as tools for asserting jurisdiction at the national level, and as cooperative
mechanisms for addressing maritime security challenges. Therefore, the
degree of implementation of maritime security frameworks in the Gulf of
Guinea is a measure of national and regional capacity and commitment
to combat maritime security threats.

This chapter will examine how effectively Gulf of Guinea States have
implemented key multilateral frameworks that seek to address various
aspects of maritime security. The chapter is divided into five parts. First,
the chapter will analyse the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS), which is the primary international legal treaty
governing ocean use and governance, assessing its implementation in the
Gulf of Guinea. The next four parts will examine the implementation of
selected frameworks that have direct bearing on the maritime security
threats analysed in chapters three and four. Each part will focus on three
objectives: (i) reviewing the background of the relevant international
222

framework or instruments; (ii) analysing the content of the framework
and its relevance to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea; and (iii)
assessing the implementation of the framework in the Gulf of Guinea.

5.2

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW OF THE SEA

CONVENTION IN THE GULF OF GUINEA
The importance of UNCLOS1 as a charter of global order and maritime
security is highlighted in its preamble, which declares it to be an
instrument for the "maintenance of peace”, for promoting “peaceful uses
of the seas and oceans”, and for enhancing “equitable international
economic order.”

2

These principles anchor the normative and

institutional arrangement of the Convention, and equally demonstrate
that it is indeed the “constitution of the oceans” and an embodiment of
the political, economic and security needs of States. 3

To properly situate the framework of the Convention in this chapter, a
brief examination of its background is necessary. It is important to note
that this historical review is being carried out from the perspective of
African States in order to assess whether Gulf of Guinea States have
1

United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
The Convention opened for signature at Montego Bay, Jamaica, on 10 December 1982, and came into
force on 16 November 1994. The Convention has 166 Ratifications as at 29 October 2013. The full
text of the Convention is reprinted in 21 International Legal Materials 1261 (1982).
2

The reference to the “realization of just and equitable international economic order” in the Preamble
has been understood by many commentators as a fulfilment of the “New International Economic
Order” doctrine that was fought for by developing countries, especially newly independent African
States. See Barbara Kwiatkowska, The 200 Mile Exclusive Economic Zone in the New Law of the Sea
2, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1989. Harry J. Johnson, The New International Economic Order
Graduate School of Business University of Chicago, 1976.
3

The description of the Convention as the constitution of the world’s oceans was used in an address
by the President of the Conference that adopted the Convention, Tommy T.B. Koh. The address is
posted at http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/koh_english.pdf, 23 August 2013.
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subsequently utilised the opportunities provided by the Convention for
securing vital maritime security interests.

5.2.1 African States and the Evolution of the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention
UNCLOS evolved from three international conferences held under the
auspices of the United Nations (UN).

4

This section summarises the

participation of African States in the three conferences and the
negotiations that crystallised into the adoption of UNCLOS.

5.2.1.1

First Law of the Sea Conference and the 1958

Conventions
The First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I)
was convened by a resolution of the UN General Assembly in 1957.5
UNCLOS I was held from 24 February to 27 April 1958, barely a year
after Ghana had liberated itself from colonial rule.6 Thus Ghana and
Liberia, together with five other African States, took part in UNCLOS I,
which was attended by eighty-six States.7 Four Conventions and an

4

The analysis in this part relies heavily on a publication co-authored by the author, Martin Tsamenyi
and Kamal-Deen Ali, "African States and the Law of Sea Convention: Have the benefits been
realized?," Ocean Yearbook 26, 2012, pp. 113-60.
5

The Conference was convened by the UN General Assembly Resolution 1105(XI) of 21 February,
1957. The travaux preparatoires and proceedings of the Conference can be found in “Official Records
of the UN Conference on the Law of Sea,” vols. I to VII, UN publication, Sales No. 58, V.4, vols. I to
VII.
6

Ghana had independence on 6 March 1957, and was the first country in the Gulf of Guinea to have
independence.
7

Other African States at the Conference included Egypt, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Sudan and South Africa.
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Optional Protocol were adopted at the end of the conference. 8 These
Conventions were subsequently ratified by three Gulf of Guinea States at
various stages following their independence – namely, Nigeria, Sierra
Leone and Senegal.9 In contrast, none of the African States that
participated in the conference (with the exception of South Africa)
ratified any of the Conventions. Indeed, this was a clear indication of the
dissatisfaction of African States with the 1958 law of the sea regime. 10

Many African States refrained from ratifying the 1958 law of the sea
framework because the Conventions were geared towards entrenching
the interests of developed States to the disadvantage of developing States
(and particularly African States that had just emerged from many years

8

"Convention on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 1958 " UN Treaty Series, 516, pp. 205, in
force 10th September 1964, "Convention on the High Seas, 1958 " UN Treaty Series 450, pp. 11, in
force 30th September 1962, "Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas, 1958," UN Treaty Series 559, pp. 285, in force 20th March 1966, "Convention on
Continental Shelf, 1958, in force10 June 1964," UN Treaty Series 499, "Optional Protocol on
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, 1958," UN Treaty Series 450, pp. 169, in force 30th September
1962 .
9

Nigeria achieved independence on 1/10/1960 and ratified the Conventions as follows: Territorial Sea
and Contiguous Zone, 26/6/1961; Convention on the High Seas, 26/6/1961; Convention on Fishing
and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas, 26/6/1961; Convention on the Continental
Shelf, 28/4/1971. Sierra Leone achieved independence on 27/4/1961 and ratified the Conventions as
follows: Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 13/3/1962; Convention on the High
Seas, 13/3/1962; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas,
13/3/1962; Convention on the Continental Shelf, 25/11/1966.
Senegal achieved independence on 4/4/1960 and ratified the Conventions as follows: Convention on
the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 25/4/1961; Convention on the High Seas, 25/4/1961;
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas, 25/4/1961;
Convention on the Continental Shelf, 28/4/1961. Senegal subsequently renounced three of the
Conventions. The details of registration of the denunciations are as follows: Convention on Territorial
Sea and Contiguous Zone, 9 June 1971 (see, No. 7477, UN Treaty Series, vol. 781, p. 332);
Convention on Living Resources of the High Seas, 9 June 1971 (see, No.8164, UN Treaty Series, vol.
781, p. 332); Convention on Continental Shelf, 1 March 1976 (see, No. 7302, UN Treaty Series, vol.
997, p. 486). The denunciations were to take effect 30 days after registrations of the notices of
denunciation.
10

Martin Tsamenyi and Kamal-Deen Ali, "African States and the Law of Sea Convention: Have the
benefits been realized?" Ocean Yearbook 26, 2012, p. 117. See generally Tayo O. Akintoba, African
States and Contemporary International Law: A Case Study of the 1982 Law of Sea Convention and
the Exclusive Economic Zone The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff 1996.
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of colonial rule).11 Indeed, this is illustrated by the design of the
Continental Shelf Convention.12 After providing that the seaward limit of
the continental shelf is the distance where the depth of the sea is 200
metres, Article 1 introduced an additional criterion, allowing States to
extend the limit of the shelf “to where the depth of the superjacent waters
admits of the exploitation of the natural resources.”13 This additional
window rendered the exact limit of continental shelf indefinite, and since
exploitability of marine resources is dependent upon technological
innovation, the Convention was, in essence, a tool for developed States
to annex large areas of the seabed.14

Also, developing States generally sought an extension of the territorial
sea beyond the customary law limit of 3 nautical miles, but this was
opposed by developed States who viewed it as a fetter on their military
and fishing interests.15

11

Tayo O. Akintoba, African States and Contemporary International Law: A Case Study of the 1982
Law of Sea Convention and the Exclusive Economic Zone, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1996, p.68.
See also Nasila S. Rembe, Africa and the International Law of the Sea, Netherlands Sijthoff and
Nordhoff, 1980.
12

"Convention on Continental Shelf, 1958,” in force10 June 1964, UN Treaty Series 499.

13

Article 1 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, UN Treaty Series Vol. 499, p. 311.

14

Robin R. Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, Law of the Sea, Manchester, Manchester University Press,
1999, p.147.
15

On the evolution of the territorial sea, see Robin Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, Law of the Sea,
Manchester University Press, 1999, p.71-81.
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5.2.1.2

Second Law of the Sea Conference - No Convention

Adopted
Due to demands placed on the UN General Assembly by developing
States for a new ocean regime, the Second United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS II) was held in 1960.16 Cameroon and
Guinea, together with Ghana and Liberia, were among the ten African
States that participated in the conference.17 The core objective of
UNCLOS II was to resolve conflicting claims to territorial seas and
fisheries zones.18 Whilst some States were still considering the
maximum limit of the territorial sea to be 6 nautical miles, African States
proposed a 12 nautical mile territorial sea limit at UNCLOS II.19 In fact,
most of the African States at the conference had already enacted
domestic legislation claiming a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles and
beyond, or were in the process of doing so.20 Due to irreconcilable
differences, UNCLOS II ended without the adoption of a Convention
after six weeks of deliberations.

16

General Assembly per Resolution 1307 (XIII) of 10 December 1958 requested the SecretaryGeneral to convene a Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea to consider the topics
of the breadth of the territorial sea and fishery limits - issues which had not been agreed upon in the
1958 Conventions. The Conference was held from 17 March to 26 April 1960 and adopted two
resolutions in its Final Act (A/CONF.19/L.15).
17

Eighty-eight States were at UNLOS II. The ten African States in attendance were Cameroon,
Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and South Africa. See UNCLOS II
Official Records, pp. 13–24.
18

Robin R. Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, Law of the Sea, Manchester, Manchester University Press,
1999, p.14.
19

See Statements by African States at UNCLOS II, UNCLOS II, Official Records, A/CONF. 19/8,
Ghana p.33 paragraph 12; Tunisia p.91 Paragraph 34; Sudan p. 110 paragraph 15; Libya p.123
paragraph 22.
20

For a commentary on these claims, see Ashley J. Roach and Robert W. Smith, United States
Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims, London and Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, 1996, p. 151-158.
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5.2.1.3

Third Law of the Sea Conference and UNCLOS 1982

The failure of participating States to reach a consensus at UNCLOS II
resulted in the 1960s and 1970s being a period of intense contestation,
with developed and developing States trying to secure their respective
interests.21 However, in the absence of a prevailing governance regime
for the oceans, developed States were (predictably) better placed to
derive maximum benefits from the zeitgeist of ‘self-help’ and
unilateralism. 22 Using the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)23 as a
platform, African States demanded the development of a normative
framework that would cater for their interests.24 In order to add
momentum to their demands, African States united with other
developing States under the umbrella of the ‘Group of 77’. This alliance
of sorts was designed to gain attention on the floor of the UN and on the
international stage in general.25 In 1972, the Yaoundé Regional Seminar
declared the right of African States to establish an economic zone
beyond the territorial sea.26 In the same year, and under the leadership of

21

Robert L. Freidheim, “The ‘Satisfied’ and ‘Dissatisfied’ States Negotiate International Law,”
World Politics 18, 1965, p. 21.
22

Michel Virally, “Sources of International Law,” in Max Sorensen, ed., Manual of Public
International Law, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1968, p. 137. See also Ram Prankash Anand,
"Tyranny of the Freedom of the Seas Doctrine " International Studies 12, 1973, pp. 416-29. Richard
Falk, “The New States and the International Legal Order,” Recueil des Cours, vol. 2, 1966, pp. 16-17.
23

On OAU, see chapter 6.

24

See in particular Resolutions CM/250 (XVI) and CM/238 adopted at the Seventeenth Ordinary
Session of the Council of Ministers, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 15 to 19 June 1971.
25

The Group of 77 was initiated on the basis of a Joint Declaration of Developing Countries, General
Assembly Resolution 1877 of 1963, UN Doc A/5587. The Group commenced work on 15 June 1964,
with 77 developing countries sitting on the sidelines of the First Session of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva. In October 1967, the Group of 77
adopted the “Charter of Algiers”, which recognised the Group as a permanent institutional structure
with Chapters and Liaison Offices in Nairobi, Paris, Rome, Vienna and Washington. Although the
membership of the Group expanded with time, when UNCLOS III convened in 1974, the Group’s
membership was approximately 120 States. The original name of the Group has been retained due to
its historic significance.
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Kenya, the concept of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) was
formulated and presented at the United Nations Seabed Committee,
which was meeting in Geneva.27 Then, the Addis Ababa and Mogadishu
Declarations of 1973 and 1974 gave final force to the African position.28
These Declarations emphatically stated the right of African States to an
EEZ and the reciprocal recognition of the EEZs of other States.29

While the above developments were taking place, the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) was convened,
with its first substantive session taking place in 1974, and enduring until
1982.30 Meanwhile, the concept of the EEZ had already received
endorsement from African and Latin American States, as well as many
other developing States.31 These endorsements were so widespread that
the concept of the EEZ was considered a rule of customary international

26

See, Conclusions in the General Report of the African States Regional Seminar on the Law of the
Sea, held in Yaoundé, Cameroon, June 1972, UN Leg. Ser. B/16, p.601. The Yaoundé Regional
Seminar was held from 20th to 30th June 1972 in Yaoundé, Cameroon.
27

See, UN Doc. A.AC. 138/SC.II/L.10, 1973. The Draft Articles are reproduced in International
Legal Materials 12, 1973, p.33.
28

Martin Tsamenyi and Kamal-Deen Ali, "African States and the Law of Sea Convention: Have the
benefits been realized?" Ocean Yearbook 26, 2012, p. 121.
29

Declaration of OAU Council of Ministers held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 17-24 May 1973, and the
Mogadishu Declaration of the Twenty First Ordinary Session of the OAU, Mogadishu, Somalia, 6 to 9
September 1974. The text of the Declarations are reproduced in the document titled “Conservation
and Utilization of Living Resources of the EEZ: Legislative History of Articles 61 and 62 of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea”, United Nations, New York, 1995, p. 9.
30

The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) was convened pursuant
to General Assembly Resolution 2750 C (XXV) of 17 December 1970. The conference was to
commence in 1973 but was postponed to the following year to allow the completion of the work of the
UN Seabed Committee which was to form part of the preparatory documents for UNCLOS III.
31

The EEZ concept also received support from a few developed States, particularly Canada, East
Germany, West Germany and Norway. See United Nations, Summary of Records of Meeting - First
Session, UNCLOS III Official Records vol. I, United Nations, New York, 1973. See also Edward L.
Miles and William T. Burke, "Pressures on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
Arising from New Fisheries Conflicts: The Problem of Straddling Stocks," Ocean Development and
International Law 20, 1989, pp. 343-57.
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law even before UNCLOS III was finalised.32 The EEZ later received
detailed expression in Part V of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.
The demands of African States also led to the creation of Part XI of
UNCLOS, which created a juridical regime that prevents unilateral
national appropriation and control of the deep seabed. This area is
commonly referred to as the Common Heritage of Mankind.33

5.2.2 Overview of the Framework of the Law of the Sea Convention
UNCLOS was adopted on 30 April 1982 by one hundred and thirty votes
to four, with seventeen abstentions.34 However, there was still some
opposition, largely from developed States, to Part XI of the Convention
that dealt with the deep seabed. Thus, it was only after the re-negotiation
of Part XI35 that the Convention entered into force in 1994.36 The main
body of UNCLOS consist of 320 Articles dealing with a plethora of
32

Thus in the 1985 Libya/Malta Case, the ICJ stated emphatically that it was “incontestable that…the
EEZ…is shown by the practice of States to have become part of customary law.” See [1985], ICJ
Report, p. 33. See also Robin R. Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, Law of the Sea, Manchester,
Manchester University Press, 1999, p.161. Generally on the evolution of the concept of the EEZ, see
David Attard, The Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
1987.
33

The concept or doctrine of the Common Heritage of Mankind broadly asserts that certain rights or
resources should not be enjoyed by some States to the exclusion of others. For a discussion of the
concept in the context of developing States and the law of sea, see Kemal Baslar, The Concept of the
Common Heritage of Mankind in International Law, The Hague Martinus Nijhoff 1998, p. 210-216.
Edwin Egede, Africa and the Deep Seabed Regime: Politics and International Law of the Common
Heritage of Mankind Heidelberg, Springer, 2011.
34

Israel, Turkey, the United States and Venezuela voted against the adoption of the Convention.
Belgium, Bulgaria, Belarus, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic
of Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Thailand,
Ukraine, the USSR and the United Kingdom abstained from the vote.
35

The instrument of modification is the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 20 July 1994.
36

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, entry into force 16
November 1994. See 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. Reprinted in 21 International Legal Materials 1261 (1982).
The Convention has 166 Ratifications as at 29 October 2013.
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issues including the delimitation of maritime boundaries, the control and
management of living and non-living resources, the protection of the
marine environment, shipping and navigation, marine scientific research
(MSR), the transfer of technology, the protection of underwater
archaeological objects, as well as the rights and obligations of States
relating to the peaceful use of the sea. The Convention has 9 Annexes,
covering various subject matters. Also Annexed to the Convention is the
Agreement Relating to Part XI, which modifies Part XI of the main
Convention. 37

On the whole, UNCLOS can be characterised in two ways. In one
respect it creates very specific rights and obligations for States; in other
respects it is a ‘framework convention’ in the sense that its proper
implementation requires interstate cooperation and the adoption of
additional instruments.38 Indeed, all the instruments being examined in
the rest of this chapter are related to the Convention. However, it suffices
at this stage to summarise the maritime zones designated by the
Convention. Such a summary is necessary for assessing the
implementation of those provisions of the Convention that deal directly
with maritime security and boundary delimitation. Other aspects of the
Convention will be reviewed in other parts of the chapter.
37

Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of Sea, 20 July 1994, reproduced in 33 International Legal Materials, 1309, 1994.
38

On the further implementation of UNCLOS, see Hans Corell, "Oversight of the Implementation of
the Global Ocean Regime: The Role of the United Nations’ ", in Davor Vidas and Willy Østreng, eds.
Order for the Oceans at the Turn of the Century, Netherlands, Kluwer Law International, 1999. Tullio
Treves, "The Role of Universal International in Implementing the 1982 UN Law of the Sea
Convention", in Alfred H. A. Soons, ed. Implementation of the Law of the Sea Convention Through
International Institution, Honolulu, Law of the Sea Institute, 1990.
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5.2.2.1

Territorial Sea and the Protection of Sovereignty and

Security Interests
UNCLOS gives coastal States the right to claim a territorial sea not
exceeding 12 nautical miles from the baselines.39 The sovereignty of
coastal States extends to the territorial sea and the air space above the
territorial sea. 40 By implication, all resources in the water column and
seabed of the territorial sea are subject to the exclusive control of the
coastal State. The sovereignty jurisdiction of coastal States in the
territorial sea is a potent tool for security jurisdiction and enforcement.41
Whilst ensuring that the right of innocent passage is not fettered, 42 Gulf
of Guinea States can enact and enforce laws aimed at protecting
homeland security and safeguarding the territorial sea itself.43 Such laws
may include the prohibition of illicit trafficking in narcotics,44 as well as
“[any crime] that disturb[s] the peace of the country or the good order of
the territorial sea.”45 This broad legislative and enforcement jurisdiction
is a veritable tool for combating the maritime security threats analysed in
chapters three and four.

39

UNCLOS, Article 3.

40

UNCLOS, Article 2. See also Robin R. Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, Law of the Sea, Manchester,
Manchester University Press, 1999, p.77.
41

G. Marston, “The Evolution of the Concept of Sovereignty over the Bed and Subsoil of the
Territorial Sea”, British Yearbook of International Law, 48, 1976-77, pp. 321 at p. 332.
42

Requirements relating to Innocent Passage are contained in Article 19.

43

See in particular UNCLOS Articles 2, 21 and 27. See also Robin R. Churchill and Vaughan Lowe,
Law of the Sea, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1999, p.95. Jose L. Jesus, "Protection of
Foreign Ships against Piracy and Terrorism at Sea: Legal Aspects," International Journal of Marine
and Coastal Law 18, 2003, pp. 363-400.
44

UNCLOS, Article 27(1)(a).

45

UNCLOS Article 27 (1)(b).
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5.2.2.2

Policing and Enforcement Rights in the Contiguous Zone

In addition to the territorial sea, coastal States may establish a
contiguous zone not exceeding 24 nautical miles from the baseline from
which the territorial sea is measured.46 Thus, where a coastal State
claims both the maximum area of the territorial sea and the contiguous
zone, its contiguous zone will stretch from the end of the twelfth nautical
mile to the twenty-fourth nautical mile. The legal regime of the
contiguous zone permits coastal States to exercise policing and
enforcement powers to prevent the infringement of customs, fiscal,
immigration and sanitary regulations.47 Thus the regime of the
contiguous zone provides an additional layer of protection with respect
to national and maritime security. In practice, measures that fall within
contiguous competence will also be relevant for security, especially
immigration and customs controls.48

5.2.2.3

Enforcement Jurisdiction on the High Seas

The high seas regime guarantees a number of maritime security
enforcement rights which are also applicable in the EEZ.49 Key among
these is jurisdiction over piracy and illicit traffic in narcotics.50 An
46

UNCLOS, Article 33.

47

Article 33(1) of UNCLOS states: “In a zone contiguous to its territorial sea, described as the
contiguous zone, the coastal State may exercise the control necessary to: (a) prevent infringement of
its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea;
(b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial
sea”.
48

On the relevance of the contiguous zone for the protection of security interests, see Shegeru Oda,
"The Concept of the Contiguous Zone," International and Comparitive Law Quarterly 11, 1, 1962,
pp. 131-53. Edwin D. Dickinson, "Jurisdiction at the maritime frontier," Harvard Law Review 40,
1926, pp. 1-29.
49

UNCLOS Article 58(2) states: “Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law
apply to the exclusive economic zone in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part.”
50

For Piracy, see Articles 100-107; and for illicit traffic in narcotics, see Article 108.
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essential element of the exercise of high seas jurisdiction is the
requirement to cooperate.51 In a regional context, this necessitates the
adoption of regional agreements and cooperative structures. The next
section will assess how Gulf of Guinea States have implemented the
legal framework on piracy, while Part 5.4 will assess the framework
relating to the suppression of trafficking in narcotics.

5.2.2.4

Protection of Resources and Security Interests in the

EEZ and on the Continental Shelf
As discussed earlier, the EEZ was central to the demands of African
States before and during the law of the sea conference. The EEZ regime
is now embodied in Part V of UNCLOS, with Article 57 recognising the
right of Gulf of Guinea States to claim an EEZ up to 200 nautical miles
from the baseline.52 Within the EEZ, coastal States have “sovereign
rights” for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and
managing the living and non-living resources of the sea and seabed.53
This right is particularly relevant for fisheries protection, and will be
examined in further detail in Part 5.5 of this chapter.

5.2.2.5

Framework for Maritime Boundary Delimitation

The provisions relating to maritime boundary delimitation are an
important part of the UNCLOS framework. Indeed, it is only when
neighbouring coastal States are able to agree on their respective maritime
51

For example, Articles 100 and 108 impose a duty to cooperate in the suppression of piracy and
illicit trafficking in narcotics.
52

Since the territorial sea limit is 12 nautical miles, properly speaking the breadth of the EEZ is 188
nautical miles.
53

UNCLOS, Article 56.
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boundaries that there can be certainty of the breadth of their maritime
zones, and by extension, certainty of the areas over which jurisdiction
can be exercised.

As a general rule of international law, interstate boundaries or frontiers
are to be settled or delimited through agreement between the States
concerned.54 This principle has been retained in UNCLOS with regard
to maritime boundaries.55 In the context of Gulf of Guinea States and
other ex-colonies, the principle of uti possidetis juris (which has been
cardinal in the consolidation of post-independent State boundaries) is
equally relevant for maritime boundary delimitation.

56

By the

application of the principle, every State is entitled to possess those areas
and boundaries that they held immediately prior to independence.57
Thus, coastal States are expected to lay claim to the maritime spaces
appurtenant to their land territory.58 What UNCLOS has done is to lay
down the principles to be employed in negotiating and agreeing on
maritime boundary limits. In the case of the territorial sea, the
54

Brian Opeskin and Martin Tsamenyi, "The Law of the Sea", in Sam Blay, Ryszard Piotrowicz and
Martin Tsamenyi, eds. Public International Law: An Australian Perspective, New York, Oxford
University Press, 2005, pp. 324-50, p.38. This principle is succinctly stated in the Gulf of Maine Case
[1985] ICJ Reports, para 112.
55

For example, Article 74(1) of UNCLOS, which deals with the delimitation of the EEZ, provides:
“The delimitation of the EEZ between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by
agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.”
56

For an exposition of the principle, see Boubacar N’Diaye, "Mauritania, August 2005: Justice and
democracy, or just another coup? ," Africa Affairs 105, 420, pp. 421-41. The ICJ also applied the
Principle in the Frontier Dispute between Burkina Faso and Republic of Mali, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p.
554.
57

Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, p.
132. See also, Victor Prescott and Clive Schofield, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World,
Leiden & Boston Martinus Nijhoff, 2005, p. 339.
58

It is arguable that, before colonialism, African Kingdoms defined territories and areas of jurisdiction
on the basis of decisions made by Kings. See, Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander, eds.,
International Maritime Boundaries vol. I, VI vols. Boston and London, Martinus Nijhoff, 1993, p.
641-68.
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Convention stipulates the medium line as an appropriate maritime
boundary,

while EEZ and continental shelf boundaries are to be

delimited on the basis of equity.59

5.2.3 Assessment of the Implementation of UNCLOS in the Gulf of
Guinea
The evaluation of the implementation of UNCLOS in this section is
limited to three areas: (i) an examination of the status of ratification of
UNCLOS and the appropriate exercise of jurisdiction provided by the
Convention; (ii) an analysis of the implementation of piracy provisions
at the national and regional level; and (iii) the delimitation of maritime
boundaries.

5.2.3.1

Ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention and the

Exercise of Appropriate Jurisdiction
Many States in the Gulf of Guinea ratified UNCLOS within a few years
of its adoption, while others did so soon after its entry into force.60
Following Liberia’s ratification of the Convention on 25 September
2008, and that of Congo-Brazzaville on 9 July 2008, all Gulf of Guinea
States are now party to the Convention. These ratifications are significant
because UNCLOS now serves as a uniform ocean relations instrument in
the region, and as a result, national legislative and policy frameworks

59

UNCLOS, Articles 15, 74 and 88. On the application of these principles to maritime boundary
delimitation in the Gulf of Guinea, see Kamal-Deen Ali and Martin Tsamenyi, "Fault Lines in
Maritime Security: Analysis of maritime boundary uncertainties in the Gulf of Guinea," African
Security Review, August 2013, pp. 1-16.
60

For the purpose of this thesis, no distinction has been made between ratification and accession to
international legal instruments. Both shall be referred be to as ratification.
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must be in conformity with its provisions. Table 5.1 shows the status of
ratification and the accompanying declaration of maritime zones of
coastal States in the Gulf of Guinea. Although not listed in the Table, it
is noteworthy that four out of the five landlocked States in the Gulf of
Guinea have also ratified the Convention.61

Table 5.1 Status of Ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention in the Gulf of
Guinea
State

Date of
Territorial
Ratification
Sea(NM)
5/12/90
12
Angola
16/10/97
200
Benin
19/11/85
12
Cameroon
10/8/87
12
Cape Verde
9/7/08
12
Congo
26/3/84
12
Cote d’Ivoire
17/2/89
12
DR Congo
21/7/97
12
Equatorial Guinea
11/3/98
12
Gabon
22/5/84
12
Gambia
7/6/83
12
Ghana
6/9/85
12
Guinea
25/8/86
12
Guinea Bissau
25/9/08
200
Liberia
17/7/96
12
Mauritania
14/08/86
12
Nigeria
3/11/87
12
São Tomé & Príncipe
25/10/84
12
Senegal
12/12/94
12
Sierra Leone
16/4/85
30
Togo
Source: Compiled from UNDOALOS Status of Ratification

Contiguous
Zone (NM)
24

24
24
24
24
18
24

24

24
24

EEZ /Continental
Shelf (NM)
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200

It should be noted, however, that merely ratifying a Convention does not
allow a State to derive the benefits and protection afforded by the
Convention. What is essential is for State Parties to incorporate the rights

61

The chronology of ratification by landlocked States is as follows: Mali: 16 July 1985, Burkina Faso:
25 January 2005, Chad: 14 August 2009, and Niger: 7 August 2013. The Central African Republic is
yet to ratify the Convention.
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and obligations provided by the Convention into domestic legal and
policy frameworks.62 It is only by so doing that the requisite jurisdiction
provided by the Convention can be asserted for the protection of
legitimate State interests. 63 Gulf of Guinea States have generally failed
in this regard. The first jurisdictional gap is evident from a review of
Table 5.1. It can be seen that half of the States in the Gulf of Guinea
have failed to declare a contiguous zone. As analysed in the preceding
section, the policing authority embodied in the regime of the contiguous
zone is important for preventing threats to national and maritime
security.64 Thus, by failing to declare a contiguous zone, a large number
of States in the region have circumscribed an essential element of their
jurisdictional competence.

It can also be seen from Table 5.1 that Benin and Liberia have claimed a
territorial sea of 200 nautical miles, while Togo has claimed a 30
nautical mile territorial sea limit. Indeed, the breadth claimed by all these
States far exceeds the 12 nautical miles stipulated by UNCLOS. 65 And

62

Mohammed Dahmani, The Fisheries Regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone, Netherlands and
Boston, Martinus Nijhoff 1987, p. 84. Generally on the relationship between international and
domestic law and the requirement of incorporation, see Dinah Shelton, ed., International Law and
Domestic Legal Systems: Incorporation, Transformation, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011. Ali
Kamal-Deen, “Legal and Policy Dimensions of Coastal Zone Monitoring and Control: The Case in
Ghana”, Ocean Development and International Law 35, 2004, pp. 179–194.
63

Mohammed Dahmani, The Fisheries Regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone, Netherlands and
Boston, Martinus Nijhoff 1987, p. 84. Ali Kamal-Deen, “Legal and Policy Dimensions of Coastal
Zone Monitoring and Control: The Case in Ghana”, Ocean Development & International Law, vol.
35, 2004, pp. 179–194.
64

See chapter 3, Section 3.3.2.2. See also Oda, "The Concept of the Contiguous Zone." Dickinson,
"Jurisdiction at the maritime frontier." Phillip C. Jessup, The Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime
Jurisdiction, New York Jennings, 1927, William E. Masterson, Jurisdiction in Marginal Seas, New
York Macmillan 1929. G. Gedel, "La mer territoriale et la zone contigue," Recueil des Cours 48,
1934, pp. 241-73.
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while these excessive claims are borne out of the ocean politics and
contestation of the 1970s (as analysed in section 5.2.2.3),66 the
declarations are patently inconsistent with the current regime, and would
thus need to be modified to ensure compliance with the Convention.
Doing so would enable the appropriate exercise of jurisdiction by the
States concerned, as well as facilitate harmonious negotiation and
delimitation of maritime boundaries.

5.2.3.2

Implementation of Framework on Piracy

The case study in chapter four extensively analysed the phenomenon of
piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as the accompanying threats to key
dimensions of security. The analysis also covered the definition of piracy
and the extension of the concept of universal jurisdiction to piratical acts.
By way of summary, Article 100 of UNCLOS encapsulates two
interrelated obligations regarding piracy. States are required to repress
piracy at the national level, and also cooperate with other States in the
suppression of piracy at the regional and international level.67 To give
practical effect to the first obligation, Gulf of Guinea States are required
to enact and enforce laws covering all aspects of the crime of piracy. 68
With respect to the second obligation, cooperative structures should be
65

Though Robert W. Smith, eds., International Maritime Boundaries, vol. VI, VI vols., Leiden and
Boston , Martinus Nijhoff, 2011, at page 4264 allude to a most recent legislation of Benin in which
Benin claimed 12nm territorial sea 200nm EEZ, there is no public availability of the said legislation.
66

As a way of influencing ocean regime changes in the 1970s, African states at the Ibadan conference
in Nigeria in November 1971, agreed that all African states should extend their territorial sea to 200
NM and adopt legislation enforcing fisheries and pollution issues in the zone.
67

Article 100 of UNCLOS provides: “All States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the
repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.”
68

See chapter 4, sections 4.2.1.2 and 4.2.1.3. See also Eugene Kontorovich, "A Guantanamo on the
Sea: The Difficulty of Prosecuting Pirates and Terrorists," California Law Review 98, 2010, pp. 24376. Diana Chang, "Piracy Laws and the Effective Prosecution of Pirates," Boston College
International and Comparative Law Review, 2010, pp. 273-188.
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established which, at a minimum, will facilitate the sharing of
information, and also possibly lead to joint patrols in the region.

A review of the national legislation database of the United Nations
Division on the Law of the Sea (UNDOALOS) shows that Liberia and
Togo are the only States in the region that have enacted piracy
legislation.69 Moreover, it is only since January 2013 that Nigeria is
reported to have initiated a process for the enactment of a law to combat
piracy and other maritime crimes.70 The UN Assessment Mission to the
Gulf of Guinea also observed that the definition of the crime of piracy in
the national laws of Benin was out-dated and not consistent with the
provisions of UNCLOS.71 In summary, there is a legislative deficit with
respect to the crime of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Thus, even if Gulf
of Guinea States are able to conduct patrols off their coasts, the efficacy
of such patrols would be seriously undermined by the absence of
domestic legislation to prosecute and punish activities that pose a threat
to maritime security. This will likely result in what has been termed
“catch and release syndrome” - a situation which manifested in the early
periods of Somali piracy when counter-piracy forces frequently released
apprehended pirates because of challenges with prosecution, thus
entrenching further insecurity.72

69

See Penal Code of Liberia, 2008, and Code de la Marine Marchande, Togo, 1971, UNDOALOS,
Legislation
and
Treaties
Data
Base,
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/index.htm, 1 January 2013.
70

See “NIMASA Seeks Legal Backing to Fight Piracy,” This Day, 14 February 2013.

71

See page 5, United Nations, Report of the United Nations Assessment Mission on Piracy in the Gulf
of Guinea, Security Council S/2012/45,19 January 2012.
72

For a discussion of the “catch and release” syndrome, and the difficulties associated with piracy
prosecution in Somalia, see Eugene Kontorovich, "A Guantanamo on the Sea: The Difficulty of
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5.2.3.3

Implementation of UNCLOS Framework for Maritime

Boundary Delimitation
To enhance maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, each State would
need to effectively police and enforce order within its coastal domain.
Therefore, certainty of maritime boundaries plays a crucial role in the
operational and policy content of maritime security at both the national
and regional level. On the contrary, where there are boundary
uncertainties or overlapping boundary claims, States would be unable to
assert their jurisdiction, or may in fact be competing for jurisdiction.
Whichever is the case, maritime security cooperation and enforcement
would be impeded, thus creating weaknesses which pirates and other
illegal actors may exploit.73 It is also possible for maritime boundary
disagreements to escalate into conflicts, which in turn can threaten the
peace and stability of the Gulf of Guinea region.

The three sections below assess the impact of maritime boundary
delimitation on maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea. The
first section summarises the status of maritime boundary delimitation in
the region. The second demonstrates how delimited maritime boundaries
have contributed to greater stability and security, while the third section
assesses the negative implications of maritime boundaries that have not
been delimited.

Prosecuting Pirates and Terrorists," California Law Review 98, 2010, pp. 243-76. Elizabeth Andersen,
Benjamin Brockman-Hawe and Patricia Goff, Suppressing Maritime Piracy: Exploring the Options in
International
Law,
Available:
http://acuns.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/06/SuppressingMaritimePiracyExploringOptionsIntlLaw.pdf, 27 July 2013.
73

Clive Schofield, “The Trouble with Islands: The Definition and Role of Islands and Rocks,” in
Seoung-Yong Hong and Jon M. Van Dyke, Maritime Boundary Disputes, Settlement Process, and the
Law of the Sea, Leiden & Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009, p.22.
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5.2.3.3.1

State of Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of

Guinea
Several maritime boundary agreements have been struck in the Gulf of
Guinea. In some cases, States have opted for joint exploitation and
development of resources,74 usually referred to as a Joint Development
Zone (JDZ).75 A JDZ may be necessitated by a disputed maritime
boundary claim, or where resources (typically oil and gas) straddle an
actual or potential maritime boundary.76 In practice, a JDZ is an
important confidence building measure (CBM) that can lead to a final
resolution of boundary issues.77 Table 5.2 summarises the maritime
agreements and JDZs in the Gulf of Guinea, with the remarks column
outlining the strategic context underpinning the maritime boundary
agreements.

74

See for example Management and Cooperation Agreement between the Government of the
Republic of Senegal and the Government of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, 14 October 1993 (entry
into force: 21 December 1995). See, Law of Sea Bulletin 31, 1996, p. 40. See also Treaty between the
Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe, 21 February
2001, entered into force 16 January 2003, Law of the Sea Bulletin 50, 2003, p. 40.
75

Zhiguo Gao, "The Legal Concept and Aspects of Joint Development in International Law," Ocean
Year Book 13, 1998, pp. 108. Masahiro Miyoshi, "The Basic Concept of Joint Development of
Hydrocarbon Resources on Continental Shelf " International Journal of Estuarine and Coastal Law 3
1988 pp. 1-18.
76

Robin R Churchill, “Joint Development Zones: International Legal Issues,” in H. Fox ed., Joint
Development of offshore Oil and Gas, vol. II, London, British Institute of International and
Comparative Law, 1990, p. 57. See also Chidinma B. Okafor, “Joint Development: An Alternative
Legal Approach to Oil and Gas Exploitation in the Nigerian-Cameroon Boundary Dispute?”
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 489-522.
77

For example, JDZ has been suggested as best solution for the Nigeria-Cameroon boundary conflict,
see, Chidinma B. Okafor, “Joint Development: An Alternative Legal Approach to Oil and Gas
Exploitation in the Nigerian-Cameroon Boundary Dispute?” International Journal of Marine and
Coastal Law, vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 489-522. Generally on JDZ as a Confidence Building Measure, see
Zhiguo Gao, “The Legal Concept and Aspects of Joint Development in International Law,” Ocean
Year Book, 13, 1998. Robin R. Churchill, “Joint Development Zones: International Legal Issues,” in
H. Fox ed., Joint Development of offshore Oil and Gas, vol. II, London, British Institute of
International and Comparative Law, 1990.
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Table 5.2:

Overview of Gulf of Guinea Maritime Boundary Agreements

STATES
Cape Verde
Senegal

AGREEMENT/DATE
Treaty on the Delimitation of
the Maritime Frontier, 17/2/
1993.

REMARKS
The agreement deepens existing peaceful
relations. It also promotes joint fisheries
management.78

Mauritania
Cape Verde

Delimitation of the Maritime
Frontier, 19/9/ 2003

The Cape Verde-Senegal agreement (see
above), created a tri-junction favourable to Cape
Verde. Mauritania agreed to the use of the trijunction because of existing peaceful relations.79

Gambia
Senegal

Treaty
fixing
Maritime
Boundaries, 4/6/ 1975.

This early Treaty has helped reduce tension
between the two States.80

Senegal
Guinea-Bissau

Management and Cooperation
Agreement, 14/10/ 1993.
Protocol
Establishing
the
Management and Cooperation
Agency, 12/6/ 1995.

The combined effect of the two agreements is a
JDZ. The JDZ covers an area that the ICJ
declared to belong to Senegal. Senegal used the
JDZ to secure strategic outcomes including
securing Guinea-Bissau’s support regarding the
Casamance insurgency.81

Equatorial Guinea
São Tomé &
Príncipe

Treaty Concerning Delimitation
of Maritime Boundary, 26/6/
1999.

This agreement has fostered investor confidence
and an injection of capital into offshore oil and
gas development.82

Nigeria
Equatorial Guinea

Treaty Concerning Maritime
Boundary, 23/9/ 2000.
Protocol Implementing Article
6.2 of the Treaty of 23
September 2000, April 2002

A pool of oil straddles the Zafiro oil field of
Equatorial Guinea and the Ekanga-1 reservoir
on the Nigerian side. The 2002 Protocol has
united the two fields, thus curtailing a volatile
situation that was heading for conflict.83

Treaty on Joint Development of
Petroleum and other Resources,
21/2/2001

Nigeria suffers a setback to getting a full EEZ at
a short stretch of its southwest coast abutting
São Tomé. Nigeria has been able to use its
weight to negotiate a JDZ.84

Nigeria
São
Tomé
Príncipe

&

78

Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander, eds., International Maritime Boundaries, vol. III, VI
vols., Boston and London, Martinus Nijhoff, 2004, pp. 2279-2291, at p.79.
79

See Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander, eds., International Maritime Boundaries, vol. III,
VI vols., Boston and London, Martinus Nijhoff, 2004, pp. 2279-2291.
80

For a discussion of the Agreement, see Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander, International
Maritime Boundaries, vol. I, VI vols., Boston and London, Martinus Nijhoff, 2004, pp. 847-855.
81

This view has been expressed in Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander,eds., International
Maritime Boundaries, vol. III, VI vols., Boston and London, Martinus Nijhoff, 2004, pp. 2252-2278,
at p.2254.
82

Jonathan I. Charney and Robert W. Smith, eds., International Maritime Boundaries, vol. IV, VI
vols., Hague and London, Martinus Nijhoff, 2002, pp. 2647-56 at p. 49.
83

For a discussion of the Protocol, see David A. Colson and Robert W. Smith, eds., International
Maritime Boundaries, vol. V, VI vols., Leiden and Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, 2005, pp. 3624-3637.
84

Jonathan I. Charney and Robert W. Smith, eds., International Maritime Boundaries, vol. IV, VI
vols., Hague and London, Martinus Nijhoff, 2002, pp. 2656-68.
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Gabon
São
Tomé
&
Príncipe
Congo (Brazzaville)
Angola

Agreement on the Delimitation
of Maritime Border, 26/4/ 2001

The agreement provides certainty for oil and gas
development.85

Protocol Approving Offshore
Unitization Prospects 14K and
A-IMI, 21/5/ 2002

DR Congo
Angola

Agreement on the Exploration
and Production of Hydrocarbon
in the Common Interest Zone,
30/7/ 2007

The agreement, which considerably favours
Angola, is regarded as a reward by President
Sassou Nguesso to Angolan troops who helped
restore him to power in 1997. 86
The Common Interest Zone (JDZ) moves
heavily towards Angolan waters with existing
petroleum activity. Angola might have agreed to
a JDZ to secure DR Congo support over
Cabinda separatists.87

It is essential to situate these agreements within the broader security and
stability requirements of the Gulf of Guinea. While some of the
agreements have forestalled conflicts, others have strengthened existing
relations, promoting shared economic interests and reflecting strategic
objectives far removed from the maritime domain. An important
conclusion to be drawn from all the three outcomes is that the
delimitation of maritime boundaries contributes to peaceful relations and
the strengthening of cooperation. This is underscored by the 1995
Senegal-Guinea Bissau agreement which has greatly enhanced
cooperation between the two States.

85

For a discussion of the Agreement, see David A. Colson and Robert W. Smith, eds., International
Maritime Boundaries, vol. V, VI vols., Leiden and Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, 2005, pp. 3683-3693.
86

For a discussion of the Protocol, see David A. Colson and Robert W. Smith, eds., International
Maritime Boundaries, vol. VI, VI vols., Leiden and Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, 2011, pp. 4281-4295, at
p. 4282-3.
87

For a discussion of the Agreement, see David A. Colson and Robert W. Smith, eds., International
Maritime Boundaries, vol. VI, VI vols., Leiden and Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, 2011, pp. 4270-4275.
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5.2.3.3.2

Maritime Boundaries as an Instrument of Cooperation

and Greater Security – the Case of the Senegal-Guinea Agreement
Senegal and Guinea-Bissau were involved in a very turbulent maritime
boundary dispute which was finally resolved in 1995. 88 The history of
the maritime boundary issue dates back to 1960, when their respective
colonial powers, France and Portugal, reached an agreement on the
limits of the territorial sea and the continental shelf.89 The Agreement
was concluded by diplomatic communication which explicitly stated that
the exchange of letters was for the purpose of defining the maritime
boundary between the Republic of Senegal (at that time an autonomous
State within the Communauté) and the Portuguese province of GuineaBissau.90 However, after independence, Guinea-Bissau disputed the
validity of agreement. Subsequently, in 1989, Guinea-Bissau instituted
two judicial proceedings in respect of the disputed maritime boundary the first in a special Arbitral Tribunal agreed to by the Parties, the second
at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The outcome of both decisions
favoured Senegal. 91

Nonetheless, in 1993 Senegal entered into a JDZ agreement with
Guinea-Bissau.92 Article 2 of the Agreement covers the sharing of
88

For a discussion of the boundary issue, see Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander, eds.,
International Maritime Boundaries, vol. III, VI vols., Boston and London, Martinus Nijhoff, 2004, pp.
2279-2291.
89

“Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf Boundary between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau,” Exchange
of Letters between Portugal and France, 26 April 1960.
90

For a detailed discussion of the Treaty, see Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander, eds.,
International Maritime Boundaries, vol. I, VI vols, Boston and London, Martinus Nijhoff, 1993, pp.
867-874.
91

Case Concerning The Arbitral Award Of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau V. Senegal), ICJ Judgment
of 12 November 1991.
92

Management and Cooperation Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Senegal and
the Government of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, 14 October 1993 (entry into force: 21 December
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resources. 93 Access to fishing resources is on equal terms, while revenue
from oil and gas is divided 85 per cent for Senegal and 15 per cent for
Guinea-Bissau. However, the sharing arrangement only applies to oil
already discovered on the Senegalese side. The Agreement also provides
for the establishment of an intergovernmental authority to manage the
exploration, prospecting and marketing of resources. Important, the
Agreement requires Senegal and Guinea-Bissau to exercise enforcement
and policing powers in the Zone, including search and rescue (SAR)
operations.

In the broader context, the Senegal-Guinea Bissau JDZ is a clear
example of how maritime boundary arrangements can have far reaching
political and strategic consequences. Given that the ICJ decided the
boundary issue in favour of Senegal, and that other indicators of State
power (such as defence capabilities, economic strength, population size
and national resources) also weighed heavily towards Senegal, it is
hardly surprising that Senegal chose not to opt for a JDZ. However, it
has been noted in the authoritative literature on maritime boundaries that
Senegal might have accepted the agreement for an interest completely
outside the maritime domain -,94 namely, Guinea-Bissau’s cooperation
and support in fighting the Casamance insurgency.95
1995) and Protocol to the Agreement of 14 October 1993 Concerning the Organization and Operation
of the Management and Cooperation Agency, 12 June 1995 (entry into force: 21 December 1995).
See, 31 Law of Sea Bulletin, 1996.
93

See Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander, eds., International Maritime Boundaries, vol. III,
VI vols. Boston and London, Martinus Nijhoff, 2004, pp. 2252-2278.
94

This view has been expressed in Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander,eds., International
Maritime Boundaries, vol. III, VI vols., Boston and London, Martinus Nijhoff, 2004, pp. 2252-2278,
at p.2254.
95

Since 1982 the Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MFDC) has waged war against
the central government of Senegal, claiming independence for Senegal’s southern province of
Casamance. Casamance Province borders Guinea-Bissau, and Senegal has accused Guinea-Bissau of
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In addition to the above observation, the larger strategic environment
surrounding the JDZ agreement should be taken into account. Indeed,
this can be traced back to the colonial history of the two States. The zeal
of two colonial powers (France and Portugal) finalising a maritime
boundary deal amidst anti-colonial struggle is testimony to their vested
interest in the future of their (soon to be) independent Countries
However, when President Joao Bernardo Vieira of Guinea-Bissau took
power by coup in 1980,96 he remained on a collision course with former
colonial power Portugal, and shifted his allegiance to France (including
by joining the French monetary zone).97 This led to geopolitical rivalry
between France and Portugal, which at one point manifested in
contestation between their navies off the coast of Guinea-Bissau.98 At the
regional level, Senegal acted as the conduit for achieving the greater
France agenda, but Senegal also ceased the opportunity to make Vieira
(and thus Guinea-Bissau), a strong ally.99 Close relations with Bissau

offering direct support to the insurgents and allowing its territory to be used for launching attacks. See
Martin Evans, Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) (Briefing
Paper),
Chatham
House,
December
2004,
http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/107933 (accessed 6 June 2013); Mouvement
des
Forces
Démocratiques
du
le
Casamance
(MFDC),
Global
Security,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/mfdc.htm (accessed 6 June 2013).
96

Until his assassination on 2 March 2009, João Bernardo Vieira was the President of Guinea-Bissau
for two distinct periods: 1980-1999 and 2005-2009.
97

The deposed leader, President Luis Cabral, was seen as an ally of Portugal. As part of radical
measures to cease ties with Portugal, Vieira exchanged the Portuguese Peso for the CFA in 1997, and
this worsened the country’s relationship with Portugal. Succeeding events led to a civil war - one side
led by Vieira with support from France, the other side led by Brigadier General Ansumane Mane with
the support of Portugal.
98

As civil war continued in Guinea-Bissau, on 31 January 1999 soldiers from Benin and Niger (acting
as intervention troops of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group), were on board the French warship
Sirrocco advancing towards Guinea-Bissau. On 2 February 1999, France was accused of using
Sirrocco to bomb locations in Guinea-Bissau in support of Vieira. Portugal also deployed warships to
the coast of Guinea-Bissau, including Corte-Real, in support of Brigadier General Ansumane Mane.
This resulted in a naval standoff.
99

Indeed, troops from Senegal and neighbouring Guinea intervened in the civil war in support of
Vieira in 1998.
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were also forged to counterbalance Gambia, which was perceived as a
safe haven for the Casamance insurgency.100

The important point to note from the analysis of the Senegal-Guinea
Bissau example is that maritime boundary agreements are instruments
for strengthening interstate relationships within and outside the maritime
realm. Given that both Senegal and Guinea Bissau were aligned with
France at the time of the negotiation of the JDZ, France’s invisible hands
would have contributed to the rapprochement. In the maritime context,
the harmonious resolution of the boundary dispute, and the subsequent
agreement that was reached, deepened maritime security cooperation
between the two States and also facilitated joint policing and
enforcement measures. In other respects, the JDZ strengthened the States
relationship on wider issues of peace and security, further enhancing
diplomatic ties. Thus the maritime boundary agreement did not just
provide clarity of interest at sea; it also illuminated future relations and
cooperation.

5.2.3.4.3

Maritime Boundaries as a Source of Conflict and

Insecurity – the Case of Nigeria and Cameroon
The summary of agreements in Table 5.2 substantially resolved past and
future maritime boundary disputes in the northern and southern segments

100

Generally on Senegal-Gambia relations, including the Casamance issue, see F.A. Renner, "Ethnic
Affinity: Partition and Political Integration in Senegambia", in A. I. Asiwaju, ed. Partitioned
Africans: Ethnic Relations Across Africa's International Boundaries, 1884-1984, London, Hurst,
1985, pp. 71-86, Jeggan C. Senghor, The Politics of Senegambian Integration, 1958-1994 New York,
Peter Lang, 2008. Jesse H. Proctor, "The Gambia's relations with Senegal: The search for
partnership," Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies 5, 2, 1967, pp. 143-60.

248

of the Gulf of Guinea.101 In contrast, there is not a single boundary
agreement in the coastal region from Guinea to Benin (as depicted in
Figure 5.1 below). This has negative implications for maritime security
enforcement and cooperation, and is also a source of conflict between
States.
Figure 5.1: Delimited and Un-delimited Areas of the Gulf of Guinea

Source: Kamal-Deen Ali and Martin Tsamenyi (2013)

Currently, a number of States in the Gulf of Guinea are either in the
throes of internal conflicts or are recovering from the debilitating effects
of such conflicts.102 In many ways, however, we may be witnessing a
compounding of instability in the region, with interstate conflicts
101

Remaining in the southern zone are possible delimitations between Cameroon and Equatorial
Guinea, Cameroon and São Tomé, Gabon and Congo-Brazzaville and Congo-Brazzaville and São
Tomé.
102

Special mention should be made of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Guinea and Guinea
Bissau in this context.
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erupting due to increased competition over offshore resources –
particularly oil and gas. Indeed, such competition is particularly
worrying, as sovereignty disputes have the capacity to quickly escalate
into interstate conflicts.103 The analysis in chapter three also
demonstrated the relationship between depleting fisheries resources and
conflicts in coastal communities. The case of Cameroon and Nigeria
exemplifies how a combination of boundary uncertainties and resource
interests can escalate into interstate conflicts, thus inhibiting maritime
security cooperation.

As far back as the colonial period, the coastal communities of Cameroon
and Nigeria have been at odds over fishing rights in the Bakassi
Peninsula.104 Thus, the agreements between colonial frontiers preserved
the fishing rights of local communities, irrespective of the limits of
colonial frontiers.105 This approach was abandoned by Nigeria and
Cameroon after independence, and at the same time the two States failed
to delimit their maritime boundaries. The result was multiple conflicts
between fishing communities living closely across national boundaries.
This led to increasing tensions at the interstate level.106 Expectations of
103

For a discussion of oil and gas as a source of conflict, see Michael T. Klare, Blood and oil: The
dangers and consequences of America’s Growing Petroleum Dependency, New York, Metropolitan
Books, 2004.
104

L. O. Ekpenyong, “Potentials of Nigerian Boundary Corridors as Sources of International
Economic Conflict,” in Borderlands in Africa, A. Asiwaji, and P. O. Adeniyi, eds., (Lagos: 1989),
p.293-305. Bawuro M. Bakindo, "The Mandara astride the Nigerian-Cameroon Boundary", in A. I.
Asiwaju, ed. Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations Across Africa's International Boundaries, 18841984, London, Hurst, 1985, pp. 29-50.
105

See for example, “Agreement between the United Kingdom and Germany respecting: (1) the
Settlement of the Frontier between Nigeria and the Cameroons, from Yola to the Sea; and (2) the
Regulation of Navigation on the Cross River,” Signed in London, March 11, 1913.
106

Bawuro M. Bakindo, "The Mandara astride the Nigerian-Cameroon Boundary", in A. I. Asiwaju,
ed. Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations Across Africa's International Boundaries, 1884-1984,
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financial revenue from oil resources in the undelimited zone increased
the intensity of the disagreements, leading to sovereignty disputes and
military confrontation.107 Despite the maritime boundary ruling of the
ICJ in 2002,108 the issue still lingers, prompting further diplomatic
interventions,

including

the establishment

of

a

UN-sanctioned

Commission to resolve the dispute.109 The contrasting examples of
Senegal-Guinea

Bissau

and

Nigeria-Cameroon

epitomise

the

significance of maritime boundary agreements to interstate cooperation
in general, and maritime security cooperation in particular.

In summary, the analysis in this first part of the chapter has demonstrated
that the effective implementation of the UNCLOS framework is crucial
for enhancing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. The next four
parts of the chapter will assess the implementation of other international
frameworks which are essential for combating maritime security
challenges in the Gulf of Guinea.

London, Hurst, 1985, pp. 29-50. See also Kevin Ngang, “Understanding the Bakassi Conflict. A
Showcase of Conflict Prevention in Practice,” European Peace University Research Papers, Issue
04/07, pp. 14-16, available at http://epu.ac.at/fileadmin/downloads/research/rp_0407.pdf, accessed 4
December 2012.
107

See “Nigeria/Cameroon: Blundering into battle,” Africa Confidential 35 (April 16 1994), 6. See
also “More Anglophone Soldiers Killed in Bakassi Skirmishes,” Southern Cameroons Information
Bulletin, No. 96001(8 March 1996).
108

Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria, Equatorial
Guinea Intervening) [2002] ICJ Rep 303.
109

Secretary-General Encourages Cameroon, Nigeria to Maintain Forward-Looking Approach That
Helped Overcome ‘Delicate’ Land, Maritime Boundary Dispute, 22 November 2011, United Nations,
Available: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sgsm13962.doc.htm, 12 December 2011.
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5.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE
SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST SAFETY OF
NAVIGATION AND FIXED PLATFORMS
The overview of maritime security challenges in chapter three has
affirmed the presence of significant threats to the security of offshore
energy platforms off the Gulf of Guinea. The case study on piracy in
chapter four equally revealed the occurrence of piratical attacks in the
Gulf of Guinea, while noting that the safety and security of shipping
does not fall within the international law definition of “piracy”. The
international framework which governs this category of threats is
composed of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Navigation, as well as its three Protocols.
Collectively, they will be referred to as the “SUA framework”.

This part will assess the implementation of the SUA framework in the
Gulf of Guinea. The analysis will follow the order outlined in the
introduction to this chapter. The first section will review the background
to the SUA framework. The second section will examine the relevance
of the framework to the Gulf of Guinea, while the third will assess the
implementation of the framework in the region.

5.3.1 Background to the SUA Framework
The background to the SUA framework is rooted in attempts to remedy
the gaps in the international law definition of “piracy”. 110 As shown in
chapter four, establishing jurisdiction over the crime of piracy requires
110

This has been examined extensively in chapter 4, section 4.2.
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the incident to: (i) have taken place outside the territorial sea; (ii) involve
two ships; and (iii) be motivated by private ends.111 This definition
excludes other violent attacks that endanger the safety and security of
ships,112 as well as attacks on offshore installations and platforms (which
by their very nature are attached to the seabed and therefore not regarded
as ships).

113

Moreover, although the scope of the EEZ jurisdiction

includes the safety of offshore platforms and installations,114 UNCLOS
has not specified which acts constitute threats to safety, or how States
may cooperate with one another to address these threats.115

Addressing these gaps was of prime importance to the international
community, with the Achille Lauro incident serving as the impetus for
the adoption of the first SUA framework in 1988.116 The Achille Lauro
incident occurred on 7 October 1985, when a group of men aligned with
the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) secretly boarded and hijacked the

111

UNCLOS, Article 101.

112

See chapter 4 of this thesis, particularly section 4.2.1.2. See also Malvina Halberstam, "Terrorism
on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety," American
Journal of International Law 88, 1988, pp. 269-292, particularly at p.290.
113

See chapter 4 of this thesis, particularly section 4.2.1.2. See also Stuart Kaye, "International
Measures to Protect Oil Platforms, Pipelines and Submarine Cable from Attack," Tulane Maritime
Law Journal 31, 2, 2007, pp. 377-423. Elizabeth Andersen, Benjamin Brockman-Hawe and Patricia
Goff, Suppressing Maritime Piracy: Exploring the Options in International Law, Available:
http://acuns.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/06/SuppressingMaritimePiracyExploringOptionsIntlLaw.pdf, 27 July 2013.
114

UNCLOS, Article 60(2).

115

Robin R. Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, Law of the Sea, Manchester, Manchester University Press,
1999, pp.154-155.
116

Malvina Halberstam, "Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO
Convention on Maritime Safety," American Journal of International Law 88, 1988, pp. 269-92, p.91.
See also Andrew L. Liput, "An Analysis of the Achille Lauro Affair: Towards an Effective and Legal
Method of Bringing International Terrorists to Justice," Fordham International Law Journal 9, 2,
1985, pp. 328-72.
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Achille Lauro - an Italian cruise ship off the Egyptian coast. 117 The ship
was carrying close to four hundred passengers representing more than
twenty different nationalities.118 The hijackers demanded the release of
Palestinian prisoners held in Israel, threatening to cause harm to the ship
and its passengers if their request was not met. Eventually, the hijackers
followed through with their threat, killing one of the passengers on
board. 119

The Achille Lauro hijacking demonstrated the ambiguous nature of the
jurisdiction (and thus the lack of an international response) over some
violent activities at sea. Since the hijacking was undertaken from within
the ship, the act could not be classified as “piracy”, and thus only the
flag State had clear jurisdiction over the incident. Other States affected
by the incident could only establish jurisdiction by evoking the passive
personality or protective principles (as analysed in chapter four).
However, these bases of jurisdiction are generally only invoked in
exceptional circumstances, and thus any action taken by a State under
these heads of jurisdiction may have lacked international support.120 It
117

"Ship Carrying 400 Seized; Hijackers Demand Release of 50 Palestinians in Israel," New York
Times, 8 October 1985.
118

"Ship Carrying 400 Seized; Hijackers Demand Release of 50 Palestinians in Israel," New York
Times, 8 October 1985.
119

Malvina Halberstam, "Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO
Convention on Maritime Safety," American Journal of International Law 88, 1988, pp. 269-92, p.269.
See also Andrew L. Liput, "An Analysis of the Achille Lauro Affair: Towards an Effective and Legal
Method of Bringing International Terrorists to Justice," Fordham International Law Journal 9, 2,
1985, pp. 328-372.
120

Geoffrey R. Watson has rightly noted that many States (including the US) have traditionally
opposed the passive personality principle. See Geoffrey R. Watson, The Passive Personality Principle
28, Texas International Law Journal, 1, 1993, p.2. See also Christopher L. Blakesley, "United States
Jurisdiction over Extraterretorial Crime," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 73, 3, 1982, pp.
1109-63. John G. McCarthy, "The Passive Personality Principle and Its Use in Combatting
International Terrorism," Fordham International Law Journal 13, 3, 1989, pp. 298-327.
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was therefore imperative for the international community to adopt an
appropriate framework so that States could combat such threats with
confidence.121 With the Achille Lauro incident serving as the
groundswell, in 1988 the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988 SUA Convention)
was adopted, together with a Protocol. Two additional instruments have
since been added, bringing the total number of instruments that compose
the SUA framework to four.

5.3.2 Overview of the SUA Framework for Maritime Security
Although the four SUA instruments are interrelated, the relevance of the
instruments to maritime security is better appreciated when they are
examined separately. This is especially the case with respect to the 1988
Convention and the Protocol.

5.3.2.1

1988 SUA Convention

The 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988 SUA Convention) is the parent
instrument in the SUA framework.122 The unique nature of the
Convention lies in its Article 3, which creates a list of substantive
offences. The Article makes it an offence for a person to: (i) seize or
121

On the process towards the SUA Convention, see Malvina Halberstam, "Terrorism on the High
Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety," American Journal of
International Law 88, 1988, pp. 269-92.
122

1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation,
10 March 1988, Rome, Italy, Entry into Force: 01 March 1992, 156 Parties as of 2 December 2010,
1678 UNTS 201 / [1993] ATS 10 / 27 ILM 672 (1988); hereinafter referred to as 1988 SUA
Convention.
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exercise control over a ship by threat or use of force or any other form of
intimidation;123 or (ii) perform an act of violence against a person on
board a ship or an act of violence likely to endanger the safe navigation
of that ship;124 or (iii) place or cause to be placed on a ship, by any
means whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to destroy that
ship, or cause damage to that ship or its cargo which endangers or is
likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship.125 Attempting,
abetting or facilitating any of above acts also constitutes an offence.126
Article 5 obligates all State Parties to create offences with appropriate
penalties on the basis of Article 3 and to prosecute offenders. 127

Articles 3 to 5 have been designed to address the difficulties associated
with the treatment of the crime of piracy under UNCLOS.128 Under the
SUA Convention, an actual attack or threat of violence constitutes a
crime, irrespective of whether it comes from within or outside the ship
and regardless of the motive of the actors.129 Article 6 deals with
jurisdiction over SUA offences, and allows the flag State, coastal State
or State of nationality of the offender to exercise jurisdiction over the
offence. If such jurisdiction is not invoked, the State of nationality of any

123

1988 SUA Convention, Article 3(1)(a).

124

1988 SUA Convention, Article 3(1)(b).

125

1988 SUA Convention, Article 3(1)(b).

126

1988 SUA Convention, Article 3(1)(2).
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Donald R. Rothwell and Tim Stephens, The International Law of the Sea, Oxford Hart Publishing,
2010, p. 434.
128

For a detailed explanation of the scope of the articles, see Douglas Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction
and the Law of the Sea, New York Cambridge University Press, 2009.
129

For a detailed explanation of the scope of these articles, see Douglas Guilfoyle, Shipping
Interdiction and the Law of the Sea, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 254-259.
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victim of the crime, or any State that the offender seeks to compel to do
or abstain from doing an act, can assume jurisdiction. These legal
consequences and obligations remain the same irrespective of whether
the offence is committed within or outside the territorial sea.

In contrast to the generally permissive language of international
conventions, the 1988 SUA Convention imposes strong cooperative
requirements on States. The Convention stipulates that a State Party in
whose territory a SUA offender is found must take the person into
custody, irrespective of whether the State wants to prosecute the offender
or not.130 The State must then extradite the suspect to a requesting State
Party on the basis of an existing extradition treaty, or by using the
Convention as the basis for extradition.131 Where the State fails to
extradite the suspect, the State is “obliged without exception” to
prosecute the criminal.132

5.3.2.2
1988 SUA Protocol
The 1988 SUA Convention was adopted in conjunction with the Protocol
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf 1988 (1988 SUA
Protocol).133 The Protocol mirrors the Convention in many ways, but
focuses entirely on the safety and security of platforms that are attached
130

1988 SUA Convention, Article 7.

131

1988 SUA Convention, Articles 10 and 11.

132

1988 SUA Convention, Article 10.

133

1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located
on the Continental Shelf, 10 March 1988, Rome, Italy, Entry into Force: 01 March 1992, 156 Parties
as of 2 December 2010, 1678 UNTS 201 / [1993] ATS 10 / 27 ILM 672 (1988); hereinafter referred to
as SUA Fixed Platform Protocol, 1988.
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to the seabed.134 In language that is reminiscent of the SUA Convention
1988, Article 2 of the 1988 Protocol creates substantive offences,
including seizing or taking control of fixed platforms by force, damaging
fixed platforms, as well as causing injury or death to persons on board
fixed platforms.135 The Protocol parallels the Convention by making all
the Convention requirements regarding the compulsory exercise of
jurisdiction, as well as the procedures relating to extradition, applicable
to the Protocol.136 This approach enhances the effectiveness of the
Protocol in much the same way as the Convention and makes it an
important instrument for addressing maritime security against offshore
infrastructure.

5.3.2.3

The 2005 SUA Protocols

The final two instruments that comprise the SUA framework were both
adopted in 2005 as Protocols to the 1988 SUA Convention and 1988
SUA Protocol.

Although the 1988 Convention and Protocol were far reaching in terms
of the substantive offences they created, as well as the obligations they
imposed on States, there were still concerns that the two instruments did
not go far enough in responding to maritime security threats.137 The
134

For a detailed discussion of the 1988 Protocol, see Stuart Kaye, "International Measures to Protect
Oil Platforms, Pipelines and Submarine Cable from Attack," Tulane Maritime Law Journal 31, 2,
2007, pp. 377-423.
135

1988 SUA Protocol, Article 2.
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1988 SUA Protocol, Article 1. See also Natalino Ronzitti, "The Prevention and Suppression of
Terrorism Against Fixed Platforms on the Continental Shelf ", in Natalino Ronzitti, ed. Maritime
Terrorism and International Law, Dordretch Martinus Nihoff, 1990, pp. 91-97.
137
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Aspects," International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 18, 2003, pp. 363-400.
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primary criticism levelled against the instruments was that they were
reactive rather proactive, providing States with the jurisdiction to punish
offences without empowering them to take preventive actions.138 This
limitation became a major concern following the terrorist attacks against
the United States on 11 September 2001.139 As analysed in chapter three,
the successful hijacking of aircrafts by terrorists heightened fears that
ships could similarly be hijacked and used as weapons against other
ships, or that terrorists would load destructive material onto containers
and land them in ports of target States.140

The international response to these post-9/11 maritime security threats
was two new SUA instruments, both of which were adopted in 2005.
The first was a Protocol to the 1988 Convention, which dealt with safety
of shipping navigation,141 while the second was a Protocol to the 1988
Protocol, which dealt with the safety of offshore platforms.142 The 2005
138

Justin S.C. Mellor, "Missing the Boat: The Legal and Practical Problems of the Prevention of
Maritime Terrorism," American University International Law Review 18, 2, 2002, pp. 341-397, at p.
384. Donald R. Rothwell and Tim Stephens, The International Law of the Sea, Oxford Hart,
Publishing, 2010, p. 435.Christopher C. Joyner, "Suppression of Terrorism on the High Seas: the 1988
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pp. 357-67.
139

Justin S.C. Mellor, "Missing the Boat: The Legal and Practical Problems of the Prevention of
Maritime Terrorism," American University International Law Review 18, 2, 2002, pp. 341-97.
140

These threats are outlined in a Resolution adopted by the IMO, see IMO, "Review of Measures and
Procedures to Prevent Acts of Terrorism which Threaten the Security of Passengers and Crews and
the Safety of Ships," Resolution A.924 (22) 20 November 2001. See also John F. Frittelli, "Maritime
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SUA Protocols have expanded the scope of offences in the 1988 SUA
framework, while at the same time adding new preventive measures.143
Article 2 of the Protocol to the SUA Convention extends the scope of
offences to include causing serious injury or damage by the use of
explosives, radioactive material or any kind of harmful biological,
chemical and nuclear (BCN) material. Article 3 also prohibits the
transport of these materials. However, it is Article 8 of the 2005 SUA
Convention that has made radical changes to the SUA regime. It sets out
cooperative measures for the suppression of the new SUA offences,
including mechanisms for the boarding of ships on the high seas.144
Thus, a State Party that has reasonable grounds for suspecting that an
offence set out in the Protocol is being committed (or is about to be
committed), may make a request to board the vessel, and the flag State is
to respond expeditiously to the request.145 Thus, in summary, the 2005
instruments have provided an enhanced regime to respond to terroristtype attacks on ships and offshore platforms146

5.3.3

Relevance of the SUA Framework to the Gulf of Guinea

and an Assessment of the Status of Implementation
The relevance of the SUA framework to the enhancement of maritime
security in the Gulf of Guinea has already been alluded to in the
however, many authors still treat the 2005 Protocol on Safety of Navigation as a separate instrument. I
have adopted the same approach.
143

For an extensive analysis of this issue, see Natalie Klein, Maritime Security and the Law of the
Sea, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 172-184. Douglas Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction and
the Law of the Sea, New York Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 254-259.
144
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146
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175.
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introduction. The instruments provide the means for securing offshore
oil platforms, and by implication, energy security in the Gulf of Guinea.
The 1988 SUA Convention also provides the basis for responding to
insurgent-type attacks which the Gulf of Guinea is faced with. 147 Indeed,
such attacks have the tendency of falling outside of the scope of
UNCLOS, as they lack the “private motive” element. However, the 1988
SUA Convention has dispensed with the private motive requirement,
thus giving Gulf of Guinea States the opportunity to effectively respond
to these attacks. Also, as explained in the preceding section, State Parties
to the SUA framework are under an obligation to prosecute offenders in
their custody, even if the offence has not been committed off their coast.
This solves the piracy conundrum discussed in chapter four, where Niger
Delta pirates commit piratical attacks off the coasts of other States, using
Nigeria as a safe haven. Under the SUA framework, Nigeria will be
obligated to prosecute the pirates, or otherwise extradite them to any
State that makes a request for extradition.

Despite the relevance of the SUA framework, the ratification and
implementation of SUA instruments by Gulf of Guinea States has been
unsatisfactory. The status of ratification is presented in Table 5.3. Only
Cote d’Ivoire is a party to all the SUA instruments, but only since 2012.
Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Gabon and Nigeria - all of whom are major
oil producing States with substantial offshore infrastructure, have not
ratified the 1988 SUA Fixed Platform Protocol. Indeed, this Protocol is

147

Generally on the SUA framework and the suppression of terrorism, see Helmut Tuerk, "Combating
Terrorism - The Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation,"
University of Miami International and Comparitive Law Review 15, 2008, pp. 337-67.
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intended to help States safeguard the security of offshore oil platforms
and installations.

Table 5.3:

Status of Ratification of the SUA Convention and Protocols in the

Gulf of Guinea

State

1988 SUA
Convention

1988 SUA
Protocol

2005
Protocol to
the 1988
Convention

2005
Protocol to
the 1988
Protocol

Angola
31/8/06
31/8/06
Benin
Cameroon
3/1/03
3/1/03
Cape Verde
Congo Brazzaville
23/3/12
23/3/12
23/3/12
23/3/12
Cote d’Ivoire
DR Congo
15/1/04
15/1/04
Equatorial Guinea
Gabon
1/11/91
Gambia
1/11/02
1/11/02
Ghana
1/2/05
1/2/05
Guinea
14/10/08
14/10/08
Guinea Bissau
5/10/95
5/10/95
Liberia
17/1/08
17/1/08
Mauritania
24/2/04
Nigeria
5/5/06
São Tomé & Príncipe 5/5/06
2/2/04
9/8/04
Senegal
Sierra Leone
10/3/03
10/3/03
Togo
Sources: IMO Status of Multilateral Convention and Instruments as at June 30 2013.

Those States that have ratified the SUA instruments have generally
failed to implement the instruments into their domestic legal system. 148
For example, although Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria have all
ratified the 1988 SUA Convention, not one has incorporated the

148
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2008).
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Convention under its national law.149 According to the United Nations
Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (UN-DOALOS),
Liberia is the only State in the region to have taken steps to implement
the 1988 SUA instruments domestically, having amended its penal code
in 2008.150 However, this still falls short of a comprehensive domestic
regime, as Liberia has failed to ratify the 2005 Protocol to the SUA
Convention. This instrument provides an enhanced regime for the
protection of shipping, and is therefore crucial for Liberia, particularly if
one considers its status as the second largest flag State in the world.151

The inadequate implementation of the SUA framework in the Gulf of
Guinea has serious maritime security implications. Indeed, Gulf of
Guinea States are incapacitated from taking enforcement measures at the
national level, thus allowing threats to be made, and attacks to be
perpetrated, on offshore platforms and the shipping industry as a whole.
The decision to delay ratification and implementation of the relevant
instruments also translates into compromised maritime security and
cooperation at the regional level. Finally, the situation constitutes a
threat to global security. Since 2004, the UN has emphasised the
importance of the SUA framework for enhancing maritime security. 152 It
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For Nigeria, see “NIMASA Seeks Legal Backing to Fight Piracy,” This Day, 14 February 2013.
For Benin, see United Nations, Report of the United Nations Assessment Mission on Piracy in the
Gulf of Guinea, Security Council S/2012/45, 19 January 2012. For Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana, see
Interview with National Authorities, on file with Author.
150

Liberia, An Act to Amend the Penal Code of 1976 Adding the Offences of Armed Robbery,
Terrorism and Hijacking as Capital Offences, 22 July 2008.
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Rating of flag States by the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in
2012. See UNCTAD, “Review of Maritime Transport, 2012, p.44.
152

See United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 62/215, 14 March 2008, paragraph 67. United
Nations General Assembly Resolution 61/222, 16 March 2007, paragraph 59. United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1540, 28 April. 2004.
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is therefore imperative for Gulf of Guinea States to ratify and implement
the SUA instruments within their domestic legal and policy frameworks.
This should be followed by the development of regional responses on the
basis of the SUA instruments.

5.4 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION AGAINST ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING
Chapter three illustrated that one of the most pressing security challenges
in the Gulf of Guinea is drug trafficking. The international legal
framework for suppressing drug trafficking is chiefly contained in the
1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances (UN Drug Convention). This part evaluates
the implementation of the framework in the Gulf of Guinea.

5.4.1 Background to the United Nations Convention against Drug
Trafficking
Attempts to combat illicit drug trafficking by sea have traditionally been
hampered by the need to balance the interests of States affected by such
conduct with the interests of the State of nationality of the ship
transporting the drugs - the flag State.153 While States affected by drug
trafficking may wish to take enforcement measures, such as boarding
and searching ships on the high seas, flag States view such measures as
an infringement of the freedom of the high seas doctrine (which vests
exclusive jurisdiction over a vessel on the high seas with the flag

153

This section draws heavily from the work of Douglas Guilfoyle, see Douglas Guilfoyle, Shipping
Interdiction and the Law of the Sea, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p.79-96.
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State).154 Article 108 of UNCLOS seeks to balance the rights States in
this regard, merely directing them to “cooperate” in the suppression of
illicit drug trafficking.155 The 1988 United Nations Convention against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988 UN
Drug Convention), which entered into force in 1990,

156

represents the

cooperative framework contemplated by Article 108(1) of UNCLOS.

5.4.2 Framework of the UN Drug Convention
The UN Drug Convention obligates State Parties to establish criminal
offences for a range of illicit trafficking activities, including the
production, sale, purchase, transportation and possession of narcotic
drugs.157 Every State Party is to assume jurisdiction on the basis of the
offences created, and to prosecute persons who commit trafficking
offences in its territory or on board a vessel flying its flag. 158 To
empower States to combat trafficking more effectively, Article 17
creates a framework for interdiction on the high seas, but this is premised
on authorisation or permission being sought from the flag State. Where
permission is granted, the requesting State may board and search the
vessel, and if there is evidence of illicit trafficking, the State may take
154

UNCLOS, Article 92(1) provides that “ships shall sail under the flag one State and …be subject to
its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas.”
155

Article 108 provides that: “(1) all States shall cooperate in the suppression of illicit traffic in
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances engaged in by ships on the high seas contrary to
international conventions; (2) any State which has reasonable grounds for believing that a ship flying
its flag is engaged in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances may request the
cooperation of other States to suppress such traffic.”
156

United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances,
Vienna, 20 December 1988, Entry into force 11 November 1990, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol.
1582, p. 95.
157

UN Drug Convention, Article 3(1)(a).

158

UN Drug Convention, Article 4(1)(a).
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appropriate measures with regard to the vessel, cargo and persons on
board.159

Although the UN Drug Convention has provided an improved
framework for combating illicit drug trafficking (as compared to the
UNCLOS regime), the Convention still has limitations when it comes to
the execution of high seas enforcement measures - particularly with
respect to interdiction, boarding, seizure and arrest procedures. First, as
noted in the preceding paragraph, boarding on the high seas can only be
carried out with permission from the flag State. Second, although the
Convention requires flag States to respond “expeditiously” to boarding
requests, this is subject to the qualification that the response be provided
“within the means available” to the flag State.160 A flag State can
therefore exploit this proviso to refuse or delay the boarding. Even where
a flag State is prepared to cooperate with a requesting State, the flag
State may nonetheless have to abide by internal administrative processes
to be able to respond to the request. This can lead to a compromising of
intelligence and evidence, or even worse, the suspect vessel escaping
altogether.161 Finally, a State that is heavily affected by drug trafficking
(often referred to as the ‘destination State’), may wish to interdict vessels
as close as possible to the ‘source State’, conceivably within the
territorial sea to prevent vessels escaping in the open waters. However,
159

UN Drug Convention, Article 17(4).

160

UN Drug Convention, Articles 17(2) and 17(4) read together.

161

Such difficulties have been expressed by US law enforcement officials. See Defining Customs
Waters for
Certain Drug Offences: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the
Judiciary, House of Representatives, 16 May 1985, Washington, DC, 1986. See William C. Gilmore,
"Narcotics interdiction at sea: UK-US Cooperation," Marine Policy 13, 1989, pp. 218-230.
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the 1988 UN Drug Convention has completely steered away from such a
boarding regime, most likely due to sovereignty concerns.
In view of the limitations of the UN Drug Convention, States have
sought further cooperative frameworks at the bilateral and regional
levels. These cooperative frameworks have indeed been encouraged by
Article 17 of the UN Drug Convention, which calls on State Parties to
enhance the effectiveness of the Convention through additional bilateral
and regional agreements.162 Two such regional frameworks are the 1995
Council of Europe Agreement

163

and the 2003 US- Caribbean Area

Agreement. 164

5.4.3 Assessment of Implementation of Counter-Narcotics Reponses
in the Gulf of Guinea
With the exception of Equatorial Guinea, all Gulf of Guinea States are
party to the UN Drug Convention.165 In 2008, Member States of the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) also declared
their political commitment to combating drug trafficking at a meeting in
Cape Verde.166 As demonstrated in chapter three, however, illicit drug
162

See Articles 17(4) and 17(9) of the 1988 UN Drug Convention. 17(9) provides: “The Parties shall
consider entering into bilateral or regional agreements or arrangements to carry out, or to enhance the
effectiveness of, the provisions of this article.”
163

Agreement on Illicit Traffic by Sea, implementing Article 17 of the United Nations Convention
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Council of Europe, Strasbourg,
31 January 1995.
164

Agreement Concerning Co-operation in Suppressing Illicit Maritime and Air Trafficking in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in the Caribbean Area, 10 April 2003.
165

See UNOCD, Status of Ratification and Accession as at 6 September 2013, available
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=VI-19&chapter=6&lang=en,
6 September 2013. The author’s research h has not pointed to why Equatorial Guinea has not ratified
the UN Drug Convention.
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UNODC, "Regional Programme for West Africa 2010–2014," 2010, pp. 135-45.
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trafficking in the Gulf of Guinea is on the increase.167 This suggests
serious gaps in counter-narcotics responses in the region.

Table 5.4:
State

Status of Ratification of UN Drug Convention, 1988
Date of Ratification

26 Oct 2005
Angola
23 May 1997
Benin
27 Feb 1989
Cameroon
8 May 1995
Cape Verde
3 Mar 2004
Congo Brazzaville
25 Nov 1991
Cote d’Ivoire
28 Oct 2005
DR Congo
Equatorial Guinea
10 Jul 2006
Gabon
23 Apr 1996
Gambia
10 Apr 1990
Ghana
27 Dec 1990
Guinea
27 Oct 1995
Guinea-Bissau
16 Sep 2005
Liberia
1 Jul 1993
Mauritania
1 Nov 1989
Nigeria
20 Jun 1996
São Tomé & Príncipe
27 Nov 1989
Senegal
6 Jun 1994
Sierra Leone
1 Aug 1990
Togo
Source: United Nations Treaty Collection as at June 2013

Drug trafficking is thriving in the Gulf of Guinea due to multiple factors,
including corruption and a lack of enforcement capacity.168 This is
accentuated by the absence of a dedicated regional cooperative
mechanism for combating illicit drug trafficking. Indeed, the response to
illicit drug trafficking in the region must be multifaceted, and the core
requirement is for Gulf of Guinea States to pursue effective regional and
167

This has been analysed in chapter three of the thesis.

168

David E. Brown, The Challenges of Drug Trafficking to Democratic Governance and Human
Security in West Africa, The Letort Papers, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2013,
pp. 43-50.
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international cooperation. As analysed in chapter three, illicit drugs enter
the region concealed in containers, but larger quantities are trafficked
through drug vessels and transhipment at sea. Vessels carrying large
quantities of drugs may tranship the drugs within the EEZ of a member
State, or in the immediate high seas area of the region. Smaller crafts
assisting in the crime will then venture into the territorial waters of the
region. In the case of drugs trafficked through the use of containers,
cooperation with source States (and particularly port inspection officials)
constitutes the most practical means for responding to the threat. In all
these cases, joint action and the sharing of information within a regional
framework would also prove useful.

Thus, there is a need for an effective, regional counter-narcotic
framework that commits Gulf of Guinea States to sharing information
and intelligence, as well as cooperative enforcement measures at sea.
The UN and its agencies launched the West Africa Coast Initiative
(WACI) in 2009 as a pilot drug watch programme.169 Gulf of Guinea
States can use the WACI platform as a base for building a counternarcotic framework. However, for a framework to be durable and
effective, ownership and commitment by regional States is critical.
Pragmatism dictates that the framework should include extra-regional
partners, especially EU States.

169

The WACI is being piloted in four States - Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone.
See United Nations Office for West Africa, West Africa Coastal Initiative,
http://unowa.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=841, 31 July 2013.
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In developing a regional framework, Gulf of Guinea States can draw
from some of the structures in the 1995 Council of Europe Agreement
and the 2003 US-Caribbean Area Agreement. For example, the Council
of Europe Agreement has clarified ambiguities regarding the cost of
enforcement - an issue that can undermine cooperative frameworks.170
This has been done by specifying key measures for the suppression of
drug trafficking which every State is obligated to enforce at its own cost,
even when the enforcement is invoked by another State.171 In all other
cases the requesting or intervening State will be responsible for the
cost.172 Therefore, the principle of burden-sharing has been adopted
under the Council of Europe framework – a principle which is absent
from the UN Drug Convention. Similarly the US-Caribbean Area
Agreement has key strengths which Gulf of Guinea States can draw
on.173 The Agreement not only requires States to act expeditiously in
answering requests for verification of the identity of suspected vessels,
but also stipulates four hours as the maximum delay period.174 Also, the
willingness of Caribbean States to cooperate with the US has led to
surveillance assistance and capacity building programmes in the
Caribbean region, including reforms in the security sector and the
judicial system.175
170

Agreement on Illicit Traffic by Sea, implementing Article 17 of the United Nations Convention
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Council of Europe, Strasbourg,
31 January 1995.
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The key measures are in Articles 4 and 5, while the provision on cost is contained in Article 25 (1).
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See Articles 9, 10, 25(1), 1995 Council of Europe Agreement.

173

Agreement Concerning Co-operation in Suppressing Illicit Maritime and Air Trafficking in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in the Caribbean Area, 10 April 2003.
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Articles 6(4) and (5).
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Liana Sun Wyler, International Drug Control Policy: Background and U.S. Responses,
Congressional Research Service, 13 August 2013, p.17, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34543.pdf,
6 September 2013,
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5.5

IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND

POLICY FRAMEWORKS FOR FISHERIES GOVERNANCE IN
THE GULF OF GUINEA
The socio-economic importance of fisheries in the Gulf of Guinea has
been examined in chapter two. Chapter three also demonstrated the
impact of declining fisheries on food security, as well as wider regional
security implications. It is thus imperative for Gulf of Guinea States to
implement measures that will address the causes of declining fisheries,
as well as promote the sustainable management of fisheries resources in
general.

This part examines the extent to which Gulf of Guinea States have
implemented

requisite

international

frameworks

for

fisheries

governance. The frameworks being examined consist of binding and
non-binding instruments, and together they serve as the key global legal
and policy regimes for addressing fisheries governance concerns. The
analysis is organised into three sections. The first section will examine
the binding governance frameworks, the second section will examine the
non-binding frameworks, while the third section assesses the
implementation of the frameworks in the Gulf of Guinea.

5.5.1

Binding Fisheries Governance Frameworks

Four binding instruments on fisheries governance will be considered in
this section: the UNCLOS fisheries framework, the FAO Compliance
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Agreement, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and the Port State Measures
Agreement.176

5.5.1.1

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

As analysed in the first part of this chapter, the desire to control fishing
resources was the catalyst for the evolution of the concept of the EEZ.
Thus, UNCLOS recognises the sovereign right of coastal States to
exploit and manage living resources in the EEZ.177 This right co-exists
with an obligation to take sound conservation measures and, in
particular, to ensure that living resources in the EEZ are not endangered
by over-exploitation.178 To facilitate the realisation of the interests of
coastal States in the EEZ, and the accompanying obligations, UNCLOS
gives coastal States enforcement rights in the EEZ. These include the
right to board and inspect fishing vessels, as well as the ability to arrest
and prosecute persons for violations of fisheries regulations.179 UNCLOS
also entreats States to cooperate in the conservation and management of
living resources, and in some cases, makes such cooperation
obligatory.180
176

The analysis in this section relies heavily on the work of Mary Ann Palma, Martin Tsamenyi and
William Edeson, Promoting Sustainable Fisheries: The International Legal and Policy Framework to
Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2010, Chapter
Three.
177

UNCLOS, Article 56.

178

UNCLOS, Article 61(2). Mary Ann Palma, Martin Tsamenyi and William Edeson, Promoting
Sustainable Fisheries : The International Legal and Policy Framework to Combat Illegal, Unreported
and Unregulated Fishing, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2010, p. 58.
179

Article 73 of UNCLOS states: “1. The coastal State may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to
explore, exploit, conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive economic zone, take such
measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to
ensure compliance with the laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity with this Convention.”
180

For example, Article 61(2) encourages regional, sub-regional and global cooperation, while
Articles 63 and 64 make cooperation compulsory.
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The rights and obligations of States regarding living resources also
extend to the high seas. Under international law, all States - coastal and
landlocked - enjoy the freedom of high seas fishing, and this has been
codified in Article 87 of UNCLOS.181 The exercise of the freedom is,
however, subject to a number of obligations. States must adopt measures
for the conservation of high seas living resources, ensure that their
nationals adhere to such measures, and they must also cooperate with
other States in the management and conservation of high seas living
resources.182

5.5.1.2

FAO Compliance Agreement

The Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation
and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (FAO
Compliance Agreement) was adopted in 1993 as the first post-UNCLOS
binding agreement for fisheries management.

183

A crucial issue

successfully dealt with by the FAO Compliance Agreement was the
reflagging of fishing vessels.184 Under the Agreement, a vessel that is
serving a suspension for violating fishing regulations is prohibited from
re-registering (reflagging) under any other State unless the period of

181

UNCLOS, Article 87(1)(e).
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UNCLOS, Articles 117 and 118. See also Mary Ann Palma, Martin Tsamenyi and William
Edeson, Promoting Sustainable Fisheries : The International Legal and Policy Framework to Combat
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2010, p. 59.
183

FAO, Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management
Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, Rome, Italy, 24 November 1993, entered into force 24
April 2003.
184

Robin R. Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, The Law of the Sea, Manchester, Manchester University
Press, 1999, pp. 302-303.
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suspension has ended.185 This prohibition has crystallised into an
important tool for combating IUU fishing in more recent fishery
frameworks. It is important to note, however, that the governance regime
of the FAO Compliance Agreement only covers fishing activities on the
high seas.186

5.5.1.3

United Nations Fish Stock Agreement

The United Nations Fish Stock Agreement was adopted in 1995 as the
implementing instrument for Articles 63 and 64 of UNCLOS, entering
into force in 2001.187 The UN Fish Stock Agreement regulates the
management of species of fish described as straddling stocks and highly
migratory species.188 Indeed, the very description of these species of fish,
tuna being the most dominant,189 shows that their management requires
some form of interstate cooperation.

190

Thus, the UN Fish Stock

Agreement creates a mechanism for managing these stocks through
regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs).191 The regime
185

FAO, Compliance Agreement, Article III (5).
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FAO, Compliance Agreement, Article II (1).
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FAO, United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 1995, in force 11
December 2001.
188

UNCLOS, Article 63 and 64. See also Robin R. Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, The Law of the Sea,
Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1999, p.294. Edward L. Miles and William T. Burke,
"Pressures on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Arising from New Fisheries
Conflicts: The Problem of Straddling Stocks " Ocean Development and International Law 20, 1989
pp. 343–57.
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On highly migratory and straddling stocks, see FAO, "The State of World Highly Migratory,
Straddling and other High Seas Fishery Resources and Associated Species," FAO Technical Paper
495, 2006.
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UNCLOS, Articles 63 and 64. Robin R. Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, Law of the Sea,
Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1999, p.294. Edward L. Miles and William T. Burke,
"Pressures on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Arising from New Fisheries
Conflicts: The Problem of Straddling Stocks," Ocean Development and International Law 20, 1989,
pp. 343–57.
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FAO, UN Fish Stock Agreement, Articles 8-14.
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consists of a wide range of responsibilities, including vessel licensing,
record keeping, catch verification, information sharing, as well as the
monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) of fishing vessels.192

The UN Fish Stock Agreement also creates mechanisms for meeting the
enforcement and capacity-building needs of developing countries.193
Also, the duty of States to ensure conservation of straddling stocks is
balanced by the need to ensure that conservation measures do not create
vulnerability in the food and nutritional requirements of communities,
especially the fishing communities of developing States.194

5.5.1.4

FAO Port State Measures Agreement

To further enhance the sustainable conservation and governance of
fisheries, consultations on the adoption of Port State Measures (PSM)
commenced in 2007,195 with the Agreement on Port State Measures
(PSMA) to combat IUU fishing finally adopted in 2009.196 In simple
terms, PSMs involve the in port inspection of fishing vessels to ensure
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UN Fish Stock Agreement, Part V. See also Lawrence Juda, "The United Nations Fish Stocks
Agreement," Yearbook of International Co-operation on Environment and Development 2001/02, pp.
53-58. Moritaka Hayashi, "The 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement and the Law of the Sea", in Davor
Vidas and Willy Østreng, eds. Order for the Oceans at the Turn of the Century Hague, Kluwer Law
International, 1999, pp. 37-53.
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UN Fish Stock Agreement, Article 24(1) and Articles 25-27.
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FAO, Twenty-seventh Session of the Committee on Fisheries, Rome, Italy, 5-9 March 2007, FAO
Fisheries Report No. 830, 2007.
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FAO, Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and
Unregulated Fishing, 22 November 2009.
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compliance with fisheries governance and conservation measures. 197 The
inspection should, at a minimum, cover the documentation of the vessel,
the type of fishing gear being used, as well as the quantity and origin of
the fish on board the vessel.198 Since this inspection is carried out in port,
it is regarded as more cost-effective than other types of enforcement
measures.199

5.5.2

Non-binding Fisheries Governance Frameworks

There are also a number of non-binding fisheries frameworks that are
part of the governance framework for fisheries. Much like binding
agreements, these non-binding frameworks are generally adopted at the
meetings of FAO member States, or as technical guidelines by FAO
special committees. Therefore, non-binding frameworks equally serve as
key multilateral instruments for engagement at regional and global
levels. Some of these non-binding instruments deal with specific
fisheries governance concerns, such as the use of fishing driftnets,200 the
regulation of fishing capacity,201 as well as the conservation of seabirds
and sharks.202 Others have a wider application, especially the FAO Code
197

Mary Ann Palma, Martin Tsamenyi and William Edeson, Promoting Sustainable Fisheries : The
International Legal and Policy Framework to Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing,
Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2010, p. 164.
198

Mary Ann Palma, Martin Tsamenyi and William Edeson, Promoting Sustainable Fisheries : The
International Legal and Policy Framework to Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing,
Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2010, p. 163.
199

Mary Ann Palma, Martin Tsamenyi and William Edeson, Promoting Sustainable Fisheries : The
International Legal and Policy Framework to Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing,
Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2010, p. 64.
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UN Resolution on Drift Fishing, Resolution 46/215, 1991, adopted by the UN General Assembly
on 20 December 1991.
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FAO, International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity, adopted at the twentythird Session of FAO Fisheries Committee, Rome, Italy, 1991.
202

FAO, International Plan of Action for Reducing Incidental Catch of Seabirds in Longline
Fisheries, adopted at the twenty-third Session of FAO Fisheries Committee, Rome, Italy, 1991. FAO,
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of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and the International Plan of
Action against IUU Fishing (IPOA-IUU). These two instruments are
examined below.

5.5.2.1

FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries

The FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries was adopted at the
twenty-eighth Session of the FAO Conference in Rome, Italy, in 1995.203
Unlike the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (that deals with specified fish
species), or the Compliance Agreement (that only regulates high sea
fishing), the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries targets the
management of all fisheries, irrespective of type or geographical
space.204 Although it is a non-binding instrument, its strength lies in the
broad measures it provides, including market-based measures for
combating IUU fishing.205

Like the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, the Code of Conduct also
recognises the capacity building needs of developing States.

206

An

important trade principle in the Code of Conduct (which also has the

International Plan of Action for the Conservation and Management of Sharks, adopted at the twentythird Session of FAO Fisheries Committee, Rome, Italy, 1991. FAO, International Plan of Action for
the Conservation and Management of Sharks, adopted at the twenty-third Session of FAO Fisheries
Committee, Rome, Italy, 1991.
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effect of combating IUU fishing), is the requirement for States to ensure
that trading in fish and fish products at both international and domestic
levels accords with sound conservation and management practices. This
is to be achieved by improving the identification of the origin of fish and
fishery products traded.207

5.5.2.2

International Plan of Action against Illegal and

Unreported Unregulated Fishing
The International Plan of Action against illegal unreported and
unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU) was adopted in 2001 on the platform of
the FAO as a holistic global instrument for combating IUU fishing.208
Although the IPOA-IUU is a non-binding instrument, it has been
modelled in such a way that it links with many of the binding and nonbinding instruments reviewed thus far. 209 As indicated in chapter three, it
was the adoption of the IPOA-IUU in 2001 that introduced the concept
of IUU fishing into fisheries governance. An analysis of the various
components of IUU fishing has already been undertaken in chapter
three.210 The IPOA-IUU lays down actionable plans for addressing the
threat of IUU fishing - plans which essentially translate into coastal
State, flag State and port State responsibilities.211
207
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Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU), Rome, Italy, 2 March 2001, endorsed by the FAO Council on 23
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The IPOA-IUU requires coastal States to develop comprehensive
legislation targeting all aspects of IUU fishing, including evidence
gathering and ensuring that such evidence meets admissibility
requirements in judicial and settlement processes.212 States must also
develop strong mechanisms for the effective monitoring, control and
surveillance (MCS) of fisheries.213 The IPOA-IUU reinforces the flag
State responsibilities imposed by the earlier instruments, and extends
some of these obligations to coastal States. For instance, it stipulates that
coastal States should not allow vessels to undertake fishing activities
within their waters without a valid licence, and also proscribes
transhipment of fish catches at sea.214 The IPOA-IUU also sets out a
wide range of Port State Measures (PSMs), including the inspection of
documents authorising fishing and the inspection of catches to confirm
the species, origin and quantity of the fish caught.215

5.5.3 Assessment of the Implementation of Fisheries Governance
Frameworks by Gulf of Guinea States
It is clear from the analysis above that the framework for fisheries
governance is quite broad. Thus, the assessment in this part will focus
on: (i) the status of ratification of the relevant binding instruments; (ii)
the implementation of the IPOA IUU; and (iii) the implementation of
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Port State Measures. The last section will highlight other pertinent issues
that impede effective fisheries governance in the Gulf of Guinea.

5.5.3.1

Ratification of Binding Instruments

The four binding instruments whose ratification is being assessed are
those that have been analysed in Section 5.5.1: UNCLOS, the UN Fish
Stocks Agreement, the FAO Compliance Agreement and the Agreement
on Port State Measures. The assessment in Section 5.2.3.1 of this chapter
has already shown that UNCLOS has been widely ratified by Gulf of
Guinea States. However, as UNCLOS only provides a general
jurisdiction for fisheries, it is the ratification and enforcement of the
three other instruments (and particularly those that are binding), that
actually

affords

effective

fisheries

governance

measures

and

cooperation. Table 5.5 depicts the status of ratification of the binding
instruments in the Gulf of Guinea.

Table 5.5

Status of Ratification of Binding Fishery Instruments

State

Angola
Benin
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Congo Brazzaville
Cote d’Ivoire
DR Congo
Equatorial Guinea
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Liberia
Mauritania

UN Fish Stock
Agreement
1994
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
16 Sep 2005
X
16 Sep 2005
X

Compliance
Agreement
1993
7 Mar 2006
4 Jan 1999
X
27 Jan 2006
X
X
X
X
X
X
12 May 2003
X
X
X
X
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Agreement on Port
State Measures
2009
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

2 Nov 2009
Nigeria
X
São Tomé & Príncipe
30 Jan 1997
Senegal
X
Sierra Leone
X
Togo
Source: FAO and UNDOALOS

X
X
8 Sep 2009
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

It is clear from the Table that the ratification of binding fisheries
instruments in the Gulf of Guinea is highly inadequate. The UN Fish
Stocks Agreement came into force since 2001, but has only been ratified
by four States.216 Meanwhile, the Compliance Agreement has been
ratified by only five States, despite having been in force since 2003.217
Given the scanty ratification of these two instruments, it is not surprising
that no Gulf of Guinea State has ratified the 2009 Agreement on Port
State Measures which is yet to enter into force. The conclusion to be
drawn from the ratification status of the above instruments is that
national and regional fisheries governance responses in the Gulf of
Guinea are highly deficient, contributing to illegal fisheries activities and
depleting fish stocks in the region.

5.5.3.2

Implementation of the IPOA-IUU

The IPOA-IUU framework requires every State to develop a National
Plan of Action (NPOA) which will constitute the policy platform for
implementing the IPOA-IUU.218 The NPOA should include a description
216

FAO, United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 1995, in force 11
December 2001.
217

FAO, Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management
Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, Rome, Italy, 24 November 1993, entered into force 24
April 2003.
218

FAO, IPOA-IUU, para. 25.
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of the country’s situation with regard to IUU fishing, a list of activities to
be undertaken in combating IUU fishing, the assignment of
responsibilities with respect to particular activities and actions, a time
frame and indicators for implementation of the activities, as well as an
embedded plan for its revision.219 FAO Resolution 6/2003 of December
2003 called on States to finalise their NPOAs by the end of 2004.220
However, as at December 2005, Gambia and Ghana were the only States
in the region to be cited as having developed their NPOA.

221

A 2011

Report has also indicated that Benin has completed its NPOA. 222 Thus,
more than a decade after the adoption of the IPOA-IUU framework, a
majority of Gulf of Guinea States have failed to create actionable plans
for its implementation. It is important to note, however, that the
development and implementation of NPOAs in many States is
constrained by funding.223 For example, the development of Gambia’s
NPOA was funded with assistance from the Global Environmental Fund
(GEF),224 while Nigeria (which has the highest Gross Domestic Product
in the region), has not dedicated funding for developing a NPOA or for
combating IUU fishing generally.225

219

FAO, Fisheries Report No. 792, 2006, Para 23.

220

FAO, Resolution 6/2003, FAO Council 124th Session, 9 December, 2003, Para 3.

221

Report of Regional Workshop on the Elaboration of National Plans of Action to Prevent Deter and
Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing – West African Subregion Accra, Ghana, 28
November - 2 December 2005, FAO, Fisheries Report No. 792, 2006, Para 50.
222

ACP Fish II Project, Report on Support to the implementation of the FCWC regional plan of action
on IUU fishing Project ref. N°CU/PE1/SN/11/011, 31 May 2011, p. 9. An earlier FAO Report
indicated the development of a NPOA in Benin, see FAO, Fisheries and Aquaculture Report No. 910,
2009, Para 41.
223

FAO, Fisheries and Aquaculture Report No. 910, 2009, Para 30.

224

FAO, Fisheries Report No. 792, 2006, Para 58.

225

Cote d’Ivoire is specifically cited in the ACP Fish II Project, Report on Support to the
implementation of the FCWC regional plan of action on IUU fishing Project ref.
N°CU/PE1/SN/11/011, 31 May 2011, p.21.
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Although the IPOA-IUU does not necessitate the adoption of Regional
Plans of Actions (RPOA), subsequent initiatives and decisions have
stipulated this to be a requirement.226 The World Summit on Sustainable
Development held in Johannesburg in 2002 encouraged the development
of RPOAs by the end of 2004, the same date set for NPOAs.227 Some
reports have indicated that the Fishing Committee for West Central
Africa (FCWC) developed a RPOA in 2009.228 However, the Plan does
not appear in the FAO database or on the official web page of the
FCWC. There is also no indication that any other Regional Fishery
Management Organisation in the Gulf of Guinea has developed an
Action Plan.229
5.5.3.3

Implementation of Port State Measures

The third outcome for the purpose of this assessment is the
implementation of Port State Measures (PSMs).

230

Since these

inspections are carried out in port, they should be more cost-effective
compared to other enforcement requirements. However, yet again Gulf
of Guinea States have failed to adopt and implement the requisite
PSMs.231 In fact, most of the States in the region have been assessed as
having no Port Inspectorates at all, while those that do have insufficient

226

Mary Ann Palma, Martin Tsamenyi and William Edeson, Promoting Sustainable Fisheries : The
International Legal and Policy Framework to Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing,
Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2010, p. 98.
227

World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, South Africa, 4 September 2000.

228

ACP Fish II Project, Report on Support to the implementation of the FCWC regional plan of action
on IUU fishing Project ref. N°CU/PE1/SN/11/011, 31 May 2011.
229

FAO, International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and
Unregulated Fishing, 2013, http://www.fao.org/fishery/ipoa-iuu/npoa/en, 12 September 2013.
230

FAO, Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and
Unregulated Fishing, 22 November 2009.
231

ACP Fish II Project, Report on Support to the implementation of the FCWC regional plan of action
on IUU fishing Project ref. N°CU/PE1/SN/11/011, 31 May 2011, p. 29.
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numbers generally lack the requisite skills to conduct port inspections
effectively.232

In light of the above discussion, it is clear that fisheries governance in
the Gulf of Guinea is ineffective, and this is undermining sustainable
fishing and creating a permissive environment for IUU fishing. This
assessment also shows that the ability of Gulf of Guinea States to combat
IUU fishing even in the immediate future is questionable.

233

Global

funding mechanisms for assisting developing States to implement the
IPOA-UU is still being explored, but it is unlikely that enough funding
will be made available.234

Hence, until Gulf of Guinea States take

positive measures to effectively implement binding and non-binding
fisheries management instruments, and also address the governance
issues analysed in chapter three, fisheries resources will remain at risk of
depletion, with serious consequences for food security as well as national
and regional security.

5.6 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
FRAMEWORK AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANISED
CRIMES

The assessment of the implementation of the United Nations
Transnational Organized Crime Convention (UNTOC) and its Protocols
232

ACP Fish II Project, Report on Support to the implementation of the FCWC regional plan of action
on IUU fishing Project ref. N°CU/PE1/SN/11/011, 31 May 2011, p. 8,24, http://acpfish2eu.org/uploads/projects/id95/Report_FCWC_IUU_implementation%2030-06-2011_PM.pdf,
12
September 2013.
233

ACP Fish II Project, Report Support to the implementation of the FCWC regional plan of action
on IUU fishing Project ref. N°CU/PE1/SN/11/011, 31 May 2011, p. 9.
234

FAO, Fisheries and Aquaculture Report No. 989, 2012.
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has been purposefully chosen as the last subject matter to be discussed in
this chapter. This is because the Convention and its three Protocols,
collectively referred to as the transnational organised crime instruments
(TOC instruments), are very relevant for combating all the maritime
security threats analysed in chapters three and four, particularly illicit
trafficking in drugs and weapons, as well as illegal migration by sea.
This part examines the extent to which Gulf of Guinea States have
implemented the UNTOC and its three Protocols.

5.6.1 Background to the Transnational Organized Crime
Instruments
The analysis of the evolution of the concept of maritime security in
chapter three demonstrated the context within which the doctrine of
mare clausum was espoused in 1635. 235 The doctrine was used to justify
the British claim to a customs zone and the imposition of security
measures along its coast in response to the illegal importation and
trading of contraband goods, including narcotics by foreign ships and
networks.236 This shows that the threat of transnational organised crime
(TOC) is not a recent phenomenon. However, increasing globalisation
has made both the effects and dynamics of TOC graver than before.237
Criminal networks are now able to execute crime across State boundaries
with ease and speed, exposing the inadequacy of national efforts at
235

The Englishman John Selden espoused the doctrine of mare clausum (which literally translates as
‘closed seas’) in 1635 to legitimise British security controls of the seas around Great Britain.
236

Robin R. Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, Law of the Sea, Manchester, Manchester University Press,
1999.
237

The Global Regime for Transnational Crime, 25 June 2013, Council on Foreign Relations
Available: http://www.cfr.org/transnational-crime/global-regime-transnational-crime/p28656, 12
November 2013.
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combating TOC.238 Indeed, the advent of TOC in the contemporary
world has called for a shift away from the piecemeal method of crime
prevention that focuses on specific crimes to a potent approach that will
target the drivers of organised crime.239

The most important step towards establishing a global framework on
TOC was taken at the World Ministerial Conference in 1994 which
called for a holistic global instrument on TOC.240 A series of multilateral
engagements on the subject led to the adoption of the United Nations
Transnational Organized Crime Convention (UNTOC) in 2000.241 The
objective of the Convention is to succinctly capture the words of the UN
Secretary General - that “if crime crosses borders, so must law
enforcement.”242
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The Global Regime for Transnational Crime, 25 June 2013, Council on Foreign Relations
Available: http://www.cfr.org/transnational-crime/global-regime-transnational-crime/p28656, 12
November 2013.
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The Global Regime for Transnational Crime, 25 June 2013, Council on Foreign Relations
Available: http://www.cfr.org/transnational-crime/global-regime-transnational-crime/p28656, 12
November 2013.
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World Ministerial Conference on Organised Transnational Crime, Naples, Italy, 21 - 23 November
1994.
241

United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by General Assembly
Resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000, Palermo, Italy, entered into force on 29 September 2003,
hereinafter referred to as UNTOC.
242

Kofi A. Annan, UN Secretary General, Forward to the UNTOC, available at UNODC,
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebooke.pdf, 12 August 2013.
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5.6.2 Scope and Content of Transnational Organized Crime
Instruments
The United Nations Transnational Organized Crime Convention
(UNTOC) was adopted in 2000 and entered into force in 2003.243 The
UNTOC covers a number of transnational crimes including money
laundering,244 corruption by public officials245 and the obstruction of
justice246 - all under the rubric of TOC. An organised criminal group is
defined as a structured group of persons acting in concert with the aim of
committing crimes in order to obtain some financial or other material
benefit, whether directly or indirectly.247

An offence is regarded as transnational in character if it fits any of these
descriptions: (i) the actions constituting the offence are committed in
more than one State;248 (ii) the offence is committed in one State but a
substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control takes
place in another State;249 (iii) the offence is committed in one State but
involves an organised criminal group that engages in criminal activities
in more than one State;250 or (iv) the crime is committed in one State but
243

United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by General Assembly
Resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000, Palermo, Italy, entered into force on 29 September 2003,
hereinafter referred to as UNTOC.
244

UNTOC, Articles 6 and 7.

245

UNTOC, Articles 8 and 9.

246

UNTOC, Article 23.

247

According to Article 2(a), an “Organized criminal group” refers to "a structured group of three or
more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or
more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain,
directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.”
248

UNTOC, Article 3(2)(a).

249

UNTOC, Article 3(2)(b).

250

UNTOC, Article 3(2)(c).
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has substantial effects in another State.251 State Parties are required to
enact laws against TOC, prevent the commission of organised crimes
within their territories, as well as investigate and prosecute perpetrators
of organised crimes.252 The Convention also places great emphasises on
international cooperation in combating organised crime. The prescribed
cooperative measures include the identification and confiscation of
proceeds of crime and mechanisms for initiating and responding to the
extradition of suspects.253

Three Protocols have been adopted to supplement the UNTOC. Two of
the Protocols - the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking
in Persons,254 as well as the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants
by Land, Air and Sea,255 were adopted together with the Convention in
2000. The third Protocol - the Protocol against Illicit Manufacture and
Trafficking in Firearms, was adopted a year later.256 The design of the
three Protocols is similar to the parent Convention. The Protocols
stipulate acts that constitute crimes in respective areas, obligating States
to take preventive and enforcement actions, and to further indicate
cooperative mechanisms to be adopted.
251

UNTOC, Article 3(2)(d).

252

UNTOC Articles 5-12.

253

UNTOC, Articles 13, 14 and 16.

254

The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and
Children, was adopted by General Assembly Resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000. It entered into
force on 25 December 2003. See 40 International Legal Material 353.
255

Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by General Assembly resolution
55/25, 15 November 2000, entered into force 28 January 2004. See 40 International Legal Materials,
2001, p. 384.
256

Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and
Components and Ammunition, 2001, adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/255, 31 May 2001,
entered into force 3 July 2005.
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The difference between the crimes of migrant smuggling and people
trafficking has been examined in great detail in chapter three. As a
summary, in the case of migrant smuggling organised criminals gain a
financial or other material benefit by facilitating the illegal entry of
people who voluntarily undertake a journey into another State.257
Meanwhile, the trafficking of people always has an element of deceit,
with the objective of the crime being to put the trafficked persons in
some form of servitude, typically prostitution or forced labour.258

5.6.3

Relevance of TOC Instruments to Gulf of Guinea and an

Assessment of the Implementation
UNTOC is a very important instrument for combating maritime security
threats in the Gulf of Guinea, particularly when its distinctiveness is
appreciated. Unlike the other international frameworks reviewed in this
chapter, UNTOC targets the sub-culture that promotes transnational
crime: organised networks, corruption, money laundering and the
obstruction of justice. The analysis of maritime security threats in
chapters three and four, and also in the present chapter, has revealed
elements of this sub-culture in the Gulf of Guinea. Indeed, drug
trafficking thrives on organised networks, corruption and the complicity
of public officials. The crimes of illegal migration and illicit trafficking
257

Article 3(a), Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 15 November 2000 (UN
A/55/383). Raimo Väyrynen, "Illegal Immigration, HumanTrafficking, and Organized Crime," United
Nations University, Discussion Paper O. 2003/72, 2003, pp. 1-25 p.1. See also David Kyle and Rey
Koslowsk, eds., Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2001.
258

Article 3(a), Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women
and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,
15 November 2000 (UN A/55/383). See also Kevin Bales, Disposable People. New Slavery in the
Global Economy Berkeley CA University of California Press, 1999.
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in persons and weapons are aided by the same sub-culture. The case
study on piracy in chapter four revealed that piracy itself is an organised
crime, while demonstrating that the trading of stolen oil cargo is
promoted by organised networks within and outside the Gulf of Guinea.
Even more ominous is the fact that piratical acts are increasingly being
committed with the use of arms and weapons. Finally, although not
always apparent, IUU fishing involves an element of organised crime,
and has been known to flourish in corrupt environments.259

5.6.3.1

Status of Ratification of TOC Instruments

It is clear from the analysis above that ratification and implementation of
UNTOC and its related instruments is crucial for enhancing maritime
security in the Gulf of Guinea. However, there are serious gaps in the
ratification of TOC instruments in the Gulf of Guinea.

Table 5.6: Status of Ratification of Transnational Organised Crime Instruments
State

Angola
Benin
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Congo Brazzaville
Cote d’Ivoire
DR Congo
Equatorial Guinea
Gabon
Gambia

UNTOC
2000
1 Apr 2013
30 Aug 2004
6 Feb 2006
15 Jul 2004
X
25 Oct 2012
28 Oct 2005
7 Feb 2003
15 Dec 2004
5 May 2003

Protocol on
Illegal
Migration 2000
X
30 Aug 2004
6 Feb 2006
15 Jul 2004
X
X
28 Oct 2005
X
X
5 May 2003

259

Protocol on
Trafficking in
Persons 2000
X
30 Aug 2004
6 Feb 2006
15 Jul 2004
X
25 Oct 2012
28 Oct 2005
7 Feb 2003
22 Sep 2010
5 May 2003

Protocol against
Trafficking in
Weapons 2001
X
30 Aug 2004
X
15 Jul 2004
X
X
28 Oct 2005
X
22 Sep 2010
X

Henrik O¨sterblom, Andrew Constable and Sayaka Fukumi, "Illegal fishing and the organized
crime analogy," Trends in Ecology and Evolution 26, 6, 2011, pp. 261-62, p.61. Bertrand L. Gallic
and Anthony Cox, "An economic analysis of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing: key
drivers and possible solutions," Marine Policy 30, 2006, pp. 689-95, p.94. See also Lyden Griggs and
Gail Lugten, "Veil over the nets: unravelling corporate liability for IUU fishing offences," Marine
Policy 31, 2007, pp. 159-68.
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21 Aug 2012
21 Aug 2012
Ghana
9 Nov 2004
8 Jun 2005
Guinea
10 Sep 2007
X
Guinea-Bissau
22 Sep 2004
22 Sep 2004
Liberia
22 Jul 2005
22 Jul 2005
Mauritania
28 Jun 2001
27 Sep 2001
Nigeria
12 Apr 2006
São Tomé & Príncipe 12 Apr 2006
27 Oct 2003
27 Oct 2003
Senegal
X
X
Sierra Leone
2 Jul 2004
28 Sep 2010
Togo
Source: UN Treaty Collection as at 17 November 2013

21 Aug 2012
9 Nov 2004
10 Sep 2007
22 Sep 2004
22 Jul 2005
28 Jun 2001
23 Aug 2006
27 Oct 2003
X
8 May 2009

X
X
24 Sep 2013
22 Sep 2004
22 Jul 2005
3 Mar 2006
12 Apr 2006
7 Apr 2006
X
17 Jul 2012

As shown in Table 5.6, Congo Brazzaville and Sierra Leone are not
Parties to any of the four instruments. Angola has ratified UNTOC but
not the accompanying Protocols. Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana ratified the
instruments almost a decade after UNTOC’s entry into force, and even
then the instruments have only partially been ratified. The ratification
status of other States with regard to TOC instruments – such as
Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Gabon and Gambia – is
equally incomplete.
As is the case with the other instruments discussed in this chapter, the
practical implementation of the TOC framework dictates effective
regional and international cooperation.260 The UN General Assembly
has, in Resolution 55/25, called on regional organisations to ratify
UNTOC and its Protocols.261 Indeed, under the framework of UNTOC,
regional organisations are required to set guidelines for the
implementation of aspects of TOC instruments, including the promotion
of cooperation among judicial and law enforcement authorities.262
However, neither ECOWAS nor ECCAS are signatories to the
instruments, making the contribution and commitment of these
260

See, for example, Article 17 of the Protocol on Smuggling of Migrants.

261

United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 55/25, 15 November 2000, para. 8.

262

See Article 7(3) and (4) of the UNTOC.
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organisations to addressing corruption and organised crime highly
questionable.

5.6.3.2

Implementation of Protocols on Illegal Migration

Given the high profile of organised crime, cooperation between Gulf of
Guinea States and the EU is germane, especially on the issue of illegal
migration (which often co-exists with human trafficking).263 Spain
initiated the Africa Plan in 2006, cooperating with a number of African
States on illegal migration, including Cape Verde and Senegal, which are
regarded as frontline migration States in the Gulf of Guinea. 264 The
Spanish initiative is also coordinated under the EU border protection
agency, Frontex.265 The engagement with Cape Verde has been largely
successful, resulting in the conclusion of an EU-Cape Verde Mobility
Partnership Agreement in 2008.266 Although Portugal (Cape Verde’s
former colonial power), is not an entry point for illegal migrants from the
Gulf of Guinea, the State has been pivotal in the implementation of the
Mobility Agreement.267 Action points in the Agreement include capacity
building on maritime border control and enforcement measures, as well
as a contribution by EU States to sea patrols off Cape Verde. In short,
the EU-Cape Verde partnership has been successful in combating illegal
263

See chapter three.

264

“The Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development,” Rabat, Morocco, 1011 July 2006.
265

EU, European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of
the Member States of the European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, 26 October 2004.
266

Council of the European Union, “Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership between the European
Union and the Republic of Cape Verde,” Brussels, 21 May 2008.
267

Meng Hsuan Chou and Marie Gibert, "The EU-Senegal Mobility Partnership: from launch to
suspension and negotiation failure," Journal of Contemporary European Research 8, 4, , 2012, pp.
408-27, p.14.
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migration by sea. However, there are concerns that Cape Verde’s
commitment to the Mobility Agreement has undermined its cooperation
in ECOWAS.268 This is because the arrangement has limited the free
movement of other ECOWAS citizens into Cape Verde - a prerequisite
for regional integration.269

In contrast to the success story of Cape Verde, cooperation between the
EU and Senegal on illegal migration has been chequered at best.270 Initial
media reports in 2006 suggested a positive roadmap,271 but the
agreement was later limited to the return of Senegalese nationals only.272
Within a few months the entire arrangement had stalled, owing to the
alleged inhumane treatment of Senegalese migrants by Spanish
officials.273 Following the incident, the government of Senegal came
under intense pressure from its nationals to terminate the agreement.274
268

For an analysis of this issue, see José L. Rocha, "Cape Verde and ECOWAS: The Challenges of
Regional Integration," Portuguese Journal of International Affairs 4, 2010, pp. 3-7.
269
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Journal of International Affairs 4, 2010. Hein de Haas, "International Migration, National
Development and the Role of Government: the case of Nigeria", in Aderanti Adepoju, Ton van
Naerssen and Annelies Zoomers, eds. International Migration and National Development in SubSaharan Africa: viewpoints and policy initiatives in the countries of origin Leiden, Brill, 2008, pp.
168-72.
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suspension and negotiation failure,” Journal of Contemporary European Research, 8, 4, 2012,
pp.408-427.
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http://www.irinnews.org/report/60468/senegal-senegal-spain-agree-to-joint-patrols-to-stem-illegalmigration, 9 September 2013.
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Douglas Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, pp.218-219 .
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Federica Bicchi, "'Our Size Fits All': normative power Europe and the Mediterranean," Journal of
European Public Policy 13, 2, 2006, pp. 286-303.
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Spain, Senegal agrees anti-migrant moves but no deal, 24 May 2006, Times of Malta, Available:
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Available:
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By the close of the year there were reports of a renewed plan, with Spain
agreeing to grant work permits to Senegalese migrants, as well as a
further US$24 million to assist Senegal to combat illegal migration.275
This paved the way for patrols led by Frontex in Senegalese waters in
2007, and within three months of the patrols being initiated, almost a
thousand illegal migrants were intercepted.276 It was hoped that Senegal
and the EU would eventually agree on a more permanent arrangement in
the form of a Mobility Partnership Agreement, but continued
disagreement led to the suspension of the initiative in 2009.277

There is, however, a wider context to the question of cooperation
between Gulf of Guinea States and the EU in combating illegal
migration. And although this cannot be explored extensively in this
chapter, it should form part of the assessment. During negotiations for
the Cotonou Agreement in 2000 (which covers EU relations with the
African-Caribbean-Pacific Group of States (ACP)), an article was
inserted into the Agreement linking the question of migration with trade
and development partnerships.278 This was vehemently opposed by Gulf
of Guinea States in particular, but nonetheless the Article was
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http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6208744.stm, 9 September 2013. Spain and Senegal agree to promote legal
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Available:
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November 2013.
276

Douglas Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, p. 218.
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included.279 Thus, while the EU and Gulf of Guinea States continue to
pursue cooperative initiatives on illegal migration on the basis of the
Cotonou Agreement, these initiatives are likely to be reluctantly agreed
to because of the economic muscle of the EU.280
No matter what value judgement is formed from the analysis of this
contested cooperation, it is imperative for Gulf of Guinea States to adopt
a regional framework to address the issue of illegal migration. The
analysis of the maritime environment of the Gulf of Guinea in chapters
three and four demonstrates that different types of security threats are
now starting to merge. Therefore, ignoring organised crime as it relates
to illegal migration may prove to be the region’s Achilles' heel. The
same organised groups that profit from the illegal smuggling of persons
into Europe may also be shipping illicit drugs or weapons into the Gulf
of Guinea.281 Thus, there is great value in fostering cooperation and
positive engagement within and outside the region.

5.6.3.3

Implementation of the Protocol against Illicit Weapon

Trafficking

279

For an extensive discussion, see Ole Elgström, "Lomé and Post-Lomé: Asymmetric Negotiations
and the Impact of Norms," European Foreign Affairs Review 5, 2, 2000, pp. 175-95. Tine Van
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Although trafficking in small arms and light weapons (SALW) has led to
immense instability in the Gulf of Guinea, almost half of the States in the
region have not ratified the protocol on illicit trafficking in weapons.282
Indeed, attempts to implement the Protocol at the regional level have not
been without their challenges. The 2010 implementation report by
ECOWAS member States highlighted gains in awareness campaigns,
capacity building, as well as the development of national legislation, but
noted that little progress had been made on the substantive issue of
reducing circulation of SALW.283 The case study on piracy in chapter
four demonstrated the rampant use of weapons in piratical attacks,
including AK47s, Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) and explosives.
That is a manifestation of a weak monitoring regime of SALW. 284

One a positive note, member States of ECOWAS adopted a Convention
on SLAW in 2006, while a similar instrument was adopted in 2010 for
the ECCAS region.285 These frameworks can help address the issue of
illegal trafficking of arms in the Gulf of Guinea if effectively

282

See chapter 6. See generally Eboe Hutchful, "Understanding the African Security Crisis", in
Abdel-Fatau Musah and Kayode Fayemi, eds. Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma, London,
Pluto Press, 2000, pp. 210-32. Eboe Hutchful and Abdoulaye Bathily, eds., The Military and
Militarism in Africa, Dakar, CODESRIA, 1998.
283

ECOWAS, ECOWAS Small Arms Control Programme, Annual Report 2010. See also "Efficacy of
Small Arms Control Measures and National Reporting: Learning from Africa," Small Arms Research
Notes 33,
August 2013. Available at http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/HResearch_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-33.pdf, 24 September 2013.
284

Cyriaque P. Agnekethom, "Political and Institutional Dynamics of the Control of Small Arms and
Light Weapons in West Africa," Disarmament Forum, 2008.
285

The ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other
Related Materials was adopted in Abuja, Nigeria, on 14 June 2006, and entered into force in
September 2009. ECCAS, Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and light
Weapons, Their Ammunition and All Parts and Components That Can Be Used for Their
Manufacture, Repair or Assembly, Kinshasa, DRC, 19 November 2010. See also OAU, Bamako
Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of
Small Arms and Light Weapons, 2000. OAU, Decision on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and
Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons, AHG/Dec.137 (LXX), July1999.
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implemented. There is, however, some disconnect between these
regional initiatives and the global instruments. As indicated in the
previous paragraph majority of Gulf of Guinea States have not ratified
the global instrument for combating the trafficking of arms. Essentially
therefore, the regional frameworks adopted by ECOWAS and ECCAS
do not tie well with the overall global process for dealing with the threat.
Since illegal trafficking in arms has global dimensions, Gulf of Guinea
States will have to commit to the global process while taking steps to
address specific regional concerns.

5.7

CONCLUSION

The analysis in this chapter has demonstrated a general lack of
implementation of international frameworks for maritime security in the
Gulf of Guinea. The analysis has also shown that the inadequate
implementation of the requisite international frameworks hampers the
enforcement of maritime security jurisdiction in the region. Indeed, the
inadequate ratification and implementation of the relevant frameworks
by Gulf of Guinea States limits their capacity to effectively combat
maritime security threats, while simultaneously undermining their
commitment to maritime security in the region.

These conclusions do not suggest that the frameworks by themselves
provide sufficient solutions to maritime security challenges. Indeed, the
discussion demonstrates that international frameworks are themselves a
product of consensus building, and therefore have limitations.
Nonetheless, they represent the most viable responses that can galvanize
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bilateral, regional and global maritime security cooperation. Thus, failure
to anchor maritime security responses to these frameworks constitutes a
serious impediment to building regional security cooperation, and
equally hinders global support and partnerships. The presence of undelimited maritime areas, which is itself a product of the inadequate
implementation of UNCLOS, complicates the already weak cooperative
environment, and is also a recipe for interstate conflict and regional
instability.

Finally, with regard to the analytical and conceptual framework
underpinning the thesis, this chapter has demonstrated that an effective
legal framework enhances maritime security capacity at the national
level, and is also an enabler of regional and global maritime security
cooperation. Conversely, deficiencies in the legal framework encumber
national response capabilities, creating dysfunctional cooperative
outcomes.
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CHAPTER SIX
PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES FOR EVOLVING
MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATIVE INITIATIVES
IN THE GULF OF GUINEA
6.1

INTRODUCTION

The analysis in the preceding chapters has underscored the need for
effective maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea. Indeed,
regional cooperation is a useful platform for aggregating national
responses, enhancing enforcement output, and enlisting international
support and cooperation. A review of the Gulf of Guinea environment
shows that four platforms are currently being used to pursue maritime
security cooperation. These platforms have different institutional
foundations, with the evolving initiatives covering different geographical
scopes.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has explicitly advocated
these platforms and initiatives as collaborative mechanisms for
enhancing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea region.1 However,
notwithstanding the importance of maritime security cooperation, the
wholesale sanctioning of ongoing initiatives without reviewing their
content, context, structure and integrative strengths is neither beneficial
for Gulf of Guinea States nor the international community at large. Also,
from a practical perspective, the need for maritime security cooperation
1

United Nations, Resolution 2018 - Piracy and Security in Africa(Security Council 6645th Meeting.
31 October 2011). United Nations, Resolution 2039 - Peace Consolidation in West Africa(Security
Council 6727th Meeting. 29 February 2012).
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in the Gulf of Guinea cannot be divorced from the broader governance
and political dynamics in the region. Indeed, the degree of maritime
security cooperation that can be achieved is dependent upon both the
nature of interstate relations and national socio-economic indicators.

It is against this backdrop that an assessment of the ongoing maritime
security initiatives in the Gulf of Guinea will be conducted. As in the
case of the earlier chapters, this chapter has both conceptual and
empirical relevance to the thesis. Conceptually, this chapter investigates
the strengths and limitations associated with the regional platform for
maritime security cooperation, as well as the critical role of good
governance in enhancing maritime security. Empirically, the chapter
examines the ways in which Gulf of Guinea States are fostering regional
maritime security cooperation, and the opportunities and challenges
created by these initiatives. It is important to note that this chapter is
concerned with cooperative initiatives being pursued only by Gulf of
Guinea States, while the next chapter will examine interventions by
external actors.

This chapter is organised in four parts. The first part will examine the
context and content of the cooperative initiatives, while the remaining
three parts will assess the structural, geopolitical and governance
challenges associated with the evolving cooperative frameworks. The
interaction between these different but coterminous challenges needs to
be highlighted. Structural challenges relate to the operationalisation of
cooperative frameworks, and some of these may be so fundamental as to
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prevent the development or realisation of the initiative altogether.
Geopolitical challenges may produce the same effect, especially where
there is a high level of interstate contestation. Otherwise, geopolitical
challenges largely affect cohesiveness and the effective delivery of
results. The same can be said of governance challenges, although the
negative impacts run much deeper and are felt long term. This implies
that unless governance challenges are identified and addressed, States
run the risk of investing time and resources in cooperative initiatives
which may not produce the desired results.

6.2

COOPERATIVE PLATFORMS AND EVOLVING

MARITIME SECURITY INITIATIVES
The four platforms that are being used to garner maritime security
cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea are the Maritime Organization for
West and Central Africa (MOWCA), the Gulf of Guinea Commission
(GGC), the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS),
and the Economic Community for Central African States (ECCAS). The
four sections below will provide an overview of each of these
institutional frameworks, as well as the maritime security objectives
being pursued. This will provide the background for the analysis in the
next part of the chapter.
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6.2.1

The Maritime Organization for West and Central Africa

and the Integrated Coastguard Network Project
The Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA) has
twenty five member States. Of these, twenty are coastal, five are
landlocked, and together they form the member States of the Gulf of
Guinea region as defined in the thesis.2 MOWCA is the successor
organisation of the Ministerial Conference of Maritime Transport of
West and Central African States (MINCONMAR), which was
established in 1975 by the Charter of the Ministerial Conference of West
and Central African States on Maritime Transport.3 MINCOMAR was
one of several platforms established by developing States in the 1970s to
secure equity in international trade by lobbying for an end to the
shipping monopoly enjoyed by developed States. In particular,
developing States advocated for a quota system so that their newly
established shipping lines would be entitled to carry a percentage of the
cargo loaded and offloaded in their ports.4

However, this objective was never met, as the national shipping lines of
developing States would soon collapse under the pressure of increased

2

See chapter 2. The coastal States of MOWCA are Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo
Brazzaville, Cote d’Ivoire, DR Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, GuineaBissau, Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. The
landlocked States are Burkina Faso, the Central Africa Republic, Chad, Mali and Niger.
3

MOWCA, Charter of the Ministerial Conference of West and Central African States on Maritime
Transport(Abidjan May 1975).
4

Generally on the contest between developed and developing States on shipping and maritime trade,
see Alexander Yeats, Trade Barriers Facing Developing Countries: Commercial Policy Measures
and Shipping London Macmillan, 1979, p. 184-93. Louise L. Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell, eds.,
Regionalism in Word Politics: Regional Organization and International Order, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1995. Karl Fasbender and Wolfgang Wagner, Shipping Conferences, Rate Policy,
and Developing Countries, Hamburg Verlag Weltarchiv, 1973.
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competition and globalisation.5 And although MINCONMAR continued
to serve as a platform for discussing shipping issues, the attention of its
Secretariat shifted largely to facilitating the implementation of shipping
regulations adopted on the floor of the International Maritime
Organization (IMO). Following a stakeholder meeting in August 1999,
MINCONMAR was renamed the Maritime Organization of West and
Central Africa (MOWCA),

6

perhaps to reflect its affiliation with the

International Maritime Organization (IMO).

Dialogue between MOWCA States on the establishment of a coastguard
network commenced in 2001 at a meeting held in Abuja, Nigeria.7 At a
second meeting jointly organised by MOWCA and the IMO in 2003, a
consensus was reached to engage the services of a consultant to carry out
feasibility studies on the coastguard programme.8 Pursuant to this
decision, the Maritime Safety Committee of the IMO mandated that the
IMO Secretariat provide funding for the feasibility study.9 The study
involved visits and meetings in selected States,10 and a report with a draft
convention for the establishment of a regional coastguard network was
submitted in 2006.11 However, the General Assembly of MOWCA
5

Awini Behnam, "The Ocean Trade in the New Economy: A Keynote Address," Ocean Development
& International Law 35, 2, 2004, pp. 115-30, at p.18.
6

The decision to change the name of the organisation from MINCONMAR to MOWCA was taken at
an extraordinary session of the General Assembly of Ministers of Transport held in Abidjan, Cote
d’Ivoire, 4-6 August 1999.
7

On the history and processes underlying the coastguard network, see MOWCA, Establishment of
MOWCA Integrated Sub-Regional Coast Guard Network(MOWCA Secretariat. May 2005).
8

Meeting of member States of MOWCA, Accra, Ghana, 17-19 March 2003.

9

See IMO, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee(MSC 78/26. 28 May 2004).

10

The States visited were Angola, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal.

11

See IMO, Report on the Mission on Evaluation and Assessment of the Feasibility to Establish An
Integrated Coast Guard Network in the West And Central African Region(TC/0046-01-2000. 15
February 2006).
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instead adopted a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 2008 –
albeit one which provided a framework for establishing an integrated
coastguard network.12 There is no formal indication as to why the
original idea of a convention was abandoned, but the author’s view is
that the MOU was selected to avoid the more formal requirements
associated with international conventions.

The overarching objective of the MOWCA coastguard project is to
create a maritime law enforcement program under a unified
administration for the whole of West and Central Africa.13 As part of this
grand objective, a regional maritime information sharing centre will be
established, allowing member States to share and exchange security
related information.14 Article 12 of the MOU divides the coastguard
network into four zones. Zone I comprises Mauritania, Senegal, Gambia,
Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde. States in Zone II include Guinea, Sierra
Leone, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana. Zone III is composed of Togo,
Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea, while Zone IV
includes Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe, Congo Brazzaville, DR
Congo and Angola. Each zone will have a designated coordination
centre, with the entire network being coordinated from two principal
coordination centres.

12

MOWCA, Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of a Sub-Regional Integrated Coast
Guard Network In West and Central Africa, MOWCA/XIII GA.08/8. 2008, herein referred to as
MOWCA Coastguard MOU, adopted at the 13th Session of the General Assembly of MOWCA
meeting, held from 29 – 31 July 2008, Dakar, Senegal. See Law of Sea Bulletin(No.68. 2008).
13

Article 6(1), MOWCA Coastguard MOU 2008.

14

Article 6(2), MOWCA Coastguard MOU 2008.
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The highest administrative body for the coastguard network is the
Council of Ministers, which comprises ministers responsible for
maritime transportation from each member State.15 Other important
functions will be undertaken by a Committee of Representatives, with
members drawn from each State Party.16 Article 11 provides for the
office of a Principal Coordinator who is responsible for the general
management of the coastguard network (and who also acts as the
network’s legal representative). Under the MOU, the Principal
Coordinator and two deputies will be appointed by the Council of
Ministers on the recommendation of the Committee of Representatives.17
However, the implementation of the project is equally entrusted to a
Technical Committee of Evaluation, which is to be appointed solely by
the Secretary General of MOWCA.18

The MOU also sets out rules governing the operation of assets and
platforms associated with the coastguard network. The plan is for the
coastguard network to acquire and operate relevant assets, including
ships that will have distinctive markings and fly the flag of MOWCA. 19
The network will be funded by financial contributions from member
States, with donor organisations and donor countries providing
additional financial support.20 Any member State seeking the presence of
ships in its zone must send a request with a “useful justification” to the
relevant Zone Coordinators, who will then approve the request and plan
15

Article 8, MOWCA Coastguard MOU 2008.

16

Article 10, MOWCA Coastguard MOU 2008.

17

Article 10, MOWCA Coastguard MOU 2008.

18

Article 9, MOWCA Coastguard MOU 2008.

19

Article 15, MOWCA Coastguard MOU 2008.

20

Article 28, MOWCA Coastguard MOU 2008.
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the mission.21 The Zone Coordinators also have authority to contract out
the maintenance and supply of ships to private companies.22

Other aspects of the MOU will be analysed in the next part of this
chapter, including the limitations and structural challenges of the
evolving maritime security initiatives. However, it should already be
apparent that the coastguard network is a complicated bureaucratic
concept with serious structural issues, thus making its successful
operationalisation highly improbable. Indeed, it is idealistic to expect
States to surrender their sovereignty and law enforcement authority to
Zone Coordinators that they have no control over. It is also impracticable
to assume that States will contribute to the acquisition of very expensive
assets like ships, and at the same time forfeit their absolute authority
over the operation and deployment of such ships.

6.2.2

The Gulf of Guinea Commission

The Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) was identified in chapter two as
one of the key regional organisations in the Gulf of Guinea whose
maritime security cooperative initiatives would be analysed. Although
the treaty establishing the Commission has defined its membership as the
sovereign States bordering the Gulf of Guinea, the Commission only has
eight member States: Angola, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, DR
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria and São Tomé and Príncipe.23
21

Article 22, MOWCA Coastguard MOU 2008.

22

Article 18, MOWCA Coastguard MOU 2008.

23

See Article III, Treaty of the Gulf of Guinea Commission, February 2001. The Treaty is not in force
and research suggests that only Nigeria has ratified the Treaty thus far. However, James Forest and
Mathew Sousa have indicated that the Treaty has also been ratified by São Tomé and Príncipe. See,
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In numerical terms, the Gulf of Guinea Commission is the smallest of the
six platforms being examined in this chapter, but strategically, the
Commission is the nerve centre of the Gulf of Guinea region, especially
when viewed in the context of global energy security interests.
In 2011, Nigeria and Angola accounted for 81 per cent of the total oil
supply from the Gulf of Guinea region, with shares of 47 and 34 per cent
respectively.24 The output levels of other member States of the
Commission are also quite high, especially when compared to other Gulf
of Guinea States.25 Therefore, from the perspective of energy resource
security, it is the membership of the GGC that has gravitas in the Gulf of
Guinea region.26 This explains why the Commission features
prominently in the literature on maritime security in the Gulf of
Guinea.27 Since energy security is a global concern, it is not surprising

Federal Republic of Nigeria, Act of Ratification and Enforcement of the Treaty Establishing the Gulf
of Guinea Commission, 2004. James J.F. Forest and Mathew V. Sousa, Oil and Terrorism in the Gulf
of Guinea: Framing U.S. Energy and Security Policies for the Gulf of Guinea, Plymouth Lexington
Books, 2006, p. 67.
24

Statistics contained in a report by Chatham House UK, see Chatham House, "Angola and the Gulf
of Guinea: Towards an Integrated Maritime Strategy," Chatham House, November 2012.
25

See chapter 2.

26

Generally on geopolitical interests in Gulf of Guinea natural resources (including oil), see Ricardo
Soares de Oliveira, Oil and Politics in Gulf of Guinea, London, Hurst and Company, 2007. Manuel
Correia de Barros, "Can the Gulf of Guinea Develop a Common Regional Oil Policy? ", in Rudolf
Traub-Merz and Douglas Yates, eds. Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea: Security & Conflict, Economic
Growth, Social Development, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2004, pp. 68-71. Howard W. French,
"Commentary - China and Africa," African Affairs 106 2007 pp. 127-32. Pierre Abramovici, "United
States: the new scramble for Africa," Review of African Political Economy 31, 2004, pp. 685-90.
Richard Auty, Sustaining Development in Mineral Economics: The resource curse thesis London
Routledge, 1993. Nicholas Shaxson, Poisoned Wells: The Dirty Politics of Africa Oil, Basingtsoke
Pelgrave Macmillan, 2008. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War
Washington DC World Bank Development Research Group, 2000.
27

See, for example, Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, Oil and Politics in Gulf of Guinea, London, Hurst,
2007, p. 1. Raymond Gilpin, "Enhancing Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea," Strategic Insights
VI, 1, January 2007. Mark Lowe, "African Countries for More Security in the Gulf of Guinea,"
Maritime Security Review, 13 August 2012, Gbenga Oduntan, "The Emergent Legal Regime for
Exploration of Hydrocarbons in the Gulf Of Guinea: Imperative Considerations for Participating
States and Multinationals " International and Comparative Law Quarterly 57, 2008, pp. 253-302.
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that the UN Security Council has advocated the role of the Commission
in delivering maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.28

There are other cogent reasons underlying the role of the GGC as a
viable platform for maritime security cooperation. First, the Treaty of the
Commission expressly indicates that its objective is to promote peace
and security, and to also serve as a forum for addressing joint security
issues.29 Second, the GGC is the only regional organisation in the Gulf
of Guinea that is ‘entirely maritime’ (in the sense that all of its eight
members are coastal States),30 while the motivation behind the formation
of the Commission was to exploit offshore resources in a secure and
beneficial manner.31 Third, the moderate size of the Commission means
that the prospects for achieving consensus on regional arrangements are
quite high. Finally, unlike other regions in the Gulf of Guinea,
increasingly access to oil revenue places member States of the GGC in a
relatively better position to acquire the necessary logistics and
cooperative platforms for maritime security, without the need for
extensive support from the international community.

In light of the above discussion, it is clear that the Secretariat of the GGC
should be able to enlist national, regional and external assistance to
develop a buoyant maritime security cooperative and enforcement

28

See, for example, paragraph 3 of UN Security Council Resolution 2039, 29 February 2012.

29

See Article VI, Treaty of the Gulf of Guinea Commission, 2001.

30

This assessment also applies to MOWCA, as its membership includes landlocked States.

31

See Articles IV and V, Treaty of the Gulf of Guinea Commission, 2001.
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framework. In reality, however, it has not been able to achieve this
objective, with the Commission’s shortcomings not being limited to
maritime security concerns, but extending to the discharge of all its
objectives. High level consultations between member States have
produced very few tangible results, and programmes devised by
technical committees of the Commission have scarcely been
implemented.32 In advocating for the Commission to play a central role
in maritime security, the Executive Secretary of the Commission, Mr
Miguel dos Anjos da Cunha Lisboa Trovoada,33 asserted in August 2012
that collective security was a key driver behind the creation of the
Commission, but bemoaned that little was being done on that front.34
Interestingly, Mr Trovoada had confirmed a few months earlier that there
were major problems militating against the smooth functioning of the
Commission’s Secretariat. 35

Therefore, although the GGC commands great recognition, the
organisation produces little or no concrete outcomes. Of course, the
internal politics of organisations are usually complex, and multiple
reasons may well account for the GGC’s lacklustre performance.
However, the author contends that the critical factor preventing the
32

Osita C. Eze and Rudolf Traub-Merz, "Interstate Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Gulf of
Guinea ", in Rudolf Traub-Merz and Douglas Yates, eds. Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea: Security
and Conflict, Economic Growth, Social Development, Nigerian National War College, 2004, pp. 7386.
33

The Executive Secretary, Mr Miguel dos Anjos da Cunha Lisboa Trovoada, previously served as
the Prime Minister (1975–1979) and President (1991–2001) of São Tomé and Príncipe.
34

"Gulf of Guinea Security," Maritime Security Review, August 2012. See also allafrica.com,
Angola: Gulf of Guinea Commission Told to Meet Security Challenges 9 April 2012, Available:
http://allafrica.com/stories/201204100008.html 3 December 2012.
35

"Gulf of Guinea Commission seeks Nigeria’s support on security," Blueprint, 17 February 2012.
"Growing security challenge: Nigeria to Partner the Gulf Of Guinea Commission " NewsDiary, 17
February 2012.
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Commission from making progress is the geopolitical environment
within which it is cast. This will be examined in second part of the
chapter.

6.2.3

Maritime Security Initiatives of the Economic

Community of West African States
Fifteen of the twenty five States in the Gulf of Guinea are part of the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which was
established in 1975.36 The formation of ECOWAS was, however,
marked by serious diplomatic challenges. It has been argued that France
regarded the formation of ECOWAS merely as a platform for Nigeria to
increase its control in the region, thereby undermining France’s
dominance in West African politics (and especially in the Francophone
enclave).37 Internally, Cote d’Ivoire was deemed to be obstructing the
formation of ECOWAS, partly in aid of the French agenda, but also
because of a regional leadership contest with Nigeria.38 However, the

36

Treaty of ECOWAS, Lagos, Nigeria, 28 May 1975. A copy of the Treaty is in 14 International
Legal Materials (1975) 1200. The coastal States of ECOWAS are Benin, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire,
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. The
Landlocked States are Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.
37

Olusegun Obasanjo, My Command, London Heinemann, 1980, p. 152. Generally on the
involvement of France and Nigeria in West African politics, see Bassey Ate, "The Presence of France
in West-Central Africa as a Fundamental Problem to Nigeria," Millennium Journal of International
Studies 12, 2, Summer, pp. 110-26. Daniela Kroslak, "France's Policy Towards Africa, Continuity or
Change?", in Ian Taylor and Paul Williams, eds. Africa in International Politics: External
Involvement on the Continent, London and New York, Routledge, 2004, pp. 61-82. Bola A.
Akinterinwa, "The Role of France in Nigeria’s Relations with its Neighbours " Jerusalem Journal of
International Relations 12, 1, 1990, pp. 112-47. Yves Person, "French West Africa and
Decolonization", in Prosser Gifford and William R. Louis, eds. The Transfer of Power in Africa:
Decolonization 1940-1960, New Haven, , Yale University Press, 1982, pp. 141-72. Shaun Gregory,
"French Military in Africa: Past and Present " African Affairs 99, 2000, pp. 435-48
38

Olajide Aluko, "Oil at Concessionary Prices for Africa: A Case Study in Nigerian Decision-Making
" Africa Affairs 75, 301, 1976, pp. 425-43 at p.36. See also Adekeye Adebajo, Building Peace in West
Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau, International Peace Academy Occasional Papers,
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discovery of oil by Nigeria, followed by oil booms in early 1970s,
propelled Nigeria into a stronger position to drive the formation of
ECOWAS.39

ECOWAS is the most structured regional organisation in Africa, and is
widely regarded as a pacesetter on most subjects concerning integration
across the African continent.40 Indeed, the organisation has played a key
role in resolving conflicts and crises in the territories of member States,
even though its constitutive authority has largely been confined to
economic cooperation.41 Whereas the role of other regional organisations
has remained in the socio-economic realm, the ECOWAS Revised
Treaty of 1992 deepened the political and security objectives of the
organisation.42 This facilitated the adoption of a treaty in 1999
establishing the Peace and Security Mechanisms of ECOWAS, which
Lynne Reinner, London, 2002, pp. 30-32. Daniel Bach, "The Politics of West African Co-Operation:
CEAO and ECOWAS," Journal of Modern African Studies 21, 4, 1983, pp. 605-30.
39

Adekeye Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau,
International Peace Academy Occasional Papers, Lynne Reinner, London, 2002, p. 27. Olajide Aluko,
"Oil at Concessionary Prices for Africa: A Case Study in Nigerian Decision-Making, " Africa Affairs
75, 301, 1976, pp. 425-43 at p.36.
40

On the pioneering role of ECOWAS in promoting the free movement of people, see Aderanti
Adepoju, "Migration Management in West Africa within the context of ECOWAS Protocol on Free
Movement of Persons and the Common Approach on Migration: Challenges and Prospects", in Marie
Tremolieres, ed. Regional Challenges of West African Migration: African and European Perspectives,
Paris, OECD, 2009, pp. 17-48. Clement A. Emenike, "Hegemony, Security and West African
Integration: Nigeria, Ghana and the Transformation of ECOWAS," PhD Queens University, Canada,
1994.
41

On ECOWAS and conflict resolution, see Adekeye Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa:
Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau, International Peace Academy Occasional Papers, Lynne
Reinner, London, 2002. Mohamed Sirjoh Bah, ECOWAS and the Dynamics of Constructing a
Security Regime in West Africa, PhD Dissertation, Queen's University at Kingston, 2004. Mark
Husband, The Liberian Civil War, London and Portland, Frank Cass 1998. Chris Alden, "From
Neglect to ‘Virtual Engagement’: The United States and the New Paradigm for Africa " African
Affairs 99, 2002, pp. 355-71 and Nkechi Mgbeoji, Collective Security – The Liberian Crisis,
Unilateralism and Global Order, Vancouver University of British Columbia Press, 2003
42

ECOWAS, Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, Cotonou, Benin,
24 July 1992, reprinted in 35 International Legal Materials (1996) 660.
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has been replicated at the continental level by the African Union (AU)
and also mirrored by other regional institutions across the continent.43
Further integration occurred in 2006, when the ECOWAS Secretariat
became a commission with enhanced powers.

These achievements go some way to explaining why ECOWAS has
projected itself as both a “mature” organisation and “the master of its
[own] destiny.”44 However, in the context of maritime security
cooperation, these attributes are lacking, with ECOWAS member States
failing to develop a cooperative framework despite entreaties by the UN
Security Council in Resolutions 2018 and 2039.45 Indeed, the only
tangible output in the region thus far has been the Nigeria-Benin joint
patrols (code-named Operation Prosperity), which launched in August
2011.46 The inability of this bilateral initiative to suppress piracy and
armed robbery off the coasts of the two States has been discussed in
chapter four. Analysis in that chapter also demonstrated how, despite
Operation Prosperity, piratical attacks have burgeoned off the coasts of
neighbouring States.

In a Meeting in July 2013, the Heads of State and Government of
ECOWAS reaffirmed their determination to combat piracy and other
43

ECOWAS, Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution,
Peace-Keeping and Security, adopted at Lome, Togo, 10 December 1999.
44

ECOWAS, “ECOWAS Commission at a Glance,” http://www.comm.ecowas.int/, 27 September
2013.
45

UN, Resolution 2018, adopted at the 6645th Security Council Meeting, 31 October 2011 and
Resolution 2039, adopted at the 6727th Meeting of the Security Council, 29 February 2012.
46

UN Security Council, “Report of the United Nations Assessment Mission on Piracy in the Gulf of
Guinea,” S/2012/45, 19 January 2012.
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forms of transnational organised crime.47 The Meeting further directed
the ECOWAS Commission to facilitate the adoption of an ECOWAS
maritime strategy, as well as the establishment of Pilot Zone E (which
had been agreed on at the Yaoundé Summit of ECOWAS and ECCAS
member States a month earlier).48 These positive developments suggest
that ECOWAS member States are taking steps to mirror the maritime
security framework of ECCAS, which is analysed below.

6.2.4

Maritime

Security

Framework

of

the

Economic

Community of Central African States
The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) has
eleven member States, seven of whom are coastal States.49 ECCAS was
formed in the early 1980s, but due to protracted internal and interstate
conflicts in the region, the administrative structures of the Community
only became operational in 1999.50 Security cooperation within ECCAS
came to fruition in 2004, following the coming into force of the Protocol
relating to the Mutual Security Pact in Central Africa (COPAX),51 which

47

ECOWAS, Final Communique, Forty-third Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads
of State and Government, Abuja, Nigeria, 17-18 July 2013, paragraph 37 and 38.
48

ECOWAS, Final Communique, 17-18 July 2013, paragraph 39.

49

The coastal States of ECCAS are Angola, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, DR Congo, Gabon,
Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tomé & Principe. The landlocked States include the Central Africa
Republic, Burundi and Chad. Rwanda was originally a member State of ECCAS, but withdrew from
the Community as a result of major disagreements with other member States, especially Angola.
Indeed, the two States fought on opposite sides during the war in DR Congo. Whilst some media
reports have indicated that Rwanda has officially re-joined ECCAS, the official web page of ECCAS
does not list Rwanda as a member State.
50

See “Economic Community of Central African States,” http://www.au.int/en/recs/eccas, 28
September 2013.
51

ECCAS, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of a Mutual Security Pact in Central Africa
(COPAX), Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, June 2002, entered into force January 2004.
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is essentially the ECCAS version of the ECOWAS and African Union’s
Peace and Security Mechanisms.52

In 2009, member States of ECCAS successfully adopted a Protocol on
Maritime Security which laid down a structure for ECCAS maritime
security cooperation.53 The background to this Protocol has been
discussed in the case study on piracy in chapter four. The case study
showed that by 2008, Niger Delta insurgents had firmly extended their
piratical activities off the coasts of Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea,
both of whom are members of ECCAS.54 Then, in 2009, there was an
alleged seaborne attack targeting the residence of the President of
Equatorial Guinea.55 The incident heightened political tensions within
ECCAS, as Equatorial Guinea suspected Cameroon of being complicit in
the attack, particularly since the perpetrators were believed to have sailed

52

For an analysis of the AU Mechanisms for Peace and Security, see Omar Touray, "The Common
Africa Defense and Security Policy," African Affairs 104, 417, 2005, pp. 635-56. Jakkie Cilliers, The
African Standby Force: An Update on Progress, Pretoria, Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008. Jeffrey
E. Marshall, "Building an Effective African Standby Force to Promote African Stability, Conflict
Resolution and Prosperity,” Crisis States Discussion Papers No.16, London School of Economics,
April 2009. Eric Berman, "African regional organisations’ peace operations: Developments and
challenges " African Security Review 11, 4, 2002. Solomon A. Dersso, The Role and Place of the
African Standby Force within the African Peace and Security Architecture, Pretoria, Institute for
Strategic Studies, January 2010. See also Monde Muyangwa and Margaret A Vogt, An assessment of
the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, 1993-2000, New York,
International Peace Academy, 2002. Colin Legum, William Zartman, Steven Longdon and Lynn
Mytelka, eds., Africa in the 1980s: A continent in Crises, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1989.
53

See ECCAS, Protocole Relatif a la Strategie de Securitisation des Interest Vitaux en Mer des Etats
de la CEEAC du Golfe de Guinea(Yaoundé, Cameroon. 24 October 2009).
54

See Chapter 4, Section 4.5.2.

55

See Chapter 4, Section 4.5.2.
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from a port in Cameroon.56 At the same time, the insurgency in Niger
Delta was identified as the source of the attack. 57

These events propelled the birth of the ECCAS maritime security
framework, which is anchored to the Maritime Security Protocol.58 That
the Protocol has been adopted and ratified by the Heads of State and
Government of ECCAS lends legal and political authority to the
framework. Indeed, the preamble to the Protocol affirms that the
maritime security cooperative framework being established is an
offshoot of the broader ECCAS Peace and Security Mechanisms.59 The
Protocol commits member States to collectively enhance maritime
security through the sharing of information, the implementation of joint
surveillance and patrols, as well as the harmonisation of legal regimes.60

Articles 5 to 7 of the Protocol set out a three-tier security structure
composed of regional, zonal and national coordination centres. The
Regional Coordination Centre, known by its French acronym
CRESMAC (Centre Régional de Sécurité Maritime de l’Afrique
56

See, Africa Research Bulletin 18155, 16 February-15 March 2009. See also Francois Vreÿ, "Bad
order at sea : From the Gulf of Aden to the Gulf of Guinea," African Security Review 18, 3, 2009, pp.
17-30.
57

See, Equatorial Guinea Warns U.S. and Europe Not to Ignore Growing Security Threat in Gulf of
Guinea,
15 October 2009, U.S. Newswire, Available: http://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/equatorial-guinea-warns-us-and-europe-not-to-ignore-growing-security-threat-in-gulf-ofguinea-64412887.html, 10 December 2010. See also, Afrol News, Growing Piracy in Gulf of Guinea
16 October 2009, Available: http://www.ocnus.net/artman2/publish/Dark_Side_4/Growing-Piracy-inGulf-of-Guinea.shtml 22 August 2011.
58

ECCAS, Protocole Relatif a la Strategie de Securitisation des Interest Vitaux en Mer des Etats de la
CEEAC du Golfe de Guinea (Yaoundé, Cameroon. 24 October 2009).
59

See Preamble, Protocole Relatif a la Strategie de Securitisation, 2009.

60

See Articles 3 and 4, Protocole Relatif a la Strategie de Securitisation, 2009.
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Centrale), will be in DR Congo.61 The maritime space of ECCAS is
divided into three zones, each with a Multinational Coordination Centre
(Centre Multinational de Coordination - CMC). Each State will also have
a national operations centre (Centre Opérationnel de Marine - COM) that
will feed into the zonal centres. The structure is presented in Figure 6.1
below.
Figure 6.1:

ECCAS Maritime Security Framework

CRESMAC – Regional
Centre Régional de Sécurité
Maritime de l’Afrique Centrale

Zone A
CMC

Zone B
CMC

Zone D
CMC

Centre Multinational de
Coordination

Centre Multinational de
Coordination

Centre Multinational de
Coordination

National
COM
Centre Opérationnel de Marine

Zone A: Angola, DR Congo; Zone B: Angola, Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon; Zone D: Cameroon,
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, São Tomé and Príncipe

At first glance, there appears to be several anomalies in the ECCAS
framework, but these anomalies simply reflect subtleties in the region. It
can be seen that the three zones are designated as A, B and D, rather than
the expected A, B and C. It should also be noted that Angola forms part
of Zone A and B, while Gabon appears in Zones B and D. The
61

The author’s research shows that construction of the offices of CRESMAC has still not been
completed.
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motivation behind these particular arrangements can partly be discerned
from Figure 5.1 in chapter 5. Angola has part of its territory (the resource
rich Cabinda Province) separated from mainland Angola and lying to the
west of DR Congo. Thus, the inclusion of Angola in Zones A and B
enables it to administer the maritime security concerns of the Cabinda
Province. Strategically, it also allows Angola to assert control over this
particular area, thus forestalling any potential secession.62 A possible
explanation for Gabon’s inclusion in Zone D is the State’s overlapping
maritime boundary claims with Equatorial Guinea. Thus, the inclusion of
Gabon in Zone D eschews any interpretation that such claims have been
abandoned. The author’s research suggest that the draft Protocol
included Zone C for the same reason, thus allowing Gabon and
Equatorial Guinea to share responsibility for that zone. However, the
deletion of Zone C at the eleventh hour is unfortunate, as it has left a gap
in the designation of the Zones.

It is the author’s considered view that the structure of the ECCAS
framework provides a functional approach to maritime security
cooperation and enforcement. Indeed, situating maritime security within
a broader regional political and security structure allows member States
to act at the highest political level possible, and to concurrently draw on
the strengths of the ECCAS institutional framework. Grouping States
into zones is a prudent option as it allows larger regional interests to be
promoted, while simultaneously taking into account local sensitivities
and concerns. For example, when it became clear that an attack on the
62

For many years, the Cabinda Province has fought for self-determination and independence from
Angola.
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Presidency of Equatorial Guinea was imminent, Zone D States
implemented the framework ahead of other ECCAS States, and indeed
prior to the Protocol being finalised.63 In summary, therefore, the
arrangement respects national sovereignty, retains “the autonomy of
national efforts to implement maritime security strategies and allows
flexibility of partnerships while ensuring coordination among member
States. Notwithstanding the author’s endorsement of the ECCAS
framework, it still faces a number of challenges, and therefore cannot be
said to be “comprehensive” (as the UN Security Council has described it
to be).64 These challenges are discussed as part of the analysis of the
challenges and limitations of the four cooperative initiatives in the Gulf
of Guinea.

6.3

STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS FOR

EVOLVING COOPERATIVE INITIATIVES
An assessment of the structural challenges confronting the above
cooperative initiatives can be guided by asking a number of pertinent
questions. These include: (i) is there synergy between the evolving
initiatives?; (ii) what level of political authority and support underpins
the initiatives?; (iii) how effective are the supporting legal and
enforcement structures?; (iv) are there inbuilt mechanisms for
coordination at the national and regional levels?; (v) do the initiatives
provide viable sources of funding?; and (vi) does the arrangement take
cognisance of the sovereignty concerns of States?
63

The “Accord Technique” for the operation of Zone D was adopted on 6 May 2009, while the main
Protocol was adopted on 24 October 2009.
64

United Nations, Security Council Resolution 2039, 27 February 2012.
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6.3.1

Political and Institutional Authority

The successful implementation of the evolving cooperative initiatives
chiefly depends on two factors: (i) the level of political authority that the
cooperative arrangement commands; and (ii) the extent to which the
mechanisms are kept within the bounds of sovereignty concerns. Unless
these two requirements are satisfied, a cooperative initiative will remain
a mere expression of policy intention. The fundamental point is that
maritime security cooperation, like all forms of security partnerships,
must earn the highest commitment of States. To be effective, it is not
sufficient for some State representatives to be part of the process. Rather,
it is crucial that the entire leadership team of States, and particularly
those members responsible for foreign affairs and defence portfolios, be
involved.

Of the four initiatives analysed in this section, the MOWCA coastguard
concept has the greatest difficulty meeting the fundamental requirements
mentioned above. The MOWCA initiative enjoys significant visibility
and goodwill, primarily because it is geared towards the protection of
shipping (the most dominant maritime activity), and also because it is
anchored to the IMO. However, the main difficulty with enforcing
regional maritime security through the leadership of MOWCA is that, as
an organisation, MOWCA’s raison d'etre is the promotion of
commercial shipping activities. Confronted by an apparent lack of
institutional authority with regard to maritime security, MOWCA drafted
a Convention to achieve this very objective, but as previously noted, the
form of document eventually settled upon was a MOU. Article 1 of the
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Draft Convention stated unequivocally that an international organisation
known as the West and Central Africa Coast Guard was being created.65
And although this phraseology was deleted from the final MOU (thereby
removing the label of a supranational organisation), when the Draft
Convention and the MOU are examined side by side, it is apparent that
they are almost identical, the main difference being the type of document
that was settled upon.

The jurisdictional difficulties posed by the structure of the coastguard
network will be examined in due course. For present purposes, it suffices
to say that the MOU has, in effect, established a regional security
architecture that operates outside the framework of ECOWAS and
ECCAS. Evidently, the operationalisation of such a textual mandate is
impracticable, as it puts MOWCA into an institutional contest with
ECOWAS and ECCAS, both of which have regional political and
security functions. Even if the MOWCA initiative was to clear this
hurdle at the regional level, it will nonetheless encounter similar
challenges with respect to the national policies of States. Indeed, the
coastguard concept would have to be administered and implemented at
the national level by agencies responsible for maritime transportation, or
at least coordinated by these agencies to achieve synergy with the
regional coastguard structure. However, this policy approach contradicts
the administrative arrangements in most Gulf of Guinea States, where

65

See Article 1-1 of the Appendix to Part Three of “Report on the Mission on Evaluation and
Assessment of the Feasibility to Establish An Integrated Coast Guard Network in the West And
Central African Region,” IMO Programme TC/0046-01-2000, 15 February 2006.
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security issues come under the portfolios of Defence, the Interior or
National Security.66

The Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) also suffers from a lack of
political and institutional authority, but for different reasons. First,
although the Treaty establishing the Commission was adopted over
thirteen years ago, it is yet to enter into force, and the author’s research
suggests that the Treaty has only been ratified by Nigeria.67 Not only
does the Commission’s authority hang in the balance, it also shows no
sign of maturing in the future. One option would have been for the
Commission to draw on the support of the broader regional political
framework. However, seven of its members are in the ECCAS region,
while Nigeria, who is its strongest member, is in the ECOWAS region.
The analysis in the next section provides further insight into the
historical and contemporary interstate disputes that prevent the
Commission from earning the necessary political mandate to implement
any meaningful maritime security cooperative initiative.

In stark contrast to the GGC, ECOWAS and ECCAS have the requisite
institutional and political authority to foster security cooperation. It may
well be that the preference for the GGC and MOWCA in certain quarters
66

Generally on security arrangements in the Gulf of Guinea, see Alix J Boucher, "National Security
policies and Strategies: A Note on Current Practice," Stimson and Future of Peace Operations, 12
December 2009. Peter Albrecht and Paul Jackson, Security Sector Transformation in Sierra Leone,
1997-2007 (Birmingham: Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform, February 2009).
67

. See, Federal Republic of Nigeria, Act of Ratification and Enforcement of the Treaty Establishing
the Gulf of Guinea Commission, 2004. However, James Forest and Mathew Sousa have indicated that
the Treaty has also been ratified by São Tomé and Príncipe. James J.F. Forest and Mathew V. Sousa,
Oil and Terrorism in the Gulf of Guinea: Framing U.S. Energy and Security Policies for the Gulf of
Guinea, Plymouth, Lexington Books, 2006, p. 67.
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is due to perceived difficulties with eliciting sufficient maritime security
interest and response from regional political frameworks. For instance, it
may be argued that ECOWAS and ECCAS are already ineffective in
delivering the traditional objectives for which they were established, and
therefore cannot be relied on to lead maritime security cooperation.

68

These are indeed legitimate concerns, but then again, dispensing with the
maritime security roles of ECCAS and ECOWAS confounds pragmatic
expectations. The fact that ECCAS has been able to activate a maritime
security framework within a short space of time demonstrates the
internal strengths available to the two institutions. Both organisations
have established security structures that can be duplicated in the
maritime space. In any event, if States are unable to effectively work
through these existing political structures then surely the chances of
embryonic arrangements delivering better results are quite remote.

6.3.2

Jurisdictional and Sovereignty Issues

In principle, interstate cooperation involves a degree of compromise by
member States, as well as the surrendering of some level of autonomy. 69
This is done for the mutual interests of member States, and in
expectation of greater benefits. Nonetheless, it is difficult to implement

68

Generally on the assessment of the effectiveness of EOCWAS in delivering its traditional mandate
of economic integration, see Dean M. Hanink and Henry J. Owusu, "Has ECOWAS Promoted Trade
among Its Members? ," Journal of African Economies 7, 3, 1998, pp. 363-83. Zubair Iqbal and
Mohsin S. Khan, eds., Trade Reform and Regional Integration in Africa Washington DC,
International Monetary Fund Publishing Service, 1998.
69

Walter Mattli, "Sovereignty Bargains in Regional Integration," International Studies Review 2, 2,
2000, pp. 149-80, at p.50 See also Ernst B. Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on
the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing," International Organization 24, 4, 1970, pp. 607-46. Karl
Loewenstein, “Sovereignty and International Co-operation,” The American Journal of International
Law 48, 2, 1954, pp. 222-244.
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cooperative arrangements that undermine the vital interests of States or
which offend sovereignty sensibilities.

Article 7 of the MOWCA MOU declares the mission of the coastguard
network as being the promotion of joint efforts and activities. However,
upon closer analysis of the document, it is apparent that the initiative
touches on core sovereignty issues. As shown in the earlier analysis, the
coastguard network will have its own logistics (fixed and mobile), as
well as training and repair facilities.70 Moreover, although the MOU
provides for a Representative Committee of State Parties,71 the project
will be implemented by a Technical Committee of Evaluation,
nominated by the Secretary General of MOWCA.72 Patrols are to be
organised and dispatched by Zone Coordinators to whom State Parties
must send requests when they require fleet service ships.73 The practical
effect of this structure is that the Representative Committee of States
Parties is subservient to the Technical Committee appointed by the
Secretary General of MOWCA. In addition, the authority of State
officials has been ceded to the Principal and Zone Coordinators. Finally,
as part of the funding arrangement for the project, State Parties are
required to surrender fifty per cent of penalties and fines resulting from
enforcement actions taken by the Network to the MOWCA Secretariat.74

70

See Articles 13-15, MOWCA MOU, 2008.

71

See Article 10, MOWCA MOU, 2008.

72

See Article 9, MOWCA MOU, 2008.
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See Article 22, MOWCA MOU, 2008.

74

Article 28, MOWCA MOU, 2008.
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In addition to the above sovereignty concerns there exists serious
jurisdictional issues. According to the MOU, a ship assigned to a State
for temporary use must fly the flag of the State, may be operated by its
officials, but remains the property of the network and must still bear the
distinctive marks, logo and emblem of MOWCA.75 This begs the
question: pursuant to what authority will enforcement measures be
carried out? Under international law, enforcement measures (including
counter-piracy measures) are to be undertaken by authorised officials of
States using vessels bearing the distinctive marks of the State. 76 Officials
are expected to operate in accordance with national law, and any liability
they incur is attributable to the State.77 In light of these requirements,
how will the logo and emblem of the Network play out vis-à-vis those of
the State? Will multiple marks be retained in the face of these legal
issues, or will the State depend on the emblem and marks of the Network
in utter disregard of its sovereignty and responsibility under international
law? Furthermore, in the event of any ensuing proceedings, will liability
rest with the flag State or MOWCA?

These sovereignty and jurisdictional issues, coupled with MOWCA’s
lack of political and institutional authority to conduct security
cooperation, makes it very difficult for the coastguard initiative to be
successfully implemented by MOWCA.

75
76

Articles 15 and 16 MOWCA MOU, 2008.
See Articles 100-111, and in particular Article 107, of UNCLOS.

77

See, for example, Article 106 of UNCLOS. See also Phillip Wendel, State Responsibility for
Interference with Freedom of Navigation in Public International Law, Heidelberg Springer, 2007.
Fred W. Crickard, ed., Multinational Naval Operations and Foreign Policy in the 21st Century,
Aldershot, Ashgate, 1998.
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6.3.3

Multiplicity of Approaches and Deepening Uncertainty

There is also a lack of coordination and synergy between the various
maritime security frameworks in the Gulf of Guinea. As analysed in the
first part of this chapter, attempts at forging maritime security
cooperation commenced on the back of the MOWCA platform, with the
MOU being adopted in 2008 with the aim of establishing a coastguard
network to service the entire Gulf of Guinea region. In 2009 the ECCAS
framework was initiated and Zone D became operational, although there
was no clear policy directive as to whether this was a replacement for, or
a fulfilment of, the MOWCA project. More than a year later, MOWCA
and the IMO jointly held a high level conference in Accra, Ghana, with
the aim of implementing the coastguard initiative, but without reference
to the ECCAS framework.78 Meanwhile, on the sidelines, the GGC had
been nursing its own approach, and these efforts continued into 2012, as
evidenced by the visit of the Secretary General of the Commission to
Nigeria.79 But despite these consultations, all the member States of the
GGC (with the exception of Nigeria) were already part of ECCAS.
Therefore, the Secretariat should have treated the ECCAS maritime
security framework as an adequate response to the maritime security
needs of the region, but unfortunately this did not occur.

78

See presentation by the IMO Deputy Director at the conference, Chris Trelawny, “Taking an
International Approach to countering piracy and wider maritime crime in West Africa,” December
2010, http://piracy-westafrica.com/uploads/files/2011/Chris_Trelawny.pdf, 30 January 2010.
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"Gulf of Guinea Commission seeks Nigeria’s support on security," Blueprint, 17 February 2012.
"Growing security challenge: Nigeria to Partner the Gulf Of Guinea Commission" NewsDiary, 17
February 2012.
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Clearly, these conflicting approaches undermine the objectives of
regional cooperation. Rather than amalgamating their strengths, regional
institutions appear to be advancing their own agendas, and at the same
time dissipating the already scarce resources available to member States.
The most recent attempt at fostering a sense of synergy was the Yaoundé
Summit of Heads of State and Governments of ECOWAS and ECCAS,
held in June 2013.80 The Summit adopted a Code of Conduct against
Piracy and Illicit Crime in the Gulf of Guinea81 - one which has been
applauded by the international community.82 However, despite the
Summit being an important step towards harmonising maritime security
cooperation,83 the author’s view is that a cautious approach should be
adopted regarding the effectiveness of the Code, and that opportunity
should be mistaken for achievement.

The Yaoundé Summit represented an opportunity for Gulf of Guinea
States to approach maritime security cooperation with a clean slate,
shaping a clear path of cooperation. However, it is the author’s
considered view that this opportunity has not been seized to the fullest
extent possible. The Code of Conduct itself contains very general
wording, has little normative content, and is still awaiting ratification
80

Summit of Heads of State and Governments of ECOWAS and ECCAS, Yaoundé, Cameroon on 2425 June 2013.
81

Article 12, Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships,
and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa, adopted at Yaoundé, Cameroon, at the
Summit of ECOWAS and ECCAS, 24-25 June 2013.
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UN, Security Council Welcomes Adoption of Code of Conduct by Regional Leaders to Prevent
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14
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2013,
Available:
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc11091.doc.htm, 29 September 2013.
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Ban welcomes anti-piracy strategy adopted by leaders from West, Central Africa, UN News Centre
Available: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45281, 29 December 2013. At UNbacked meeting, African States seek to combat piracy in Gulf of Guinea, UN News Centre, Available:
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44440&Cr=piracy&Cr1=, 29 December 2013.
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and implementation. Moreover, the platform is ad hoc and there is no
indication that it can be sustained in the future. But perhaps the greatest
indictment of the Summit is that it has no way of addressing parallel
initiatives in the region, and has thus complicated maritime security
cooperation in some ways. The preamble to the Code of Conduct refers
to all the initiatives being pursued (e.g. ECOWAS and ECCAS), but
does not indicate how the MOWCA coastguard network substantively
relates to these initiatives. And in the case of the GGC, the Code of
Conduct seeks to parallel the authority of the GGC with that of
ECOWAS and ECCAS.84 In this way, the Yaoundé Summit has tacitly
approved all the cooperative initiatives in the region, thereby creating
further uncertainty.

In much the same way that maritime security threats in the Gulf of
Guinea require attention, so too does the Zeitgeist of duplication and
confusion. Both the GGC and MOWCA have the potential to enhance
maritime security cooperation in very positive ways, and without
necessarily occupying the driver’s seat. For example, MOWCA could
engage Gulf of Guinea States more rigorously on the issue of ratification
and implementation of relevant international frameworks, particularly
those relating to the safety and security of shipping. MOWCA could
equally capitalise on its association with the IMO to promote capacity
building in the region. Meanwhile, the GGC could exercise its treaty
objective of promoting the efficient exploitation of offshore resources to
the benefit of maritime security. If member States are able to develop
84

See, for example, Article 12(2), which adds the Secretary General of the Gulf of Guinea
Commission as one of the authorities to be notified by States when undertaking g enforcement action
pursuant to the Code of Conduct.
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and manage resources efficiently, the outcomes will positively enhance
maritime security. Therefore, what needs to be promoted is a harmonised
approach to maritime security.

6.3.4

Limited Capability and Funding

The operationalisation of cooperative maritime security in the Gulf of
Guinea is seriously constrained by the limited capability of States. And
although security sector funding is generally inadequate, the situation
with respect to Navies and Coastguards is more problematic. Angola’s
allocation of resources with respect to the protection of its maritime
estate is typical of Gulf of Guinea States. Angola has an estimated
coastline of 1600km - the longest in the Gulf of Guinea. Its GDP is the
second highest in the region, and much of that is derived from offshore
resources. Yet the personnel strength of the Angolan Navy is only 1,000
(compared to 100,000 for its Army and 6,000 for its Air Force).85 The
amount of equipment possessed by the Angolan Navy is also very
limited when contrasted with that of its Army. 86 The Nigerian Navy is
similarly underfunded and has limited capability.87 Its personnel strength
is 8,000 - the largest in the Gulf of Guinea, but that is in sharp contrast to
its 62,000-strong Army.88
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"Chapter Nine: Sub-Saharan Africa," The Military Balance, 2012, pp. 421-22.
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See, “Nigerian Navy is underfunded, former Naval Capt. tells senate committee,” 4 June 2013,
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A quick glance at the personnel strength of Navies and Coast Guards
across the region reveals a worrying situation: Gambia 70, Benin 200,
Sierra Leone 200, Guinea Bissau 350, Guinea 400 and Gabon 500.89
Indeed, the author maintains that these personnel strength figures are
inadequate to police the region’s vast maritime estate.90 Liberia
represents another anomaly, not just for the Gulf of Guinea, but on how
the global maritime community as a whole matches responsibility with
maritime interest. Although Liberia is the second largest flag State in the
world,91 its Coast Guard has a diminutive personnel strength of only 50,
with 8 crafts under ten feet in length servicing the State.92 It is thus clear
that in the Gulf of Guinea, the maritime responsibility exercised by
States is not commensurate with the size of their maritime interest.

The embryonic ECCAS framework is equally being confronted with
funding challenges. More than two years after adopting the ECCAS
framework, the Regional Coordination Centre, CRESMAC, is not
operational, and no patrols are being carried out in Zones A and B.93
Article 8 of the Protocol envisaged four sources to finance the cost of the
joint patrols: (i) a region-wide maritime security and safety tax; (ii) a
percentage of the financial penalties collected by member States; (iii)
contributions from national shipping organisations; and (iv) financial
89
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support from donors and international partners. However, thus far, no
funding has been derived from the first three sources. Hence, the
construction of offices to host CRESMAC is currently being funded with
the aid of donor support.94

There are two interrelated explanations for the weak state of maritime
security logistics and resources in the Gulf of Guinea. The first is that
Governments in the region are more concerned with land-based security
issues. The second is that the Gulf of Guinea region suffers from ‘sea
blindness’- the inability to appreciate the vast potential of maritime
interests and resources for socio-economic development. .95 Both
interpretations have some merit. For example, the Continental Early
Warning System (CEWS), which was established under the regional
Mechanisms for Peace and Security, could be used as a tool for
highlighting maritime security threats. However, its use has thus far been
restricted to security issues on land, despite the debilitating effects of
maritime security threats on the stability and security of the region.

It should, however, be emphasised that the two explanations canvassed
above have understated the reality of the situation. The truth is that the
cost of maritime security enforcement is very high, and most States in
the Gulf of Guinea States would be hard pressed to finance enforcement
activities considering the fragile state of their economies. This situation
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Ocean," Chatham House, July 2013, pp. 7-8.
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is made more difficult by the lack of real commitment and support from
the international community. This point will be addressed in detail in the
next chapter.

6.3.5

Inadequate Enforcement Framework and

Interoperability Issues
Regional maritime security cooperation cannot take place in a vacuum.
First, there must be laws, enforcement procedures and judicial processes
at the national level to support physical patrols and surveillance
activities. However, as demonstrated in chapter five, many States in the
region have failed to ratify and implement the requisite international
legal framework. Thus, there does not exist an adequate legal framework
upon which jurisdiction can be asserted, and enforcement measures
implemented. Second, the usefulness of cooperative initiatives depends
on multilateral and bilateral legal frameworks covering issues such as the
custody and transfer of suspects, evidentiary material and exhibits, as
well as the extradition of persons from one State to the other. In the
absence of these two important requirements, a maritime security
framework may have the requisite structure to be functional, but will be
largely ineffective in practice. Indeed, this is the case with the ECCAS
framework.

Even where the above requirements are met, another critical determinant
of cooperative enforcement must be present: interoperability.96
96

Generally on interoperability and the critical elements of Naval and Coast Guard operations, see
Chris Rahman, “Naval Cooperation and Coalition Building in Southeast Asia and the Southwest
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Interoperability is a broad subject which cannot be covered within the
scope of the current analysis. However, the key elements that support
interoperability include effective communication, common procedures
and a culture of working together.97 Indeed, these elements are lacking in
the Gulf of Guinea because Navies and Coast Guards do not have a
shared history of partnership.98 In addition, they possess different
operational procedures based on their respective colonial legacies, and
more importantly, they do not share a common language – perhaps the
most crucial factor in facilitating cooperative operational enforcement.

It is important for regional cooperative processes to grapple with these
issues and work towards an effective solution. The US Africa
Partnership Station (APS), together with a number of Exercises being
supported by external partners, have the potential to enhance

Pacific: Status and prospects, Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Centre, Working Paper No. 7,
October 2001.
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Generally on interoperability, see Fitz-Gerald, "Multinational Land Force Interoperability: Meeting
the Challenge of Different Cultural Backgrounds in Chapter 6 Peace Support Operations", in Hugh
Segal, ed. Geopolitical Integrity, Montreal IRPP, 2005, pp. 217-39. Charles Barry, "NATO's
combined joint task forces in theory and practice," Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 38, 1, 1996.
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Norman Paterson School of International Affairs Occasional Paper No. 26, 2001. Herbert Howe,
"Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping " International Security 21, 3, 1997-98,
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Solutions for African Conflict: The ECOMOG Experiment, 1999, The Journal of Conflict Studies,
Available: http://journals.hil.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/4379/5057, 13 December 2013. Natalie
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interoperability, but these programmes are rolled out only once a year,
and thus their impact is likely to be minimal. 99

6.3.6

Lack of Comprehensiveness

There is a relationship between the structural deficit discussed above, the
analysis on inadequate enforcement framework in the preceding section,
as well as the conceptual analysis relating to the concept of security in in
chapter three. Indeed, the evolving cooperative mechanisms concentrate
too heavily on combating piracy and safeguarding energy security,
thereby neglecting other vital dimensions of maritime security, such as
depleting fisheries. MOWCA’s use of a regional coastguard network for
maritime security only makes sense in the context of suppressing piracy,
while the focus of the GGC has thus far been on energy security. It is
therefore not surprising that the safety of global shipping and energy
resource security are topics that sit comfortably with the objectives of
these two organisations. The Code of Conduct adopted at the Yaoundé
Summit is also largely targeted at combating piracy.

6.3.7

Maritime Boundaries Disputes

Finally, maritime boundary disputes make cooperative initiatives
difficult to implement. This subject has been exhaustively examined in
chapter five, but will also be highlighted here for completeness. A
discussion of maritime boundary disputes also provides a suitable link to
99

See chapter 7 for an analysis of the US African Partnership Station (APS) and other Exercises
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another challenge confronting cooperative initiatives – regional
geopolitics.

6.4

GEOPOLITICAL

CHALLENGES

OF

REGIONAL

COOPERATION
In the last few years, there has been increased optimism about the
prospects for maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea, with
the evolving initiatives enjoying the fair winds of political harmony.
Notwithstanding this, there are a series of geopolitical issues which
maritime security cooperative frameworks must contend with. These
geopolitical tensions have both historical and contemporary arteries, and
their impact is not limited to security cooperation. However, unlike other
cooperative domains, security cooperation does not have the luxury of
time. The longer cooperation is hamstrung, the greater the opportunity
for maritime security threats to manifest and organised criminal
networks to prevail. Understanding the prevailing geopolitical issues
thus allows the future of maritime security cooperation to be properly
guided.

6.4.1

Nemesis of the Gulf of Guinea Commission

A discussion of interstate rivalries and tensions may initially sound a
little fanciful, particularly in the absence of overt conflict or the
exchange of ‘hot’ words between States. Furthermore, the evidence of
interstate hostility is often anecdotal and open to interpretation,
especially when the points of contention lie in the past rather than the
334

present. And yet these footprints from the past are the best indicator of
the present relationship between States. Thankfully, in the case of the
Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC), there are clues which connect the
past with the present, illuminating the remnants of interstate contests and
rivalries.

The media headlines and news reports concerning the visit of the
Executive Secretary of the GGC to Nigeria in February 2012 are
noteworthy in this regard, as they point to the tensions and conflicts
within the Commission.100 One news caption read: “Gulf of Guinea
Commission seeks Nigeria’s support on security”, while another
proclaimed “Growing security challenge: Nigeria to Partner the Gulf Of
Guinea Commission.”101 The fundamental question posed by these
headlines can be simply stated: why is an organisation seeking the
partnership or support of a member State to achieve its objectives? The
answer to this question is that the Executive Secretary was making a
frantic effort to bridge a political gap that exists within the GGC.

Fortunately, the content of the news reports further illuminates the point
being made. According to the reports, the Executive Secretary informed
the Nigerian Vice President of the inability of the Commission and its
Secretariat to function effectively, whereupon the Vice President is said
100

The Executive Secretary, Mr Miguel dos Anjos da Cunha Lisboa Trovoada, previously served as
the Prime Minister (1975–1979) and President (1991–2001) of São Tomé and Príncipe.
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February 2012.
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to have promised that “Nigeria will as a matter of urgency consider the
pleas of the Gulf of Guinea Commission on its desire to perform its
statutory duties”. The Nigerian Vice President also affirmed that he
would “advise [the] President [of Nigeria] appropriately so that a
decision shall be reached to allow the Secretariat to function
optimally.”102 The purpose of this diplomatic dialogue was to enable the
Executive Secretary to tacitly convey to the Vice President the fact that
Nigeria was preventing the Commission from making progress, and
interestingly, the Vice President confidently but indirectly acknowledged
this fact. This illustrates that the future of the GGC rests largely in the
hands of Nigeria – a situation which requires an appreciation of the
history and politics of Nigeria and its immediate locale. This historical
and political context will be examined below, and centres largely on
Nigeria’s relationship with Equatorial Guinea.103

Compared to Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea is a small State, yet the sour
relations between the two countries have shaped the diplomacy and
grand strategy of Nigeria.104 Tensions between Nigeria and Equatorial
Guinea heightened in 1976 over the alleged murder of Nigerian migrant
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workers by Equatoguinean soldiers.105 Then, in 1988, Equatorial Guinea
tied a diplomatic knot with apartheid South Africa, leading to a massive
influx of South African workers into Equatorial Guinea. The people and
government of Nigeria realised this was more than mere labour
diplomacy; Equatorial Guinea was procuring external support to
countermand Nigeria’s power and dominance.106 Indeed, in addition to
sending a large proportion of its labour force to Equatorial Guinea, the
South African government was establishing a military base on Bioko
Island - strategically located close to Nigeria.107 It should be also noted
that Nigeria was a core member of the African anti-apartheid team, and
was thus engaged in a diplomatic battle with South Africa. For this
reason, Nigeria regarded the South African military base in Equatorial
Guinea as a serious national security threat.108

In the same period, Equatorial Guinea established another partnership,
this time with Israel. According to newspaper reports at the time, Nigeria
looked at this relationship with an equal degree of suspicion.109 Indeed, it
is asserted that these events alerted Nigeria to the fact that it was not
sufficient for the country’s foreign policy to focus westwards on
ECOWAS, but that it also needed have its neighbouring southern
105

Ebenezer Obadare, "Constructing Pax Nigeriana? The Media and Conflict in Nigeria-Equatorial
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of Labour, Ibadan, Oxford University Press, 1978.
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enclave strongly within its control. To this end, and through a series of
strategic calculations, Nigeria succeeded in influencing the formation of
the GGC.110

It may thus be argued that as far as Nigeria is concerned, the real purpose
of the GGC was, and perhaps still is, to provide a strategic counterbalance to external influences in the region, , thus securing Nigeria’s
sphere of influence.111 According to this conception, the GGC allows
Nigeria to determine what decisions and alliances are made in the
organisation, in which case Nigeria and its political leadership stands to
make strategic gains regardless of whether the Commission makes
progress or not.112 However, this historical angle may not entirely
explain the GGC’s failure to make headway in the maritime security
domain. All member States of the Commission rely heavily on oil
revenue, and as illustrated in chapter 5, Nigeria has joint developments
relating to offshore oil production with Equatorial Guinea and São Tomé
and Príncipe.113 Thus, the security of offshore platforms is a shared
concern, and this should spur Nigeria to heed the requests of the GGC
Secretariat and the UN Security Council to develop a cooperative
maritime security framework. But if such a framework fails to eventuate
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(and indeed the facts point towards no change in Nigerian policy in this
regard), then there must be other considerations at play.

It is the author’s view that there is both continuity and change within the
GGC, giving Nigeria a firm belief in the security of its old policy of
strategic rationalisation. Indeed, the motivation for Nigeria maintaining
the status quo may well be on the rise. High oil reserves, increasing oil
wealth, and the accompanying diplomatic leverage possessed by
Equatorial Guinea are all reasons for Nigeria to be on the lookout for
Equatorial Guinea and the serious challenges it poses to Nigeria’s
security and strategic interests.114 Nigeria may logically be keeping São
Tomé and Príncipe on its radar as well. The irony of interstate relations
is that ‘small’ States have the potential to be seen as a threat by their
‘large’ neighbours. This is because it is customary for smaller States like
Equatorial Guinea and São Tomé and Príncipe to rely heavily on external
partnerships and support. Moreover, the oil and gas endowments being
received by these small States have made such partnerships easier to
forge. This results in neighbouring countries becoming wary of the ‘big’
powers that lie behind ‘small’ States, with the partnerships being
interpreted as a quest for power. Whether by coincidence or design, this
presumption looks as though it is becoming a reality, with Equatorial
Guinea said to be spending a substantial sum on defence equipment.115
Many naval assets have been acquired, with reports indicating that are
114
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being delivered from Israel, and corvettes from South Korea.

116

This

defence build-up has been canvassed in commentaries concerning the
arms race being waged by Equatorial Guinea, with the State seeking to
balance Nigeria’s naval power and defend its maritime borders. One
commentator has described the situation as follows: “one of the richest
countries in Africa, Equatorial Guinea, is rapidly expanding its naval
power. The fleet of the 600,000-strong country will be larger than that of
160 million-strong Nigeria.” 117 Although this comment exaggerates the
danger that the military of Equatorial Guinea can pose to Nigeria, the
description conveys the reality of interstate rivalry.

Angola, another key member of the GGC and host to the GGC
Secretariat, may well represent another angle to the Commission’s
politics. As indicated earlier, Nigeria accounts for 47 per cent of oil
supplies from the Gulf Guinea, while Angola accounts for 34 per cent.118
However, after ten years of being ravaged by civil war, Angola is
growing steadily and views its financial and military strengths as
instruments of influence.119 This foreign policy arm is not just limited to
116

See "Israel preparing to deliver two OPV to Equatorial Guinea Navy," DefenceWeb 17 January
2011. "Equatorial Guinea seeks to buy 3 corvettes from South Korea " Stratsis Incite, 31 December
2011. Available at http://stratsisincite.wordpress.com/2010/12/31/equatorial-guinea-seeks-to-buy-3corvettes-from-south-korea/, accessed 7 December 2012.
117

Africa's richest nation ready for war 7 February 2012, Pravda.ru,
http://english.pravda.ru/hotspots/conflicts/07-02-2012/120436-equatorial_guinea-0/, 7
2012.

Available:
December

118

Figures quoted in a report of Chatham House, see Chatham House, "Angola and the Gulf of
Guinea: Towards an Integrated Maritime Strategy," Chatham House, November 2012.
119

This was asserted by Angola’s Foreign Minister in an Address at Chatham House, London, in
February 2012. See Justin Pearce, "Diary: Angola’s Georges Chicoti asserts foreign policy strength
and business potential," Royal Africa society,
12 March 2012. Available at
http://africanarguments.org/2012/03/12/diary-angola-comes-to-town-%E2%80%93-georges-chicotiasserts-foreign-policy-strength-and-business-potential%E2%80%93-by-justin-pearce/, accessed 8
December 2012.

340

the ECCAS region, but is being extended to ECOWAS States including
Guinea Bissau in what may be described as a carving out of the
Lusaphone enclave.120 The growing prowess of Angola is probably also
being keenly watched by Nigeria. Finally, Nigeria’s relations with
Cameroon have been dented because of conflict over the Bakassi
Peninsula.121

The above analysis has highlighted the regional politics within which the
GGC operates. Regardless of its treaty objectives, therefore, the
Commission remains a political platform with little outcomes. Indeed,
the GGC is unlikely to make any substantial or enduring changes to the
maritime security landscape in the region, thus heavy reliance on the
Commission for effective maritime security results is misplaced.

6.4.2

ECCAS –Tensions and the Test Ahead

As previously explained, once Nigeria is taken out of the GGC, only
ECCAS coastal States will remain. For these States, the 2009 ECCAS
Maritime Security Protocol, together with the Technical Understanding
that launched cooperative patrols in Zone D, provides the blueprint for
the operationalisation of region-wide maritime security cooperation.
However, a number of factors will determine the sustainability of
maritime security cooperation among ECCAS member States.
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Angola's growing economic and military strength represents both an
opportunity and a challenge, and only time will determine where the
pendulum will settle. However, the likelihood is that Angola’s
dominance will create a sense of insecurity in the entire region. Indeed, it
is logical to expect smaller, neighbouring States to be wary of the
potentially oppressive hegemony which Angola’s increasing power
represents. Second, Angola has a history of military interventions in two
Congos - Brazzaville and Kinshasa, and this serves as a reminder of how
Angola became a game changer in the region. The intervention in
Congo-Brazzaville in 1999 brought the current President, Sassou
Nguesso, to power for the second time.122 Nguesso has manipulated the
political system to ensure that he remains in power until August 2016.123
It is only after his exit that it will become clear what degree of harmony
will exist between Angola and Congo-Brazzaville. Meanwhile, DR
Congo is still reeling in decades of internal conflicts, while Cameroon
and Equatorial Guinea are in the grips of Presidents whose terms have
endured for more than two decades.

It is clear from the above discussion that there is a great deal of
uncertainty surrounding future geopolitical stability in the ECCAS
region. Indeed, patronage and personnel allegiances seem to be the main
factors shaping the region’s geopolitical environment. Thus, the vectors
of regional cooperation may alter dramatically with changes in political
leadership. This puts the future of maritime security cooperation on an
uncertain path.
122
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6.4.3

ECOWAS Region - Old Troubles in a New Phase

If ECCAS States are yet to pass an endurance test, as shown by the
analysis above, can we safely say that the ECOWAS region has scored
top marks based on the relative stability in the region and the longevity
of its cooperative structures? And, at any rate, should we forecast a
promising future where maritime security cooperation is the norm? It is
argued that the outcome of maritime security cooperation in the
ECOWAS region depends on three geopolitical factors: first, the history
of geopolitical differences, and how these differences influence future
behaviour and prospects for cooperation; second, the extent to which the
ECOWAS Commission can reap the benefits of cooperation already
established by member States; and finally (and more importantly), the
challenges brought about by the new phase of security cooperation.
Although the present situation may not be as fraught as in the past, the
Anglophone-Francophone divide in the ECOWAS region still exists,
perpetuated by disparate languages and geopolitical orientations.
Emphasising this point is perhaps akin to saying aloud what many are
saying in whispers. Cote d’Ivoire is beginning to rebuild itself after years
of conflict and civil war, the most recent clash being in 2011.124 Indeed,
the country’s current President, Alassane Ouattara, was only able to
occupy the seat of government following a military intervention by
France that forced former President, Laurent Gbagbo, out of power.
124
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Gbagbo had repeatedly refused to relinquish power despite losing
elections.125 President Ouattara has already proclaimed in a recent
interview that his country is “regaining its former stature in economic,
political and diplomatic terms.” President Ouattara has further asserted
that “France is a privileged partner [of Cote d’Ivoire] and we are
delighted with that.”126 This reinforces the strong influence of France in
the ECOWAS region, but more importantly, the resurgence of an
Ivorian-French partnership that has the potential to reignite a geopolitical
contest with Nigeria.
Meanwhile, the fall-out from the political conflict in Cote d’Ivoire has
affected relations with Ghana. The political leadership in Ghana is
perceived by Cote d’Ivoire’s new government as being an ally of the
former Ivorian President, Laurent Gbagbo, with Ghana accusing Cote
d’Ivoire of sending mercenaries into Ghana to assassinate exiled Ivorian
politicians.127 There is also a maritime boundary dispute between Ghana
and Cote d’Ivoire which seems to be deepening, with meetings and
negotiations dating back as far as 2009 yielding no positive results.128
The stakes look very high, with the Ivorian claim overlapping several
areas where Ghana has already made oil discoveries.129 Yet despite the
125
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two States being locked in a stalemate, they are expected to share a
common patrol and surveillance zone in a future ECOWAS maritime
security framework.130

The above analysis shows that interstate cooperation and trust in the
ECOWAS region is equally unsettled, and this has implications for the
buoyancy of maritime security cooperation.

6.4.4

“New Security” and the Demands of New Relations

While this amalgamation of old and new geopolitical rifts will
undoubtedly test the cooperative and institutional strengths of ECOWAS
and ECCAS, it is important to keep in mind that maritime security
cooperation is a relatively new concept - and not just for Gulf of Guinea
States, but for the whole international community. Indeed, this kind of
multilateral, integrated, multi-faceted cooperation is a “new security”
concept that calls for a completely novel approach to geopolitical
relations.

The present mechanisms which anchor regional and continental security
cooperation are land centric, having evolved in response to ethnic and
political conflicts within States. Indeed, to date, the cooperative security
“Cote
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strategies emanating from ECOWAS and ECCAS have focused on
political consensus-building so that troops can be deployed to restore
peace in violent conflicts. Such a task is completely different from
maritime security cooperation.

To begin with, those who commit maritime crimes or benefit from the
perpetuation of maritime security threats in the Gulf of Guinea will have
connections with member States of the above organisations in one form
another, most likely as citizens. Therefore, any enforcement measures
that are taken will very likely impact national sensibilities. Second, the
type of cooperation being envisaged is geared towards addressing
multiple threats, and will thus necessitate multiple national agencies
working across multiple jurisdictional boundaries. Therefore, while
information sharing and joint or coordinated patrols represent physical
responses to maritime security threats, what is really required for
effective maritime security cooperation is long and enduring interstate
relations.

This new phase of security cooperation differs significantly from all
forms of cooperation that have existed in the region thus far. Moreover,
no precedent has been set for the kind of cooperative maritime security
framework being contemplated by Gulf of Guinea States. The situation
between Somalia and the Indian Ocean is somewhat analogous, but in
that case the deployment was mandated by the UN Security Council and
enforced by foreign navies. The task was also restricted to combating
piracy and armed robbery, as well as protecting ships carrying food and
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humanitarian aid to Somalia.131 Further efforts led to the adoption of the
Djibouti Code of Conduct by the States bordering the Indian Ocean, 132
but this initiative was again restricted to repressing piracy by the States
concerned, and is yet to find expression in joint patrols.

A second example is the cooperative strategy to repress piracy between
Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia in the Malacca Strait, known as
MALSINDO. The political tensions surrounding this particular initiative
have led a large volume academic research and commentary. 133 But
MALSINDO “cooperation” is again limited to combating piratical
attacks, and its practical scope is restricted to the three States notifying
each other of pending patrols (which is described generously in the
131
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2012, e-International Relations, Available: http://www.e-ir.info/2012/11/06/anti-piracy-actors-southafrica/, 18 November 2012. Leon Engelbrecht, "SADC adopts anti-piracy policy," DefenceWeb, 31
August 2011. Chris Szabo, "SADC Defence Conference ‘historic’," DefenceWeb, 26 July 2011.
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See, for example, Sam Bateman, "Regional Efforts for Maritime Security Cooperation", in
Dachoong Kim, Seo-Hang Lee and Jin-Hyun Paik, eds. Maritime Security and Cooperation in the
Asia-Pacific Towards the 21st Century, the Institute for East and West Studies, 2000, pp. 215-42.
David Martin Jones, "Regionalism's False Promise: ASEAN and East Asian Community", in David
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Dynamic of International Security Cooperation in South East Asia: Change and Continuity,"
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literature as “coordinated patrols”).134 Progress within the broader region
has led to the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy
and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP).135

The crucial point to note is that existing maritime security cooperative
initiatives are unlike the comprehensive ECCAS framework (which is
currently being mirrored by ECOWAS). So although a combination of
necessity and optimism is propelling Gulf of Guinea States into this new
form of maritime security cooperation, the limits and challenges of this
novel approach have not been highlighted. Above all, the new model
demands a fresh approach to geopolitical relations – one which is yet to
gain popularity, as well as serious tact and a plethora of confidence
building measures. Only if these ingredients are present will the
emerging initiatives be likely to succeed.

6.4.5

The Mauritania Factor

Finally, the emerging cooperative initiatives will have to grapple with
another geopolitical issue – one which centres on the role of Mauritania
in the region. As stated in chapter two, Mauritania withdrew from
ECOWAS in 2000 as a result of disagreements, 136 and is now a member
134

It has been argued that there is very little coordination associated with these patrols. The
interaction between States is largely limited to the exchange of schedules, with some assessments
showing that not even this requirement is adhered to in practice. See John Braford, “The Growing
Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in South East Asia,” Naval War College Review 58, 3,
pp. 63-86, at p.66.
135

“Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in
Asia,” 11 November 2004, entered into force on 4 September 2006.
136

On the withdrawal of Mauritania, see ECOWAS, “Executive Secretary's Report 2000: Chapter II,”
http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=es-rep2000-3-5&lang=en,
14
October
2013.
Generally on issues of ECOWAS integration (including Mauritania), see Fumi Olonisakin,
"ECOWAS: from Economic Integration to Peace Building", in Thomas Jaye, Dauda Garuba and
Stella Amadi, eds. ECOWAS and the Dynamics of Conflict and Peace-building Senegal, CODERSA,
2011, pp. 11-26. Kofi O. Kufuor, The Institutional Transformation of the Economic Community of
West African, Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing, 2006, pp. 19-68.
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State of the Arab Maghreb Union.137 However, Mauritania is still a
member State of MOWCA. It is clear from the analysis in chapter three
that if ECOWAS States are to be successful in responding to maritime
security threats, and particularly illicit trafficking in narcotics and illegal
migration by sea, some form of cooperation must exist with Mauritania.
There is also a further relationship between Mauritania and its immediate
neighbouring States under a Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission
(SRFC).138

Therefore, while Mauritania continues to keep its political distance from
Gulf of Guinea States, the importance of safeguarding the region’s
maritime security, and also of ensuring Mauritania’s own fisheries
interest, demands that Mauritania be integrated into the ECOWAS
framework. This puts ECOWAS and Mauritania in a difficult situation,
with Mauritania presenting a difficult geopolitical hurdle for ECOWAS
States to overcome.

6.5

LAND-SEA NEXUS AND THE GOVERNANCE

CHALLENGES FOR MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION
While the above structural and geopolitical challenges deserve attention,
it is important to note that the difficulty in responding to maritime
security threats is really a manifestation of land-based governance
limitations. In other words, good order at sea is a reflection of good order
137

Other member States of the Arab Maghreb Union are Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Libya.

138
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within States, and conversely, disorder within States will most likely find
expression in maritime security threats, or at the very least, promote the
escalation of such threats. Therefore, regional cooperative frameworks
are not sufficient to enhance maritime security; what is required is good
governance, and the viability of regional initiatives depends on the
quality of governance at the national and regional levels.139

It is noted that “governance” is a term that has multiple levels of
meaning. The Commission on Global Governance has defined
“governance” as the ““ways individuals and institutions, public and
private, manage their common affairs.”140 To the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), governance is “the exercise of
economic, political, and administrative authority to manage a country’s
affairs at all levels,”141 while the World Bank views it as “the manner in
which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic
and social resources for development.”142 Governance has also been
explained as “a form of order that occurs at various levels of social
activity and interaction, from the village to the international system.” 143
The relationship between governance and security has been succinctly
captured as follows: “governance, rather than government, more
139

On governance and security in Africa, see Samuel M. Makinda and Wafula F. Okumu, The
African Union: Challenges of Globalization, Security, and Governance, New York, Routledge, 2007.
On governance and security generally, see Tom Rippon and Graham Kemp, eds., Governance and
Security as a Unitary Concept Victoria, Agio Publishing House, 2012.
140
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on Global Governance, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 2.
141

UNDP, Governance for Sustainable Human Development, 1997, p.2.
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World Bank, Governance and Development, 1992, p.3.
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Samuel M. Makinda, "Global Governance and Terrorism," Global Change, Peace & Security 15,
1, 2010, pp. 43-58, at p.45.
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accurately captures the dynamics of security and insecurity on the
African continent.144 A synthesis of the concept of governance (as
understood by the UN Economic and Social Council) and relevant
literature

elicits

“accountability”,

words

such

“transparency”,

as

“stability”,

“competence”

“legitimacy”,
and

“effective

policymaking”.145

The importance of these definitions and signposts for the purpose of this
research is that they recognise governance as both a platform for
producing responses to management concerns (including security), and
as a measure or indicator of the performance of governments and
institutions. In essence, good governance creates order within a State,
thereby enabling the delivery of effective security. It also empowers a
State to work more closely with regional partners in pursuing common
security objectives. The five sections below examine a number of
governance issues and their relationship with maritime security
cooperation. Of course, given the multiplicity of governance issues in the
Gulf of Guinea, the discussion is not exhaustive.146 Nonetheless, the
analysis seeks to show that the scoping of maritime security cooperation
144

Alan Bryden, Boubacar N’Diaye and Funmi Olonisakin, eds, Challenges of Security Sector
Governance in West Africa, Geneva, Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2008, p.8.
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Governance and Public Administration, E/C.16/2006/4, 5 January 2006. Jon Pierre and Guy B. Peters,
Governance, Politics and the State, New York St. Martin’s Press, 2000. Jon Pierre, Debating
Governance: Authority, Steering, and Democracy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000.
146

Generally on governance challenges in the Gulf of Guinea and other developing countries, see
Alan Bryden, Boubacar N’Diaye and Funmi Olonisakin, eds, Challenges of Security Sector
Governance in West Africa, Geneva, Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2008.
William Easterly and Rose Levine, "Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics 111, 4, 1997, pp. 1203-50. Christopher Clague, ed., Institutions and
Economic Development: Growth and Governance in Less-Developed and Post-Socialist Countries,
Baltimore and London, John Hopkins University Press, 1997. Yi Feng, Democracy, Governance and
Economic Performance: Theory and Evidence, Cambridge: MA MIT Press, 2005.
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in the Gulf of Guinea can only be effective when governance issues are
openly acknowledged and systematically addressed.

6.5.1 Instability, Political Leadership and Insecurity
The proclivity of the Gulf of Guinea region to both intrastate and
interstate conflicts has been alluded to in the discussion of geopolitical
challenges. It is axiomatic that instability creates disorder, which in turn
undermines the fundamental interests of States, including maritime
security cooperation. However, the impact of instability on maritime
security deserves further analysis.

Conflict and instability reflect the inability of governments to maintain a
peaceful and ordered society, and thus serve as a catalyst for further
insecurity, including maritime security threats. At the same time,
instability represents a high level of insecurity, which diverts the
attention of the political leadership away from other types of threats,
such as piracy, drug trafficking and other illicit activities. In the African
context, there is clear evidence that once instability and disorder become
pervasive, with malignant actors and illegal activities taking root,
members of the political leadership become beneficiaries of illegal
‘services’, thereby compromising their authority (and hence ability) to
fight crime.147
147

William Reno, "Clandestine Economies, Violence and States in Africa," Journal of International
Affairs 53, 2, Spring 2000, pp. 433-59. Obi N. I. Ebbe, "The Political-Criminal Nexus: The Nigerian
Case " Trends in Organized Crime 4, 3, Spring 1999, pp. 29-59. Horn Hansen and Dirk Steffen, “The
Lull before the Storm: Maritime Piracy and Election Violence in the Niger Delta,” Journal of
Maritime Security, 15 March 2011.
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For example, elements of MEND (the main piracy actors in the Gulf of
Guinea), are alleged to have been used by Nigerian politicians to
intimidate political opponents.148 This symbiotic relationship tends to
legitimatise other criminal acts perpetrated by these groups. Piracy and
armed robbery attacks in the Gulf of Guinea have already reached record
levels in 2013, and there are projections that the number of incidents will
continue to increase in 2014 and 2015. 149 An important risk factor that
feeds into these projections, but which is not explicitly mentioned in the
literature, is Nigeria’s presidential election in 2015. Election dynamics
are likely to revitalise the relationship between the political elite and
criminal groups, thus compromising the will and commitment of
governments to combat piratical attacks, ransom kidnappings and the left
of oil offshore.

There is another important dimension to the governance-instabilitymaritime security chain in the Gulf of Guinea. As conflicts in the region
are generally internal, governments of Gulf of Guinea States give less
priority to their Navies and Coast Guards while overspending on land
troops. Therefore, the dismal state of the region’s Navies and Coast

148

In 2007, a spokesman for MEND identified then Vice President Goodluck Jonathan, now President
of Nigeria, as one of its patrons. Global Market Brief: Uneasy Alliance in Nigeria, 10 May 2007,
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Global
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Available:
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Journal of Maritime Security, 15 March 2011.
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Guards is a by-product of conflict and instability. Indeed, a survey of the
region would reveal that Navies and Coast Guards have been absorbed
into land forces especially during conflicts, thereby leaving the region’s
maritime borders and ocean space unprotected.

6.5.2 Institutional Effectiveness and Coordination
The effectiveness of regional maritime security cooperation depends on
the competence of national institutions.150 In turn, the efficacy of
national institutions is contingent on stable and ordered governance
structures. Thus, governance structures and public institutions have an
interdependent relationship. Whereas weak governance produces poorly
functioning public sector institutions, dysfunctional institutions tend to
exacerbate governance problems, including the delivery of security
objectives.151

Also, since maritime security is a shared responsibility between different
national agencies, institutional coordination is vital for the realisation of
regional cooperative objectives.

However, the feasibility report

commissioned by MOWCA and the IMO in 2006 indicated weaknesses
in the coordination of national agencies across the Gulf of Guinea.152 The
report revealed that in many instances there is hardly any engagement

150
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between the multiple agencies charged with maritime security
responsibilities, and in other cases national bodies have conflicting
roles.153 These institutional gaps need to be addressed to ensure effective
maritime security cooperation.

6.5.3 Corruption and Lack of Transparency
Corruption is another important governance issue that impacts on
maritime security. As shown in Table 2.1 in chapter two, the corruption
index of Gulf of Guinea States is very high.154 Corruption undermines
the performance of public institutions, affects delivery of governance
imperatives including security, while also promoting criminal conducts.
Indeed, if politicians and other members of the ruling elite allow greed to
dictate the way they conduct public affairs, the net effect will likely be
the emergence of a national-regional psyche that views criminality as a
rewarding enterprise.155 It is therefore not surprising that the analysis in
chapter three shows corruption as a factor that promotes illicit trafficking
in narcotics and IUU fishing. Unless these governance issues are
addressed as part of the regional cooperative process, the objectives of
maritime security cooperation will be undermined.

There is also a relationship between corruption and the building of
strategic partnerships to enhance maritime security in the Gulf of

153
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Guinea. As demonstrated earlier, Gulf of Guinea States are plagued with
capability deficiencies when undertaking maritime security enforcement.
It is therefore likely that regional States are looking to donor agencies
and external partnerships to fund and support the cost of maritime
security enforcement. One of the critical factors that will inform the
preparedness of donors and partners to offer the necessary support is the
presence or absence of corruption.

6.5.4 Governance of Offshore Resources
Chapter three has discussed the importance of fisheries to human
security, and conversely, how depleting fisheries resources can be a
source of multiple security threats. Hence, the governance of both living
and non-living offshore resources is crucial to maritime security. The
Niger Delta insurgency has its roots in agitations over the management
of oil and gas resources.156 Thus, the increasing offshore oil and gas
discoveries in the Gulf of Guinea have the potential to be either a source
of security or insecurity, depending on how Gulf of Guinea States
manage such resources and the revenue they generate.

6.5.5 Security Governance, Culture and Reform
The final governance challenge to maritime security cooperation in the
Gulf of Guinea is the governance of security itself. As illustrated in the
156

See chapter four. See also Anna Dunin, The Niger Delta: Where Oil is a Curse 8 August 2011,
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analysis of the concept of security, the pursuit of security is optimised
when it is directed at enhancing the welfare of society. 157 But this is only
possible when the driving force behind the desire of governments to seek
cooperation in the first place is the wellbeing of the people they
represent.

Although the ECCAS maritime security framework is holistic in terms of
the outcomes it seeks to secure, the analysis of its background
demonstrates that it was the seaborne attack on the Presidential Palace in
Equatorial Guinea that galvanised ECCAS member States into action.
This illustrates how the political leadership of some States prioritises
personal and regime security over other dimensions of security. It also
raises two critical and opposing questions that must be answered. They
are: (i) is maritime security cooperation mainly being driven by security
concerns that directly impact on political authority and revenue?; and (ii)
is there a genuine commitment by Gulf of Guinea States to address
security issues, such as depleting living resources, that impact on
communities and society at large?

The author asserts that it is critical to seek a governance approach that
puts society at the heart of maritime security cooperation. This approach
necessitates some changes in the security culture of certain States, as
well as reforms to security sector institutions.158
157

See chapter three.
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6.6

CONCLUSIONS

The analysis in this chapter has demonstrated that maritime security
cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea is currently being pursued through
multiple institutional frameworks. Indeed, this has resulted in a high
degree of confusion, undermining the success of some cooperative
initiatives. Moreover, although the relevant institutions have varying
strengths and weaknesses, no assessment is being made by the relevant
actors and the international community as to which regional frameworks
are most suitable for achieving effective maritime security cooperation.

The analysis has also shown that despite the UN Security Council
endorsing the GGC and MOWCA as platforms for maritime security
cooperation, the two institutions are confronted with fundamental
structural and geopolitical challenges that prevent them from playing a
pivotal role in the region. Nonetheless, they still possess strengths that
can supplement the institutional frameworks of ECCAS and ECOWAS
– both of which have been shown to be more suitable platforms for
cooperation. Indeed, ECCAS member States have already devised a
framework for maritime security cooperation which is anchored in the
broader political and economic structures of the region. This can be
replicated by ECOWAS member States in the future.

Nonetheless, the analysis has demonstrated that there are three types of
challenges – structural, geopolitical and governance-related – that need
to be addressed in order for maritime security cooperation to be effective
in the region. On the whole, therefore, the analysis in this chapter has
supported the analytical and conceptual framework of the thesis.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND THE
DYNAMICS OF MARITIME SECURITY IN THE GULF
OF GUINEA

7.1

INTRODUCTION

The analysis in the preceding chapters has illustrated the convergence of
maritime security interests in the Gulf of Guinea. Addressing these
security concerns necessitates the participation of external actors and the
building of international partnerships. The legitimacy of external
interventions is also founded on the notion that such interventions are in
the ‘interest’ of the global community. The role of external actors can
also be justified on the basis of relevant UN Security Council
Resolutions. These Resolutions implore the international community to
support the adoption of comprehensive strategies by Gulf of Guinea
States to address incidents of piracy and armed robbery in the region.1
Moreover, as illustrated in chapter six, a number of Gulf of Guinea
States have expressly requested the support and intervention of the
international community to address the maritime security situation in the
region.

There is therefore a convergence of interest in addressing the state of
insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea. However, despite such convergence,
1

United Nations, Resolution 2018 - Piracy and Security in Africa(Security Council 6645th Meeting.
31 October 2011). United Nations, Resolution 2039 - Peace Consolidation in West Africa(Security
Council 6727th Meeting. 29 February 2012).
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there exists a simultaneous divergence of interests, because the
objectives and priorities of the various actors may differ. There may, for
instance, be widespread agreement on the scope of maritime security
threats, but differences of opinion regarding the order in which to
address these threats. Also, as with other areas of State relations,
maritime security cooperation may be underpinned by strategic motives
or involve the trading of certain benefits and opportunities, thereby
evoking competition or conflict among participants at different levels.
The implication of this is that maritime security efforts may pull in
different directions, while cooperative outcomes may not deliver durable
security.

It is against this background that the contribution of external actors to
maritime security regime building in the Gulf of Guinea will be
examined. Consideration will also be given to the challenges and
limitations that accompany these interventions. Drawing on the analysis
of the strategic interests in the Gulf of Guinea in chapter two, and also
the threat analysis in chapters three and four, the author has selected the
United States, France, the United Kingdom, China and the European
Union as the key actors for the purpose of the analysis.

There are additional strategic reasons underlying the scope of the
chapter. Apart from being a global power, the United States has a
dedicated maritime security cooperative engagement with the Gulf of
Guinea, and thus it is important to assess the scope and context of this
engagement. A combination of historical and contemporary connections,
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which in some cases includes defence and security arrangements, makes
France, the United Kingdom and the European Union important
candidates for the chapter. Finally, China’s growing economic interest in
Africa, and in particular the presence of Chinese companies in the
offshore oil and gas industry of the Gulf of Guinea, makes it an
important candidate for interrogation.

The substantive analysis is organised in six parts. The first five parts will
examine the interventions, policies and contributions of these actors,
while the sixth part is devoted to an examination of the challenges and
limitations of the interventions.

7.2

UNITED STATES AND MARITIME SECURITY IN THE

GULF OF GUINEA
As the world’s superpower, the United States (US) has a spectrum of
maritime interests. This ranges from the protection of international trade
and shipping, energy security, as well as combating transnational
organised crimes (including drug trafficking, terrorism and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)).2 These maritime
security objectives are elucidated in key US policy documents that
inform the country’s maritime security engagements and policies in
Africa, and in particular, its maritime security cooperative framework in
2

Generally on US maritime security interests and responses, see John F. Frittelli, "Port and Maritime
Security: Background and Issues for Congress," United States Congressional Research Service Order
Code RL31733, Updated 27 May 2005. Boske B. Leigh and Lyndon B. Johnson, "Port and Supplychain Security Initiatives in the United States and Abroad," United States Congressional Research
Service, 2006. Joann Peterson and Alan Treat, "The Post-9/11 Global Framework for Cargo
Security," Journal of International Commerce and Economics, March 2008, pp. 1-30.
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the Gulf of Guinea. This section will review the relevant policy
frameworks and instruments, as well as US maritime security activities
and interventions in the Gulf of Guinea.

7.2.1

United States Maritime Security Policy Framework
United States seapower will be globally postured to secure our homeland and
citizens from direct attack and to advance our interests around the world.3

The United States National Strategy on Maritime Security (NSMS) is the
overarching maritime security policy document of the US.4 The NSMS
was promulgated in 2005 as part of a suite of post-9/11 security
responses. The language and strategic objectives outlined in the NSMS
covers both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security issues.5 The opening paragraph of
the Strategy notes that “the United States has a vital national interest in
maritime security [and] must be prepared to stop terrorists and rogue
States before they…threaten or use WMD or engage in other attacks
against the US and allies and friends.”6 The paragraphs that follow also
note that the security of the world’s oceans is important because they are
“a source of food, mineral resources, and recreation, and they support
commerce among nations.”7

3

United States, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. (Washington, October 2007).

4

United States, National Strategy on Maritime Security. (Washington DC, September 2005).

5

See analysis of the concept of security in chapter 3.

6

United States, National Strategy on Maritime Security, 2005, p. 1.

7

United States, National Strategy on Maritime Security, 2005, p. 1.
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These contrasting quotations denote both the hard and soft security
objectives of the NSMS. This dual strategic objective is to be achieved
by blending public and private maritime security activities, and also
through national, regional and international coordination.8 The Strategy
commits the US to pursue cooperative initiatives as a fundamental part
of its maritime security architecture.9 The underlying cooperative
imperatives are reflected in the International Outreach Coordination
Strategy adopted in November 2005, as well as the Cooperative Strategy
for 21st Century Seapower, which launched in 2007.10 Whilst these
strategic documents provide the policy framework for US maritime
security activities and interventions in the Gulf of Guinea, the actual
execution of the cooperative engagements is carried out by the United
States African Command (AFRICOM) and its dedicated maritime
platform – the African Partnership Station (APS).

7.2.2

Birth of the United States African Command

Although the US traditionally had five combatant military commands
overseeing its military interests around the world, no single command
was dedicated specifically to Africa, despite its significance as one of the
largest continents in the world.11 Indeed, responsibility for Africa was
distributed among several Commands. The Indian Ocean region was
8

United States, National Strategy on Maritime Security, 2005, p.11.

9

United States, National Strategy on Maritime Security, 2005, p.13.

10

United States, International Outreach and Coordination Strategy. November 2005). United States, A
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (Washington, October 2007)
11

Northern Command (NORTHCOM) for North America, Southern Command (SOUTHCOMD) for
South America and the Caribbean, Central Command (CENTCOMD) for the Middle East and South
West Asia, European Command (EUCOM) for Europe, and the Pacific Command (PANCOM) for the
Far East and Pacific region.
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assigned to the Pacific Command (PANCOM), East and Southern Africa
came under Central Command (CENTCOM), while North Africa and
Sub-Saharan Africa (which includes the Gulf of Guinea) were
administered

by

the

European

Command

(EUCOM).12

This

dissemination of responsibility for Africa reflected the low strategic
importance that the US attached to the continent.13

However, developments that have taken place since 1998 have led the
US to reassess the continent, and particularly the Gulf of Guinea. These
developments include the bombing of US Embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania in 1998, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, as well as the growing status
of Africa as a source of vital natural resources, including oil, gas and
minerals.14 In line with this new strategic outlook, the US announced
major funding for African security programmes in 2005.15 Then, in
February 2007, the US African Command (AFRICOM) was created to

12

For details on these Commands, see Office of the Secretary of Defence and Joint Staff,
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/combatcomm.html, 11 December 2013.
13
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Papers, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2013, p. 4.
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focus exclusively on the African continent, with the Command becoming
fully operational in October 2008.16

The original intention of the US was to locate AFRICOM in Africa “where it can best interact with partner nations.”17 However, African
States steered away from hosting the command, with many being
opposed to the presence of the US military anywhere on the continent.
Meanwhile, a negative campaign was being waged by diasporic African
communities, further intensifying the anti-American sentiment.

18

Eyebrows were raised when reports surfaced that Nigeria had endorsed
AFRICOM, and was considering hosting the Command’s headquarters.
However, not only did Nigeria indicate that it would not host the
headquarters of AFRICOM, it also voiced its objection to AFRICOM
being accommodated anywhere near its sphere of influence - namely,
West Africa.19 This posture crushed the possibility of stationing
16

See White House, President Bush Creates a Department of Defense Unified Combatant Command
for
Africa,
6
February
2007,
Available:
http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/02/20070206-3.html 8 October 2011. For an extensive
analysis of the background and future of AFRICOM see David E. Brown, "AFRICOM AT 5 Years:
The Maturation of a New U.S. Combatant Command," The Letort Papers, Strategic Studies Institute,
U.S. Army war College, 2013. Sean McFate, "U.S. Africa Command: A New Strategic Paradigm?,"
Military Review 88, 1, January-February 2008.
17

This quotation is from the Policy Statement of President Bush on the launch of AFRICOM. See
U.S. Library of Congress, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests, and the Role of the U.S. Military
in Africa, Washington, D.C Congressional Research Service, 7 December 2007.
18

Nigerian newspapers described the situation as an example of “American pomposity” and “US
contempt for Nigeria,” while some Nigerian military leaders bemoaned that “Nigeria will be finished
as a force.” See Arild Nodland, "Guns, Oil, and ‘Cake’: Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea", in
Bruce A. Elleman, Andrew Forbes and David Rosenberg, eds. Piracy and Maritime Crime: Historical
and Modern Case Studies, Newport, Naval War College Press, 2010, pp. 191-206, p.202. See also
John Liebhardt, The groundswell of Opposition to AFRICOM from African Bloggers, 24 February
2008,
Available:
http://globalvoicesonline.org/2008/02/24/african-bloggers-the-groundswell-ofopposition-to-africom/ 4 October 2011. Danny Glover and Nicole C. Lee, Say No to Africom, 19
November 2007, Available: http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Africa/Say_No_Africom.html, 24
September 2011.
19

allAfrica.com, No USA Barack Or Base In Nigeria! Yes!,
3 June 2008, Available:
http://www.nairaland.com/nigeria/topic-139364.0.html 4 October 2011. Robert Manson, "Do We
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AFRICOM in Liberia, even though Liberia had made a public
declaration to host the Command’s headquarters.20 The US eventually
made a policy shift by locating AFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart,
Germany, while the main body of the command operates from the US
and other European States.21

The Mission Statement of AFRICOM states that the objective of the
command is to “protect and defend the national security interests of the
US by strengthening the defence capabilities of African States and
regional organizations and, when directed, [to] conduct military
operations, in order to deter and defeat transnational threats and to
provide a security environment conducive to good governance and
development.”22 This Mission Statement conceptualises AFRICOM as a
“combatant command plus.”23 What this means is that AFRICOM has
been structured for the delivery of both hard and soft security. Indeed, it

Want to "Kill People and Break Things' in Africa? A Historian's Thoughts on Africa Command,"
Strategic Studies Quarterly 2, 1, Spring 2008, pp. 97-130. See also Arild Nodland, "Guns, Oil, and
‘Cake’: Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea", in Bruce A. Elleman, Andrew Forbes and David
Rosenberg, eds. Piracy and Maritime Crime: Historical and Modern Case Studies, Newport, Naval
War College Press, 2010, pp. 191-206.
20

See, "U.S. AFRICOM Headquarters to Remain in Germany for "Foreseeable Future'" "
International Herald Tribune, 19 November 2008. Ezekiel Pajibo and Emira Woods, "African
Command: Wrong for Liberia, Disastrous for Africa," Foreign Policy in Focus, 26 July 2007. Making
the case for Liberia to host Africom, 19 November 2007, Liberia and Friends Journal, Available:
http://liberiaandfriends.blogspot.com.au/2007/11/making-case-for-liberia-to-host-africom.html,
10
January 2014.
21

Some staff members are stationed at the MacDill Air Force Base in Florida, while others are based
at the Joint Analysis Center of AFRICOM in Moles-Worth, England. Army and Navy Units are
located in Naples, Italy. The Air Force is located in Kaiserslautern, Germany, while the Marine Corps
is also based in Böblingen Germany. However, the US has since procured an operational base in
Djibouti.
22

See AFRICOM Mission Statement, Available: http://www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp 8
October 2011.
23

David E. Brown, "AFRICOM AT 5 Years: The Maturation of a New U.S. Combatant Command,"
The Letort Papers, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army war College, 2013, p. 21.
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has capabilities and strategic responsibilities similar to traditional
combatant commands, but is also supported by US civilian government
agencies whose task it is to focus on issues of governance, development,
and to track all other non-military interests.

7.2.3

The African Partnership Station

The African Partnership Station (APS) is one of the key platforms for
meeting US maritime security objectives and other strategic goals in the
Gulf of Guinea. 24 The APS was launched in 2007 with the deployment
of USS Swift and USS Fort McHenry to the Gulf of Guinea. There has
since been consistent APS deployments and presence in the region.25 The
APS may be viewed as a more functional replication of the West Africa
Training Cruise (WATC), a traditional US cooperative maritime
platform for joint sea exercises in West Africa. Unlike the WATC,
however, the APS recruits personnel from the Gulf of Guinea for more
extended periods, at times up to six months, during which time they are
provided with training and taught essential skills relating to maritime
security enforcement.26 The APS is also used for delivering humanitarian
assistance to coastal communities in the Gulf of Guinea.

24

The APS originally came under the US European Command, but is now under the Africa
Command. For details, see Commander US Naval Forces Africa, “About Africa Partnership Station,”
http://www.c6f.navy.mil/about%20us.html, 28 January 2013.
25

Tim Fish, "United States Navy Announces further Support for Africa Partnership Station," Jane's
Defence Weekly October 2008.
26

See, Commander US Naval Forces Africa, “About
http://www.c6f.navy.mil/about%20us.html, 12 December 2013.
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Africa

Partnership

Station,”

Another strategic role of the APS may be sea basing. This can be
inferred from the US Cooperative Strategy which requires US forwarddeployed forces at sea to swiftly suppress conflicts in unstable regions,
and to increase naval power in order to deter conflicts, aggressive
transnational actors and rogue States.

27

Indeed, this strategic edict

resonates with the concept of sea basing, which similarly advocates the
use of US power at sea to influence events and situations on land that
may affect US vital interests.28 Analysing unstable situations in the Gulf
of Guinea, as well as possible scenarios which may warrant intervention
by naval platforms, has long been part of the work of the US intelligence
community.29 This Mission is now firmly situated in the Cooperative
Strategy, with the APS being the most likely platform for execution. It is
perhaps not a coincidence that the APS was deployed within a few
months of the Cooperative Strategy being launched.

30

Therefore, the

APS, much like AFRICOM, is an encapsulation of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’
security concepts in both a conceptual and practical context.

27

US Government, “A Cooperative Strategy for the 21 st Century Seapower,” October 2007, p. 11.

28

The debate surrounding sea basing is elaborated by Geoffrey Till, "Naval Transformation, Ground
Forces, and the Expeditionary Impulse: The Sea-Basing Debate " Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.
Army War College, December 2006.
29

In 2005, US intelligence services had predicted governmental collapse and conflict in Nigeria, with
the US considering possible options for intervening. See United States National Intelligence Council,
Mapping Sub-Saharan Africa’s Future: Conference Summary. (Washington, D.C, March 2005). See
also, Arild Nodland, "Guns, Oil, and ‘Cake’: Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea", in Bruce A.
Elleman, Andrew Forbes and David Rosenberg, eds. Piracy and Maritime Crime: Historical and
Modern Case Studies, Newport, Naval War College Press, 2010, pp. 191-206. "US Senate Hears
Concerns on Security, Corruption in African Gulf," Oil Daily, 2004.
30

See also Kathi A. Sohn, "The Global Fleet Station: A Powerful Tool for Preventing Conflict," Naval
War College Review 62, 1, Winter 2009, pp. 45-58. Nathan Hodge, “New US Army field manual
focuses on stabilising failed states,” Jane's Defence Weekly, October 2008.
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7.2.4

Role of the United States in Promoting Maritime

Security Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea
Meanwhile, the US has been promoting regional maritime security
cooperation and capacity building on various subjects of maritime
security across the Gulf of Guinea. The first high profile consultation on
regional maritime security cooperation was hosted in 2004 by the US
European Command in Naples, Italy.31 In attendance were the Chiefs of
Naval Staffs from Nigeria and Ghana, as well as senior ranking officers
of other navies of Gulf of Guinea States. Also present was the UN
Special Representative for West Africa. In November 2006, the US
European Command sponsored a second Gulf of Guinea Maritime
Security and Safety Ministerial Conference in Benin, with the US
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs being in attendance.32
The objectives of the Conference were to achieve sub-regional consensus
on threats to maritime safety and security (MSS), to forge high level
consensus and political buy-in for a Plan of Action on maritime security,
to identify and support time-sensitive measures for improving MSS, to
promote regional collaboration and coordinate the active participation of
relevant regional institutions, and lastly, to provide a justification and
mechanism for coordinated and collaborative international assistance.

31

The Conference was held from 3-4 October, 2004. See United States European Command,
Maritime Security Conference Brings Gulf of Guinea Navies Together 5 October 2004, Available:
http://www.eucom.mil/article/21949/Maritime-Security-Conference-Brings-Gulf-Guinea, 1 February
2013.
32

United State European Command, Framework for Action Plan adopted at Ministerial Conference
15
November
2006,
United
State
European
Command
Available:
http://www.eucom.mil/article/20998/framework-action-plan-adopted-ministerial, 1 February 2013.
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These meetings were crucial in helping the US to forge its strategic
engagement with Africa. In other words, it can be argued that maritime
security cooperation served as the catalyst for the US furthering its
strategic interest in Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. Subsequently, in 2010
and 2011, the US sponsored another maritime security conference at the
continental level, with the African Union (AU), the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic
Community of Central African States (ECCAS) all featuring
prominently.33

What is significant about these conferences is the profile and scope of
the stakeholders involved. The US deliberately projected its maritime
security dialogue through the US Africa Centre for Strategic Studies
(ACSS), whose stated mission is to integrate and reflect African interests
in US policy initiatives.34 Thus, the ACSS has managed to congregate
African participants from different sectors and backgrounds and cast
them as stakeholders in the emerging US maritime security partnership.
Other than Navies, key official and policy makers from sectors as
diverse as fisheries, environmental science and technology, customs,
shipping and ports, civil society and academia have been involved. It is
the author’s view that this broad consultative process can help cure the

33

The theme of the first conference was “Africa Maritime Safety and Security - Towards Economic
Prosperity,” October 2010, Stuttgart, Germany. The second conference was dubbed “2011 ECCASECOWAS Maritime Safety and Security - Toward Strategic Synergies in the Maritime Domains of
West and Central Africa,” 19–21 July 2011, Garmisch, Germany.
34

See web page of Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, http://africacenter.org/about/ 16 October 2011.
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lack of coordination of maritime security measures at the national and
regional levels in the Gulf of Guinea.35

In addition to high-level African involvement, the conferences have
attracted participation from the UN, the World Bank, the European
Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the Chiefs of European
Navies (CHENS). This high profile involvement serves to endorse and
add momentum to the maritime security objectives of the US.

7.2.5 United States Logistics Support and Capacity Building
As a result of APS deployments, naval and other law enforcement
officers across the Gulf of Guinea are benefiting from capacity building
in critical areas of maritime security. Indeed, by sharing skills training
across the APS platform, navies and coastguards can enhance the future
interoperability of personnel and operations.

The US may also be able to play a role in enhancing the Maritime
Domain Awareness (MDA) of Gulf of Guinea States. Effective MDA
involves the collection, analysis and dissemination of information for the
purpose of gaining a clear operational picture of maritime security
threats, thus facilitating a better response to such threats.36 Indeed, MDA
is a key component of the US layered framework for maritime security,
35

See chapter 6.

36

United States, National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness for the National Strategy for
Maritime Security. (Washington DC, October 2005).
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and MDA resources, platforms and experiences have the potential to
improve the maritime security information and intelligence deficit in the
Gulf of Guinea. Although some information may be classified,
procedures can be developed for sharing what information can be made
available to further collective interests.

The conclusion to be drawn from the profile of US military activities in
the Gulf of Guinea, as well as the strategic packaging of its maritime
security cooperative frameworks, is that the US is a major player in the
evolving cooperative maritime security framework in the Gulf of
Guinea.

7.3

FRANCE AND MARITIME SECURITY IN THE GULF OF

GUINEA
The choice of France as the second subject of this chapter is in
recognition of the fact that when it comes to political influence in Africa
(and especially in the Gulf of Guinea), France is not just another
European State – France stands alone.37 Centuries of French engagement
with the Gulf of Guinea has crystallised into a network of strategic
interrelations, including with respect to maritime security. The analysis
below will identify France’s strategic and maritime security interest in
the region, evaluate the framework for maritime security cooperation,

37

Martin Guy, "Continuity and Change in Franco-African Relations," Journal of Morden African
Studies 33, 1, 1995, pp. 1-20, p.6. See also Jakkie Cilliers, "Still ... France Versus the Rest in Africa?
," African Security Review 10, 3, 2001. Jean-François Bayart, "Reflexion sur la politique africaine de
la France," Politique Africaine 58, 1995, pp. 41-51.
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and also assess the geopolitical perspectives of the French role in Gulf of
Guinea maritime security.

7.3.1

France’s Strategic and Maritime Security Interest in the

Gulf of Guinea
The strategic and maritime security interest of France in the Gulf of
Guinea is encapsulated in the very description of French colonies as
territoire d'outre mer – that is, as the “overseas territory” of France. This
taxonomy is not just a description of relative locations; it is in fact a
conceptual understanding of how the overseas territories are an integral
part of France. This concept has survived into the postcolonial era, with
the country’s foreign policy objectives constantly being adjusted to exert
even greater control over the African continent.38 The oft quoted remark
of President Francois, that “without Africa France will no longer have
[a] history in the twenty-first century”,39 follows on from the assertion
made his predecessor, that “I am dealing with African Affairs, namely

38

Jean-François Bayart, "Reflexion sur la politique africaine de la France," Politique Africaine 58,
1995, pp. 41-51, p. 49. Generally on France’s political and conceptual engagement with Africa, see
Yves Person, "French West Africa and Decolonization", in Prosser Gifford and William R. Louis,
eds. The Transfer of Power in Africa: Decolonization 1940-1960, New Haven, , Yale University
Press, 1982, pp. 141-72. Christopher M. Andrew, "France: Adjustment to Change", in Hedley Bull,
ed. The Expansion of International Society, Oxford, Claredon Press, 1984. V.S. Sheth, "French Policy
in Africa: An Assessment," Africa Quarterly 39, 2, 1999, pp. 69-87. John Chipman, French Power in
Africa, Oxford, Blackwell, 1989.
39

Quoted in John Chipman, French Power in Africa, Oxford, Blackwell, 1989, p. 9. See also Dorothy
S. White, Black Africa and de Gaulle, Philadelphia Pennsylvania University Press, 1979. Emmanuel
Ela Ela, "La Nouvelle Politique de cooperation militaire de la France en Afrique," Defense Nationale
56, 2, 2000, pp. 86-100.
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France's interest in Africa.”40 Indeed, these comments make doubly clear
the importance of Africa to France.

Therefore, the strategic gains of France’s engagement in the Gulf of
Guinea go beyond economic and historical relations; indeed, they seek to
maintain a leadership role for France. To demonstrate its commitment to
the Gulf of Guinea, France has succeeded on many occasions in
advancing EU initiatives for the development of the region, while at the
same time monopolising the relative gains.41 There are, of course,
debates and projections of a renewed French policy that would bring an
end to this paternalistic approach to former colonies.42 In his 2007
election campaign, President Sarkozy promised a major shift in foreign
policy with respect to former French colonies.43 The 2010 FrancoAfrican Summit was seen as a likely platform for a new policy directive
to be unveiled, but ensuing events have demonstrated that a policy
change is unlikely to occur.44 While France may be praised for echoing
Africa’s voice for fairness in international affairs (including a demand
40

This remark was made by President Giscard d'Estaing, a centre-right politician, who was also the
French President from 1974 to 1981. Quoted in Martin Guy, "Continuity and Change in FrancoAfrican Relations," Journal of Morden African Studies 33, 1, 1995, pp. 1-20, p.6.
41

On France-EU-Africa politics and relations, see Daniela Kroslak, "France's Policy Towards Africa,
Continuity or Change?", in Ian Taylor and Paul Williams, eds. Africa in International Politics:
External Involvement on the Continent, London and New York, Routledge, 2004, pp. 61-82. See also
Douglas Yates, "France, The EU, and Africa", in Adekeye Adebajo and Kaye Whiteman, eds. The
EU and Africa: From Eurafrique to Afro-Europa, London, Hurst, 2012.
42

See especially Daniela Kroslak, "France's Policy Towards Africa, Continuity or Change?” in Ian
Taylor and Paul Williams, eds. Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the
Continent, London and New York, Routledge, 2004, pp. 61-82. Martin Guy, "Continuity and Change
in Franco-African Relations," Journal of Morden African Studies 33, 1, 1995, pp. 1-20.
43

Paul Melly and Vincent Darracq, "A New Way to Engage? French Policy in Africa from Sarkozy to
Hollande," Chatham House, May 2013, pp. 4.
44

Paul Melly and Vincent Darracq, "A New Way to Engage? French Policy in Africa from Sarkozy to
Hollande," Chatham House, May 2013, pp. 3-4.
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for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council),

45

the central

geopolitical message that President Sarkozy conveyed at the Summit was
that France should speak for Africa and adopt a leadership role. Indeed,
the change in policy that Sarkozy promised was couched in rather
ambiguous language. Sarkozy pledged that he would “renegotiate”
defence pacts with Africa. However, this was followed by the caveat that
France would work with Africa to provide the “security system that
Africa needs.”

46

In the three years following Sarkozy’s pledge, France

has negotiated additional defence agreements47 and increased its role in
stabilising conflicts in the Gulf of Guinea – particularly in Cote d’Ivoire,
Mali and the Central African Republic. France has also unequivocally
declared Nigeria’s extremist group, Boko Haram, as a threat to its
interest in the Gulf of Guinea region, and offered assistance to Nigeria to
counter the group’s hostile activities.48

Hence, to engage in a discussion of France’s maritime interest in the
Gulf of Guinea is to focus on only one half of the picture. After all, the
desire to dominate trade and control sea routes in the region underpinned
colonial rule.49 France is still a major trading partner in the Gulf of
45

For commentary on the Summit see Robert Marquand and Scott Baldauf, "President Sarkozy urges
revamped trade ties at Africa-France Summit " The Christian Science Monitor 1 June 2010.
46

"French to Renegotiate Military Accords with Africa: Sarkozy," The Sydney Morning Herald, 29
February 2008.
47

Côte d'Ivoire President Ouattara to sign military accord on Paris Visit, 25 January 2012,
Available:
http://www.english.rfi.fr/africa/20120125-cote-divoire-president-ouattara-sign-militaryaccord-paris-visit, 29 September 2012. On recent France-Cameroon defence and security relations, see
Juliete Rousselot, "The Impact of French Influence on the State of Democracy and Human Rights in
Cameroon," Cameroon Journal of Democracy and Human Rights 1, 4, 2010, pp. 51-79.
48

"France to help Nigeria with Boko Haram militants," DefenceWeb, 14 November 2011.
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David Eltis and Lawrence C. Jennings, "Trade between Western Africa and the Atlantic World in
the Pre-Colonial Era," The American Historical Review 93, 4, 1988 pp. 936-59.
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Guinea, accounting for a quarter of EU investment in Africa in 2008, and
it is also a recipient of half of Africa’s investment in Europe.50 The
analysis in chapter two has also highlighted France’s interest in Gulf of
Guinea oil and gas resources, as well as the region’s fisheries resources.

Maintaining order, control and security in the Gulf of Guinea should
therefore be both a necessity for France and a demonstration of its status.
The optimal foreign policy for France would be to assume a leadership
role in all matters of security in Africa, with the country’s ideal fallback
position being not to relinquish that leadership role in any of its former
colonies.51 It also needs to be emphasised that preserving this leadership
role on maritime security, as well as other matters, is not just what
France seeks for itself. It fits into the broader geopolitical interest of
political leadership, particularly in Francophone Gulf of Guinea, where
States seek to maintain a strong relationship with France. 52

50

European Commission and African Union, Africa-EU - economic indicators, trade and investment
for 2008/2009 (European Commission 2009). On France’s trade relations, see Ralph A. Austen,
Trans-Saharan Africa in World History, Oxford Oxford University Press, 2010. Ralph A. Austen,
African economic history: internal development and external dependency, London Heinemann, 1987.
51

See Tony Chafer, "French African Policy: Towards Change," African Affairs 91, 1992, pp. 37-51.
John Chipman, French Power in Africa, Oxford Blackwell, 1989. Daniel Bach, "Francophone
Regional Organization and ECOWAS", in Julius Okolo and Stephen Wright, eds. West African
Regional Cooperation and Development, Oxford, Westview Press, 1990, pp. 54-55. Daniel Bach,
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Studies 21, 4, 1983, pp. 605-30.
52
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7.3.2 France’s Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation in
the Gulf of Guinea
France has existing defence pacts and cooperative relationships with all
Francophone States in the Gulf of Guinea.53 The Accord de Cooperation
is the framework agreement protecting France’s strategic interest in the
region. The document also forms the basis for defence and security
assistance.54

The Accords generally uphold the authority of the

Francophone State over internal security and external defence, with the
proviso that France may be requested to play a role in both.55 The
Accords also underpin maritime cooperative initiatives, such as the
establishment of the naval academy in Cote d’Ivoire, which serves as a
training

institution

for

all

surrounding

Francophone

States.56

Furthermore, the Accords provide for access to ports and the permanent
deployment of forces (mission de presénce), including naval
components.57

Following an increase in piratical incidents in the Gulf of Guinea in
2012, France deployed a surveillance frigate to the region and announced

53

Shaun Gregory, "French Military in Africa: Past and Present " African Affairs 99, 2000, pp. 435-48
, p. 438.
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Rachel Utely, "Not to Do Less but to Do Better: French Military Policy in Africa," International
Affairs 78, 1, 2002, pp. 129-46, p.41.
55

For a critique of these Accords, see, Phillipe Vasset, "The Myth of Military Aid: The Case of
French Military Cooperation in Africa " SAIS Review of International Affairs 17, 2, 1997, pp. 165-80.
56

The naval academy, Ecole Militaire Préparatoire Technique (EMPT), is located at Bingerville,
Cote d’Ivoire, and was established by France as a regional merchant marine/naval training centre
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See Rubin Luckham, "French Militarism in Africa " Review of African Political Economy 24, 1982,
pp. 55-84. Shaun Gregory, "French Military in Africa: Past and Present " African Affairs 99, 2000,
pp. 435-48.
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anti-piracy training with Benin and Togo.58 Earlier reports of a planned
sea exercise with Gulf of Guinea States (including Ghana), signalled that
France intended to expand its maritime security partnership in the
region.59

Beyond these measures, however, there is very little output from France
towards enhancing maritime security in the region, both in terms of a
precise policy framework and specific financial and logistics support. In
an address to the UN Security Council in 2012, France promised to
spend US$ 1.6 million to reform the maritime security sectors of Togo,
Benin and Ghana under a Priority Solidarity Fund.60 Nonetheless, France
still commands a privileged position in charting maritime security
cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea. Therefore, any attempt - whether
actual or perceived - to dislodge that leadership role will have
implications for the progress of maritime security cooperation in the
Gulf of Guinea. These dynamics are analysed in the evaluation of the
challenges and limitations to external engagements in Part 7.7.
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7.4

UNITED KINGDOM AND GULF OF GUINEA MARITIME

SECURITY
This section will examine the maritime security interest of the United
Kingdom (UK) in the Gulf of Guinea, and also assess the country’s
maritime security cooperative framework for the region.

7.4.1 Status of the United Kingdom as a Maritime Nation and its
Strategic Interest in Maritime Security
The status of the UK as a maritime nation is incontrovertible in both
historical and contemporary terms. Indeed, this maritime destiny
underscored the UK’s Mare clausum crusade in 1635. As illustrated in
chapter three, the Mare clausum principle was advocated by the UK to
justify its exercise of exclusive sovereignty over the belt water
contiguous to its coast for security purposes. In essence, therefore, the
principle of Mare clausum is in direct opposition to Mare librum (the
freedom of the seas concept), which was the dominant principle of the
time. However, in the negotiations leading up to the adoption of
UNCLOS in 1982 (in which the vicissitudes of Mare clausum were to
find expression in an extended territorial sea and vested rights in the
EEZ), the UK was again worried that the evolving regime would result
in the “nationalization of roughly two-thirds of the earth’s surface.”61
Although these two policy positions appear contradictory at first glance,
they are both understandable and reconcilable from the perspective of
61

Statement attributed to former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, as quoted by David
Miliband, UK Member of Parliament for South Shields, in a recent presentation to celebrate the 30 th
Anniversary of the Law of Sea Convention. See Maritime UK, Guest post: David Miliband on the
Law of the Sea, December 12, 2012, Maritime UK, http://www.maritimeuk.org/2012/12/guest-postcountries-can-accomplish-great-things-together/, 16 April 2013.

379

maritime nations.

Mare clausum was championed to secure the

immediate sea boundaries of the UK (in addition to other strategic
reasons).62 But the antithesis to Mare clausum, the concept of Mare
librum, was equally crucial for British maritime trade and future naval
power. 63

Today, as in earlier times, the UK is a dominant maritime nation. Indeed,
London is the citadel of a maritime industry spanning ship ownership,
ship

operators,

cargo

interests,

insurance companies, financial

institutions and maritime security companies. The contribution of the
maritime industry to the GDP of the UK in 2011 has been estimated at
£31.7 billion.64 Moreover, this figure may well represent just a fraction
of the economic gains that the UK makes from the sea. Therefore, while
the UK, like any other nation, has a vested interest in its own maritime
domain, the security of the world’s oceans (and the corresponding
maritime activities that ensure this security), constitute the real strategic
interest of the UK. The 2009 UK National Security Strategy has, in fact,

62
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International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 26, 2011, pp. 433-61.
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See Oxford Economics, The economic impact of the UK Maritime Services Sector (Maritime UK,
December 2012).
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identified this particular interest as needing protection in order for the
continued prosperity of the UK and its citizens.65

7.4.2 United Kingdom Cooperative Maritime Strategy for the Gulf
of Guinea
Compared to France, the UK has an arguably less paternalistic posture
and interest in its colonial heritage.66 Nonetheless, there are still very
important strategic interests for the UK to protect in the Gulf of Guinea,
including oil and gas resources (which have been analysed in chapter
two). The 2010 UK Defence and Security Review outlined a range of
risks in the region, including political instability and piracy, which
endanger UK strategic interests and require the adoption of effective
response measures.67 In this respect, the core requirements would be to
protect critical offshore infrastructure and facilitate the uninterrupted
supply of oil and gas resources from the region into the global market.68
The Defence and Security Review also highlighted drug trafficking and
other transnational organised crimes as security threats that need to be
addressed in the Gulf of Guinea.69
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Cold War", in Ian Taylor and Paul Williams, eds. Africa in International Politics: External
Involvement on the Continent, London and New York, Routledge, 2004, pp. 41-60 at p.43.
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United Kingdom, Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010, Cm 7948: October 2010, p. 50.
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United Kingdom, Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010, Cm 7948: October 2010, p. 50. See
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With the above strategic and maritime security interests, the UK is
expected to contribute to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea in both
specific and comprehensive ways. Indeed, for many years the UK has
provided capacity building services for EEZ management through the
Ghana Armed Forces Staff College, with participation from other
African States.70 The UK also supports military training and capacity
building initiatives in Sierra Leone and Gambia.71 However, these
initiatives fall short of the interventions required to address the maritime
security situation in the region.

Recent reports have, however, indicated that the UK (in partnership with
the private sector), is establishing a Gulf of Guinea Maritime Trade
Information Sharing Centre (MTISC), which will be stationed in
Ghana.72 Moreover, two Royal Navy ships, HMS Dauntless and HMS
Rover, are said to have conducted patrols along the Gulf of Guinea in
2012, providing training to navies and coastguards in the process.73 The
same source has also indicated that the UK is providing assistance to
ECOWAS to develop a cooperative maritime security strategy. 74 These
70

This training is carried out under the UK’s International Military Assistance Training Team
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January 2012.
72

The Royal Navy’s Response to Maritime Security concerns off West Africa, Nautilus International,
Available: https://www.nautilusint.org/atwork/pages/RoyalFleetAuxiliary.aspx, 24 January 2013.
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interventions may mark the beginning of the UK bringing strong assets
and capabilities to the maritime security table – assets and capabilities
which the 2009 National Security Strategy touted as being available
within the UK defence system to address security threats within and
outside the UK.75

7.5

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND GULF OF GUINEA

MARITIME SECURITY
Although the analysis in the last two Parts has extensively covered two
key States of the EU - France and the UK, it is still important to examine
the relationship between the EU and the Gulf of Guinea in the context of
maritime security cooperation. There are multiple reasons why this is
crucial, but two factors will help illustrate the point. First, analysing the
maritime security objectives of the EU in the Gulf of Guinea will reflect
the wider European approach. Second, the EU has institutional maritime
relations with Gulf of Guinea States, so it is necessary to assess the
corresponding contribution that the EU brings to maritime security
cooperation in the region.

7.5.1 Maritime Interest of the European Union in the Gulf of
Guinea
The analysis in the previous chapters has outlined the maritime security
interest of the EU in the Gulf of Guinea. Chapter two discussed both
energy security and access to fisheries resources. Chapter three
75

United Kingdom, National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Updated 2009, Cm 7590: June
2009, p.101.
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examined the mutual interest of the EU and Gulf of Guinea States in
combating transnational organised crime (with a particular emphasis on
illicit narcotics trafficking and illegal migration by sea). Chapter four
demonstrated the global impact of piratical attacks, while chapter five
reinforced concerns surrounding illegal migration by examining the
complications encountered by the EU and Gulf of Guinea States in
seeking to harmonise their respective legal frameworks. The next section
will therefore focus on the cooperative strategies, frameworks and
contributions of the EU to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.

7.5.2 EU Maritime Security Cooperative Framework in the Gulf of
Guinea
In 2005, the Chiefs of the European Navies (CHENS) released a
strategic document titled “Vision for the Future Role of European
Maritime Forces”.76 Although the document identified Sub-Saharan
Africa as a region where EU maritime forces will play a role in the
future, it fell short of identifying how the contemplated responses will be
executed.77 In 2010 a second concept paper was released, highlighting
new areas and regions where piratical attacks and acts of maritime
violence are on the increase, thus posing a serious threat to global
shipping.78 Although the Gulf of Guinea was not explicitly mentioned in
the paper, the profile and description of the piratical activities closely
76
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2010,

p.5,

resemble those in the Gulf of Guinea region. In the same year, the
European Council called on the EU to actively contribute to a stable and
secure global maritime environment.79

These developments can be viewed as antecedents to the Critical
Maritime Routes in the Gulf of Guinea (CRIMGO) project, which was
launched by the EU in January 2013.80 The €4.5 million project is
designed to improve safety and security off the coasts of seven Gulf of
Guinea States – namely, Benin, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon,
Nigeria, Sâo Tomé and Principe and Togo. As the analysis in chapter
four has shown, the CRIMGO project covers both traditional and
emerging high-risk piracy areas in the Gulf of Guinea.81 Therefore, the
programme has the potential to enhance the counter-piracy capacity of
Gulf of Guinea States. It is also appropriate that the scheme comes under
the thematic Instrument for Stability (IfS), which links issues of
instability and transnational threats with development concerns. The EU
Africa Peace Facility (APF) that supports stability programmes in Africa
(including peacekeeping missions), also falls within the ambit of the
IfS.82 Thus, by locating the CRIMGO project and APF in one thematic
instrument, the EU and Gulf of Guinea States have an opportunity to
79
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2013 by jo.chuter, Maritime Security Review.
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Since the establishment of the APF in 2004, over €740 million is said to have been spent with about
€ 600 on peacekeeping alone.
See http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regionalcooperation/peace/index_en.htm, accessed 27 September 2007.
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synergise policy responses, thereby increasing the prospects for success
of the two projects.

However, despite these purported strengths, there are major limitations
associated with the substantive outcomes of the CRIMGO project and its
conceptual underpinnings. This is factored into the analysis of the
challenges and limitations of international support for maritime
cooperation in the last part of the chapter.

7.6

CHINA AND GULF OF GUINEA MARITIME SECURITY

China features prominently in almost every discussion on evolving
patterns in the global community. Thus, an analysis of future maritime
security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea must take into account the
role that China could play. Indeed, as the summary below shows, China
has strategic interests to protect in the region.

7.6.1 China’s Maritime Security Interest in the Gulf of Guinea.
China’s offshore energy interest in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as its
fishing interest in the region, has been extensively outlined in chapters
two and three. These interests, together with trade and other economic
activities, constitute vital interests that can be endangered by increasing
insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea. Indeed, after claiming responsibility for
a bomb explosion near an oil refinery in 2006, the leadership of MEND
warned the Chinese government and its oil companies to stay away from
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the Niger Delta region. The militant organisation further stated that the
Chinese government would be “placing its citizens in [MEND’s] line of
fire” by investing in Niger Delta oil resources.83

It is thus logical to expect China to have a strategic outlook on Gulf of
Guinea maritime security, and in particular, to contribute towards
enhancing maritime security in the region. However, unlike the other
external actors that have been discussed in this chapter, China has unique
challenges in seeking inclusion in the evolving maritime security
initiatives in the Gulf of Guinea. In a strategic context, therefore, these
difficulties translate as challenges to maritime security cooperation in the
Gulf of Guinea. Since these issues cannot be ignored, it is important to
understand the context within which China’s difficulties arise before
analysing the geostrategic ramifications of China’s position in detail.

Generally, the contribution of a non-regional State in enhancing
maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea may take one of four forms:
training and military exercises, defence and security agreements,
logistics support, or the execution and enforcement of maritime security
rights under international law. The analysis in this chapter has shown
that the maritime security engagements of the US, France, the UK and
the EU are based on these channels. For example, the partnerships and
engagements of the US and France are generally based on the first three
83

See Julie Ziegler, "Nigerian Militants Claim Bomb Attack, Warns Chinese Companies,"
Bloomberg, 29 April 2006. Gal Luft and Anne Korin, Energy Security Challenges for the twenty-first
Century, California Greenwood Publishing Group, 2009, p. 249. See also US Congressional Research
Service, “Nigeria: Current Issues,” Updated January 30, 2008.
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options, while the fourth option is invoked when the tides of insecurity
are high and key strategic interests are at risk. But where does this leave
China? How does China relate to these four options?

7.6.2 China’s Opportunities and Challenges in Participating in Gulf
of Guinea Cooperative Frameworks
Although China does have general military-to-military relations with
some Gulf of Guinea States,84 it has no defence or security arrangements
in the region. Indeed, the naval component of China’s military, the
People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-Navy), has neither a sea presence
nor a record of joint training exercises in the Gulf of Guinea.85 Recent
counter-piracy deployments off the coast of Somalia have provided an
opportunity for the PLA-Navy to gain experience on longer deployments
and multilateral operations on African shores, but this represents an
exception to the prevailing situation.86 Furthermore, it is unlikely that the
status quo will change anytime soon, mainly because of interoperability
issues like doctrinal differences, as well as language and cultural
barriers.
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2009.
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China may, however, resort to logistics support or sales as a means of
getting a footing in the Gulf of Guinea maritime security cooperative
framework. Indeed, there are signs that this option is already being
vigorously pursued. At a general level, China’s defence sales to Africa
have increased in the last two decades,87 due largely to the low cost of
hardware and attractive terms of payment.88 In 2006 the Nigerian Navy
ordered maritime patrol vessels from China, and in 2011 Ghana accepted
delivery of four Chinese-built vessels. China also donated a riverine craft
to DR Congo in 2011, and is reported to have offered a grant to Benin
for the purchase of patrol boats.89 And although there are debates
surrounding the quality of Chinese defence equipment, these ‘deliveries’
represent an important contribution to maritime security regime building,
particularly if one considers the poor state of logistics in the Gulf of
Guinea region.90

Logistics sales and support cannot, however, be a comprehensive
solution to the types of threats the Chinese interest is exposed to in the
Gulf of Guinea. A Chinese flagged ship carrying strategic cargo for
87
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China may be hijacked by pirates in the Gulf of Guinea. How will China
be able to protect its interest in this scenario? This makes it imperative
for China to explore possibly the last remaining avenue for protecting its
interest – the exercise of enforcement rights under international law.
However, this option presents fundamental legal and geostrategic
challenges for China.

As analysed in chapter four, international law recognises the right of
States to combat piracy on the high seas, and by extension, in the EEZ.
International law also grants authority to military ships to exercise the
right of visit in the process of enforcing law and order at sea.91
Furthermore, a military ship may engage in hot pursuit where the
circumstances so permit.92 These rights, which are undoubtedly
important tools for maritime security enforcement, are very much
dependent on an equally important right or doctrine – the freedom of
navigation. Indeed, this right is guaranteed to all States under
international law.93 And although the specific rights mentioned above
cannot be exercised in the territorial sea, military vessels can deter
criminal activities (including piratical attacks) in the territorial sea
simply by exercising the right of innocent passage.94
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However, the freedom of the seas doctrine, and by extension the doctrine
of freedom of navigation, may be regarded as hegemonic tools,

95

with

States ascribing to this view possibly limiting the passage rights of other
States off their coasts.96 Indeed, this accords with China’s strategic view,
with China opposing some military activities in the EEZ, and taking the
additional position that sovereignty jurisdiction in the territorial sea
entitles China to receive notification for the passage of military vessels.97
Strategically, therefore, China will shy away from prosecuting any
maritime security enforcement rights off the coast of the Gulf of Guinea,
as doing so would contradict its legal and strategic position on the law of
the sea. It is equally unlikely that China will advocate freedom of
navigation as the basis for maritime security measures in the Gulf of
Guinea, because again this would not be in conformity with its core
strategic principles, especially the policies of non-interference, peaceful
rise, as well as the principle of development without hegemony.98
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Therefore, if the increasing piratical incidents in the Gulf of Guinea pose
a major threat to China’s interest, China will have to seek out options
outside the four broad tools analysed above to meet its maritime security
objectives. A possible solution for China would be to advocate for some
form of UN authorised enforcement, similar to the UN Security Council
resolutions for Somalia (which gave other States a mandate to implement
counter-piracy measures). However, this course of action raises another
set of strategic difficulties for China. The Chinese leadership has
repeatedly emphasised that the participation of PLA-Navy in combating
piracy off the Somali coast was a discharge of China’s UN obligation
and not an attempt to secure its own hegemonic interest. 99 These
statements are meant to convey the message that China is acting
consistently with its peaceful rise doctrine. Therefore, from a policy
perspective, it is unlikely that China will publicly advocate for any UN
authorised operations, although such a course of action would be in
China’s best interests.

It is argued that pragmatism will lead China down the path of silent
diplomacy in three ways. First, China may covertly push for a UN-led
initiative that prescribes counter-piracy measures. This opaque
diplomacy will help disguise China’s policy shift. For Gulf of Guinea
States, however, authorised intervention by the UN should be the least
preferable option, as it epitomises the failure of national and regional
efforts. Authorised intervention could also be viewed as a hegemonic
99
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Mingjiang Li, "China’s Gulf of Aden Expedition and Maritime Cooperation in East Asia," China Brief
9, 1, 12 January 2009.

392

tool by some States, especially Nigeria. China would thus need to mask
its policy moves very carefully to avoid losing friends in the region. A
second option would be for China to collaborate more closely with US
and other Western States, or at the very least be less critical of their
policies in the Gulf of Guinea, even if such action may look hegemonic.
By so doing, China may be able to share in the dividends of Western
initiatives without being accused of jettisoning its own geostrategic
principles. Thirdly, China may support efforts by Gulf of Guinea States
to adopt a regional solution in the hope that the regional approach may
make room for the participation of non-regional States, including China.
But whereas Western States will be able to substantially exploit regional
approaches through historical relations and alliances, China has little
room to manoeuvre in this regard.

It remains unclear how a possible Sino-Gulf of Guinea maritime security
partnership would evolve beyond logistics support. But there is certainly
realpolitik at hand, and China will continue to find itself in a difficult
situation should piratical attacks continue to increase in the Gulf of
Guinea. The problematic nature of China involvement in the region’s
maritime security framework will also affect the evolving geostrategic
environment.
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7.7 CHALLENGES
AND
LIMITATIONS
OF
INTERNATIONAL
CONTRIBUTION
TO
MARITIME
SECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA
The analysis thus far has centred on the contribution that external actors
have made (and continue to make) to maritime security in the Gulf of
Guinea. The discussion has also identified issues and challenges that
may impact on the participation of particular actors in the evolution of
maritime security cooperation in the region.

This section examines the broad challenges and contending currents
associated with the participation and contribution of external actors to
maritime security regime building in the Gulf of Guinea. Four important
themes underpin the analysis: (i) the geostrategic undercurrents between
external actors; (ii) the inadequacy of external support for maritime
security in the Gulf of Guinea; (iii) the selective approach to maritime
security adopted by some external actors; and (iv) the governance-based
obligations of Gulf of Guinea States regarding maritime security. While
the focus of the discussion will be on the selected actors, the issues and
challenges under investigation are capable of being extrapolated, albeit
with modification, to cover actors outside the scope of this chapter.

7.7.1

Multiplicity and Coordination

The effectiveness of maritime security outcomes depends on
coordination, not only in regard to regional efforts, but also in respect of
support services provided by third-party sources. Indeed, external actors,
donor agencies and relevant international organisations should engage
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with Gulf of Guinea States on a harmonised platform. However, the
analysis of the role and contribution of external actors in the region
points to the unpacking of initiatives with little or no coordination. The
likely result will thus be a duplication of effort and a less than optimal
utilisation of resources.

It is tempting to view the multiple interventions by numerous actors as
an opportunity for Gulf of Guinea States to build capacity. However, the
reality may be far from ideal. Multiple interventions tend to overstretch
national administrators, who are then required to respond to and
implement diverse partnerships. This ultimately overcrowds national
policy, adversely affecting maritime security decision-making and
coordination.

7.7.2

Cooperation, Compromise or Competition?

The assessment in the preceding section suggests the need for a
comprehensive approach to the intervention of the international
community on maritime security issues. But as the analysis in chapter six
has shown, the regional situation itself is less than cohesive, and this
may partly account for the coordination deficit between external
partnerships. However, the lack of coordination could equally be due to
differences in the strategic interests of the actors, or even competing
geostrategic objectives. Therefore, it is important to explore this subject
in some detail.
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Drawing on the analysis of the maritime security activities of the five
actors (the US, France, the EU, the UK and China), as well as their
corresponding geopolitical relationship with the Gulf of Guinea, it is
possible that France is in geo-strategic competition with both its fellow
EU States and the US. This puts France at the centre of maritime security
geopolitics in the Gulf of Guinea. Thus, it is imperative to assess
whether France will serve as an enabler or an obstacle to maritime
security cooperation in the region. To phrase the question more directly:
will France view the maritime activities of the US and the UK in the
Gulf of Guinea as an opportunity or an impediment?

In asking the above question, the author is not seeking to discount the
significance of some important ongoing cooperative initiatives in the
region. Indeed, the issue is being raised with full awareness of the
increasing cooperation between France, the UK and the US on issues of
peacekeeping

in

Africa.

Such

cooperation

has

facilitated

the

implementation of the US African Contingency Operations Training and
Assistance (ACOTA) Program, which was initially launched in 1996 as
the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI).100 The relationship
100
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between the three States has also led to joint military exercises in the
Gulf of Guinea region, including Exercise Guidimakha, which focuses
on peacekeeping and counter-insurgency,101 and Exercise Obangame
Express, an annual maritime security enforcement exercise, the most
recent of which was conducted in February 2013.102 On several
occasions French personnel have also embarked on US ships deployed
for the African Partnership Station (APS) in the Gulf of Guinea. Finally,
one may point to counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean (where
Western States have operated under the umbrella of Joint Task Force
51), as further evidence of France’s willingness to cooperate with fellow
Western States regarding maritime security in the region. 103

The above examples of cooperation do not, however, repudiate the
possibility of competition between France and other external actors. As
the discussion in this chapter and elsewhere has shown, maritime
security co-operation may serve as a conduit for attaining wider strategic
interests. Thus, when it comes to charting a course for maritime security
in the Gulf of Guinea, competition cannot be discounted. Indeed, the
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contest is not so much about whether there is room for all actors to
participate; it is chiefly about who should lead and who should follow.
As analysed earlier, France has always taken the lead on security issues
in Africa, and in 2013 France spearheaded multinational interventions
into Mali and the Central African Republic. Therefore, it is extremely
unlikely that France would willingly defer its leadership role when it
comes to African waters to any other State. On the contrary, history has
shown that France will seek to maintain its control in the region if it has
the capacity to do so.

A decade ago, critical commentaries on international relations suggested
that the increased integration of France into both the EU and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would reduce France’s unilateral
security engagement and quest for leadership in Africa.104 Indeed, the
1998 Saint Malo Declaration between France and the UK was
interpreted as having two cardinal objectives.105 First, to motivate France
to share defence and security roles in Africa with the UK, and second, as
a precursor to the implementation of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which
sought create a Common Defence and Security Policy for the EU.106
However, evidence that France would not share its entrenched security
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role in Africa with the UK would soon become apparent.107 In 2002
France adopted a domestic policy framework on security and
peacekeeping in Africa. And although the framework provided for the
coordination of military action in Africa between France and other EU
States, decisions concerning security and peacekeeping in Africa were
reserved for France alone.108 This affirms the view that despite an overt
commitment to policy revision, cooperation and compromise, France is
likely to revert to unilateral action when it comes to security policy in
Africa. The St Malo Declaration itself was perhaps a strategic move by
Paris to balance the increasing attention of Washington on Africa, and to
also buoy its declining post-Cold War strength.109

Thus, if France can prevent other Western States from playing a
significant role in Gulf of Guinea maritime security, it will most likely
do so. However, with AFRICOM assuming a formidable capability and
presence in the region, the military power and underlying strategic
objectives of the US can no longer be curtailed.110 Pursuing regional
maritime security cooperation is a costly endeavour, and realistically, it
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is the US that has the personnel and resources to carry out such an
operation. It can be inferred from the US programmes and engagements
examined earlier in this chapter that Washington is poised for the top
leadership position in Africa among extra-regional players.111 This is
where the US may be viewed as undoing France in its pré carré (sphere
of influence).

According to the renowned Franco-Africa relations expert, Jean-François
Bayart, France has always feared the undesirable effect of American
influence in Africa.112 This fear may have become a reality for France,
because although existing defence and security agreements (Accord de
Cooperation) provide significant leverage for France, the absence of
similar agreements cannot completely constrain US seapower in the Gulf
of Guinea. From a legal perspective, the US can rely on international law
rights and obligations (including the freedom of navigation and the duty
to supress piracy) to pursue its maritime security objectives. Logistically,
the US also has the platform and resources to sustain its security
initiatives, and more importantly, international legitimacy from emerging
UN Security Council Resolutions. Furthermore, the inability of Gulf of
Guinea States to safeguard their own region, coupled with the US-led
Somali counter-piracy experiment, are veritable public opinion tools for
the US.113
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This evolving geostrategic environment can be viewed as a contest
between a regional power whose presence on land is undisputable, and a
global power that is forward-deployed in the littorals. All things being
equal, Paris will remain committed to ECOWAS and ECCAS as
platforms of action, while hoping that Washington keeps its burgeoning
maritime security influence at an even keel. The diplomatic language
from the Elysée Summit for Peace and Security in Africa will be that
Gulf of Guinea States should be allowed to find a regional solution. As
Mr Araud of France asserted during a UN Security Council debate: “it is
up to [Gulf of Guinea] States…to identify a regional strategy.”114 Of
course, if France has any involvement in this “regional strategy”, it will
undoubtedly involve France in a stewardship role. If, however, the battle
for the control of regional institutions falls into the hands of the US, the
most plausible policy choice for France would be to eschew a structured
approach to regional maritime security cooperation in favour of more
flexible arrangements. Indeed, in a US-France leadership struggle,
France would likely seek to keep its continental authority intact, or at the
very least secure its Francophone enclave.

African States to deal with recent conflict in Mali is instructive: “Right now, the ECOWAS force isn't
capable at all. What you saw there, it is a completely incapable force. That has to change.” See
"ECOWAS force in Mali is 'incapable': US official," Associate Free Press, 9 April 2013. See also
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However, it is important to note that there are other States that may
challenge the superiority of France in the Gulf of Guinea. For example,
the UK has its own provinces in the region, Nigeria is a sub-regional
power to contend with, while China may possibly gain some ground in
the very near future. It is in this way that the convergence of maritime
security interests, national strategic objectives, as well as geopolitical
counterbalancing can hold back the progress of regional maritime
security cooperation and the delivery of human security imperatives.

7.7.3

In Search of Inclusive Maritime Security

The analysis in the last section focused on the geostrategic aspects of
maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea. But even where the
discussion is confined to maritime security simpliciter, there are still
important edges to smooth out. “Maritime security” means different
things to different partnership players. As a result, it is important to
deconstruct the evolving cooperative initiatives so that the security
inclinations of the various actors are made apparent.

Although the stated objective of the EU CRIMGO programme is to
address maritime security concerns in Critical Maritime Routes in the
Gulf of Guinea, the coasts of Guinea and Sierra Leone (which are highrisk piracy areas) are not included in the project.115 It is also curious that
the rich fisheries area of the Gulf of Guinea (from Senegal to Liberia),
where the EU has many fishing access agreements, has been excluded
115
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from the project.116 Indeed, this region is synonymous with IUU fishing
activities.117 It is worth restating that in 2012 depleting fisheries stocks
led to threats by Senegalese fishermen to resort to piracy if the
government failed to address IUU fishing and foreign fishing
licensing.118

The analysis in chapter three has demonstrated the overlap between
sustainable fisheries, fisheries access and licensing arrangements, food
security, maritime security, and the stability of the Gulf of Guinea
region.119 Indeed, the EU should be interested in addressing these links,
as EU fishing access arrangements form a significant part of the
equation. However, the geographic scope of the CRIMGO project
unfortunately stops short of that sub-region. Moreover, a good number of
States in that enclave, particularly Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and
Guinea Bissau, suffer multiple setbacks – poverty, weak institutions and
drug trafficking. If one considers that the EU thematic Instrument for
Stability is the funding source for the CRIMGO initiative,120 it is rather
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surprising that the project is not seeking to synchronise maritime security
concerns with the broader issue of regional stability and development.

The above questions demonstrate that something is amiss in the security
objectives of the CRIMGO project. Further interrogation is warranted by
a reflection on the project’s name – Critical Maritime Routes in the Gulf
of Guinea. Compared to the rest of the Gulf of Guinea, there is nothing
uniquely “critical” about the “maritime routes” that fall within the scope
of the project, except that the relevant States have rich deposits of oil and
gas, and as a result many oil tankers use the sea routes.121 Therefore, it
appears that the “critical” concerns that the CRIMGO project has been
designed to address are energy security concerns - from both the
perspective of offshore installations and oil vessels. This deduction
should in no way undervalue the fact that addressing any type of
maritime security threat in the Gulf of Guinea is worthwhile.
Nonetheless, it is essential for policy makers in the Gulf of Guinea to
have a clear understanding of what security objectives are being pursued,
as well as an understanding of the overarching partnership framework
and the ultimate purpose of the relevant security outcomes.

A review of the regional dialogue on maritime security suggests that
energy security takes top priority, followed by the protection of shipping.
As demonstrated in chapter six, this accounts for MOWCA and the GGC
being priority partners with some external actors.122 Chapter six also
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highlighted the fact that the Code of Conduct adopted by the Heads of
State and Governments of ECOWAS and ECCAS is largely geared
towards addressing piratical attacks. This selective approach to security
has the potential to leave the Gulf of Guinea without durable security in
other critical areas, such as food security..

It is also important to have a system in place that defines the priorities
underpinning cooperative initiatives. For example, the maritime security
interest of the US spans multiple areas - from counter-piracy to
combating the proliferation of WMD. However, not all the maritime
security interests presented by the US as requiring cooperation may be of
immediate interest to Gulf of Guinea States. This may not sound too
problematic when viewed in isolation, but where Gulf of Guinea States
are required to fund part of the cost of security, questions may arise as to
the direction and justification for the funding, as well as the ultimate gain
which is being sought. Indeed, even if governments do not raise these
issues, it is likely that civil society activists will. There is thus a need to
clarify the content and scope of maritime security objectives for the
purpose of maritime security cooperation.

7.7.4

Inadequate Logistics and Financial Support

While maritime security cooperation is arguably allowing some external
actors to pursue wider strategic interests, there is no corresponding
allocation of logistical support or funds to address maritime security
threats. As shown in chapter six, the capability of navies and coastguards
405

across the region is minimal. Therefore, the expectation of regional
leaders and institutions was that external support would be forth coming.
This was one of the factors that ballasted the MOWCA coastguard
initiative for years, despite its apparent lack of authority for the type of
security enterprise it sought to pursue.123 The interest of some national
heads of shipping administrations in the MOWCA initiative waned
following a meeting in Accra, Ghana, in December 2011, where external
partners made no commitment to fund or provide logistical support for
the initiative, and indeed the presentation by the IMO ended with the
remark: “African solution to African opportunities…[It’s] investment not
aid.”124

The ECCAS Protocol on maritime security equally stipulates donor
support as one of the funding sources for joint patrols and other security
activities.125 However, evidence that the anticipated financial support has
not been forthcoming can be found in the financial commitments that
have been made to date. France has pledged only US$1.6 million to
support maritime security,126 while funding for the EU CRIMGO project
(which supports seven Gulf of Guinea States), is just €4.5 million. This
amount is just a fraction of the annual cost of financing the Nigerian-

123

See Article 28 of the 2008 MOWCA MOU, which lists contributions from international
organisations and donor countries as one of the sources of funding for the coastguard network.
124

See conference presentation by Chris Trelawny, Deputy Director of the IMO, “Taking an
International Approach to countering piracy and wider maritime crime in West Africa,” December
2011, http://piracy-westafrica.com/uploads/files/2011/Chris_Trelawny.pdf, 30 January 2012. The
author of this thesis had the benefit of attending the conference and interacting with many of the
stakeholders.
125

See, Article 8, Protocole Relatif a la Strategie de Securitisation, 2009.

126

United Nations, Security Council 6723rd Meeting, 27 February 2012, p. 10.

406

Benin joint patrols (code-named Operation Prosperity), which has been
estimated by the UN at US$112 million.127

Despite this dire financial predicament, the expectation and call for
external support persists. The Summit of the Heads of State and
Government of ECOWAS-ECCAS, held in June 2013, concluded with
an appeal to international donors and Western governments for financial
assistance.128 The words of the Ivorian President were very instructive in
this regard: “I urge the international community to show the same
firmness in the Gulf of Guinea as displayed in the Gulf of Aden, where
the presence of international naval forces has helped to drastically reduce
acts of piracy,”.129 Of course, not all Gulf of Guinea States may share
President Ouattara’s support for the presence of foreign naval forces in
their waters. However, the hope is that counter-piracy initiatives in the
Gulf of Guinea will get similar attention to those in the Indian Ocean,
where among other projects, a Trust Fund has been established under the
auspices of the IMO, with support from the UN.130
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Although it remains to be seen what tangible support will be made
available by the international community, Gulf of Guinea States need to
understand that the Indian Ocean region presents different geostrategic
imperatives to the Gulf of Guinea. The wide multilateral support for
counter-piracy initiatives in the Indian Ocean is driven by the region
being an important artery of global shipping. For this reason, the Gulf of
Guinea cannot be expected to engender the same level of response from
shipping interests around the world.131 Moreover, unlike the Indian
Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, which are shared by States on multiple
continents, the Gulf of Guinea is largely bordered by member States of
ECOWAS and ECCAS.

Therefore, notwithstanding the interest of other States in the region,
tangible support is likely to remain paltry, and thus Gulf of Guinea States
will largely need to provide their own security. The unspoken view
operating in this context can be simply stated: it is extractive resources
that make the region strategic, and Gulf of Guinea States are already
receiving revenue from the mining sector and gas industries. To the
extent that exploitation of these resources can continue with minimum
disruption, oil and gas companies (and their governments), have no
incentive to make a financial commitment beyond what is required to
secure the production platforms. Indeed, most offshore platforms are
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protected by private security companies, and the costs incurred are
treated as a tax deduction before royalty payments are made.

Thus, whereas piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is substantially a by-product
of the poor management of Niger Delta oil resources and bad
environmental practices by some transnational oil companies, the larger
impact of piracy is felt by the economies of Gulf of Guinea States, which
in turn has ramifications for the security and stability of the region.
Based on the UN estimates referred to earlier, the annual cost of antipiracy patrols undertaken by Benin is US$5.6million. Indeed, this is the
base cost for such patrols, and does not take into account related
maritime security enforcement expenses. Benin’s GDP is US$6.7billion,
and according to the World Bank, the country ranks 108 and 112
respectively in meeting basic health and education requirements out of
139 States globally.132 Thus, spending US$5.6million on piracy patrols
represents a huge diversion of resources for Benin, resources which
could otherwise be directed towards other human security needs. Indeed,
the fact that Benin needs to allocate such a vast sum to anti-piracy
patrols may further deepen the country’s social and economic fragility.
The international community must therefore show a greater commitment
towards supporting maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.
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7.7.5 The Overlap between National Security, Governance
Challenges and Sovereignty
The call by the Ivorian President, Alassane Ouattara, for a foreign naval
presence in the Gulf of Guinea is not an isolated case. A similar plea was
made by the President of Equatorial Guinea following the seaborne
attack on his Presidential Palace in 2009. Indeed, the President warned
the US and Europe not to ignore the growing number of “attacks by
rebels and smugglers” off the Gulf of Guinea.133 Then, in 2011, President
Boni Yaya of Benin wrote to the UN asking for help to fight piracy off
the coast of Benin. 134 This can be interpreted in the same light as the
earlier demands.

The above comments by leaders of Gulf of Guinea States prompt several
questions. They include: (i) do the leaders fully understand the
sovereignty implications of having a foreign naval presence in their
waters?; (ii) are the leaders ready to commit to transparent and open
government if such a demand is made by the international community as
a condition for addressing insecurity in the region?; (iii) if the results
achieved by the foreign naval force do not meet the expectations (or
serve the interests) of Gulf of Guinea States, will the leaders of such
States object to the navy’s continued presence on the basis of national
133
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security concerns?; and (iv) will other Gulf of Guinea States support the
calls made by the leaders of Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea and Benin?
These are all legitimate issues to investigate.

It is argued that requests for a foreign naval presence are driven by short
term interests, and that such forces are unlikely to enjoy long term
support from Gulf of Guinea leaders, including those leaders who asked
for the support in the first instance. In this regard, it should be noted that
the deployment of foreign navies off the coast of Somalia was made
possible by the fact that the Somali State was, and still is, in a state flux.
It may even be argued that the foreign naval presence was viewed
positively by the Transitional Federal Government because it provided
the government with both security and legitimacy (the latter being
seriously contested by opposing forces). This notion of embracing
elements of foreign security that may, in reality, impinge on a State’s
sovereignty, but nonetheless serve domestic security or political
objectives, can be situated on a conceptual spectrum of securitisation135
to omnibancing.136 While the traditional discourse on balance of power
issues focuses on strategic alliances as against external threats,
omnibancing looks at how alliances may be used to secure external or
domestic objectives, with the latter being the essential motivation.137
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It is noted that the call for foreign anti-piracy forces by Gulf of Guinea
leaders may not be intended to secure political gains. Nonetheless, the
propensity and eagerness of the political leadership to sacrifice national
sovereignty concerns can only be a move to secure short term goals. It
is submitted that this policy choice is not in the interest of the
international community, and certainly does not promote the long term
security of citizens in the region. The reason for this can be succinctly
stated: the policy itself is simply not durable. Indeed, Gulf of Guinea
leaders may, in the future, raise the issue of sovereignty or use national
security concerns as a refuge if the outcomes achieved by foreign
security forces become unsuitable or unfavourable. For example, it is
possible that persons connected to the corridors of political power may
play a role in drug trafficking or transactions involving stolen oil cargo.
Thus, when foreign States demand reliable and transparent governance,
the political leadership may no longer be supportive of the gens d'armes
they voluntarily invited.

External forces are also unlikely to provide a sustainable solution
because unanimous support for such forces is unlikely to be forthcoming.
Indeed, some States in the region may have genuine sovereignty
concerns over the presence of foreign forces in their waters, and will not
be prepared to compromise on such a sensitive issue. For example, not
only would Nigeria view a foreign presence in its waters as undermining
its power, it would also consider such an arrangement as tantamount to
Nigeria being asked to submit its national security to foreign decision
making. As analysed in chapter 4, the ravaging Niger Delta piracy
emanates from Nigeria’s governance deficit and national security
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bargain. Nigeria would thus be sensitive to any process that seeks to set
the insurgency back on its previous course, with the State also looking
unkindly on the calls made by other leaders in the region for a foreign
naval presence. Hence, such calls have the potential to affect intraregional trust and cooperation.

Despite foreign security forces not being a feasible option, the situation
in the Gulf of Guinea poses a serious threat to regional and global
security. Nigeria must therefore commit to good governance and seek an
effective response to maritime security. So too must other States. This is
because the nexus between poor governance and insecurity in the region
goes beyond piracy. As shown in chapter five, inadequacies in Ghana’s
fisheries governance has contributed to IUU fishing in the Gulf of
Guinea, while drug trafficking thrives across the region because of
institutional weaknesses and corruption.

7.7.6 Ownership versus Privatisation of Security
The sixth and final issue that will determine the progress of maritime
security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea is the question of private
security companies (PSCs), or private maritime security companies
(PMSCs) as they are known in the maritime sector. There are major
differences of opinion regarding the proper use of armed PSCs on board
vessels transiting between coastal States.138 This has led to tensions and
138
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cooperative challenges in Southeast Asia, and a similar scenario is
unfolding in the Gulf of Guinea. 139

Although PSCs are not entirely new, the US-led war in Iraq has placed
them centre stage.140 PSCs were used by the US and other Western
States to provide a wide range of services in Iraq, including the
protection of critical installations and escorting high level personnel.141
This was also the case in the Afghanistan war. Thus, PSCs are seen as
part of the political economy surrounding these recent conflicts.142 A
good number of PSCs are based in the US and the UK, with several
having searchlight offices in other parts of the world.143 The services of
PSCs have been adapted for the Somali coast, where they serve as armed
guards on board commercial ships transiting the coast (thereby
safeguarding against piracy attacks), or on board specially operated
vessels escorting commercial ships (much like navies or coast guards).144
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They also provide protection to offshore oil and gas companies. To
facilitate the delivery of these services, PSCs operate a network of
vessels at sea, some carrying large numbers of arms and personnel. In
many respects, they resemble floating armouries, homes and offices.

There are contested views on the use of PSCs. Some industry
practitioners and security experts strongly endorse PSCs as an effective
means of protecting ships from piratical attacks.145 The private shipping
industry views PSCs as a solution to the ineffectiveness of navies and
coastguards of developing States, and the associated problem of
corruption in the delivery of security in those States.146 Some countries,
mostly developed States but also flag States, have adopted the same
position.147 These views certainly have some merit, as Navies and Coast
Guards in the Gulf of Guinea are generally ineffective and corruption is
a real concern.148 Therefore, the proponents of PSCs in the Gulf of
Guinea have legitimate grounds for their assertions.
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However, the concept of PSCs, and the business model surrounding their
use, has been met with opposition in some regions.149 Indeed, the
presence of armed guards in the territorial waters of some States is
viewed as both a threat to national security and an infringement of
sovereignty. There are also issues with transparency and public oversight
over the operations of PSCs, with some reports accusing PSCs of
secretly fostering further conflict and insecurity so they can remain in
business.150 Governments in Southeast Asia have also blamed PSCs and
global marine insurance companies for exaggerating maritime security
risks for their own financial benefit. For example, some estimates put the
cost of engaging a four-man PSC team for a journey from Asia to Europe
through the Gulf of Aden at $50,000.151 Even the shipping industry is
wary of this high cost.152 It is important to note, however, that the
associated cost of engaging PSCs is ultimately borne by consumers.153

There have also been some concerns with the operations of PSCs off the
coast of Somalia. A UN report in 2012 showed that a number of PSCs
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were in violation of an arms embargo, and in some cases were unable to
account for the arms in their possession.154 This raised the possibility that
the arms might have found their way into the hands of insurgent or rebel
groups. Also, while PSCs have played a key role in reducing piratical
incidents in the Indian Ocean, some experts argue that the combination
of PSCs and naval forces creates complexity and confusion for ship
owners, particularly those looking for simple security solutions.155

In May 2012, the IMO adopted interim guidelines for the operation of
PSCs, designated within the IMO as privately contracted armed security
personnel (PCASP).156 The IMO guidelines are meant to chart a common
course for the use of PSCs, thereby alleviating some of the concerns
analysed above. Ultimately, however, the IMO process cannot interfere
with the sovereign right of States to decide whether or not to allow PSCs
in their territorial waters.157 Indeed, the announcement by the IMO that
the guidelines had been adopted also indicated that there was opposition
from some State representatives to the process.158
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The above analysis shows that PSCs have the potential to either enhance
maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, or exacerbate national and
human security problems. In this way, PSCs represent a double edged
sword for governments in the region. Indeed, there are valid reasons
supporting the use of PSCs, but their practical effect is that Navies and
Coast Guards in the region will be less able to build capacity and skills,
rendering them ill equipped and thus ineffective into the future. Some
time ago, former French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing asserted that
France would have to take care of security in Africa because African
States “do not have resources to build modern armed forces.” The former
President further proclaimed that by allowing France to assume
responsibility for Africa’s security, African governments will be able to
“allocate resources to development projects.”159 More than thirty years
have passed since former President d'Estaing uttered those words, yet
Africa enjoys neither peace nor security, has no professional armed
forces unit, and has not enjoyed the benefits that accompany
development. This nullifies the hypothesis of the former French
President.

Given the opposing views on PSCs, Gulf of Guinea States need to adopt
a clear policy position on the matter. The decision by Nigeria to suspend
a number of PSCs has been received with disquiet by the private security
industry.160 Southeast Asian States have generally contested (and in
159
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some cases prevented) the operation of armed PSCs off their coasts, but
it is important for governments to demonstrate greater responsibility in
this area by bolstering the capability of their Navies and Coast Guards to
forestall maritime security threats in the first place The Somali example
has also shown that even when using their best efforts, Navies and Coast
Guards can only patrol a limited area of the coast.161 Therefore, it is
likely that ship owners will continue to rely on the services of PSCs in
high-risk situations.162 This highlights the need for Gulf of Guinea States
to clarify the role of PSCs in the evolving regional cooperative
initiatives.

There are reports of some Gulf of Guinea States making police and
military personnel provide escort services to commercial vessels for a
fee.163 This practice, whether an option extended only to commercial
vessels or an emerging national policy, is a delicate path to tread. Indeed,
it amounts to the commercialisation of national security services, and can
thus seriously undermine the long term security of region. It also puts the
purpose of States’ security institutions in dispute and disrepute, as they
are likely to lose their public character. Indeed, the penchant of security
institutions, especially militaries, to be in control of public affairs and to
derive personal benefits from their public duties, has contributed

161

Michael L. Mineau, "Pirates, Blackwater and Maritime Piracy: The Rise of Private Navies in
Response to Morden Piracy," Journal of International Business and Law 9, 1, 2010, pp. 63-78, p. 64.
162

Michael L. Mineau, "Pirates, Blackwater and Maritime Piracy: The Rise of Private Navies in
Response to Morden Piracy," Journal of International Business and Law 9, 1, 2010, pp. 63-78, p. 64.
163

States that have been specifically identified in this regard include Nigeria, Benin and Togo. Adjoa
Anyimadu," Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea: Lessons Learned from the Indian Ocean,"
Chatham House, July 2013, p.11.

419

significantly to poor governance and human security problems in the
Gulf of Guinea region.164

By allowing the direct sale of security services, governments of Gulf of
Guinea States are exacerbating governance problems and sponsoring
unbridled corruption in security services. Indeed, such action sends the
message that the stakes are high in the emerging maritime market. It may
not take long for these police or military personnel to become the
‘praetorian guards’ of the ocean, assuming leadership positions so they
can ‘properly’ administer what will undoubtedly become a thriving
business enterprise. Governments should steer clear from this path, and
instead raise the required revenue through established governmental
channels, including taxes and royalties. Part of this revenue can then be
used to equip and build the capability of security agencies, without
turning them into tax collectors or salesmen.

7.8

CONCLUSIONS

The analysis in this chapter has demonstrated that there are both
opportunities and challenges associated with the involvement of the
international community in Gulf of Guinea maritime security. External
actors and partnerships may either enhance maritime security
cooperation or entrench insecurity in the region. Indeed, while the Gulf
164
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of Guinea epitomises “bad order at sea,” external actors may well
represent “bad order from the sea.”

To contribute to greater security in the region, external partners must do
three things. First, they must moderate their pursuit of exclusive national
and geostrategic interests. Second, they must be committed to a broader
and inclusive concept of maritime security, and thirdly, they should aim
to provide meaningful logistics support and funding to Gulf of Guinea
States. In turn, States in the region must show greater commitment to
improving governance and developing necessary policy structures that
will provide clarity on their maritime security engagement with the
international community.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSIONS

This thesis has examined the state of maritime security in the Gulf of
Guinea against the hypothesis that current approaches to maritime
security cooperation in the region are inadequate and suffer multiple
limitations. The strategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea dates back to
ancient times, and indeed the region remains vital to global security and
commerce in the contemporary world. The Gulf of Guinea is a major
source of essential commodities for both domestic and industrial use,
while its sea lanes connect trade between multiple continents. There is
also a growing global focus on the Gulf of Guinea due to increasing
offshore oil and gas discoveries, as well as international dependence on
the region for energy security needs. The maritime profile of the Gulf of
Guinea is also making a significant contribution to the socio-economic
development of member States. Indeed, if the opportunities afforded by
the region’s maritime domain are effectively harnessed, there is great
potential for delivering positive human development outcomes for Gulf
of Guinea citizens.

There is therefore a convergence of national, regional and international
interests in the Gulf of Guinea. The key requirement for safeguarding
these interests is effective regional and international maritime security
cooperation. However, as the analysis in this thesis has shown, the
current approaches to maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of
Guinea are inadequate. Indeed, this conclusion supports the hypothesis
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that has been put forward in the thesis. This chapter summarises the
findings and conclusions of the research to demonstrate that the thesis
hypothesis has been established. First, the chapter will state five
conclusions from the research that support the thesis hypothesis. Second,
the chapter will summarise the evidence and findings in support of each
conclusion. Third, the chapter will provide suggestions for enhancing
maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea.

Five key conclusions have been drawn from the thesis, supporting the
thesis hypothesis. These are: (i) the current processes for maritime
security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea do not adequately address the
multiple security threats in the region; (ii) poor governance contributes
significantly to maritime security threats in the Gulf of Guinea, but the
current cooperative framework does not address the land-sea nexus of
maritime security concerns; (iii) the legal framework for maritime
security in the Gulf of Guinea is poorly developed, and this undermines
the effectiveness of maritime security enforcement and cooperation; (vi)
regional maritime security cooperative processes lack coordination and
suffer several setbacks; and, (v) international support for maritime
security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea is inadequate, uncoordinated,
and possibly influenced by self-serving national interests that affect its
overall effectiveness.

Inadequate Maritime Security Processes
The first conclusion which supports the thesis hypothesis is that the
current processes for maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of
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Guinea inadequately address maritime security concerns in the region.
This conclusion has been substantiated by the findings in chapters two
and three, and also by additional findings in chapters six and seven.
Chapter two established the broad scope of maritime interests in the Gulf
of Guinea – one which spans international trade and shipping, marine
living resources, offshore oil and gas reserves, as well as the laying of
submarine cables and pipelines. Chapter three then assessed the threats
to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. This was accomplished by:
(i) developing a conceptual framework for understanding the concept of
maritime security; and (ii) providing an empirical analysis of maritime
security threats in the Gulf of Guinea. The analysis has shown that while
piracy is undoubtedly a significant maritime security concern in the Gulf
of Guinea, there are other maritime security threats that equally
undermine the security and stability of the region. Indeed, the analysis
has uncovered decades of illegal trafficking in narcotic drugs into the
Gulf of Guinea, with criminal networks constantly adjusting their modus
operandi to sustain the drug trade. Organised criminals also exploit the
Gulf of Guinea maritime domain for illegal trafficking in arms, thereby
contributing to violent crimes and conflicts, while illegal migration by
sea leads to maritime risks and disasters. Finally, illegal fishing
contributes to depleting fisheries resources in the Gulf of Guinea.
However, these threats have not been addressed by UN Security Council
Resolutions 2018 and 2039. The analysis in chapters six and seven also
revealed that concerns over the illegal trafficking of drugs and arms, as
well as IUU fishing activities, have not been prioritised in regional and
international cooperative initiatives. Thus, the findings in the thesis
support the conclusion that the current processes for maritime security
cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea do not comprehensively address
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maritime security threats in the region, thereby failing to provide an
inclusive concept of security.

Failure to address Poor Governance and the Land-Sea Nexus of
Maritime Security Threats
The second conclusion in support of the thesis hypothesis is that poor
governance by Gulf of Guinea States contributes significantly to
maritime security threats in the region, and that the present processes for
cooperation do not address governance concerns. This conclusion has
been validated by the findings in chapters three and four, and by also by
the findings in chapter six. The analysis in chapter three has shown that
although there are different drivers of maritime security threats in the
Gulf of Guinea, the common factor which accounts for the pervasiveness
of these threats is ineffective governance - particularly corruption
involving public officials and weaknesses in law enforcement.
Meanwhile, the case study on piracy in chapter four demonstrated that
the growing threat of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is substantially driven
by Niger Delta pirates, and that the activities of these actors have been
spurred by Niger Delta insurgency. Chapter four also highlighted the
interrelationship between governance failures and the inception and
proliferation of Niger Delta piracy. The analysis in chapter six, however,
revealed that the cooperative initiatives being pursued by Gulf of Guinea
States mainly address piratical incidents as sea-based crimes, thereby
neglecting the governance dimension of these crimes.
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Poorly Developed Legal Frameworks
The third conclusion supporting the thesis hypothesis is that the requisite
legal framework for enhancing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea is
poorly developed, thus presenting a setback for maritime security
enforcement and cooperation. This conclusion rests on the findings in
chapter five. Indeed, the chapter assessed the extent to which Gulf of
Guinea States have ratified and implemented requisite international
instruments that provide for the exercise of maritime security jurisdiction
and cooperation. The conclusions reached were that Gulf of Guinea
States have generally failed to ratify the relevant international
instruments, and that in cases where the instruments have been ratified,
many of the States have failed to implement them into their domestic
legal and policy framework. For example, only Cote d’Ivoire has ratified
the 1988 SUA Convention and its three Protocols. Moreover, despite
illegal trafficking in weapons contributing to instability in the Gulf of
Guinea, nine States are yet to ratify the Protocol against Trafficking in
Weapons, which was adopted in 2001. Furthermore, although UNCLOS
has been ratified by all Gulf of Guinea States, many of the States have
not incorporated the Convention’s framework for combating piracy into
their domestic legal regime. Finally, in the context of fisheries
protection, Gambia and Ghana are the only States in the region that have
developed National Plans of Action against illegal, unreported and
unregulated fishing (in accordance with the global framework that was
adopted in 2001), while the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement has only
been ratified by five States – Angola, Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana and
Senegal. There is therefore a gaping deficit in the legal framework for
maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. As a result, even if Gulf of
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Guinea States were able to conduct patrols off their coasts, the efficacy
of such patrols would be seriously undermined by the absence of
domestic legislation to prosecute and punish perpetrators of sea-based
crimes. Poorly developed legal frameworks also undermine regional and
global cooperation, as there is no common basis for the exercise of
maritime security enforcement.

An Uncoordinated Regional Cooperative Framework
The fourth conclusion supporting the thesis hypothesis is that regional
cooperative initiatives are uncoordinated and suffer multiple setbacks.
This finding was reached in chapter six, which assessed maritime
security cooperative initiatives in Gulf of Guinea region. The analysis in
that chapter showed that four regional organisations are concurrently
serving as platforms for maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of
Guinea: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),
the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the
Maritime Organisation for West and Central African States (MOWCA),
and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC). The analysis in chapter six
further demonstrated that the evolving cooperative initiatives in the
region are at different stages of development, with the ECCAS
framework being the most established of the four. The analysis also
identified three categories of challenges that confront the cooperative
initiatives:

structural,

geopolitical

and

governance-based.

Fundamentally, however, there is lack of coordination in regional
processes. Therefore, while the ECCAS maritime security framework
provides an effective structure for cooperation (and should certainly be
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implemented by member States), the GGC continues to pursue a
different cooperative agenda. Indeed, this is despite the fact that all the
member States of the Commission, with the exception of Nigeria, are
also members of ECCAS. The analysis in chapter six also demonstrates
that although the Protocol establishing the ECCAS maritime security
framework was adopted in 2009, MOWCA has continued to hold
consultations and meetings to further its plan for a regional coastguard
network, without any reference to the ECCAS framework. These
conflicting regional initiatives undermine the processes of maritime
security cooperation. Sadly, an examination of the outcome of the
Summit of Heads of State and Governments of Gulf of Guinea, held in
June 2013, illustrates that there is still no coordination between the
various regional processes.

An Inadequate International Cooperative Framework
The final conclusion which affirms the thesis hypothesis is that
international support for maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of
Guinea is inadequate, uncoordinated, and possibly influenced by selfserving national interests, thus affecting its overall effectiveness. This
conclusion is supported by the analysis in chapter seven, though the
background to that conclusion has been established in earlier chapters. In
particular, the analysis in chapter six has shown limitations in the
regional capacity to address maritime security threats, thus the need for
global cooperation and support. Meanwhile, the analysis in chapter seven
has demonstrated that a number of programmes are currently aimed at
enhancing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. For example, the US
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is using its African Partnership Station (APS) programme for capacity
building in the Gulf of Guinea. France supports maritime security
initiatives (especially in Francophone States) through defence and
security agreements. UK ships were on patrol in the Gulf of Guinea in
2012, provided training to Navies and Coast Guards in the region, while
the European Union (EU) launched the Critical Maritime Routes in the
Gulf of Guinea (CRIMGO) project in 2013, with the aim of improving
maritime safety and security in seven Gulf of Guinea States.

Although these partnerships are important for enhancing maritime
security in the Gulf of Guinea, the available funding for these projects is
inadequate. For example, the funding for the maritime security
programmes of France in 2012 was a paltry US$1.6 million, while only
€4.5 million has been allocated for the EU Critical Maritime Routes in
the Gulf of Guinea (CRIMGO) project. In comparative terms, these
amounts represent a small fraction of the annual financial contribution
made by Nigeria and Benin for their joint patrols, which has been
estimated by the UN at US$112 million. Moreover, the analysis in
chapter seven has shown that there is no coordination between these
external partnership programmes. Indeed, this has the potential to
overstretch the resources of national administrators, who would be
required to respond to and implement a diverse range of maritime
security partnerships. While there is no clear explanation for the lack of
synergy between these external programmes, the thesis has proposed
competing national strategic objectives as a possible factor, particularly
between the US and France - the two most dominant external maritime
security partners. The analysis suggests that for the US, maritime
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security cooperation is an avenue for establishing closer relations with
Gulf of Guinea States, and for furthering defence and security interests.
Therefore, it is possible that France may view US maritime security
partnerships in the Gulf of Guinea as a threat to its long-term dominance
in the region.

Towards a comprehensive Framework for Maritime Security
in the Gulf of Guinea
Any proposal for enhancing maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of
Guinea must be comprehensive. The framework devised for the thesis
was developed in chapter three (Figure 3.1), and is reproduced below.
Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation

The framework identifies three key components of a comprehensive
maritime security structure: effective regional cooperation, adequate
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national capacity and viable global support. It also has three critical
progress indicators: improved governance, adequate legal frameworks
and an inclusive maritime security concept. The three overlapping
triangles show that maritime security is a shared responsibility, but they
equally denote the three levels of security analysed in the thesis:
national, regional and international.

Flowing from the proposed framework, the enhancement of maritime
security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea will involve four critical
requirements: (i) defining a functional regional platform for cooperation
and its interaction with national and international components; (ii)
incorporating the identified maritime security threats into the cooperative
process; (iii) providing the requisite legal frameworks for maritime
security jurisdiction and enforcement; and (vi) addressing governance
concerns.

The first requirement recognises regional cooperation as a vital vehicle
for addressing maritime security threats. However, the effectiveness of
regional cooperation will very much depend on identifying the
appropriate regional platform for cooperation. In other words, there is a
need for an effective regional process that can enlist both national and
international participation. Based on the conclusions reached in the
thesis, ECOWAS and ECCAS are the most suitable regional platforms
for developing cooperative frameworks in the Gulf of Guinea, while the
GGC and MOWCA will play complementary roles. Indeed, if a welldefined process is formulated, national, regional and international efforts
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can be galvanised to systematically address other limitations that have
identified in the thesis, such as inadequate funding and the limited
national capacity of Gulf of Guinea States.

The second requirement involves incorporating the maritime security
threats identified in the thesis into the cooperative process. This will help
address a critical gap in prevailing maritime security initiatives in the
Gulf of Guinea, and also provide an inclusive concept of security for
regional and international cooperation.

As demonstrated in the thesis, international legal and policy frameworks
are essential tools for asserting maritime security jurisdiction and for
promoting maritime security cooperation. The failure of Gulf of Guinea
States to ratify and implement relevant maritime security instruments is a
major obstacle to maritime security cooperation. Therefore, to
effectively enhance maritime security in the region, Gulf of Guinea
States will have to ratify and incorporate the relevant international
instruments into their domestic legal and policy frameworks.

Finally, the land-sea nexus of maritime security cooperation is currently
being neglected in the cooperative process of Gulf of Guinea States. It
should, however, be stressed that maritime security threats are largely an
expression of governance deficits in the Gulf of Guinea region. Thus, if
maritime security cooperation is to yield positive outcomes with longterm benefits, governments in the Gulf of Guinea will have to commit to
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improving governance as an integral part of the evolving cooperative
process.

Although there are serious challenges facing the Gulf of Guinea, there is
also the prospect for a bright and promising future. Effective maritime
security is a sine qua non for harvesting the future prospects. The
multilateral processes being embarked upon provide the hope that
regional leaders, external partners and the UN are committed to ensuring
effective maritime security. This thesis has identified gaps in current
process of cooperation that will have to be addressed to ensure robust
maritime security outcomes. Indeed, if the relevant stakeholders take
heed of the recommendations canvassed in this thesis, the opportunity
exists to alleviate poverty, halt instability, protect marine resources and
strengthen regional ties while enhancing regional and global security.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1 - UN Security Council Resolution 2018 (2011)

S/RES/2018 (2011)

United Nations

Security Council

Distr.: General
31 October 2011

Resolution 2018 (2011)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 6645th meeting,
on 31 October 2011
The Security Council,
Expressing its deep concern about the threat that piracy and
armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea pose to
international
navigation,
security
and the economic
development of states in the region,
Recalling its statement of 30 August 2011 on piracy and
armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea,
Expressing its concern over the threat that piracy and
armed robbery at sea pose to the safety of seafarers and other
persons, including through their being taken as hostages, and
deeply concerned by the violence employed by pirates and
persons involved in piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf
of Guinea,
Affirming its respect for the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the States of the Gulf of Guinea and their neighbours,
Further affirming that the provisions of this resolution apply
only with respect to the situation in the Gulf of Guinea,
Affirming that international law, as reflected in the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December
1982, in particular its articles 100, 101 and
105, sets out the legal framework applicable to countering
piracy and armed robbery at sea, as well as other ocean activities,
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Noting that applicable international legal instruments
provide for parties to create criminal offences, establish
jurisdiction, and prosecute or extradite for prosecution, persons
responsible for or suspected of seizing or exercising control
over a ship or fixed platform by force or threat thereof or
any other form of intimidation,
Emphasizing the importance of finding a comprehensive
solution to the problem of piracy and armed robbery at sea in
the Gulf of Guinea,
Noting the efforts of the States of the Gulf of Guinea to
address this problem, including joint patrols at sea and the
activities of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Benin
Republic off the coast of Benin,
Also noting the need for international assistance as part of a
comprehensive strategy to support national and regional efforts
to assist States in the region with their efforts to address piracy
and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea,
Welcoming the contributions made by some Member States
and international organizations in support of the maritime sector,
including security, capacity-building and the joint operations of
the States of the Gulf of Guinea,
Stressing that the coordination of efforts at the regional level
is necessary for the development of a comprehensive strategy
to counter the threat of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the
Gulf of Guinea,
Noting that States in the region have a leadership role to play in
this regard, supported by organizations in the region,
1.
Condemns all acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea
committed off the coast of the States of the Gulf of Guinea;
2.
Welcomes the intention to convene a summit of Gulf of
Guinea Heads of State in order to consider a comprehensive
response in the region and encourages the States of the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the
Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) to develop a comprehensive
strategy, including through:
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(a)
the development of domestic laws and regulations,
where these are not in place, criminalizing piracy and armed
robbery at sea;
(b) the development of a regional framework to counter
piracy and armed robbery at sea, including informationsharing and operational coordination mechanisms in the
region;
(c) the development and strengthening of domestic laws and
regulations, as appropriate,
to implement
relevant
international agreements addressing the safety and security
of navigation, in accordance with international law;
3.
Encourages States of ECOWAS, ECCAS and the
GGC, through concerted action, to counter piracy and armed
robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea through the conduct of
bilateral or regional maritime patrols consistent with relevant
international law; and requests the States concerned to take
appropriate steps to ensure that the activities they undertake
pursuant to this resolution, do not have a practical effect of
denying or impairing freedom of navigation on the high seas or
the right of innocent passage in the territorial sea to vessels of
third States;
4.
Calls upon States, in cooperation with the
shipping industry, the insurance industry and the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) to issue to ships entitled to fly
their flag, appropriate advice and guidance within context of the
Gulf of Guinea, on avoidance, evasion and defensive
techniques and measures to take, if under the threat of attack, or
attack when sailing in the waters of the Gulf of Guinea;
5.
Further calls upon States of ECOWAS, ECCAS and
GGC, in conjunction with flag States and States of nationality
of victims or of perpetrators of acts of piracy or armed
robbery at sea, to cooperate in the prosecution of alleged
perpetrators, including facilitators and financiers of acts of
piracy and armed robbery at sea committed off the coast of the
Gulf of Guinea, in accordance with applicable international law,
including human rights law;
6.
Encourages the international community to assist,
upon request, the States concerned in the region, ECOWAS,
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ECCAS, GGC and other relevant organizations and agencies in
strengthening their efforts to counter piracy and armed robbery at
sea, in the Gulf of Guinea;
7.
Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General of the
United Nations to deploy a United Nations assessment mission
to examine the threat of piracy and armed robbery at sea, in
the Gulf of Guinea and explore options on how best to
address the problem, and looks forward to receiving the mission’s
report with recommendations on the matter;
8.

Decides to remain seized of the matter.
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APPENDIX 2 – UN Security Council Resolution 2039 (2012)

S/RES/2039 (2012)*

United Nations

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 February 2012

Resolution 2039 (2012)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 6727th meeting, on
29 February 2012
The Security Council,
Recalling its statement of 30 August 2011 and its resolution
2018 (2011) of 31 October 2011, on piracy and armed robbery at sea
in the Gulf of Guinea,
Expressing its deep concern about the threat that piracy and
armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea pose to
international navigation, security and the economic development
of states in the region,
Recognizing that piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of
Guinea affect littoral countries, including their hinterland areas
and landlocked countries in the region,
Expressing its concern over the threat that piracy and armed
robbery at sea pose to the safety of seafarers and other persons,
including through their being taken as hostages, and deeply
concerned by the violence employed by pirates and persons involved
in piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea,
Affirming that international law, as reflected in the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, in
particular its articles 100, 101 and
105, sets out the legal framework applicable to countering piracy and
armed robbery at sea, as well as other ocean activities,
Affirming its respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of the States of the Gulf of Guinea and their neighbours,
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Further affirming that the provisions of this resolution apply
only with respect to the situation in the Gulf of Guinea,
Recognizing the urgent need to devise and adopt effective
and practical measures to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea in
the Gulf of Guinea,
Emphasizing the importance of building on existing national,
regional and extraregional initiatives to enhance maritime safety
and security in the Gulf of Guinea,
Welcoming the initiatives already taken by States in the region and
regional organizations, including the Economic Community of
Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS), the Gulf of Guinea Commission
(GGC) and the Maritime Organization for West and Central
Africa (MOWCA), to enhance maritime safety and security in the
Gulf of Guinea,
Noting the ECCAS comprehensive joint maritime security
architecture to counter piracy in the Central African subregion,
including the strategy adopted by the ECCAS Peace and Security
Council in February 2008, the establishment of the Regional Centre
for Maritime Security in Central Africa (CRESMAC) in PointeNoire, Congo, as well as the multinational coordination centres in the
region,
Further noting the preparatory steps taken by ECOWAS towards
developing a maritime security approach through an Integrated
Maritime Security Strategy and an Integrated Maritime Plan,
Noting the importance of adopting a comprehensive
approach led by the countries of the region to counter the threat of
piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea and their
underlying causes,
Also noting the need for international assistance as part of a
comprehensive strategy to support national and regional efforts to
assist States in the region with their efforts to address piracy and
armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea,
Stressing that the coordination of efforts at the regional level is
necessary for the development of a comprehensive strategy to
counter the threat of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of
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Guinea, in order to enable the prevention and interdiction of such
criminal activities and to ensure that persons engaging in piracy and
armed robbery at sea are prosecuted and punished if convicted, with
due regard for internationally recognized rules and principles of
international law,
Reiterating that States in the region have a leadership
role to play in countering the threat and addressing the
underlying causes of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of
Guinea, in close cooperation with organizations in the region, and
their partners,
Welcoming the contributions by Member States and international
organizations in support of ongoing national and regional efforts to
secure Gulf of Guinea coastal areas and conduct naval operations,
including the joint patrols carried out by the Federal Republic of
Nigeria and the Republic of Benin off the coast of Benin, and also
welcoming further contributions, upon request,
Expressing its concern about the serious threats to
international peace and stability in different regions of the world, in
particular in West Africa and the Sahel Region, posed by
transnational organized crime, including illicit weapons and drug
trafficking, piracy and armed robbery at sea,
Affirming its full commitment to promoting the maintenance
of peace and stability in the Gulf of Guinea region,
1.
Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General’s
assessment mission on piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, which was
dispatched to the region from 7 to
24 November 2011;
2.
Encourages national authorities, as well as regional and
international
partners
to
consider
implementing
the
recommendations of the assessment mission, as appropriate;
3. Stresses the primary responsibility of the States of the Gulf of
Guinea to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of
Guinea and in this context urges them through ECCAS, ECOWAS
and the GGC to work towards the convening of the planned joint
Summit of Gulf of Guinea States to develop a regional antipiracy strategy, in cooperation with the African Union;
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4.
Requests the Secretary-General through the United
Nations Office of West Africa (UNOWA) and the United Nations
Office of Central Africa (UNOCA) to support States and subregional
organizations in convening the joint Summit, as referenced in
resolution 2018 (2011), to the extent feasible;
5.
Urges States of the region of the Gulf of Guinea to take
prompt action, at national and regional levels with the support of the
international community where able, and by mutual agreement,
to develop and implement national maritime security strategies,
including for the establishment of a legal framework for the
prevention, and repression of piracy and armed robbery at sea
and as well as prosecution of persons engaging in those crimes,
and punishment of those convicted of those crimes and encourages
regional cooperation in this regard;
6. Encourages Benin and Nigeria to extend their joint patrols
beyond March 2012, while the countries of the Gulf of Guinea
continue to work towards building their capacities to independently
secure their coastlines and also encourages international partners to
consider providing support, as needed, in that regard and to the
extent feasible;
7.
Encourages the States of the Gulf of Guinea, ECOWAS,
ECCAS and GGC, to develop and implement transnational and
transregional maritime security coordination centres covering the
whole region of the Gulf of Guinea, building on existing initiatives,
such as those under the auspices of the International Maritime
Organization (IMO);
8.
Encourages international partners to provide support to
regional States and organizations for the enhancement of their
capabilities to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea in the
Gulf of Guinea, including their capacity to conduct regional
patrols, to establish and maintain joint coordination centres and joint
information-sharing centres, and for the effective implementation of
the regional strategy, once adopted;
9.
Requests the Secretary-General to support efforts
towards mobilizing resources following the creation of the
regional strategy to assist in building national and regional
capacities in close consultation with States and regional and
extraregional organizations;
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10.
Further requests the Secretary-General to keep the
Security Council regularly informed through UNOWA and
UNOCA, on the situation of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the
Gulf of Guinea, including on progress made regarding the joint
Summit as well as by ECOWAS, ECCAS and the GGC to develop a
comprehensive strategy to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea;
11.

Decides to remain seized of the matter.
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APPENDIX 3 – MOWCA MOU on Establishment of Regional Coast
Guard Network

MARITIME ORGANISATION
OF WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA
th

13 Session of the General Assembly
Dakar 2008
MOWCA

MOWCA/XIII GA.08/8
Item 6.2.1.1.c of the Agenda
Original : FRENCH
Version : English

29 – 31 July 2008
Dakar, Republic of Senegal

Mission Statement: “Towards a cost-effective Maritime Transport Service, high on
safety, security and low on pollution”

MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING
ON THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF A SUB-REGIONAL
INTEGRATED COAST GUARD
NETWORK
IN WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA.
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MÉMORANDUM D'ENTENTE
DU RÉSEAU SOUSRÉGIONAL INTÉGRÉ DE
GARDE-CÔTES DES ÉTATS
D'AFRIQUE DE L'OUEST
ET DU CENTRE.

Les États côtiers membres de l'Organisation
maritime de l'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre
Organization of West and Central Africa
(OMAOC) :
(MOWCA) :
The Coastal Member States of the Maritime

1. Angola

1. Angola

2. Bénin

2. Benin
3.

3. Cameroun

Cameroon

4. Cap-Vert

4. Cape Verde

5. Congo

5. Congo

6. Congo RD

6. Congo DR

7. Côte d'Ivoire

7. Côte d'Ivoire

8. Gabon

8. Gabon

9. Gambie

9. The Gambia

10. Ghana

10. Ghana

11. Guinée

11. Guinea

12. Guinée-Bissau

12. Guinea Bissau

13. Guinée équatoriale

13. Equatorial Guinea

14. Libéria

14. Liberia

15. Mauritanie

15. Mauritania

16. Nigéria

16. Nigeria

17. Sao Tomé-et-Principe

17. Sao Tome and Principe

18. Sénégal

18. Senegal

19. Sierra Leone

19. Sierra Leone

20. Togo

20. Togo
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Landlocked Member States of MOWCA Les États enclavés membres de l'OMAOC
associated to the Memorandum :
associés au Mémorandum :
Burkina Faso
Mali
Niger
Central African Republic
Chad

Burkina Faso
Mali
Niger
République centrafricaine
Tchad

Considering the relevant provisions of
United Nations General Assembly resolution
55/2 on the United Nations Millennium
Declaration and, in particular, section II on
Peace, security and disarmament; section III
on Development and poverty eradication;
section IV on Protecting our common
environment; and section VII on Meeting the
special needs of Africa

Notant les dispositions pertinentes de la
résolution 55/2 de l'Assemblée générale des
Nations Unies sur la Déclaration du
Millénaire des Nations Unies et, en
particulier, la section II "Paix, sécurité et
désarmement"; la section III "Développement
et élimination de la pauvreté"; la section IV
"Protéger notre environnement commun"; et
la section VII "Répondre aux besoins
spéciaux de l'Afrique";

Considering the United Nations General
Assembly resolution A/RES/55/7 on Oceans
and the Law of the Sea urging all States, and
in particular coastal States, in affected
regions to take all necessary and appropriate
measures to prevent and combat incidents of
piracy and armed robbery at sea, including
through regional co-operation, and to
investigate or co-operate in the investigation
of such incidents wherever they occur and
bring the alleged perpetrators to justice in
accordance with international law;

Notant la résolution A/RES/55/7 de
l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies sur
les océans et le droit de la mer, dans laquelle
l'Assemblée prie instamment tous les États,
en particulier les États côtiers, de prendre
toutes les mesures nécessaires et appropriées,
notamment dans le cadre de la coopération
régionale, pour prévenir et combattre les
actes de piraterie et les vols à main armée
commis en mer, d'enquêter ou d'apporter leur
concours aux enquêtes menées sur de tels
incidents partout où ils se produisent et de
traduire en justice les auteurs présumés,
conformément au droit international;

Considering the United Nations General Notant la résolution A/RES/59/24 de
Assembly resolution A/RES/59/24 on l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies sur
Oceans and the Law of the Sea also urging les océans et le droit de la mer dans laquelle
all States, in co-operation with the également l'Assemblée engage vivement tous
International Maritime Organization, to les États à lutter, en coopération avec
combat piracy and armed robbery at sea; and l'Organisation maritime internationale, contre
to carry on regional co-operation in the les actes de piraterie et les vols à main armée
prevention and suppression of piracy and commis en mer; et à poursuivre la
armed robbery at sea in some geographical coopération régionale en matière de
areas, and urging States to give urgent prévention et de répression de la piraterie et
attention to promoting, adopting and des vols à main armée en mer dans certaines
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implementing co-operation agreements, in régions, et engage vivement les États à
particular at the regional level in high-risk s'employer d'urgence à promouvoir, adopter
areas;
et exécuter des accords de coopération, en
particulier au niveau régional dans les
régions à haut risque;
Considering the United Nations General Notant la résolution de l'Assemblée générale
Assembly resolution A/RES/60/30 on des Nations Unies A/Res/60/30 sur les
Oceans and the Law of the Sea also urging océans et le droit de la mer, dans laquelle
all States, in cooperation with the l'Assemblée engage vivement tous les États à
International Maritime Organization, to lutter, en coopération avec l'Organisation
combat piracy and armed robbery at sea by maritime internationale, contre les actes de
adopting measures, including those relating piraterie et les vols à main armée commis en
to assistance with capacity-building through mer en adoptant des mesures, y compris
training of seafarers, port staff and d'aide au renforcement des capacités, en
enforcement personnel in the prevention, formant les gens de mer, le personnel des
reporting and investigation of incidents, ports et les agents de la force publique à la
bringing the alleged perpetrators to justice, in prévention et à la constatation des incidents
accordance with international law, and by et à la conduite d'enquêtes à leur sujet, en
adopting national legislation, as well as traduisant en justice les auteurs présumés
providing
enforcement
vessels
and conformément aux dispositions du droit
equipment and guarding against fraudulent international, en se dotant d'une législation
ship registration,
nationale, en consacrant à cette lutte des
navires et du matériel adaptés et en
empêchant les immatriculations frauduleuses
de navires;

Taking into account the Maritime Transport
Charter for West and Central African States,
adopted in Abidjan on May 7, 1975 and as
amended on August 6, 1999;

Prenant en considération la Charte des
transports maritimes des Etats de l’Afrique
de l’Ouest et du Centre, adoptée à Abidjan le
7 mai 1975 et telle que modifiée le 6 août
1999;

Taking into account the Convention on the
Institutionalisation of the Ministerial
Conference of Central African States on
Maritime Transport adopted in Accra on
February 26, 1977 and as amended in
Abidjan on August 06, 1999;

Prenant en considération la Convention
portant création de la
Conférence
ministérielle des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest
et du Centre sur les transports maritimes
adoptée à Accra le 26 février 1977 et telle
que modifiée à Abidjan le 6 août 1999;

Taking into account the MOWCA
resolution n°193/12/03 on maritime safety in
West and Central Africa adopted in
LUANDA on October 31, 2003, in particular

Prenant en considération la résolution
No 193/12/03 de l'OMAOC adoptée à
LUANDA le 31 octobre 2003 sur la sécurité
maritime en Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre,
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the setting up of an integrated sub-regional en particulier la mise en place d'un Réseau
network of coastguards;
sous-régional intégré de garde-côtes;

Recognizing that the history of maritime
security and safety as well as marine
environmental protection in West and
Central African Sub-region is full of
incidents and accidents that expose the lack
or inadequacy of response capabilitiy in the
sub-region ;

Reconnaissant que l'histoire de la sécurité et
de la sûreté maritimes ainsi que de la
protection de l'environnement marin en
Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre est émaillée
d'incidents et d'accidents qui ont mis en
évidence l'absence de capacité de réaction de
la sous région ou son inadéquation;

Appreciating the efforts carried out in these
fields, by the United Nations, through the
International Maritime Organization IMO,
by the adoption of various conventions,
including the Convention on the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, 1988 (the 1988 SUA
Convention),
as
revised,
and
the
International Convention on Maritime
Search and Rescue, 1979, as amended (SAR
1979), aiming at developing an international
search and rescue (SAR) plan so that no
matter where an accident occurs, the rescue
of persons in distress at sea would be coordinated by a SAR organization and, when
necessary,
by
co-operation
between
neighbouring SAR organizations; including
also the International Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea,1974, as amended
(SOLAS 1974), the Protocol of 1978 relating
to the International Convention on the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as
amended (MARPOL PROT 1978), OPRC
Convention, 1990, etc. which provisions
should be implemented at shore and at sea,
for the implementation of maritime
navigation and marine pollution prevention
and control;

Accueillant avec satisfaction les efforts
déployés par les Nations Unies, par
l'intermédiaire de l'Organisation maritime
internationale (OMI), à savoir l'adoption de
diverses Conventions dont la Convention de
1988 pour la répression d'actes illicites contre
la sécurité de la navigation maritime
(Convention SUA de 1988), telle que révisée,
et la Convention de 1979 sur la recherche et
le sauvetage maritimes (Convention SAR),
telle que modifiée, visant à établir un plan
international de recherche et de sauvetage
(SAR) afin que, partout où un accident se
produit, le sauvetage des personnes en
détresse en mer soit coordonné par une
organisation SAR et, lorsque nécessaire,
moyennant la coopération entre les
organisations SAR voisines, ainsi que la
Convention internationale de 1974 pour la
sauvegarde de la vie humaine en mer
(Convention SOLAS de 1974), telle que
modifiée, le Protocole de 1978 relatif à la
Convention internationale de 1973 pour la
prévention de la pollution par les navires, tel
que modifié (MARPOL PROT 1978), la
Convention OPRC de 1990, etc., dont les
dispositions devraient être mises en oeuvre
sur terre et en mer aux fins de la prévention
et du contrôle de la pollution marine et de la
navigation maritime;
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Recognizing with deep concern the grave
dangers to the safety and security of persons
at sea and to the protection of the marine
environment arising from unlawful acts
against ships and in particular from acts of
piracy or armed robbery;

Constatant avec une vive inquiétude les
graves dangers pour la sécurité et la sûreté
des personnes en mer et pour la protection du
milieu marin qui résultent des actes illicites
commis à l'encontre des navires, et
notamment des actes de piraterie ou des vols
à main armée;

Also recognizing that national, regional and
international efforts to combat terrorism also
enhance the ability to combat organized
crime and armed robberies against ships;

Reconnaissant également que les initiatives
nationales, régionales et internationales de
lutte contre le terrorisme renforcent aussi la
capacité de combattre la criminalité
organisée et les vols à main armée à
l'encontre des navires;

Being aware that the fight against piracy and
armed robbery against ships is often impeded
by the absence of effective or adequate
legislative and administrative arrangements
for the investigation of reported cases of
piracy or armed robbery against ships;

Being also aware that, when arrests are
made, there is the absolute need for a
legislative framework and of adequate
guidelines for the conduct of investigation so
as to allow for the prosecution, conviction
and punishment of those involved in acts of
piracy and armed robbery against ships.

Conscients que la lutte contre la piraterie et
les vols à main armée à l'encontre des navires
est souvent entravée par le manque de
dispositifs législatifs et administratifs
efficaces ou appropriés pour enquêter sur les
cas de cet ordre qui ont été déclarés;
Conscients également que, dans le cas où
sont effectuées des arrestations, il est
absolument nécessaire de disposer d'un cadre
législatif et de directives appropriées pour la
conduite de l'enquête de façon à permettre la
poursuite, la condamnation et le châtiment
des personnes impliquées dans des actes de
piraterie et de vols à main armée à l'encontre
des navires;

Recalling the obligations of States under Rappelant les obligations des États en vertu
United Nations Security Council resolutions des résolutions 1373 (2001), 1540 (2004) et
1373 (2001), 1540 (2004) and 1566 (2004);
1566 (2004) du Conseil de Sécurité des
Nations Unies;
Recalling the provisions of the United Rappelant les dispositions de la Convention
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer de
(UNCLOS);
1982;

Recalling also the relevant provisions of the Rappelant également les dispositions
1988 SUA Convention and the Protocol for pertinentes de la Convention SUA de 1988 et
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the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the
Continental Shelf, 1988 (the 1988 SUA
Protocol);

du Protocole de 1988 pour la répression
d'actes illicites contre la sécurité des platesformes fixes situées sur le plateau continental
(le Protocole SUA de 1988);

Recalling further the need for ships,
consistent with the provisions of UNCLOS,
to provide assistance in response to a
situation of persons in distress at sea;

Rappelant en outre que les navires doivent,
conformément aux dispositions de la
Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de
la mer, prêter assistance dans les situations
où des personnes sont en détresse en mer;

Recognizing also the vulnerability of
transport networks, the important role energy
shipping plays in the global economy, and
the importance, in this respect, of enhancing
safety,
security,
and
environmental
protection of the sea area along the Atlantic
coast of the MOWCA Member States
(hereinafter referred to as “the coast of West
and Central Africa”);

Reconnaissant également la vulnérabilité
des réseaux de transport, le rôle considérable
que joue le transport de l'énergie dans
l'économie mondiale et l'importance qu'il y a,
à cet égard, à renforcer la sécurité, la sûreté et
la protection de l'environnement de la zone
maritime le long de la côte Atlantique des
États membres de l'OMAOC (ci-après
dénommée "la côte de l'Afrique de l'Ouest et
du Centre");

Recognizing further the need to balance
maritime security and facilitation and to
minimize any adverse effects on the free
flow of commerce to and from ports in West
and Central Africa and that enhanced
maritime security along the coast of West
and Central Africa will promote international
trade, economic co-operation and sustainable
economic development;

Reconnaissant en outre qu'il faut respecter
un équilibre entre la sûreté maritime et les
dispositions visant à faciliter la navigation et
réduire au maximum tout effet négatif sur le
libre mouvement du commerce à destination
et en provenance des ports d'Afrique de
l'Ouest et du Centre, et qu'une sûreté
maritime renforcée le long des côtes
d'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre favorisera
le commerce international, la coopération
économique et le développement économique
durable;
Reconnaissant le fait que le renforcement de
la sûreté dans le secteur des transports
maritimes internationaux est une condition
essentielle et fondamentale de la prospérité et
de la sûreté économiques de l'Afrique de
l'Ouest et du Centre et que tous les États y
ont directement intérêt;

Acknowledging
the
fact
that
the
enhancement of security in the international
maritime transport sector is an indispensable
and fundamental condition for the welfare
and economic security in West and Central
Africa and is in the direct interest of all
States;
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Further recognizing that the successful
implementation
and
maintenance
of
compliance with SOLAS 1974 and the
International Ship and Port Facility Security
Code (the ISPS Code) require, inter alia, the
early and efficient collection, assessment and
exchange of security-related information;

Reconnaissant en outre que, pour assurer
l'application et le respect permanent de la
Convention SOLAS de 1974 et du Code
international pour la sûreté des navires et des
installations portuaires (Code ISPS), il faut,
entre autres, procéder à la collecte,
l'évaluation et l'échange rapides et efficaces
de renseignements concernant la sûreté;

Also recognizing the need to set, in
accordance with SOLAS 1974 regulation XI2/7 on Threats to ships, security levels and to
ensure the provision of security level
information to ships operating in our
territorial sea or having communicated an
intention to enter our territorial sea, and
where a risk of an attack has been identified,
to provide advice to the ships concerned;

Reconnaissant
également
qu'il
faut,
conformément à la règle XI-2/7 de la
Convention SOLAS de 1974 relative aux
menaces contre les navires, établir des
niveaux de sûreté et veiller à ce que les
renseignements sur ces niveaux de sûreté
soient communiqués aux navires exploités
dans les mers territoriales des États de
l'Afrique de l'Ouest et du centre ou ayant fait
part de leur intention d'entrer dans ces mers
territoriales et, lorsqu'un risque d'attaque a
été déterminé, informer les navires
concernés;

Expressing great concern for the security of
passengers and crews on board ships
including small craft, both at anchor and
underway, in the context of incidents
involving terrorism and other unlawful acts
against ships, and the associated risks to
people on shore or populations in port areas
as well as to ports, offshore terminals and the
marine environment;

Se déclarant gravement préoccupés par la
sûreté des passagers et des équipages à bord
des navires, y compris des embarcations de
faibles dimensions, qu'ils soient au mouillage
ou en route, dans la perspective d'incidents
incluant des actes de terrorisme et d'autres
actes illicites à l'encontre des navires, ainsi
que par les risques connexes pour les
personnes à terre ou les populations se
trouvant dans les zones portuaires et pour les
ports, les installations portuaires au large et le
milieu marin;

Being convinced of the need for MOWCA
Member States to co-operate and to take, as a
matter of the highest priority, all necessary
action to prevent and suppress any incidents
which threaten the security in the
international maritime transport sector;

Convaincus qu'il faut que les États membres
de l'OMAOC coopèrent et prennent, à titre
hautement prioritaire, toutes les mesures
nécessaires pour prévenir et réprimer tous les
incidents qui menacent la sûreté du secteur
des transports maritimes internationaux;
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Recognizing the importance of sustainable
fisheries as potential means for creating and
sustaining employment, providing food
security and generating revenue for the
national economies of MOWCA Member
States, and that they contribute to economic
growth and poverty reduction;

Reconnaissant l'importance que revêtent les
pêcheries durables en tant que moyen
susceptible de créer et de maintenir des
emplois, d'assurer la sécurité alimentaire et
de générer des recettes pour les économies
nationales
des
États
membres
de
l'Organisation maritime de l'Afrique de
l'Ouest et du Centre, ainsi que leur
contribution à la croissance économique et à
la réduction de la pauvreté;

Desiring to move from words to action
through full implementation of various
international instruments for sustainable
fisheries adopted or enacted in the past
decades, including the 1995 Food and
Agriculture Organization Code of Conduct
for Responsible Fisheries, Governments in
West and Central Africa should appreciate
the social, economic and financial benefits of
sustainable fisheries and provide financial,
material and human resources to achieve
defined objectives in protecting these
resources and their environment;

Souhaitant concrétiser les mots par des
actions en mettant pleinement en œuvre les
divers instruments internationaux relatifs aux
pêcheries durables, adoptés ou promulgués
au

cours

des

précédentes

décennies,

notamment le Code de conduite de 1995 pour
une

pêche

responsable

adopté

par

l'Organisation

des

Unies

pour

l'alimentation

et

l'agriculture,

les

Nations

Gouvernements des pays d'Afrique de l'Ouest
et du Centre devraient être conscients de
l'intérêt social, économique et financier des
pêcheries durables et fournir des ressources
financières, matérielles et humaines pour
atteindre des objectifs précis en matière de
protection de ces ressources et de leur
environnement;

Recognizing that among those rescued at sea
may be refugees and asylum seekers who
should in accordance with international law,
specifically the 1951 Convention relating to
the Status of Refugees, and its 1967 Protocol
as well as the 1969 OAU Convention
governing the specific aspects of refugee
problems of Africa, be disembarked
promptly at a place of safety where they are
safe from prosecution or other human rights
violation and where the asylum requests will
be examined;

Reconnaissant que parmi ceux qui sont
secourus en mer, il peut y avoir des réfugiés
et des demandeurs d'asile qui devraient,
conformément au droit international,
précisément la Convention de 1951 relative
au statut des réfugiés et son Protocole
de 1967 ainsi que la Convention de l'OUA
régissant les aspects propres aux problèmes
des réfugiés en Afrique (1969), être
débarqués au plus tôt en un lieu sûr où ils
seront à l'abri de toute poursuite ou d'autres
violations des droits de l'homme et où les
demandes d'asile seront examinées;
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Realizing that measures taken to control
borders and restrictions on aliens' access to
territory constitute a valid exercise of State
sovereignty;

Conscient que les mesures prises pour
assurer le contrôle des frontières et les
restrictions d'accès des étrangers sur le
territoire sont justifiées dans le cadre de
l'exercice de la souveraineté d'un État;

Respecting fully the sovereignty, sovereign
rights, jurisdiction and territorial integrity of
the States which constitute the network, the
principle on non-intervention, and the
relevant provisions of international law, in
particular, UNCLOS;

Respectant pleinement la souveraineté, les
droits souverains, la juridiction et l'intégrité
territoriale des États qui constituent le
Réseau, le principe de non-intervention et les
dispositions
pertinentes
du
droit
international, notamment la Convention des
Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer;

Recognizing the potential benefits for the
establishment of an integrated coast guard
function network for the west and central
coast of Africa across a wide range of
activities, including the enhancement of
maritime safety, security and environmental
protection, law enforcement, and economic
development;

Reconnaissant l'intérêt que pourrait présenter
la mise en place d'un Réseau intégré de
garde-côtes le long du littoral des pays
d'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre dans des
domaines très variés, notamment le
renforcement de la sécurité et de la sûreté
maritimes
et
la
protection
de
l'environnement, l'application des lois et le
développement économique;

Recognizing that in the absence of a regional
integration scheme, these conventions
impose costly obligations in each West and
Central African State in so far as each State
develops its own regulation framework, set
up its own shore installations and brings into
service its own coastguard network mainly
through
its
Navy
or
Maritime
Administration;

Reconnaissant qu'en l'absence de dispositif
régional d'intégration, les conventions
imposent de coûteuses obligations à chaque
État de l'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre, dans
la mesure où chaque État élabore son propre
cadre réglementaire, établit ses propres
infrastructures à terre et met en service son
propre réseau de garde-côtes, en s'appuyant
principalement sur sa marine nationale ou
son administration maritime;

Conscious that the multiplicity of regulations
and implementation procedures concerning
their marine and coastal zones is not only
expensive for the States taken individually,
but also does not allow the States to take full
advantage of economies of scale in guarding
the coast and it also creates barriers and
obstacles to shipping and trade ;

Conscients que la multiplicité des règles et
des procédures d'application concernant leurs
zones maritimes et côtières n'entraîne pas
seulement des frais importants pour les États
pris individuellement, mais également qu'elle
ne leur permet pas de tirer pleinement parti
des économies d'échelle en ce qui concerne
les services de garde-côtes et qu'elle crée par
ailleurs des obstacles et des barrières aux
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transports maritimes et au commerce;
Noting that, taking into account the
considerable obligations posed by the 1979
SAR Convention, it had not been accepted or
ratified by many Coastal states throughout
the world including those of West and
Central Africa and that the SAR Convention
as amended clarifies the responsibilities of
Governments and puts greater emphasis on
the regional approach and co-ordination
between maritime and aeronautical SAR
operations ;

Notant que, compte tenu des obligations
considérables imposées par la Convention
SAR de 1979, cette dernière n'a pas été
acceptée ou ratifiée par nombre d'États
côtiers à travers le monde, dont ceux de
l'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre, et que la
Convention SAR, telle que modifiée, clarifie
les responsabilités des gouvernements et met
davantage l'accent sur une approche
régionale et sur la coordination entre les
opérations SAR maritimes et aéronautiques;

Conscious that in the absence of a subregional agreement on the right of hotpursuit across national borders, the subregion lacks an effective means to pursuit
and prohibit piracy and armed robbery acts;

Conscients qu'en l'absence d'accord sousrégional sur le droit de poursuite à travers les
frontières nationales, la sous-région manque
de moyens effectifs de poursuivre et de
combattre les actes de piraterie et les vols à
main armée;

Recognizing that although most of
MOWCA Member States, through their
respective Navy, Marine Police and
Merchant Marine Administrations, already
perform some coastguard activities, however
these activities are not co-ordinated for a
regional response in case of crises
transcending national boundaries ;

Reconnaissant que, bien que la plupart des
États membres de l'OMAOC assurent déjà
des
activités
de
garde-côtes
par
l'intermédiaire de leur marine nationale, leur
police maritime et leur administration de la
marine marchande, ces activités ne sont pas
coordonnées de manière à pouvoir intervenir
à l'échelle régionale en cas de crise dépassant
les frontières nationales;

Conscious that most of the IMO Conscients que la plupart des conventions de
Conventions can only be implemented l'OMI ne peuvent être effectivement mises en
effectively on a regional or sub-regional œuvre que dans un cadre sous-régional ou
basis and,
régional et,
Convinced that MOWCA Member States
individual coastguard activities can take
advantage of economies of scale derived
from an improved and harmonized regional
coastguard network and a strengthened cooperation and exchange of information

Convaincus que les activités de garde-côtes
des États membres de l'OMAOC pris
individuellement peuvent tirer grand parti
des économies d'échelle découlant de la mise
en place d'un réseau régional de garde-côtes
amélioré et harmonisé et d'une coopération
renforcée, ainsi que des échanges
d'informations;
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Conscious that the issues of management of Conscients du fait que les questions relatives
à la gestion des mers et océans sont
the seas and oceans are closely interrelated
étroitement liées et doivent être prises en
and need to be considered as a whole ;
considération dans leur ensemble;
Affirming the duty of States to use the seas Affirmant le devoir des États d'utiliser les
mers et les océans à des fins pacifiques;
and oceans for peaceful purposes ;
Acknowledging the importance of resolving Reconnaissant qu'il est important de
résoudre les conflits de souveraineté et de
sovereignty and jurisdictional disputes
juridiction par la voie pacifique et sans usage
peacefully and without resort to force ;
de la force;
Supporting the will of MOWCA to foster a Appuyant la volonté de l'OMAOC de
regional
environment
conducive
to faciliter l'émergence d'un environnement
maintaining the peace, commerce and régional propice au maintien de la paix, au
commerce et à la prospérité de l'Afrique de
prosperity of the West and Central Africa;
l'Ouest et du Centre;
Taking into account IMO Resolution
A.584(14) of 20 November 1985 on the
development of measures to prevent
unlawful acts which threaten the safety of
ships and security of their passengers and
crews ;

Tenant compte de la résolution de l'OMI
A.584 (14) du 20 novembre 1985 sur
l'élaboration de mesures visant à prévenir les
actes illicites qui compromettent la sécurité
des navires et la sûreté de leurs passagers et
de leurs équipages;

Acknowledging the guiding principles for
the Protection of the oceans, all kinds of
seas, including enclosed and semi-enclosed
seas, and coastal areas and the protection,
rational use and development of their living
resources set out in Chapter 17 of Agenda
21, agreed at the United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development (UNCED)
in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 ;

Reconnaissant les principes directeurs
énoncés dans le chapitre 17 d'Action 21,
adopté à la Conférence des Nations Unies sur
l'environnement et le développement de Rio
de Janeiro en 1992, à savoir protection des
océans et de toutes les mers - y compris les
mers fermées et semi-fermées - et des zones
côtières et protection, utilisation rationnelle
et mise en valeur de leurs ressources
biologiques;
Acknowledging the importance of seaborne Reconnaissant l'importance du commerce
maritime dans la région de l'Afrique de
trade in the West and Central Africa;
l'Ouest et du Centre;
Conscious of the interests which countries Conscients des intérêts que les pays
share in the marine environment, and in a partagent en ce qui concerne le milieu marin,
spirit of cooperation, friendship and dans un esprit de coopération, d'amitié et de
bonne volonté;
goodwill ;
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Conscious of the need to develop a common Conscients qu'il est nécessaire de mettre au
point une approche commune pour résoudre
approach to common maritime safety and
les problèmes communs de sécurité et de
security problems ; and
sûreté maritimes; et
Taking

into

account

of

the Tenant compte des recommandations du
recommendations of IMO/MOWCA forum forum OMI/OMAOC tenu à Dakar du 23 au
held in Dakar from 23 to 25 October 2006 on 25 octobre 2006 sur la mise en place d'un
the establishment of an integrated coast réseau intégré de garde-côtes pour les États
d'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre;
guard function network for West and Central
African Countries;
Convinced that the following Memorandum
of Understanding will promote regional
maritime cooperation and a stable maritime
environment, contribute to the peace, good
order and continuing prosperity of the West

Convaincus que le présent Mémorandum
d'entente peut d'une part, promouvoir la
coopération maritime régionale et un
environnement maritime stable, et d'autre
part, contribuer à la paix, à l'ordre et à la
prospérité durable de l'Afrique de l'Ouest et
du Centre;

and Central Africa ;
Conviennent de ce qui suit :
PREMIÈRE PARTIE : DÉFINITIONS,
INSTRUMENTS PERTINENTS, DROITS
ET OBLIGATIONS :
Article 1 :

DÉFINITIONS

1. Aux fins du présent Mémorandum :
Agree to what follows:

"État Partie" ou "Partie" signifie un État
côtier de l'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre
FIRST
PART:
DEFINITION, ayant signé ou accepté le présent
RELEVANT INSTRUMENTS, RIGHTS Mémorandum d'entente.
AND DUTIES:
"eaux archipélagiques" signifie les eaux
fermées délimitées par les lignes de base
ARTICLE I
DEFINITIONS
archipélagiques d'un État archipel tracées
conformément à l'article 47 de la Convention
1. For the purposes of the following
des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer de
Memorandum :
1982;
"garde-côtes" signifie l'administration de
and Central Africa coastal State having droit public d'un État qui est chargée de
signed or accepted this Memorandum of l'élaboration et de la mise en œuvre des
politiques relatives à la sauvegarde de la vie
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State Party " or

" Party " means West

humaine en mer, aux interventions de
recherche et de sauvetage, à la police
maritime et à la surveillance de la
"archipelagic waters" means those waters
pollution marine;
enclosed by the archipelagic baselines of an
Understanding

archipelagic State drawn in accordance with
Article 47 of UNCLOS ;
“coastguard” means a public statutory
agency in a State responsible for the
development and implementation of policies
on safety of life at sea, search and rescue
interventions, maritime navigation police and
marine pollution police ;

Competent Officer: An Officer of a State
Party, competent to enforce legal provisions,
to investigate infringements to these
provisions and to prosecute or to report to a
prosecuting Authority.

Fonctionnaire compétent : Fonctionnaire
d'un État Partie, habilité à appliquer des
dispositions juridiques, enquêter sur des
infractions à ces dispositions et engager des
poursuites devant les tribunaux ou rendre
compte à l'autorité chargée de ces poursuites.

Facility: Mobile or fixed facility of the Moyen : Moyen mobile ou fixe du réseau
Network
"plateau continental" désigne les fonds
marins et leur sous-sol, tel que défini dans la
area of seabed and subsoil as defined by Part
partie VI de la Convention des Nations Unies
VI of UNCLOS ;
sur le droit de la mer de 1982;
"continental shelf" means the submarine

"enclosed or semi-enclosed sea" means a "mer fermée ou mer semi-fermée" désigne
gulf, basin or sea surrounded by two or more un golfe, un bassin ou une mer entouré par
deux ou plusieurs États et relié à une autre
States and connected to another sea or the
mer ou à l'océan par un passage étroit, ou
ocean by a narrow outlet or consisting constitué, entièrement ou principalement, des
entirely or primarily of the territorial seas mers territoriales et des zones économiques
and exclusive economic zones of two or exclusives de deux ou plusieurs États côtiers,
more coastal States, as defined by Part IX of telles que définies dans la partie IX de la
Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de
UNCLOS ;
la mer de 1982;
"exclusive economic zone" means an area

"zone économique exclusive" désigne une
superjacent to the sea-bed, and subsoil, as zone surjacente au fond de la mer, et au sousdefined by Part V of the UNCLOS ;
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sol, telle que définie dans la partie V de la
Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de
la mer de 1982;
“foreign sea” means a sea area where a
State, as coastal State, is different from the
State providing the flag of a given facility of
the Organization ;

"mer étrangère" signifie une zone maritime
où un État, agissant en tant qu'État côtier, est
différent de l'État du pavillon d'un moyen de
l'Organisation;

"haute mer" signifie les eaux auxquelles les
"high seas" means those waters to which the dispositions de la partie VII de la Convention des
provisions of Part VII of UNCLOS applies ; Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer de 1982
s'appliquent;

"marine environment" includes the oceans

"milieu marin" désigne les océans et toutes les
mers et les zones côtières adjacentes;

and all seas and adjacent coastal areas ;
“piracy” as defined in Art 101 of UNCLOS
means : (a) any illegal acts of violence or
detention, or any act of depredation,
committed for private ends by the crew or
the passengers of a private ship or a private

"piraterie", telle que définie à l'article 101 de la
Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer
de 1982 désigne : a) tout acte illicite de violence ou
de détention ou toute déprédation commise, par
l'équipage ou les passagers d'un navire ou d'un
aéronef privé, agissant à des fins privées, et dirigé :

aircraft, and directed :
-

-

on the high seas, against another ship
or aircraft, or against persons or
property on board such ship or
aircraft ;
against a ship, aircraft, persons or
property in a place outside the
jurisdiction of any State ;

(b) any act of voluntary participation in the
operation of a ship or of an aircraft with
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or
aircraft ;

-

-

contre un autre navire ou aéronef, ou
contre des personnes ou des biens à
leur bord, en haute mer;
contre un navire ou aéronef, des
personnes ou des biens, dans un lieu
ne relevant pas de la juridiction d'un
État;

b) tout acte de participation volontaire à
l'utilisation d'un navire ou d'un aéronef,
lorsque son auteur a connaissance de faits
dont il découle que ce navire ou cet aéronef
est un navire ou aéronef pirate;

(c) any act inciting or of intentionally
facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph c) tout acte ayant pour but d'inciter à
commettre les actes définis aux lettres a) ou
(a) or (b).”;
b), ou commis dans l'intention de les faciliter;
on entend par "pollution du milieu marin"
pollution of the marine environment" l'introduction directe ou indirecte, par
means the introduction by man, directly or l'homme, de substances ou d'énergie dans le
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indirectly, of substances or energy into the milieu marin, y compris les estuaires,
lorsqu'elle a ou peut avoir des effets nuisibles
marine environment, including estuaries,
tels que dommages aux ressources
which results or is likely to result in such
biologiques et à la faune et la flore marines,
deleterious effects as harm to living risques pour la santé de l'homme, entrave aux
resources and marine life, hazards to human activités maritimes, y compris la pêche et les
health, hindrance to marine activities, autres utilisations légitimes de la mer,
including fishing and other legitimate uses of altération de la qualité de l'eau de mer du
the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea point de vue de son utilisation et dégradation
des valeurs d'agrément, telle que définie dans
water and reduction of amenities, as defined
la partie I de la Convention des Nations
by Part I of UNCLOS ;
Unies sur le droit de la mer, de 1982;
"sea lines of communication" is the term "lignes de communications maritimes" est
used to describe shipping routes used for le terme utilisé pour décrire les routes
maritimes servant au commerce maritime;
seaborne trade ;
"surveillance" signifie l'observation de
"surveillance" means the observation of
l'espace aérien, des surfaces terrestres et des
aerospace, surface and sub-surface areas,
zones sous-marines, des lieux, des personnes
places, persons or objects by visual, aural, ou des objets par des moyens visuels,
electronic, and photographic means; and
acoustiques,
électroniques
et
photographiques; et
"mer territoriale" désigne la partie de la
mer qui est revendiquée par l'État côtier en
is claimed by the coastal State as territorial
tant que mer territoriale, conformément à la
sea in accordance with Section 2, Part II of section 2 de la partie II de la Convention des
UNCLOS.
Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer de 1982.
"territorial sea" means the belt of sea which

ARTICLE II
INSTRUMENTS

INSTRUMENTS
RELEVANT Article 2 :
PERTINENTS

1. Aux fins du présent Mémorandum, les
1. For the purposes of this Memorandum, "instruments pertinents" sont ceux énumérés ci“relevant documents” are the under listed dessous, avec tous les protocoles ou amendements
instruments together with any protocols or y afférents ainsi que les codes obligatoires adoptés
amendments thereto and mandatory codes enacted dans le cadre de ces instruments et protocoles :
pursuant to such instruments or protocols :


Maritime Transport Charter for West
and Central Africa adopted in
Abidjan on May 7, 1975 and as
amended on August 6, 1999;



IMO Assembly resolution A.584(14)
of 20 November 1985 on the
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Charte maritime d'Abidjan de
l’Afrique de l’Ouest at du Centre de
1975, telle que modifiée le 6 août
1999;



Résolution de l'OMI A.584(14) du
20 novembre 1985 sur l'élaboration

development of measures to prevent
unlawful acts which threaten the
safety of ships and security of their
passengers and crews;


United Nations General Assembly
resolutions A/Res/55/2, A/Res/55/7,
A/Res/59/24 and A/Res/60/30



MOWCA Recommendations No
04/05;
No 05/05;
No
06/05
approving the establishment of four
(4) coastguard zones in the subregion
for
effective
zonal
coordination and the setting up of
two principal coordinating centres
for the region, adopted by the
MOWCA Bureau of Ministers in
Luanda, March 2005 and September
2007;







MOWCA Resolution n° 182/11/01
approving the proposal to establish
an integrated Sub-regional Coast
Guard network, adopted at 11th
General Assembly of Ministers of
MOWCA, Abuja, 4th June 2001;

International Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as
amended (SOLAS 74);

The International Ship and Port
Facility Security Code.(ISPS Code)
Code ;



United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS) ;



International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships,
1973 as modified by the Protocol of
1978 (MARPOL 73/78) ;
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de mesures visant à prévenir les actes
illicites qui compromettent la
sécurité des navires et la sûreté de
leurs passagers et de leurs équipages;


Résolutions de l'Assemblée générale
des
Nations Unies
A/Res/55/2,
A/Res/55/7,
A/Res/59/24
et
A/Res/60/30



Recommandations de l'OMAOC No
04/05 ;
No 05/05;
n°06/05
approuvant l'établissement de quatre
(4) zones couvertes par des
garde-côtes dans la sous-région en
vue d'une coordination efficace entre
les zones et la création des deux
centres principal de coordination
pour la région, adoptées par le
Bureau des Ministres de l'OMAOC à
Luanda, mars 2005 et septembre,
2007;



Résolution No 182/11/01
de
l'OMAOC
approuvant la
proposition visant à établir un
réseau sous-régional intégré de
garde-côtes,
adoptée à la 11ème
Assemblée générale des Ministres
de l'OMAOC à Abuja le 4 juin 2001;



Convention internationale de 1974
pour la sauvegarde de la vie humaine
en mer (Convention SOLAS de
1974) et son Protocole de 1978;



Code international pour la sûreté des
navires et des instalations portuaires
(Code ISPS) ;



Convention des Nations Unies sur le
droit de la mer de 1982;



Convention internationale de 1973
pour la prévention de la pollution par
les navires, telle que modifiée par le
Protocole de 1978 (MARPOL
73/78);



Convention sur le Règlement
international de 1972 pour prévenir

les abordages en mer (Convention
COLREG de 1972);


Convention on the International
Regulation for Preventing Collisions
at Sea !972; (COLREG 72) ;



International Convention on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage
(CLC) 1969 as amended by the CLC
protocol of 1992;



International
Suppression
against the
Navigation,
amended ;










Convention for the
of Unlawful Acts
Safety of Maritime
1988; (SUA 88), as

Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Fixed Platforms Located on the
Continental Shelf,1988,.(SUA Prot
88), as amended ;
International Convention on the
preparation,
the fight and the
co-operation in case oil pollution
(OPRC 90);



Protocole de 1992 modifiant la
Convention internationale de 1969
sur la responsabilité civile pour les
dommages dus à la pollution par les
hydrocarbures
(Protocole
CLC
de 1992);



Convention de 1988 pour la
répression d'actes illicites contre la
sécurité de la navigation maritime
(Convention SUA de 1988), telle que
modifiée;



Protocole de 1988 pour la répression
d'actes illicites contre la sécurité des
plates-formes fixes situées sur le
plateau continental (Protocole SUA
de 1988 tel que modifié);



Convention internationale de 1990
sur la préparation, la lutte et la
coopération en matière de pollution
par les hydrocarbures (Convention
OPRC);



Convention SAR de 1979, telle que
modifiée;



Code de conduite pour une pêche
responsable de l'Organisation des
Nations Unies pour l'alimentation et
l'agriculture;



Convention de 1952 relative au statut
des réfugiés (et Protocole de 1967)
ainsi que Convention de l'UA y
afférente.

1979 SAR Convention as amended

United
Nations
Food
and
Agricultural Program Code of
Conduct for Fisheries;

1951 Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees, and its 1967
Protocol as well as the 1969 OAU
Convention governing the specific
aspects of refugee problems of
Africa.

Article 3: RIGHTS AND DUTIES

Article 3 : DROITS ET OBLIGATIONS

1. Les États reconnaissent :
1. States recognize:
 the sovereignty and responsibilities
 la souveraineté et les responsabilités
of other States in respect of their
des autres États en ce qui concerne
522

internal waters, territorial seas, and
archipelagic waters ;





leurs
eaux
intérieures,
mers
territoriales et eaux archipélagiques;


les droits souverains et les
obligations des autres États en ce qui
concerne leurs zones économiques
exclusives
et
leurs
plateaux
continentaux; et



les droits et les responsabilités des
autres États, tels que prévus par la
Convention des Nations Unies sur le
droit de la mer de 1982 et les autres
conventions et traités et par le droit
international général.

the sovereign rights and duties of
other States with regard to exclusive
economic zones and continental
shelves; and

the rights and responsibilities of
other States as provided by
UNCLOS, other conventions, treaty
obligations and general international
law.

SECOND PART: THE INTEGRATED
NETWORK OF COASTGUARDS

DEUXIÈME PARTIE : LE RÉSEAU
INTÉGRÉ DE GARDE-CÔTES

TITLE I: AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

TITRE I : AU NIVEAU NATIONAL

Article
4: The States Parties take
following obligations:
1. to seek the establishment of a system for
coordinating agencies with responsibility for
national coastguard functions by each coastal
Member State of MOWCA to develop and
implement, as necessary:

Article 4 : Les États Parties s'engagent à :
.1
solliciter la création par chacun des
États membres de l'OMAOC d'un service
national de garde-côtes pour élaborer et
mettre en œuvre, selon qu'il conviendra :

(a) appropriate national maritime security
policies to safeguard maritime trade from all
forms of unlawful acts;
(b) national legislation, practices and
procedures, which together provide the
security necessary for the safe and secure
operation of port facilities and ships at all
security levels;

a) une politique nationale de sûreté maritime
afin de protéger le commerce maritime contre
toutes les formes d'actes illicites;
b) une législation nationale, des règles
pratiques et des procédures qui assurent
conjointement les conditions nécessaires à la
sécurité et à la sûreté de l'exploitation des
installations portuaires et des navires à tous
les niveaux de sûreté;
(c) legislation which ensures effective c) une législation qui garantit une protection
protection of the marine environment.
efficace de l’environnement marin.

2. to establish, as necessary, a national .2
mettre en place, le cas échéant, un
system for co-ordinating the related activities système national en vue de coordonner les
between the departments, agencies, control activités connexes entre les départements,
authorities, and other organizations of the institutions, autorités chargées du contrôle, et
State, port operators, Companies and other
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entities concerned with, or responsible for
the implementation of, compliance with, and
enforcement of, measures to enhance
maritime security and search and rescue;

autres organismes de l'État, exploitants
portuaires, compagnies et autres entités
chargées de mettre en œuvre, appliquer et
faire appliquer les mesures visant à renforcer
la sûreté maritime ainsi que la recherche et le
sauvetage;

3. to establish, as necessary, a national
system for harmonizing and co-ordinating
security measures designed to enhance the
security in the international maritime
transport sector with those of other modes of
transport ;

.3
mettre en place, le cas échéant, un
système national en vue d'harmoniser et de
coordonner les mesures relatives à la sûreté
destinées à renforcer la sûreté dans le secteur
du transport maritime international avec
celles qui s'appliquent à d'autres modes de
transport;

4.
to institute or improve a national
mechanism for intra- and intergovernmental
agencies and other relevant stakeholders to
co-operate and co-ordinate on a coastguard
function;

.4
mettre en place un mécanisme
national, ou améliorer le mécanisme existant,
permettant aux institutions officielles
nationales et intergouvernementales et à
d'autres parties prenantes concernées de
coopérer et de coordonner l'action des
services des garde-côtes;

5. to prosecute, in accordance with relevant
domestic laws, perpetrators of all forms of
piracy and unlawful acts against seafarers,
ships, port facility personnel and port
facilities;

5. poursuivre en justice, conformément aux
lois nationales applicables, les auteurs de
toutes les formes d'actes de piraterie et
d'actes illicites à l'encontre des gens de mer,
des navires, des installations portuaires et du
personnel qui y travaille;

6. Set up in each MOWCA member States 6. créer, dans chaque État membre de
the maritime Fund
l'OMAOC, les fonds maritime.
Article 5: Organization and operation

Article 5 : Organisation et fonctionnement

The organization and the operation of the
national structure come exclusively under the
responsibility of each State in accordance
with the laws and regulations in force.

L'organisation et le fonctionnement de la
structure nationale relèvent exclusivement de
la compétence de chaque État Partie
conformément aux lois et règlements en
vigueur.

TITLE II: AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL

TITRE II : AU NIVEAU RÉGIONAL

Article 6: The Parties take following Article 6 : Les États Parties s'engagent à :
obligations:
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.1
s'employer à créer un réseau intégré
1. to seek the establishment of an integrated de garde-côtes des pays d'Afrique de l'Ouest
coastguard function network for West and et du Centre pour élaborer et mettre en
Central Africa to develop and implement, as œuvre, selon qu'il conviendra :
necessary:
a) une politique régionale appropriée de
sûreté maritime afin de protéger le commerce
(a) appropriate regional maritime security maritime contre toutes les formes d'actes
policies to safeguard maritime trade from all illicites;
forms of unlawful acts;
b) une législation régionale, des règles
(b) regional legislation, practices and pratiques et des procédures qui assurent
procedures, which together provide the conjointement les conditions nécessaires à la
security necessary for the safe and secure sécurité et à la sûreté de l'exploitation des
operation of port facilities and ships at all installations portuaires et des navires à tous
security levels;
les niveaux de sûreté;

2. to consolidate the existing, or seek to
establish, as the case may be, a regional
maritime information centre through which
the States can share and exchange securityrelated information, for the aim of preventing
or combating unlawful acts against seafarers,
ships, port facility personnel and port
facilities in the area and ensuring prompt
response to any distress or security alert
received from these ships;

.2
renforcer l'actuel centre régional
d'information maritime, ou s'employer à en
créer un, selon le cas, grâce auquel les États
peuvent mettre en commun et échanger des
renseignements relatifs à la sûreté en vue de
prévenir les actes illicites à l'encontre des
gens de mer, des navires, des installations
portuaires et de leurs personnels se trouvant
dans la zone, ou de lutter contre ces actes, et
de garantir une intervention rapide dans tous
les cas où sont reçues des alertes de détresse
ou de sûreté provenant de ces navires;

.3
rechercher des moyens d'inciter les
États Parties qui font commerce avec
l'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre ainsi que le
secteur des transports maritimes à développer
3. to seek ways for engaging States which et à renforcer la sécurité, la sûreté et la
trade with West and Central Africa and the protection de l'environnement en Afrique de
shipping industry to support and enhance the l'Ouest et du Centre;
safety, security and environmental protection
in West and Central Africa;
4.
lutter contre les actes de piraterie et les
vols à main armée à l'encontre des navires, les actes
illicites et la criminalité transnationale organisée en
mer, en améliorant les stratégies régionales de
4. to combat piracy, armed robbery against sûreté maritime et en renforçant la coopération
ships, unlawful acts and transnational multilatérale aux fins de leur mise en oeuvre;
organized crime at sea by enhancing the
regional maritime security strategies and
multilateral
co-operation
in
their
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implementation;
5. to integrate any existing co-operative
efforts or arrangements relating to combating
unlawful acts against seafarers, ships, port
facility personnel and port facilities and
trans-national organized maritime crime,
including those relating to collection,
assessment, sharing and exchanging of
security-related information and those
relating to the co-operation and co-ordination
among the institutions concerned, such as
naval units, coastal patrol and law
enforcement agencies, shipping companies,
seafarers, and port authorities with a view of
identifying any areas which may warrant
improvements;

5.
intégrer toutes les initiatives ou
dispositifs de coopération existants qui ont
trait à la lutte contre les actes illicites à
l'encontre des gens de mer, des navires, des
installations portuaires et de leurs personnels,
et à la criminalité transnationale organisée
dans les transports maritimes, notamment
ceux qui concernent la collecte, l'évaluation,
la mise en commun et l'échange de
renseignements relatifs à la sûreté, ainsi que
ceux qui portent sur la coopération et la
coordination entre les institutions concernées
telles que les unités navales, les services de
recherche côtiers et les organes de la force
publique, les compagnies de navigation, les
gens de mer et les administrations portuaires
afin de recenser tous les éléments qu'il y
aurait lieu d'améliorer;

6. to improve international and regional cooperation with a view to ensure that pirates
and persons committing unlawful acts
against seafarers, ships and port facilities and
port facility personnel do not evade
prosecution;

6.
améliorer
la
coopération
internationale et régionale afin de garantir
que les pirates et les personnes qui
commettent des actes criminels à l'encontre
des gens de mer, des navires et des
installations portuaires et du personnel qui y
travaille, n'échappent pas aux poursuites;

7. to take into account any existing
legislative and administrative arrangements
relating to the investigation of alleged piracy
or armed robbery incidents and for the
prosecution, conviction and punishment of
those involved in acts of piracy and armed
robbery against ships with a view of
identifying any areas which may warrant
improvement taking into account the
guidelines for the suppression of piracy and
armed-robbery against ships1 developed by
the International Maritime Organization;

7.
prendre en compte tous les
dispositifs législatifs et administratifs
existants qui ont trait aux enquêtes sur les
incidents présumés de piraterie et de vols à
main armée ainsi qu'à la poursuite, à la
condamnation et au châtiment des personnes
impliquées dans des actes de piraterie et des
vols à main armée à l'encontre des navires,
afin de recenser tous les éléments qu'il y
aurait lieu d'améliorer en tenant compte des
recommandations
et
des
directives
pertinentes sur la répression des actes de
piraterie et des vols à main armée à l'encontre
des navires formulées par l'Organisation
maritime internationale;

8. to improve the capacity of national and
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regional training institutions for the training
and development of relevant indigenous
human capital for the operation of an
efficient regional coastguard function
network;

.8
améliorer les moyens des institutions
de formation nationales et régionales aux fins
de la formation et de la mise en valeur du
capital humain local en vue de faire
fonctionner un réseau régional efficace de
garde-côtes;

9. to seek the commitment, consistent with
the provisions of UNCLOS, of any military
ship or other ships in the area capable of
providing assistance, to respond to any
situation of persons in distress at sea;

.9
obtenir l'engagement, conformément
aux dispositions de la Convention des
Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer, de la
part de tous les navires de guerre ou autres
qui se trouvent dans la zone et sont en
mesure de prêter assistance, qu'ils
interviendront lorsque des personnes sont en
détresse en mer;

10. to become parties to and implement the
provisions of, the International Conventions
and Protocols related to the prevention and
suppression of international terrorism and, in
particular, the 1988 SUA Convention, the
1988 SUA Protocol, the Protocol of 2005 to
the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation and the Protocol of
2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf;
the United Nations Convention against
Trans-national Organized Crime, 2000; and
also to become parties to and implement the
1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees, and its 1967 Protocol as well as
the 1969 OAU Convention governing the
specific aspects of refugee problems of
Africa;

10.
devenir parties, dans les plus brefs
délais, aux conventions et protocoles
internationaux qui concernent la prévention
et la répression du terrorisme international, et
notamment la Convention SUA de 1988, le
Protocole SUA de 1988, le Protocole de 2005
relatif à la Convention pour la répression
d'actes illicites contre la sécurité de la
navigation maritime et le Protocole de 2005
relatif au Protocole pour la répression d'actes
illicites contre la sécurité des plates-formes
fixes situées sur le plateau continental, la
Convention des Nations Unies contre la
criminalité transnationale organisée (2000);
et aussi devenir parties en appliquant leurs
dispositions, à la Convention de 1951 relative
au statut des réfugiés et son Protocole de
1967 ainsi qu'à la Convention de l'OUA
régissant les aspects propres aux problèmes
des réfugiés en Afrique (1969);

11. to ensure that, in seeking the fulfilment
of the above objectives, a balance is
maintained between the need to enhance
maritime security and facilitation of
maritime traffic and to avoid any
unnecessary delays to international maritime
trade in West and Central Africa;

11
faire en sorte, en s'efforçant
d'atteindre les objectifs ci-dessus, de
respecter un équilibre entre la nécessité de
renforcer la sûreté maritime et les
dispositions visant à faciliter le trafic
maritime, de façon à éviter de retarder
indûment le commerce maritime international
en Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre;
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12. to co-operate and collaborate with the
sub-regional fisheries bodies and the Food
and Agriculture Organization on preventing
and combating illegal, unregulated and
unreported fishing, and protecting fisheries
resources for sustainable long term
utilization to sustain livelihoods in West and
Central Africa;

.12
coopérer et collaborer avec les
organismes de pêche sous-régionaux et
l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour
l'alimentation et l'agriculture pour prévenir et
éliminer la pêche illicite, non déclarée et non
réglementée, et protéger les ressources
halieutiques en vue d'une exploitation
durable permettant de conserver les moyens
de subsistance en Afrique de l'Ouest et du
Centre;

13. to ensure that measures taken to control
borders and restrictions and aliens access to
territory are in compliance with international
law including human rights and refugee law;

13.
s'assurer que les mesures prises pour
contrôler les frontières et les restrictions de
l'accès des étrangers sur le territoire sont
conformes au droit international, notamment
aux droits de l'homme et au droit des
réfugiés;

14. to co-operate with the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees with 14.
coopérer avec le Haut Commissariat
regard to the protection of asylum seekers des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés (HCR)
and refugees at sea;
en ce qui concerne la protection des
demandeurs d'asile et des réfugiés en mer;

15. to review periodically the progress of the
efforts made in achieving the above
objective and to share the result of the
experience gained with MOWCA Member
States; and

16. to have the General Assembly of
MOWCA and the Bureau of Ministers
informed of efforts made in achieving the
above objective, and of the international
support provided in this regard.
TITLE
2:
ORGANISATION

MISSION

15.
examiner
régulièrement
l'état
d'avancement des initiatives menées pour
atteindre les objectifs susmentionnés et
partager les résultats de l'expérience acquise
avec les États Membres de l'OMAOC; et
16.
tenir l'Assemblée Générale de
l'OMAOC et le Bureau des Ministres
informés des efforts déployés pour atteindre
les objectifs ci-dessus et du soutien
international reçu à cet effet.

AND

TITRE

Article 7: Missions

2:
MISSIONS
ORGANISATION

ET

Article 7 : Missions

The goal of the Coastguard Function
Network (the Network) is to allow the parties
to promote and make joint efforts as far as
their maritime activities are concerned,

Le Réseau de garde-côtes a pour mission de
permettre aux États Parties de promouvoir et
d'entreprendre, dans la mesure où leurs
activités maritimes sont concernées, des
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particularly those devoted to the protection
of the human life, the enforcement of the
laws, the improvement of safety and the
protection of the environment.

actions communes visant notamment à la
sauvegarde de la vie humaine en mer, au
respect des lois, à l'amélioration de la sécurité
et à la protection du milieu marin.
Article 8 : Organisation administrative

Article 8: Administrative organisation

L'organe suprême de décision du Réseau est
le Conseil des Ministres (ci-après dénommé
le Conseil).

The highest body of administration of the
Network is the Council of Ministers
(hereafter called the Council).

Le Conseil des Ministres élit son bureau
conformément au règlement intérieur de
l'Organisation.

The Council of Ministers elects its bureau in
accordance with the Rules of Procedure of
the Organisation

Le Conseil décide de la politique générale
du Réseau, adopte le budget annuel, nomme
le Coordonnateur principal et prend toutes
autres
décisions
prévues
par
le
Mémorandum. Il peut interpréter le
Mémorandum.

The Council decides on the general policy
of the Network, adopts the annual budget,
appoints the Principal Coordinator and takes
all other decisions envisaged by the
memorandum. It can interpret the
Memorandum.
The Council meets twice (2) per annum. It
can hold extraordinary meetings where
necessary.

Le Conseil se réunit deux (2) fois par an. Il
peut tenir des réunions extraordinaires en cas
de besoin.

Le Coordonnateur principal du Réseau
The Principal Coordinator of the Network participe aux réunions du Conseil.
takes part in the meetings of the Council.
Le Secrétaire général de l'OMAOC participe
The Secretary-General of MOWCA takes aux réunions du Conseil en qualité
part in the meetings of the Council as d'observateur.
observer.
Article 9: TECHNICAL EVALUATION
COMMITTEE
The Technical Committee of Evaluation
(hereafter) called the technical committee, is
composed of experts nominated by the
Secretary-general of MOWCA, in charge of
steering the implementation and the progress
of the Network
Article 10: Committee of Representatives

Article 9 : Le Comité technique d'évaluation

Le Comité technique d’évaluation (ci-après)
appelé le comité technique, est composé
d’experts nommés par le Secrétaire Général
de l’OMAOC, chargé de suivre la mise en
œuvre et l’évolution du Réseau

Article 10 : Comité des représentants

The Representatives of the Committee
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(hereafter called the Committee) is
composed of a Representative for each State
Party. Each Representative can be assisted
by two substitutes.

Le Comité des Représentants (ci-après appelé
le Comité) est composé d’un Représentant de
chaque Etat Partie. Chaque Représentant
peut être assisté de deux Représentants
suppléants.

The Representative of a State Party is the
Person in charge, in his/her country, of
the general coordination of all the
questions relating to the Network and the
only person in charge of the connection
between his Government and the
Network, except for what relates to the
capacity of the Council.

Le Représentant d’une Partie est le
Responsable, dans son pays, de la
coordination générale de toutes les questions
regardant le Réseau et seul chargé de la
liaison entre son Gouvernement et le
Réseau, à l’exception des questions relevant
de la compétence du Conseil.

The Committee assists the Principal
Coordinator in the general administration of
the Network. On a proposal from the
Principal Coordinator, it decides principles
of the work programme and the means of
the Network. It adopts the relevant
operational documents relating to the
activity of the Organisation.

Le Comité assiste les Coordonnateurs
principaux dans la gestion du Réseau. Sur
proposition des Coordonnateurs principaux,
il décide (des principes) du programme
d’activité des moyens du Réseau. Il adopte
les documents opérationnels pertinents en
relation avec l’activité du Réseau.

It examines all the questions submitted to it
by the Principal Coordinators and,
according to the cases, delivers opinions,
decides or transmits to the technical
evaluation committee.
The Committee proposes to the Council the
appointment of the Deputy Principal
Coordinator and the Coordinator of zones.

Il examine toutes les questions qui lui sont
soumises par les Coordonnateurs principaux
et, selon les cas, donne les avis, décide ou
transmet au comité technique d’évaluation.
Le Comité propose au comité d’évaluation
la
nomination
des
Coordonnateurs
principaux Adjoints et les Coordonnateurs
de zones.

The committee of evaluation attends the Le comité d’évaluation assiste statutairement
meetings of the committee as statutory aux réunions du comité.
participant.
Le Comité des Représentants élit son bureau
The Representatives Committee elects its conformément au règlement intérieur du
bureau in accordance with the rules of Réseau
procedure of the Organisation.
Article 11: Committee of Representatives

Article 11 : Comité des représentants

The Principal Coordinator is the legal Le Coordonnateur principal est
representative of the network. He/she is représentant légal du Réseau. Il
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le
est

responsible for its general management and
can take the required measures to this end, in
accordance with the provisions of this
memorandum. He/she can delegate his
powers to his Assistant and to the
Coordinator of the zones in accordance with
the directives approved by the Council.

responsable de sa gestion générale et peut
prendre les mesures nécessaires à cette fin,
conformément aux dispositions du présent
Mémorandum. Il peut déléguer ses pouvoirs
à son adjoint et aux Coordonnateurs de zone,
conformément aux directives approuvées par
le Conseil.

He/she is replaced by the Deputy Principal
Coordinator when he/she is unavailable.
He/she accounts for operational activities of
the Network at each meeting of the Council.

Il est remplacé par le Coordonnateur
principal adjoint en cas d'empêchement. Il
rend compte, lors de chaque réunion du
Conseil, des activités du Réseau.

Article 12: Constitution of the Network
Article 12 : Constitution du Réseau
The Network comprises four (04)
Coastguard zones with respective four (4) Le Réseau comprend quatre (4) zones des
Coastguard Zonal Coordinating Centres and garde cotes avec quatre (4) Centres de
two (2) Principal Coordinating Centres:
coordination de la zone et deux (2) Centres
principal de coordination :
- Zone 1: Mauritania, Senegal, Gambia,
Guinea Bissau, Cabo Verde.
- Zone 2: Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, - Zone 1 : Mauritanie, Sénégal, Gambie,
Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana.
Guinée-Bissau, Cap Vert.
- Zone 3: Togo,
Benin,
Nigeria,
- Zone 2 : Guinée, Sierra Léone, Libéria,
Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea.
Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana.
- Zone 4: Gabon, Congo, DRC, Sao
- Zone 3 : Togo,
Bénin,
Nigéria,
Tome & Principe, Angola.
Cameroun, Guinée équatoriale
ln each zone, a Coordinator is in charge of - Zone 4 : Gabon, Congo, RDC, Sao
Tomé-et-Principe, Angola
operations in his/her zone, according to
Principal Coordinator's instructions and
Dans chaque zone, les operations sont
orders.
dirigées par un Coordonnateur, selon les
instructions et ordres du Coordonnateur
principal.
Article 13

Article 13

The Network comprises fixed facilities and Le Réseau comprend des moyens fixes et des
mobile facilities.
moyens mobiles.
Article 14: Fixed facilities include:

Article 14 : Les moyens fixes comprennent :


operational facilities, devoted to
gathering of information (such as radar
stations) and anagement of operations and, in


les moyens opérationnels, consacrés
à la collecte des informations (comme les
stations radar) et à la direction des
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general, of all the activities of the Network;

opérations, et d'une manière générale, des
activités du Réseau;


training facilities, devoted to
improving the skills of the staff. Training
facilities can be shared with another structure
or created within the framework of an
existing training centre;

 les moyens de formation, consacrés à
l'amélioration des compétences du personnel.
Les moyens de formation peuvent être
partagés avec une autre structure ou être
créés dans le cadre d'un établissement de
formation existant;


Means, devoted to the maintenance
 Les moyens de soutien, consacrés à
and the
l'entretien et au soutien opérationnel du
operational support of the Network.
Réseau.
Article 15
The logistic means of the Network include
nautical and aeronautical means, and also
terrestrial means. All the logistic means of
the Network are subject to the operational
rules envisaged by the second part of this
memorandum. All the means of the Network
have the same colors and distinctive marks
adopted by the Council. Similar distinctive
characteristics appear in the logo and
emblem of the Network.

Article 16:
Each ship belonging to the Network flies the
flag of the State Party where it is assigned. It
is used only in its zone except temporarily
for joint missions, reinforcements or
replacements of other ships. The logistic
means of the Network cannot be used for
military missions of the flag State, except for
peace or evacuation missions

The logistic means are the property of the
Network. It supplies them with fuel, makes
the maintenance and assigns each one of
them to a State Party which has the
responsibility to equip and train the crew.

Article 15
Les moyens mobiles du Réseau comprennent
des moyens martimes et aéronautiques et
également des moyens terrestres. Tous les
moyens mobiles du Réseau sont soumis aux
règles d'exploitation prévues dans la
deuxième partie du présent Mémorandum.
Tous les moyens du Réseau portent les
mêmes couleurs et marques distinctives
adoptées par le Conseil. Des caractéristiques
distinctives semblables apparaissent dans le
logo et l'emblème du Réseau.
Article 16
Chaque navire du Réseau bat le pavillon de
l'État Partie à laquelle il a été affecté. Il est
utilisé uniquement dans sa zone sauf, à titre
temporaire, pour des missions conjointes, du
renfort ou en remplacement d'autres moyens.
Les moyens du Réseau ne peuvent pas être
utilisés pour des missions militaires menées
par l’État du pavillon, sauf pour des missions
de maintien de la paix ou d'évacuation.
Les moyens mobiles sont la propriété du
Réseau qui les approvisionne en carburant,
les entretient et qui affecte chacun d'eux à
une Partie qui a la charge d'équipes et de
former l'équipage.
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A part of the training of the crew however is
organized and supported by the Network.
While endorsing the responsibility to equip
and train the crew, the Flag State can make
arrangements with other States Parties in
order to allow nationals to be embarked in
the maximum proportion of a third of the
officers and half of all the crew.

Une partie de la formation des équipages est
cependant organisée et supportée par le
Réseau. Tout en assumant la responsabilité
d’équiper et de former l'équipage, l'État
Partie du pavillon peut passer des accords
avec d'autres Parties pour que des nationaux
de celles-ci soient embarqués dans la
proportion maximale d'un tiers des officiers
et de la moitié de tout l'équipage.

Article 17
However, if the agreement fixing the
conditions of equipment and maintenance is
accepted by the Network, a State Party can
provide the network with logistic means as
stipulated by the memorandum except for the
right of ownership.

Article 17
Cependant, si l’accord fixant les conditions
d’équipement et d’entretien est accepté par le
Réseau, un État Partie peut mettre un moyen
mobile à la disposition du Réseau, comme
prévu par le présent Mémorandum, sauf en ce
qui concerne le droit de propriété.

In this case, the conditions of armaments,
provisioning and maintenance are subject of
an agreement between the Organization and
the State Party

Dans ce cas, les conditions d'armement,
d'approvisionnement et d'entretien font l'objet
d'un accord entre l'Organisation et l'État
Partie.

Article 18
The supply and the maintenance of ships can
be conceded by the zones Coordinators to a
private company with the consent of the
Principal Coordinators.

Article 19
The Principal Coordinator and zone
Coordinators are assisted by a permanent
office including as much as possible agents
of all the parties concerned. These offices
include an operational center devoted to the
collection of information and to the diffusion
of information relating to the activities of the
Organization

THIRD
PART:
OPERATIONS

RULES

Article 18
Les tâches relatives à l’approvisionnement et
à l'entretien des moyens peuvent être
concédées par les Coordonnateurs de zone à
une société privée avec l'accord du
Coordonnateur principal.

Article 19
Le Coordonnateur principal et les
Coordonnateurs de zone sont assistés par un
bureau permanent comprenant autant que
possible des agents de toutes les parties
concernées. Ces bureaux comprennent un
centre opérationnel consacré à la collecte
d'informations et à la diffusion d'informations
relatives aux activités de l'Organisation.

OF TROISIÈME PARTIE :
D'EXPLOITATION
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LES

RÈGLES

TITLE 1: IN NORMAL TIME

TITRE I : EN TEMPS NORMAL

Article 20: At national level
Each State Party organizes at the national
level, its surveillance missions in accordance
with its laws and regulations in force.

Article 20 : Au niveau national
Chaque État Partie organise, au niveau
national,
ses missions de surveillance
conformément à ses lois et règlements en
vigueur.

Article 21: Zone cooperation agreement

Article 21 : Accord de coopération au niveau
de la zone

The States Parties, in addition to the
provisions of the memorandum and its
appendices, can sign bilateral cooperation
agreements without prejudice to the
agreement set up and organizing the specific
functioning of each zone.

Outre les dispositions réglementaires prévues
par le Mémorandum et ses annexes, les États
Parties peuvent signer des accords de
coopération bilatérale sans préjudice de
l'accord cadre mis en place et organisant le
fonctionnement spécifique de chaque zone.

Each time it is necessary, a State Party can
benefit, through this agreement, from
logistical and humane support of another
State Party according to procedures they will
have adopted.
The same State Party can sign the same
agreement with the other State Parties of the
zone.

Chaque fois qu'il est nécessaire, un État
Partie peut dans le cadre de cet accord
bénéficier du soutien d'un autre État Partie en
moyens logisitiques et en personnel, selon les
modalités qu'ils auront arrêtées.
Un État Partie peut signer le même accord
avec tous les autres États Parties de la zone.
Article 22 : Les missions sont planifiées et
ordonnées par les Coordonnateurs de zone.

Article 22: The missions are planned and
ordered by the zone Coordinators.
Les Parties, par l'intermédiaire de leur
Représentant, envoient aux Coordonnateurs
The States Parties via their representatives de zone, avec toutes justifications utiles, leurs
send to the zone Coordinators, with any demandes concernant la présence des moyens
useful justification, their requests for dans leur secteur.
presence of the facilities in their sector.
Les programmes des missions ordonnées par
The programmes of missions ordered by the les Coordonnateurs de zone sont envoyés aux
zone Coordinators are sent to the Représentants des États Parties de la zone.
Representatives of the State parties of the
zone.
Article 23: The facilities must carry out Article 23 : Les moyens doivent servir à
constabulary missions in accordance with the exécuter les missions de police dans le
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law of the competent State Party for the respect du droit de l'État Partie compétent
given sector, and in accordance with pour le secteur donné, et dans le respect de la
UNCLOS.
Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de
la mer de 1982.
SAR missions are carried out according to Les missions SAR sont exécutées selon les
provisions of SAR Convention and its dispositions de la Convention SAR et de ses
protocols.
documents d'application.

Article 24: On request or with the
authorization of a competent agent, a
coastguard facility can carry out an act of
police in a foreign sector, as if it were a
facility of the State Party of this sector and in
accordance with the applied laws. If the
competent agent is not on board, his request
or his authorization can be transmitted by
any suitable means of communication. The
reports of the embarked agents on board
have the same legal force as a report carried
out by a competent Officer.

Article 24 : Sur demande ou avec
l'autorisation d'un agent compétent, un
moyen peut exécuter un acte de police dans
un secteur étranger, comme s'il était un
moyen de l'État Partie de ce secteur et en
conformité avec la législation qui y est en
vigueur. Si l'agent compétent n'est pas à bord
du moyen, sa demande ou son autorisation
peut être transmise par tout moyen de
communication approprié. Les comptes
rendus des agents embarqués à bord du
moyen ont la même valeur juridique qu'un
compte rendu effectué par un fonctionnaire
compétent.

Article 25: The States Parties take any Article 25 : Les États Parties prennent toute
appropriate measures to harmonize their mesure appropriée pour harmoniser leurs
legal status relating to the policing at sea.
régimes juridiques relatifs à la police en mer.
TITLE II: IN TIME OF CRISIS

TITRE II : EN TEMPS DE CRISE

Article 26: In case of events (accidents, acts
of piracy, marine pollution, and other illicit
acts) in territorial waters under jurisdiction
of a given zone, and requiring an external
assistance,
the
Maritime
Authority
approaches at once the Principal Coordinator
of the zone and informs the agency or
agencies with responsibility for national
coastguard functions.

Article 26 : En cas d’événements (accidents,
actes de piraterie, pollution marine, trafic et
autres actes illicites) ayant eu lieu dans les
eaux sous juridiction d'une zone donnée et
nécessitant une assistance extérieure,
l'autorité maritime locale saisit aussitôt le
Coordonnateur principal de la zone en vue
d'informer les garde-côtes.

The Principal Coordinator concerned Le Coordonnateur de la zone en question met
implements the action plan envisaged for this en œuvre le plan d'action prévu à cet effet et
purpose and annexed at the present annexé au présent Mémorandum.
memorandum.
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TITLE III: EMERGENCY PLAN

TITRE III : PLAN D'URGENCE

Article 27: The Principal Coordinator works
out a sub regional draft of emergency plan to
be submitted to the approval of the Council.
The Principal Coordinator is in charge of the
implementation of the emergency plan thus
adopted.

Article 27 : Le Coordonnateur principal
établit un projet de plan d'urgence sousrégional à soumettre à l'approbation du
Conseil. Le Coordonnateur principal est
chargé de la mise en œuvre du plan d'urgence
ainsi adopté.

FOURTH
PART:
RESOURCES

FINANCIAL QUATRIÈME PARTIE :
FINANCIÈRES

Article 28: The financial resources of the
network include:
- regional maritime funds;
- the
normal
or
extraordinary
contributions decided by the Council;
- contributions of organizations or donor
countries;
- 50 % of penalties and confiscations
resulting from the actions of the Network.
Article 29: Each State Party begins to pay its
financial contribution to the Network in
accordance with the decisions and
procedures adopted by the council.

RESSOURCES

Article 28 : Les ressources financières du
Réseau comprennent :
- les fonds maritimes régionaux;
- les
contributions
ordinaires
ou
extraordinaires décidées par le
Conseil;
- des contributions d'organisations ou pays
donateurs;
- 50 % des amendes et confiscations
résultant des actions du Réseau.
Article 29 : Chaque État Partie s'engage à
s'acquitter de sa contribution financière aux
coûts de fonctionnement du Réseau,
conformément aux décisions et procédures
adoptées par le Conseil.

FIFTH PART: ENGAGEMENTS OF CINQUIÈME
PARTIE :
STATE PARTIES
ENGAGEMENTS DES ÉTATS PARTIES
Article 30: Each State Party gives effect to
the provisions of this Memorandum or its
appendices, which constitute an integral part
of the Memorandum, and will take any
necessary measures to ratify or accept the
relevant legal instruments for the
implementation of the Memorandum.

Article 30 : Chaque État Partie donne effet
aux dispositions du présent Mémorandum ou
de ses annexes, lesquelles font partie
intégrante du Mémorandum, et prendra toutes
les mesures nécessaires pour ratifier ou
accepter les instruments juridiques pertinents
pour la mise en œuvre du Mémorandum.

Article 31 : Chaque État Partie établit une
Article 31: Each State Party establishes an organisation nationale de garde-côtes
effective national organization of coastguard, efficace, en s'assurant que cette organisation
by making sure that this organization is in est conforme aux normes décrites dans les
conformity with the standards described in instruments définis dans le présent
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the
instruments
Memorandum.

defined

in

this Mémorandum.

Article 32 : Chaque État Partie se concerte,
Article 32: Each State Party consults, coopère et échange des informations avec les
cooperates and exchanges information with autres États Parties en vue de mieux réaliser
other States Parties in order to improve the les objectifs du Mémorandum.
objectives of the Memorandum.
SIXIÈME
FINALES

SIXTH PART: FINAL PROVISIONS
.
TITLE I : OTHER PROVISIONS

PARTIE :

DISPOSITIONS

TITRE I : DISPOSITIONS DIVERSES

Article 33: Any State Party which has
accepted the Memorandum can propose
amendments or appendices to the
Memorandum.

Article 33 : Tout État Partie, qui a accepté le
Mémorandum,
peut
proposer
des
amendements
ou
des
annexes
au
Mémorandum.

In the case of amendment proposal to the
Memorandum, the following procedure will
apply:
a) the amendment suggested will be
submitted to the principal Coordination
Centre in order to be studied, at least six
(06) weeks before the meeting of the
Committee;
b) the amendments will be adopted by a
majority of two thirds of the
Representatives of the States Parties in
the Committee;
c) if the amendment is adopted, it will be
communicated
by
the
principal
Coordination Centre to the States Parties
for acceptance.

Dans le cas d’une proposition d'amendements
au Mémorandum, la procédure suivante
s'appliquera :
a)
l'amendement proposé sera soumis au
Centre principal de Coordination pour
étude, au moins six (6) semaines avant
la réunion du Comité;
b)
les amendements seront adoptés par
une majorité des deux tiers des
Représentants des Parties présentes et
votantes dans le Comité;
c)
si l'amendement est adopté, il sera
communiqué par le Centre principal de
Coordination aux États Parties pour
acceptation.

Article 34: An amendment is supposed to be
accepted, either at the end of a period of six
(06) months after adoption by the
Representatives of the States Parties in the
Committee, or at the end of any other period
determined
unanimously
by
the
Representatives of the States Parties in the
Committee, unless for the considered period
an objection is communicated to the
Secretariat by a State Party.

Article 34 : Un amendement est réputé avoir
été accepté, soit à la fin d'une période de six
(6) mois après adoption par les Représentants
des États Parties dans le Comité, soit à la fin
de toute autre période déterminée à
l'unanimité par les représentants des États
Parties dans le Comité au moment de son
adoption, à moins que pendant la période
considérée une objection soit communiquée
au Secrétariat par un État Partie.
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An amendment comes into force sixty (60)
days after being accepted, or at the end of
any other period determined unanimously by
the Council.

Un amendement entre en vigueur soixante
(60) jours après avoir été accepté, ou à la fin
de toute autre période déterminée à
l'unanimité par le Conseil.

Article35: In case of amendment or Article 35 : Dans le cas de propositions
appendix
proposals,
the
following d'amendements
ou
d'annexes
au
procedures is followed:
Mémorandum, la procédure suivante est
suivie :
a) the amendment or the appendix proposed a) l'amendement ou l'annexe proposé sera
will be submitted to the examination by
soumis à l'examen des États Parties par
the States Parties through the Principal
l’intermédiaire
du
Coordonnateur
Coordinator;
principal;
b) the amendment or the appendix is b) l'amendement ou l'annexe est réputé avoir
supposed to be accepted at the end of a
été accepté à la fin d'une période de trois
period of three (03) months from the
(3) mois à partir de la date à laquelle il a
date on which it was communicated by
été communiqué par le Centre principal
the Principal Coordination Centre, unless
de coordination, à moins qu'un État Partie
a State Party requests only the
ne demande par écrit que l'amendement
amendment in writing or the appendix is
ou l'annexe ne soit examiné par le
not examined by the Committee. In this
Conseil. Dans ce cas, la procédure
case, the procedure specified in article
spécifiée à l'article 6.1.1. s'applique;
6.1.1 applies;
c) l'amendement ou l'annexe entre en
c) the amendment or the appendix comes
vigueur soixante (60) jours après avoir
into force sixty (60) days after being
été accepté, ou à la fin de toute autre
accepted, or at the end of any other
période déterminée à l'unanimité par les
period determined unanimously by the
États Parties.
States Parties.
Article 36 : Le Mémorandum s'applique sans
Article 36: The Memorandum comes into préjudice des droits et obligations découlant
force without prejudice to the laws and d'un instrument international, quel qu'il soit.
regulations derived from an international
instrument.
Une autorité maritime, qui remplit les critères
spécifiés dans le présent Mémorandum ou
A Maritime Authority satisfying the criteria dans ses amendements ou annexes, peut
specified in this memorandum or its adhérer au Mémorandum ou à ses
amendments or appendices can adhere to the amendements ou annexes avec l'accord de
Memorandum or its amendments or tous les États Parties qui ont accepté le
appendices with the agreement of all the Mémorandum, ses amendements ou annexes.
States Parties which have accepted the
Memorandum,
its
amendments
or
appendices.

538

Article 37: The Memorandum remains ready
for signature to the West and Central Africa
States and throughout a twelve (12) month
period, in the headquarters of MOWCA.

Article 37 : Le Mémorandum demeure
ouvert à la signature des États de l'Afrique de
l'Ouest et du Centre pendant une durée de
douze (12) mois, au siège de l'OMAOC.

However, it comes into force in a given zone Toutefois, il entre en vigueur dans une zone
three months after all the States Parties of donnée trois mois après que tous les États
this zone have signed it.
Parties de cette zone l'ont signé.
After the considerations mentioned above,
the States Parties will be able to implement it
if they satisfy the requirements contained in
the Memorandum.

Compte tenu des aspects susmentionnés, les
États Parties peuvent mettre le Mémorandum
en application s'ils satisfont aux exigences
qui y sont enoncées.

Article 38: Any maritime Authority or
Organization wishing to take part as observer
will submit a written request to the
Committee, and will be considered as
observer with the unanimous agreement of
the Representatives of the States Parties
present and voting at the meeting of the
Committee.

Article 38 : Une autorité maritime ou
organisation souhaitant participer comme
observateur soumettra au Comité une
demande écrite, et sera admise comme
observateur avec l'accord unanime des
Représentants des États Parties présents et
votantes à la réunion du Comité.

Article 39: Each State Party, which has not
yet done so, is invited to establish,
specialized Government Agency which shall
develop and execute on shore and at sea
duties of maritime navigation and marine
pollution polices, including search and
rescue, combating piracy and unlawful acts
against safety and security of maritime
navigation.

Article 40: In establishing such Agencies,
States shall take account of the relevant
international conventions and instruments on
the aforementioned issues and the need to
grant adequate enforcement powers to such
Agencies. States shall take steps to
harmonize their legal regimes regarding
enforcement at sea

Article 39 : Tout État Partie, qui ne l'a pas
encore fait, est invité à établir un service
gouvernemental spécialisé chargé de mettre
au point et d'exécuter, à terre et en mer, les
missions de police en matière de navigation
maritime et de pollution marine, y compris la
recherche et le sauvetage, la lutte contre la
piraterie et les actes illicites commis contre la
sécurité de la navigation maritime.
Article 40 : En créant de tels services, les
États Parties tiennent compte des conventions
et instruments internationaux pertinents
relatifs aux questions susmentionnées ainsi
qu'au besoin de garantir des pouvoirs
coercitifs adéquats à de tels services. Les
États Parties prennent les mesures
nécessaires pour harmoniser leurs régimes
juridiques concernant l'application des lois en
mer.

539

MARITIME COOPERATION

COOPÉRATION MARITIME

Article 41: States are invited to become Article 41 : Les États sont invités à devenir
parties to UNCLOS, SUA and other relevant Parties contractantes à la Convention des
instruments, noting that this will contribute Nations Unies sur le droit de la Mer de 1982,
à la Convention SUA et à d'autres
to the strengthening of peace, security,
instruments pertinents, dans le but de
cooperation, sustainable development and
contribuer au renforcement de la paix, de la
friendly relations.
sûreté, de la coopération, du développement
durable et des relations amicales.
Article 42: States Parties accept that a Article 42 : Les États Parties admettent
qu'une bonne compréhension du concept de
comprehensive concept of regional maritime
sûreté maritime régionale implique une
security requires an integrated regional and
approche régionale et multidisciplinaire
multidisciplinary approach, necessitating intégrée, nécessitant la coopération et la
cooperation and coordination of all interested coordination de toutes les structures et
activités concernées.
bodies and activities.

Article 43: States Parties agree to offer Article 43 : Les États Parties s'engagent à
assistance upon request in a coordinated apporter leur assistance aux États membres,
method to member States on capacity sur demande et de manière coordonnée, afin
building in terms of equipment and de renforcer les capacités en matière
d'équipement et de personnel, en vue de la
personnel requirement for the establishment
mise en place et de l’exécution efficace des
of and efficient performance of coastguard fonctions de garde-côtes par un service
functions by a designated agency.
désigné.
Article 44 : Les États Parties reconnaissent
Article 44: States Parties recognize the l'importance de la coopération pour la gestion
importance of cooperation for the du milieu marin dans la région de l'Afrique
management of the marine environment, de l'Ouest et du Centre, particulièrement en
particularly with respect to safety, security ce qui concerne la sécurité et la sûreté
and maritime casualty for the West and maritimes, et les accidents maritimes.
Central Africa region.

MARITIME ROUTES

ROUTES MARITIMES

Article 45 : Les États Parties reconnaissent
Article 45: States Parties recognize the l'importance de la liberté de navigation,
importance of freedom of navigation, in conformément aux dispositions de la
accordance with the provisions of UNCLOS, Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de
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to the maintenance of seaborne trade in West la mer de 1982, pour la poursuite des
échanges commerciaux maritimes dans la
and Central Africa.
région de l'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre.

Article

46:

Taking

into

account

the Article 46 : Eu égard à la promotion de la
promotion of the safety of navigation and the sécurité de la navigation et de la protection
protection of the marine environment, States du milieu marin, les États Parties établissent
shall develop cooperative approaches to the des stratégies de coopération pour le maintien
et la protection des routes maritimes. De
maintenance and protection of maritime
telles stratégies de coopération prévoient
routes. Such co-operative approaches include l'échange d'informations et la formation dans
exchanges of information and training in des domaines tels que l'assistance
such areas as humanitarian assistance, search humanitaire, la recherche et le sauvetage, la
and rescue, marine safety, and law and order sécurité maritime et l'ordre public en mer.
at sea. The exchange of information should L'échange d'informations devrait inclure les
renseignements sur les menaces potentielles
include information on likely threats to, or
ou les incidents en matière de sûreté
security incidents relating to maritime routes.
concernant les routes maritimes.
Article 47 : D'autres mesures de mise en
Article 47: Further implementation of this
œuvre de cette stratégie de coopération
cooperative approach could include naval
peuvent inclure la coopération maritime et le
cooperation and the sharing of information
partage des informations résultant de la
resulting from maritime surveillance.
surveillance maritime.
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

ASSISTANCE HUMANITAIRE

Article 48: States Parties recognize the Article 48 : Les États Parties reconnaissent
benefits of working together on the les avantages découlant des initiatives
prevention, mitigation and management of communes de prévention, d'atténuation des
maritime natural disasters, including effets et de gestion des catastrophes
naturelles,
notamment
la
preparedness and early warning systems, the maritimes
préparation et les systèmes d’alerte rapide,
exchange of information, compilation of data
l'échange d'informations, le regroupement
bases, planning, disaster reduction and relief des bases de données, la planification, la
activities, as well as training and education prévention des catastrophes et les activités
programs.
humanitaires, ainsi que la formation et les
programmes éducatifs.
RECHERCHE ET SAUVETAGE
Article 49 : Les États Parties sont invités à
Article 49: States Parties are invited to promouvoir un plus grand partage de leur
promote greater sharing of maritime Search expérience et expertise en matière de
and Rescue (SAR) experience and expertise, recherche et de sauvetage (SAR), et à
SEARCH AND RESCUE
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as well as facilitate coordination and faciliter la coordination et la coopération en
matière de formation et de procédures SAR.
cooperation in SAR training and procedures.
Article 50 : Les États Parties se concertent
Article 50: States Parties consult with regard en ce qui concerne la ratification, la mise en
to the ratification, implementation and œuvre et la participation aux instruments et
participation in relevant conventions and conventions maritimes pertinents en matière
de recherche et de sauvetage.
instruments concerning maritime SAR.
MARITIME SAFETY

SÉCURITÉ MARITIME

Article 51: States Parties shall promote
Article 51 : Les États Parties favorisent la
sécurité maritime en prenant des mesures
telles que :
- l'édition de cartes adéquates;
- la publication et la diffusion d'avis aux
navigateurs;
- l'utilisation d'aides à la navigation
appropriées;
Article 52: States Parties express support for
la notification des routes maritimes
regional and international efforts to deal with
recommandées.
the problem of sub-standard ships, including
the establishment of regional systems of port
Article 52 : Les États Parties expriment leur
state control.
appui aux efforts régionaux et internationaux
destinés à régler le problème des navires sous
Article 53: States Parties consult each other normes, y compris l'établissement de régimes
régionaux de contrôle par l'État du port.
with
regard
to
the
ratification,
navigational safety by measures such as:
- the edition of adequate cartography;
- the publication and the diffusion of notices
to sailors;
- the use of appropriate navigational aids;
- the notification of recommended shipping
routes.

implementation and participation in relevant
conventions and instruments concerning Article 53: Les États Parties se concertent en
maritime safety.
ce qui concerne la ratification, la mise en
œuvre et la participation aux instruments et
conventions maritimes pertinents en matière
de sécurité maritime.
LAW AND ORDER AT SEA

ORDRE PUBLIC EN MER

Article 54 : Les États Parties reconnaissent
l'importance de la coopération pour le maintien et
cooperation in the maintenance and enforcement of law and
le respect de l'ordre public en mer, y compris la
order at sea, including the prevention of piracy, drug prévention de la piraterie, du trafic de drogue et
smuggling, and other crimes at sea, also recognize the rights d’autres crimes en mer, et reconnaissent
of States Parties to enforce their domestic laws at sea to the également les droits des États à appliquer leurs
Article 54: States Parties recognize the importance of
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lois nationales en mer dans les limites admises
par le droit international.

extent allowed by international law.

Article 55: States Parties recognize the right of hot pursuit
and shall develop an effective mechanism thereof which
shall take in consideration the provisions of Article III of this

Article 55 : Les États Parties reconnaissent le
droit de poursuite et mettront en place à cet effet
un dispositif efficace qui tiendra compte des
dispositions de l'article III du Mémorandum.

Memorandum.

Article 56: States Parties are invited to institute regular
meetings to enhance cooperation and coordination in their
maritime enforcement activities.

Article 56 : Les États Parties sont invitées à instituer des
réunions régulières pour renforcer la coopération et la
coordination de leurs activités en matière d'application des
règlements maritimes.

COOPÉRATION MARITIME
Article 57 : Les États Parties reconnaissent les avantages
découlant de la coopération maritime pour ce qui est de créer
un climat de confiance, y compris le renforcement des
contacts entre personnels et les mesures volontaires visant à
promouvoir la transparence.
NAVAL CO-OPERATION

Article 58 : Les États Parties peuvent souhaiter
disposer d'un cadre d'instruments bilatéraux ou
Article 57: States Parties acknowledge the confidence- multilatéraux applicables aux marines nationales
building benefits of naval cooperation, including increased concernées en vue d'éviter les incidents
personnel contacts and voluntary measures to promote naval maritimes.
transparency.

SURVEILLANCE MARITIME

Article 58: States Parties may wish to consider a framework
of bilateral or multilateral instruments for the navy concerned
in order to avoid the nautical incidents.

MARITIME SURVEILLANCE

Article 59: States Parties recognize that maritime
surveillance may be conducted for peaceful purposes as part
of the exercise of freedom of navigation and over flight in
areas claimed as exclusive economic zone or continental

Article 59 : Les États Parties reconnaissent que
la surveillance maritime peut être exercée à des
fins pacifiques, dans le cadre de l'exercice de la
liberté de navigation et de survol des zones
économiques exclusives ou des plateaux
continentaux et de la haute mer. La surveillance
maritime devrait être exercée avec l'accord de
l'État côtier et sans préjudice de ses droits et
responsabilités d’ordre juridictionnel dans sa zone
économique exclusive ou sur son plateau
continental, conformément à la Convention des
Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer de 1982.

shelf, and on the high seas. This should be conducted with
consent and without prejudice to the jurisdictional rights and
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responsibilities of the coastal State within its exclusive
economic zone or over its continental shelf, as provided for
under

UNCLOS.http://aus-

cscap.anu.edu.au/memo4.html

-

fn0#fn0http://aus-cscap.anu.edu.au/memo4.html fn0#fn0

Article 60: States Parties shall work towards developing
arrangements for the sharing of surveillance information with
other States Parties to this Memorandum.

PROTECTION AND PRESERVATION OF THE MARINE
ENVIRONMENT

Article 61: States Parties recognize their individual and
collective obligation to protect and preserve the marine
environment.

Article 60 : Les États Parties oeuvrent à la mise
en place de mécanismes de partage des
renseignements découlant de la surveillance avec
d'autres États Parties au Mémorandum.
PROTECTION ET PRÉSERVATION DU MILIEU
MARIN

Article 61 : Les États Parties reconnaissent leur obligation
individuelle et collective de protéger et préserver le milieu
marin.

Article 62: States Parties shall consult with regard to:

(a) cooperation on a bilateral, sub-regional and

regional basis in taking all measures
necessary to prevent, reduce, monitor and
control pollution of the marine environment
from all sources ;

Article 62 : Les États Parties se concertent en ce
qui concerne :
a) la coopération sur une base bilatérale,
sous-régionale et régionale, en vue de
prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour
prévenir, réduire, suivre et contrôler la
pollution du milieu marin due à toutes les
sources;

ratification,
implementation
and b) la ratification, la mise en œuvre et la
participation aux conventions et instruments
participation in relevant conventions and
pertinents concernant la protection, la
instruments
concerning
protection,
préservation et la surveillance du milieu marin;
preservation and monitoring of the marine
environment;
c) la mise en œuvre du chapitre 17 d'Action 21,
adopté à la Conférence des Nations Unies
(c) the implementation of Chapter 17 of Agenda
de 1992 sur l'environnement et le
21, adopted at the 1992 United Nations
développement (CNUED), notamment les
Conference
on
Environment
and
programmes concernant la gestion intégrée et
Development (UNCED), particularly those
le développement durable, la protection du
program areas concerning integrated
milieu marin et le renforcement de la
management and sustainable development,
coopération internationale, y compris la
marine environmental protection and the
coopération et la coordination régionales; et
strengthening of international cooperation,
including
regional
cooperation
and
coordination; and

(b) the
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(d) the development and implementation of d) l'élaboration et la mise en œuvre de

programmes de surveillance et de plans
d'urgence nationaux, sous-régionaux et
régionaux, pour faire face aux incidents de
pollution du milieu marin.

national,
sub-regional
and
regional
monitoring programs and contingency plans
in response to pollution incidents in the
marine environment.

seas.

Article 63 : Les États Parties se concertent aux
niveaux bilatéral et sous-régional pour formuler et
harmoniser les politiques de conservation, gestion
et utilisation durable des ressources biologiques
marines qui sont situées de part et d'autre des
zones maritimes, ou qui sont particulièrement
migratoires ou bien qui apparaissent en haute
mer.

Article 64: States Parties consult at the bilateral and sub-

Article 64 : Les États Parties se concertent aux niveaux

regional levels in the formulation and harmonization of

bilatéral et sous-régional pour formuler et harmoniser les

policies for the exploration and exploitation of marine non-

politiques d'exploration et d'exploitation des ressources non

living resources which occur across two or more zones of

biologiques marines qui sont situées de part et d'autre de

national jurisdiction, especially in cases where a shared

deux ou plusieurs zones sous juridiction nationale,

resource can be exploited, wholly or in part, from one or

notamment dans les cas où une ressource partagée peut être

more of the zones of national jurisdiction.

exploitée, en tout ou en partie, à partir d'une ou plusieurs

Article 63: States Parties consult at the bilateral and subregional levels in the formulation and harmonization of
policies for the conservation, management and sustainable
utilization of marine living resources that straddle maritime
zones, or which are highly migratory, or occur in the high

zones sous juridiction nationale.

RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE MARINE

MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

Article 65: States parties are invited to cooperate, directly or
through competent international, regional or sub-regional
organizations, for the purpose of promoting studies,
undertaking programs of scientific research and the
exchange of information and data about the marine
environment, particularly about pollution of the marine
environment and changing sea levels.

directement ou à par l'intermédiaire des organisations sousrégionales, régionales ou internationales compétentes, en
vue de promouvoir des études, de conduire des programmes
de recherche scientifique et d'échanger des informations et
des données sur le milieu marin, notamment sur la pollution
du milieu marin et l'évolution du niveau de la mer.

Article 66: States Parties are invited to consult on the
harmonization of their respective procedures, in accordance
with Part XIII of UNCLOS, for granting consent to proposed
marine scientific research projects in their exclusive
economic zones and on their continental shelves.

Article 65 : Les États Parties sont invités à coopérer,

Article 66 : Les États Parties sont invités à se concerter en
vue d'harmoniser leurs procédures respectives en matière
d'octroi d'autorisations pour les projets de recherche
scientifique marine proposés dans leurs zones économiques
exclusives et sur leurs plateaux continentaux, conformément
à la partie XIII de la Convention internationale des
Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer.
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COOPÉRATION TECHNIQUE ET
RENFORCEMENT DES CAPACITÉS

TECHNICAL COOPERATION
AND CAPACITY-BUILDING

Article 67: States Parties recognize the benefits of technical
cooperation and capacity-building, and are invited to
implement relevant programs in the maritime sector
designed to build infrastructures, institutions and capabilities
for policy formulation and implementation. This includes
information sharing and development of database.

Article 67 : Les États Parties reconnaissent les
avantages de la coopération technique et du
renforcement des capacités, et sont invités à
mener à bien des programmes pertinents dans le
secteur maritime pour mettre en place des
infrastructures, des institutions et des capacités
en vue de formuler et d'appliquer des politiques
générales. Cela inclut le partage d'informations et
la création de banques de données.

FORMATION ET ÉDUCATION

TRAINING AND EDUCATION

Article 68 : Les États Parties coopèrent en vue de
mettre au point et de promouvoir des programmes
promotion of training and educational programs for the éducatifs et de formation concernant la gestion du
management of the marine environment, particularly for the milieu marin, notamment le maintien de la sécurité
maintenance of safety and law and order at sea, the et de l'ordre public en mer, la préservation et la
preservation and protection of the marine environment, and protection du milieu marin, et la prévention, la
réduction et le contrôle de la pollution marine.
the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution.
Cette coopération peut notamment consister à :
Article 68: States Parties cooperate on the development and

Such cooperation might include :

a) the offer of places on national training
courses to other States, subject to payment
of relevant costs;
b) sharing curriculum and course information;

a) offrir des places dans les cours nationaux à
d'autres États Parties, à condition de payer
les coûts y afférents;
b) partager les programmes et les informations
sur les cours;

c) the exchange of naval and law enforcement
personnel, scientists and other experts;

c) échanger des personnels de la marine et de
la force publique, ainsi que des scientifiques
et d'autres experts;

d) the exchange of views on maritime issues;

d) échanger des avis sur les questions
maritimes;

e) holding conferences, seminars, workshops
and symposiums on maritime subjects of
common interest; and
f)

fostering cooperation among maritime
training institutions and research centres.

e) tenir des conférences, séminaires, ateliers et
symposiums sur des sujets maritimes
d'intérêt commun; et
f)
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encourager la coopération entre les
institutions de formation maritime et les
centres de recherche.

g) the offer of places on national training
courses to other States, subject to payment
of relevant costs;

g) offrir des places dans les cours nationaux
d'autres États, à condition de payer les coûts
y afférents;

h) the exchange of naval and law enforcement
personnel, scientists and other experts;

h) échanger des personnels de la marine et de
la force publique, ainsi que des scientifiques
et d'autres experts;

i)

the exchange of views on maritime issues;

i)

échanger des avis sur les questions
maritimes;

j)

holding conferences, seminars, workshops
and symposiums on maritime subjects of
common interest; and

j)

tenir des conférences, séminaires, ateliers et
symposiums sur des sujets maritimes
d'intérêt commun; et

k) fostering cooperation among maritime
training institutions and research centres.

k) encourager la coopération entre les
institutions de formation maritime et les
centres de recherche.

States Parties are invited to institute regular
meetings to enhance cooperation and
coordination in their maritime enforcement
activities.

Les États Parties sont invités à instituer des
réunions régulières pour renforcer la coopération
et la coordination dans leurs activités de mise en
application de la réglementation maritime.

TITLE II: FINAL PROVISIONS

TITRE II : DISPOSITIONS FINALES

Article 69: Any State Party can withdraw from the Article 69 : Tout État Partie peut se retirer du
Memorandum by a written notification to the Mémorandum en le notifiant par écrit au Comité
soixante (60) jours avant.
Committee sixty (60) days before.
Article 70: The English, French and Portuguese Article 70 : Les versions anglaise, française et
portugaise du présent Mémorandum font
versions of this Memorandum are authentic.
également foi.
This Memorandum is adopted and open to Le présent Mémorandum est adopté et ouvert à la
signature
in
Dakar, signature à Dakar, le -------------------------------------,
…………………………………………………..
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Hereafter have signed The Representatives of Ont signé les Représentants des États Parties
the following States Parties:
ci-après :
1. Angola

1.

Angola

2. Benin

2.

Bénin

3. Cameroon

3.

Cameroun

4. Cape-Verde

4.

Cap-Vert

5. Congo

5.

Congo

6. D.R. Congo

6.

Congo RD

7. Côte d'Ivoire

7.

Côte d'Ivoire

8. Gabon

8.

Gabon

9. Gambia

9.

Gambie

10. Ghana

10.

Ghana

11. Guinea

11.

Guinée

12. Guinea-Bissau

12.

Guinée-Bissau

13. Equatorial Guinea

13.

Guinée-équatoriale

14. Liberia

14.

Libéria

15. Mauritania

15.

Mauritanie

16. Nigeria

16.

Nigéria

17. Sao Tomé and Principe

17.

Sao Tomé-et-Principe

18. Senegal

18.

Sénégal

19. Sierra Leone

19.

Sierra Leone

20. Togo

20.

Togo
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APPENDIX 4 - ECCAS Protocol on Maritime Security Cooperation

ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF CENTRAL AFRICAN STATES
(E.C.C.A)
COMUNIDAD ECONOMICA DE LOS ESTADOS DEL AFRICA CENTRAL
(C.E.E.A.C)
COMMUNAUTE ECONOMIQUE DES ETATS DE L'AFRIQUE CENTRALE
(C:E.E.A.C)
COMUNIDADE ECONOMICA DOS ESTADOS DA AFRICA CENTRAL
(C.E.E.A.C)

PROTOCOLE
RELATIF A LA STRATEGIE DE SECURISATION DES
INTERESTS VITAUX EN MER DES ETATS DE LA CEEAC DU
GOLFE DE GUINEE
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APPENDIX 5 – Treaty on Gulf of Guinea Commission
Treaty On The Gulf Of Guinea Commission
Article I Definitions
In this Treaty,
“Commission” means the “Gulf of Guinea Commission”;
“Council” means the Council of Minister of the Gulf of Guinea
Commission; “Minister”
includes the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, and Other Ministers of the Parties, responsible for the
activities within the scope of this Treaty;
“Senior Officials” include government officials of each Party
designed as such, and accredited to the Commission.
Article II The Organization
An organization is herby established (instituted) to be known as the
“Gulf of Guinea
Commission”, and hereinafter referred to as “the Commission”.
Article III Membership
Membership of the Commission shall be limited to sovereign
States bordering the
Gulf of Guinea.
Article IV Scope
(i) The Commission shall have within its purview the promotion
of peace and se- curity in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as the
economic, social and environmental well being of its members;
(ii) The Commission shall
regulate and harmonize the
exploitation of the natural resources of the Gulf of Guinea, in
particular, in such specific endeavours as fishing and oil exploration, and the exploitation of other resources
yet to be tapped in the area;
(iii) With regard to sub-paragraph (ii) above, the Commission shall
apply a collective approach that would enhance the common
pooling of technological know-how for the development of the
common heritage of the Gulf and reduce the costs of exploitation
of all the resources.
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Article V Aims
The Commission shall be a forum for addressing problems
affecting Member-states in the following areas:(a) environmental pollution of their common maritime zone;
(b) border issues vis-à-vis delimitation of maritime borders and other
conflicts arising in the overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones
(EEZ);
(c) security matters such as issue of Joint Border Patrol, Immigration
and simi- lar matters;
(d) co-ordination of fishing activities in the Gulf.
Article VI Objectives
The objective of the Commission shall be:
(a)
to help achieve mutual confidence and trust amongst
member-states;
(b) to create an atmosphere in which mutually beneficial economic
activities by citizens of member-states could be peacefully
pursued;
(c) to provide a framework for the monitoring and control of
environmental degradation in the Gulf, as well as harmonization
of the exploitation of na tural resources in the overlapping areas of
the EEZ, through the pooling of technological and infrastructural
facilities and other cost-sharing strategies;
(d) to co-ordinate and articulate common positions on issues of
particular in- terests to the enhancement of peace and stability in
the sub-region.
Article VII Institutional Framework
The Commission shall be recognized as an international legal
“persona”.
Article VIII
(i) For the purpose of achieving the aims and objectives laid down
in Article V and VI above, the Commission shall encourage
regular exchange of opinion (consul- tation) amongst the State
Parties so as to facilitate concertation of views on various African
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and international issues aimed at better understanding, security
and stability within the sub-region;
(ii) to this end, there shall be created, the assembly of Heads of States
and Govern- ment, and the Council of Ministers, notably Ministers
in charge of: Foreign Affairs, Economy, Hydrocarbons, Fishing
resources, Mines, Environment.
Article IX Assembly Of Heads Of State And Government
The assembly of Heads of State and Government of Parties to this
Treaty shall be the governing and decision – making body of the
Commission. It shall determine the objectives and principles
governing programmes and activities to be carried out. A
Summit Session shall be held once a year, in alphabetical
rotation.
Article X Council Of Ministers
The Council of Ministers shall meet at last once a year, to
harmonise views on issues and programmes to be tackled before
the assembly of Heads of State and Government.
Article XI Protocols
Parties shall prepare and adopt additional protocols stipulating
measures, pro- cedures and standards for the purpose of
clarifying and improving methods by which the provisions of
this Treaty shall be implemented.
Article XII Relationship With Other Organizations
With a view to achieving the aims and objectives of this Treaty,
the Commission shall co-operate through all appropriate means
with
relevant sub-regional, regional and
international
organizations, as well as with any other concerned institution.
Article XIII Settlement Of Disputes
The Parties shall endeavour to resolve any matter in dispute
arising from the application or interpretation of this Treaty by
negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or other peaceful means.
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Article XIV Agreement Concludes By State Parties With Non-Party
States
Parties may conclude economic, technical or cultural Agreements
with third Parties outside the Gulf of Guinea Commission,
provided that such Agreements are not incompatible with the
provisions of this Treaty. Copies of such Agreements shall be
transmitted to the Executive Secretary who shall inform the
Council thereof.
Article XV Ratification, Acceptance, Approval Or Accession
This Treaty shall be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by
States, which have signed it and shall remain open for accession by
other States of the sub-region in accordance with their respective
legislative procedures.
Article XVI Depository Authority
The present Treaty and all instruments of Ratification, Acceptance,
Approval or Ac- cession will be deposited with the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of.............................. (or whoever is chosen as
depository) who shall tansmit certified copies of this Treaty to all
Parties and notify them of the dates of deposit of each Instrument
of Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or Accession.
Article XVII
The Depository Authority shall register this Treaty with the
Organization of African Unity, the United Nations Organization and
such other Organizations as the Council may determine.
Article XVIII Entry Into Force, Amendment And Termination
(i) This Treaty shall enter into force thirty (30) days following the
deposit with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the ……..….
(or whoever is chosen) of the fourth Instrument of
Ratification.
(ii) For each of the States which ratifies, accepts, approves, or
accedes after the entry into force, this Treaty shall enter into
force thirty (30) days after the deposit by that State of its
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Instrument of Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or
Accession.
(iii) This Treaty may be amended by four of the Parties, and such
amendment shall enter into force within thirty (30) days after its
adoption. The text of such amend- ment shall be circulated to all
Parties at least sixty (60) days before voting.
(iv) This Treaty shall terminate by a vote of four of the Parties,
ninety (90) days after such a vote is taken. Notice of such
termination shall be circulated to all Parties through the
Executive Secretary, ninety (90) days before voting, and may
be withdrawn at any time before the vote is taken.
(v)
After the termination of this Treaty, its provisions shall
continue to govern all existing and unexpired projects or
[…non-readable in copy….] within its frame- work.
Article XIX
This Treaty is made in four original languages which are English,
French, Spanish and Portuguese Languages, each text being
equally authentic.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized
by their respective governments for that purpose, have signed this
Treaty.
DONE at…….this….day of…………19…..
Republic of Angola
Republic of Cameroon
Democratic Republic of Congo
Republic of Congo Brazzaville
Republic of Equatorial Guinea
Republic of Gabon
Federal Republic of Nigeria
Democratic Republic of São Tomé & Príncipe
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